How Insurgencies End

[Dayuhan]

Maybe. That's a policy decision. Policy decisions are political.
Given the current policy - support the Karzai Government, what are the options?

If our policy allows us only one option of questionable desirability, it may be time to reassess the policy.

If we must support the Karzai government, then we must, but let's not deceive ourselves about what we're doing. We're not picking a side in a pre-existing conflict. We entered Afghanistan to impose certain conditions on the governance of Afghanistan (primarily the absence of AQ), and we created the Karzai government in pursuit of that objective. To the extent that the Karzai government is a "side", it's our side. The fight is not between the Karzai government and the Taliban, with us intervening in support of the Taliban, it's between us and the Taliban, with us creating and holding up the Karzai government to put a local face on our attempt to achieve our own objectives.

[Bob's World]

From my perspective the number one goal must always be the attainment of a government that is perceived as legitimate in the eyes of the populace. This means understanding how a populace (and the populace of Afghanistan is a diverse one) sees legitimacy being bestowed.

Then "simply" enable that process taking place, and be willing to work with whatever form of government emerges.

This means working with Karzai today, but doing so in a manner so that he, his populace, and the world, clearly understand that our goal is a government viewed as legitimate and that we fully appreciate that a government as illegitimate as Mr. Karzai's (due to the Western Influence that created it)is a presumption that will be damn hard to overcome.

Too often external powers put their men in, and then commit themselves to keeping their men in, rather than committing themselves to producing legitimacy of government and developing a relationship with that government.

I stand on my point that the tried and true stratagem of installing and sustaining "friendly dictators" is obsolete in today's information age. These puppets simply cannot control their populaces anymore, and the trouble no longer confines itself to those foreign shores, but soon comes to the shores of the sponsor.

[William F. Owen]

From my perspective the number one goal must always be the attainment of a government that is perceived as legitimate in the eyes of the populace. This means understanding how a populace (and the populace of Afghanistan is a diverse one) sees legitimacy being bestowed.

...but that is purely an issue for the Policy makers. Legitimacy is an entirely political idea. The job of the military is to destroy anyone contesting that legitimacy via violence. Military action, cannot and should not have anything to do with bestowing "legitimacy." -
In US policy terms only elected officials have any legitimacy, so the "idea" is purely political. Killing those who disagree enforces the policy!

[Bob's World]

A sticky problem indeed...

First, of course, the only source that can "bestow legitimacy" to a government is the actual populace to be governed by the same. To reinforce, I said "enable" the establishment of a legitimate government.

I am enjoying very much working closely with MG Nick Carter, the Brit officer handpicked to lead the main effort here in the south of Afghanistan. The way "General Nick" describes the mission it is the "establishment of representative government and opportunity."

A couple hundred years ago others described it as "Government of, by and for the people" and the unalianable rights of "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness."

[Eden]

The thread seems to have narrowed its focus from insurgency in general to Afghanistan. I believe that Afghanistan is a bad case to study if you are seeking to construct (or argue about) a taxonomy for insurgency, because it is as close to unique as any war can be.

1. By 2002, Afghanistan was ungoverned. The occupying power (that is us) then proceeded to try and impose a central government on the population. So far, not much different than what occupying powers have done for time immemorial. But we attempted much more than just creating a national authority; we sought to construct an entire governmental structure reaching down to the district level, disenfranchising both the traditional (tribal) and organic (warlords) local power centers. Moreover, this had to be a government that could survive the withdrawal of our forces at some unspecified future date, so it had to gain a certain amount of popular support - in other words, it required 'legitimacy' beyond that afforded through the right of conquest.

2. Unfortunately, we allowed competitors to arise who were trying to fill the governance vacuum at the same time we were. The difference between 'us' and 'them' is that they have no intention of withdrawing, ever. They will be able to sustain their version of an Afghan government with their bayonets, rather than rely strictly on popular support or legitimacy.

