MAJ Ehrhart - Increasing Small Arms Lethality in Afgh.

[Sylvan]

Not sure how much following that link clarified matters for you.

The envelopment of a target area was often not quite that. If the Fire Force comprised a K-Car and 3 G-Cars (3 x 4 man sticks) with 20 paras (5 x sticks) following the a Dak (Dakota-DC3) one could rarely seal off an area. The trick was to get a complete and detailed briefing from the call-sign on the ground and select the likely escape routes given the line of approach of the aircraft. The troops in the para-Dak would then be dropped in a cultivated field somewhere close by and ferried in closer by chopper. The Allouette III was great as it could get into a tight LZ and you had to get the pilot, the fuel line or the tail rotor to really put it on its ass.

There was a lot of skill required by the Airborne Commander and the K-Car pilot (the senior pilot) to work the deployment to its best tactically.

I never heard of the paras being dropped in a stop line on the ground where they stayed. It always required movement or ferrying to get into position. And the need for paras was only there because there were not enough choppers to lift enough troops in.

Later in the war there was a increase in the number of choppers through South Africa sending in (I think) 27 choppers and crews so the 'Jumbo' Fire Forces were established (jumbo only in the Rhodesian context) with two k-Cars and 5 G-Cars each with a para Dak (DC3) and two Lynx (Cessna 337 Skymaster) aircraft. The second K-Car was normally what was termed and alpha-fit where insted of the 20mm cannon there were four .30 Browning MGs side mounted. The alpha-fit was actually more lethal than the 20mm cannon because when there was tree cover the rounds would explode on contact with very little resulting penetration and when the ground was soft the rounds would penetrate fractionally before exploding with the resultant limited shrapnel spread. (A 7.62mm minigun would be similar to the alpha-fit)

30mm is the soft sand is having the same problem. While wonderful for top attack on armored vehicles, a M134 would be much better for what we find ourselves doing now.

[JMA]

30mm is the soft sand is having the same problem. While wonderful for top attack on armored vehicles, a M134 would be much better for what we find ourselves doing now.

What incidence of stoppages are found with the M134?

With the Alpha-fit (4 x .30 Brownings) if one gun had a stoppage it was not the end of the world as the remaining three were still pretty good. With the 20mm if it had a stoppage then you had nothing.

[Ken White]

Manufacturer's claims: (LINK).

More detailed figures, data from the Federation of American Scientists, generally cross checked, fairly objective and reliable:(LINK).

[sapperfitz82]

The 400m and 600m ranges for Afghan ambushes seems to originate from the max effective range of the PG / MG they are using while allowing them to break contact after the engagement. Their fire is not what we would consider particularly accurate, but in most ambushes the killzone is restrictive and so it funnels the fire any way.

Reasons why their fire is in accurate - I have found in Astan particularly the men have horrible eyesight. They are malnourished from a very young age and develop cataracts early. Few have glasses. Also their is a primitive belief that Allah will guide their bullets, so much so that they feel aiming is questioning his omnipotence. Broad generalities - but then again that is what we are talking in.

Given that we generally want to kill the enemy and avoid over-kill as a principle - why would we not improve the effectiveness of rifles? The argument should be a cost - benefit one. It seems here to have devolved into one about whether we should just call CAS or roll up in our IFV.

If the individual soldier can be made much more lethal through a series of improvements (SA, survivability, ballistics, etc.) and the cost is worth the gain (mobility, financial, etc.) why would one not improve the soldier?

5.56mm has its benefits, soldier's today are not impressed with them (claims the paper [me too by the way]). Ballistics have vastly improved since the 5.56mm's inception and adoption. The Army in general does not believe the gain is worth the cost.

What the hell does a Laotian machine gun have to do with it?!

Yes, give the infantryman a better bullet. No do not adopt a radically different weapon now unless it provides x percentage of benefit over the current platform (think pulse rifle). Hell, improve the artillery and CAS and everything else too.

