Not defending Karzai, and claiming no expertise here, just offering up for comment a few things that cross my mind when I see discussions like this one.
One: It's frequently asserted (including this thread) that Afghans no longer view Karzai as legitimate - or some variation on that theme. I'm certain that's true of individuals (no doubt of Abdullah Abdullah, to name one) and results in regions will obviously vary, but while I've seen poll results (BBC/ABC/ARD) that indicate Karzai's support/popularity among Afghans is actually on the rise (post-2009 election, even), and has always been higher than that of NATO forces, I've never seen the opposite claim supported.
Two: After Karzai and Abdullah's fraudulent votes were thrown out of the Afghan election results (only @200k for Abdullah, iirc), Karzai ended up with a hair under 50% of the vote, Abdullah a bit over 30. I believe the result of "round two" would have been a greater gap, with far fewer votes cast. Pure speculation on my part, as Abdullah's withdrawal assured we'll never know. (But see one above - re: Karzai's "popularity".)
Three: No discussion of the wheels within wheels/great game aspects of the situation is complete without a read of Kai Eide's December, 2009 letter, this NY Times report on same, and Peter Galbraith's response to that report. Certainly there are many other "must reads" but I think these give the reader a good feel for some of the behind the scenes fun and games.
From the Times:
Galbraith characterizes that a bit differently: "I privately suggested to Kai Eide, the United Nations special representative to Afghanistan, that we consider recommending to the Afghans that they establish an interim government headed by a respected neutral figure..."“He [Galbraith] told me he would first meet with Vice President Biden,” Mr. Eide wrote. “If the vice president agreed with Galbraith’s proposal they would approach President Obama with the following plan: President Karzai should be forced to resign as president.” Then a new government would be installed led by a former finance minister, Ashraf Ghani, or a former interior minister, Ali A. Jalali, both favorites of American officials.
I'm not certain in this case that Ghani (2.94% of the vote) or Jalali ("Afghan American and a Distinguished Professor at the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies of the National Defense University, which is located in Washington, D.C.") would have been welcomed by the Afghan people as "neutral".
In fact, whether he actually said it or not, I imagine I hear Ho Chi Minh repeating his comment on the coup that toppled Diệm: "I can scarcely believe the Americans would be so stupid." A harsh thing sometimes, my imagination.
I do know Kipling said this:...and I find it interesting that there's now a push on to portray Karzai as drugged, drunk, or diseased."They do not understand that nobody cares a straw for the internal administration of Native States so long as oppression and crime are kept within decent limits, and the ruler is not drugged, drunk, or diseased from one end of the year to the other."
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