Also, where is the cost/gain argument with Javelin vs Dragon and Copperhead vs Dumb Hellfire and 155mm vs Excalibur? Is it just me or does it sound as if the Acquisition guys never fought as Infantry?

[Pete]

Yes, give the infantryman a better bullet. No do not adopt a radically different weapon now unless it provides x percentage of benefit over the current platform (think pulse rifle). Hell, improve the artillery and CAS and everything else too.

Also, where is the cost/gain argument with Javelin vs Dragon and Copperhead vs Dumb Hellfire and 155mm vs Excalibur? Is it just me or does it sound as if the Acquisition guys never fought as Infantry?

The Trade-Off Analysis or Analysis of Alternatives has long been part of the documentation required to justify a new materiel system for DoD. The recommended format for trade-off studies can be found in the DoD 5000 series of publications.

As with almost everything DoD does, trade-off analyses generally reflect the biases of the organization that produces them--often these analyses will show that the preferred alternative is the one that will increase the funding of the organization producing the study. One of the greatests strengths of DoD, as well as one of its greatest weaknesses, is that regardless of the evidence a general officer will think about something for about five seconds before he makes a decision. In the Army a standing joke among officers with alternate specialties in operations research is that once given an assignment to prepare an in-depth study they will politic around to find out what answer the powers that be want to hear.

As I understand it Secretary of Defense Gates turned the whole Army acquisition system upside-down when he ordered procurement of the MRAP. The tank-automotive guys were unresponsive to the idea of doing something in a hurry. If I understand Gates' point of view, the question wasn't what was the best armored vehicle for the mission, it was what could be done now to save lives while he is secretary of defense. It was a bit like the adoption of the M1 Carbine in 1942--with all of its faults, there was a war going on and the best was the enemy of the good. Left to their own devices the DoD acquisition community might come up with a suitable system in 10 to 12 years.

[kaur]

Members of the 3rd and 7th Commandos assisted by Special Forces move to their objective while receiving enemy gunfire Feb. 25 in Helmand Province, Afghanistan.03.04.2010

SCAR-H, 7,62x51

[jcustis]

I look at it this way. If a soldier can't group (from the prone position) 5 rounds within 4 inches @ 100m or 1 inch @ 25m then you do two things. You fire his instructor and take his weapon away and issue him with a machette.

All he will do is make the contact area more noisy and be a greater danger to you than the enemy.

Once qualified to marksman level in the equivalent of APWT then the real training can begin.

Remember there is basic training and recruit training and then there is ETS training (exercise trained soldier). In most armies the basic training does not flow directly into being inserted into unit already in a war situation.

In Rhodesia we did and that made the training people get a lot smarter. And in many instances the training instructors were NCOs rotated out of ops to do the training and subsequently were 100% operationally current.



OK, but that is not live firing. So can we agree then that the live ammo allocated to training will be fired by the selected crews who in turn are probably selected as a result of using the other stuff?



Ok, lets agree on the basics here and they are , aiming , holding, breathing and squeezing. Once this is mastered at the 'entry level' say by score a 4" group @ 100m etc etc then we introduce light variation, moving targets, making the shooter out of breath before having to shoot etc etc. What goes and what stays and what gets added?

But yes... I think I can see where you are coming from. More kills are propably made by weapons other than rifles and so concentrate on where the difference will be made.

If I could be king for a day, my desire would be to have the ability to take a troop who demonstrated the aptitude and even slightest desire for instructor work, and get them assigned to the business of actually instructing. This would be in stark contrast to the silliness we face within the Corps of screening teams that pull stellar Marines out of a list and say, "you're getting screened for recruiting duty whether you are acutally better suited for another billet or not."

I think we could resolve so many of our instructional systems design and training deficit issues with the flexibility to do that, as well as allow our best and brightest to stay within those field without career impairment simply because they did not get their ticket punched by one of the big three of drill field, recruiter, or MSG duty.

[Ken White]

select folks that seemed suited for a job and see how they did. If they did well, they stayed there and did that. That process worked. so we don't do that anymore...

Two things happened. civilian HR practices got introduced to military personnel systems -- no matter how inappropriate they were.

Then Congress got overly involved as a result of not understanding the Armed Forces but instead deciding to listen to whining service folks and parents (as opposed to having to listen to them) and to attempt to reduce their whining workload, dictated 'fairness and equality' would rule all personnel decisions.

Thus as a result, Congress and the Personnel people have totally screwed the services by insisting that one size fits all, that all persons of like education and experience are equal in all respects and that they are thus totally interchangeable. While that is obviously incorrect and is potentially dangerous -- sooner or later, someone not suited for command is going to really screw up badly and get a lot of people killed -- they are simply refusing to do what you sensibly suggest.

as well as allow our best and brightest to stay within those field without career impairment simply because they did not get their ticket punched by one of the big three of drill field, recruiter, or MSG duty.

The Drill Field and Recruiting take particular mindsets (and I suggest anyone who excels at one job will be miserable at the other in the case of those two). So does other Instructional work, so does staying in a TOE unit and doing the job called for there, so does command or staff work.

We ignore that and opt to go for -- even force -- mediocrity and then wonder why performance today is far from stellar and why it take so long to implement change.

Mediocre loves company and stays mediocre as long as it can possibly do so...

[jcustis]

select folks that seemed suited for a job and see how they did. If they did well, they stayed there and did that. That process worked. so we don't do that anymore...

Two things happened. civilian HR practices got introduced to military personnel systems -- no matter how inappropriate they were.

Then Congress got overly involved as a result of not understanding the Armed Forces but instead deciding to listen to whining service folks and parents (as opposed to having to listen to them) and to attempt to reduce their whining workload, dictated 'fairness and equality' would rule all personnel decisions.

Thus as a result, Congress and the Personnel people have totally screwed the services by insisting that one size fits all, that all persons of like education and experience are equal in all respects and that they are thus totally interchangeable. While that is obviously incorrect and is potentially dangerous -- sooner or later, someone not suited for command is going to really screw up badly and get a lot of people killed -- they are simply refusing to do what you sensibly suggest.The Drill Field and Recruiting take particular mindsets (and I suggest anyone who excels at one job will be miserable at the other in the case of those two). So does other Instructional work, so does staying in a TOE unit and doing the job called for there, so does command or staff work.

We ignore that and opt to go for -- even force -- mediocrity and then wonder why performance today is far from stellar and why it take so long to implement change.

Mediocre loves company and stays mediocre as long as it can possibly do so...

Amen.

[Firn]

Better than usual, another update about some enemy marksmen and their weapons which seem to shoot better then the poor rest.

First, what exactly is meant by “sniper”? Like many terms used to discuss war fighting, this is a slippery word. In the context of Afghan fighting, American troops tend to talk about a sniper when they encounter an insurgent rifleman who is obviously more skilled and disciplined than the norm, someone who fires with reasonable accuracy at medium and longish ranges, usually using a rifle-and-ammunition combination that can be effective out to 400 or 500 meters or more. But while the Taliban’s “snipers” are not the usual class of Kalashnikov-carrying Afghan fighter, they typically are not what a conventional soldier might think of in relation to the term.

...

Among the captured rifles were two variants of the Lee-Enfield rifle line. These are bolt-action rifles with design roots reaching to the late 19th century, when conventional armies favored heavier, long-barreled rifles that fired more powerful ammunition than what is predominant in military use today.

Good to see that at least most don't have good training, optical sights and consistent good ammunition.


Firn

[JMA]

A false attribution.
But an apt quote.

and the correct attribution is?

[Ken White]

LINK.

The all knowing seem to constantly stumble over small things. Amazing..

The false attribution to P. Arbiter is deemed due to the fact that no one likes to credit Americans with capability for original thought. S'Okay, we're used to it and don't mind a bit...

[JMA]

LINK.

The all knowing seem to constantly stumble over small things. Amazing..

The false attribution to P. Arbiter is deemed due to the fact that no one likes to credit Americans with capability for original thought. S'Okay, we're used to it and don't mind a bit...

Charlton Ogburn, "Merrill's Marauders", thank you I stand corrected.

Now "Merrill's Marauders" was some outfit!

Distinguished Unit Citation: "The unit must display such gallantry, determination, and esprit de corps in accomplishing its mission under extremely difficult and hazardous conditions as to set it apart and above other units participating in the same campaign."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Merrill's_Marauders

We need some more of that derring-do in the current conflicts.

[jmm99]

reading the results of such derring-do at breakfast, would become very upset by the casualties - from the Wiki:

A week after Myitkyina fell, on August 10, 1944, the 5307th was disbanded with a final total of 130 combat-effective officers and men (out of the original 2,997). Of the 2,750 to enter Burma, only 2 were left alive who had never been hospitalized with wounds or major illness.

The cost to the Chindits was as great, but did generate at least two good books by Chindit brigadiers - Bidwell, Shelford (1979). The Chindit war : the campaigns in Burma, 1944. London: Hodder & Stoughton. OCLC 221110416; and Masters, John (2002) [1961]. The Road Past Mandalay. London: Cassel. ISBN 0304361577.

While the campaign exemplified bravery and courage under impossible conditions, its long-term strategic goals never came close to being realized - and a lot of good men were killed for little lasting purpose.

Regards

Mike

[Ken White]

We need some more of that derring-do in the current conflicts.

derring do, no question -- but on balance, they were only marginally effective militarily and what little they did achieve was at excessive cost. I've talked to several former members and most were and are quite proud of their service but have little good to say about the efforts overall effectiveness.

Different time. While daring action occurs on a small scale and locally today, it is not broadly tolerated in the west. Those days are gone, they were killed off by the politically correct movements of the 70s and are highly unlikely to return short of a major, existential war. Risk avoidance is all too prevalent today, a societal (and thus quite difficult to reverse), not a military impact.

[JMA]

derring do, no question -- but on balance, they were only marginally effective militarily and what little they did achieve was at excessive cost. I've talked to several former members and most were and are quite proud of their service but have little good to say about the efforts overall effectiveness.

Sadly it seems the same will be written about most of the forces deployed in Afghanistan.

Different time. While daring action occurs on a small scale and locally today, it is not broadly tolerated in the west. Those days are gone, they were killed off by the politically correct movements of the 70s and are highly unlikely to return short of a major, existential war. Risk avoidance is all too prevalent today, a societal (and thus quite difficult to reverse), not a military impact.

So exactly is the point of going into action in Afghanistan then?

[Ken White]

Sadly it seems the same will be written about most of the forces deployed in Afghanistan.

Probably not but it today is, as I said, a different time, different even to your and my wars, much less Burma in WW II.

So exactly is the point of going into action in Afghanistan then?

I'm the wrong guy to ask. You'll need to ask G. W. Bush who made the determination to stay there or B. H. Obama who made the decision to continue the effort there. I agreed with going and toppling the Taliban. I did not agree with staying. I do now believe we cannot leave to precipitously but neither can we stay indefinitely (which has always been true and is why I didn't and don't agree with the decision to stay...). No win situation -- it always was.

[sapperfitz82]

I am also in favor of a punitive raid, but if we had funded and led a successful insurgency in Iraq as well (opposed to a conventional war) would those two actions have not put enormous pressure on Iran (which I contend is the true target of GWOT in SW Asia)?

[JMA]

...on balance, they were only marginally effective militarily and what little they did achieve was at excessive cost.

Is this not accurate of the current forces in Afghanistan?

[JMA]

...While the campaign exemplified bravery and courage under impossible conditions, its long-term strategic goals never came close to being realized - and a lot of good men were killed for little lasting purpose.

How close it this to an accurate description of the situation in Afghanistan?