3. Even at this late date, there are still spaces in Afghanistan that have neither insurgents nor governance. In essence, we are acting as both insurgents and counterinsurgents. In some areas, we are trying to establish cadres, recruit supporters, and extend political power into virgin territories; in others we are locked in a contest with competitors seeking to do the same; in still other areas, we are conducting classic counterinsurgency or guarding sanctuaries for a weak central government whose goals increasingly diverge from our own.

I can't think of too many historical examples paralelling what is happening to day in Afghanistan. Therefore, using it as a case study to validate or invalidate the RAND study is a bit unfair. In taxonomical terms, Afghanistan is the platypus of the insurgency world.

[Steve Blair]

Good point, Eden. It's always worth remembering that in many ways each insurgency is different, and we need to be prepared to select techniques and tools based on those differences, not some perceived similarity to another historical situation.

For what it's worth, Afghanistan reminds me more of Arizona in the 1860s and 1870s than it does many other recent insurgency examples.

[Entropy]

Dahuyan,

Treating insurgency as a subset of civil war muddies the issue even further, because whatever the conflict in Afghanistan is, it is definitely not civil war.

I think that really depends on one's perspective. One could reasonably argue that Afghanistan has been in a constant state of civil war since 1979. So far no "government" has been able to "seal the deal" and, depending on where one sits, these "governments" could be considered powerful factions in that civil war. Additionally, consider that every "government" since 1979 was sustained by significant foreign support, including the current government. Does foreign intervention to elevate one faction above others constitute an end to a civil war - or do these foreign interventions simply prolong it?

[MikeF]

For what it's worth, Afghanistan reminds me more of Arizona in the 1860s and 1870s than it does many other recent insurgency examples.

Good point Steve. I was wondering if you were going to bring this up. This weekend, I was thinking pre-Westphalian. I wondered how long it took many of the states outside the original 13 to consider themselves Americans and part of the US?

We didn't exactly ask Florida to join the Union. Andrew Jackson just kinda pulled them in.

v/r

Mike

[Steve Blair]

Good point Steve. I was wondering if you were going to bring this up. This weekend, I was thinking pre-Westphalian. I wondered how long it took many of the states outside the original 13 to consider themselves Americans and part of the US?

We didn't exactly ask Florida to join the Union. Andrew Jackson just kinda pulled them in.

v/r

Mike

For some it was quite a long time...and there were often competing issues and drives. To take the Arizona example, you had at least three or four distinct tribal groups, a recently-arrived Anglo population with divergent interests (although most were focused on mining, but there was the North-South current active along with a deep dislike for the tribal population) and a Hispanic populace that had only recently adjusted to the new arrivals. New Mexico had a similar experience, colored by the powerful presence of the Navajo peoples (prior to 1863 or 1864, at least). And as you get further north, the picture shifts to a degree.

I like to compare Arizona in some ways to Afghanistan due to the competing power centers and populations, who for some time were on an almost equal footing. The Apache and Pai peoples had been raiding and been raided by the Hispanic population for generations, and looked upon the Anglos as newcomers of uncertain disposition. The Anglos tended to view the tribal population as obstacles to the exploitation of the land's mineral resources, but they also viewed the national government (including the Army) as an obstacle to their preferred solution or unresponsive to their problem. In turn, many Army officers saw the Anglo population of Arizona as an obstacle to their preferred peaceful solutions. And to further color things, many of the Anglos were Southern sympathizers who let sectional differences color their responses to government actions or programs. Simplified picture to be sure, but I don't want to bore anyone too much with heavy details.

[Dayuhan]

In US policy terms only elected officials have any legitimacy, so the "idea" is purely political. Killing those who disagree enforces the policy!

Possibly so, but what applicability do US definitions of legitimacy have to Afghanistan? Isn’t it the Afghans who have to decide whether or not a government is legitimate? If we decide for them and try to kill all who disagree we may find ourselves set for a whole lot of killing.

The thread seems to have narrowed its focus from insurgency in general to Afghanistan. I believe that Afghanistan is a bad case to study if you are seeking to construct (or argue about) a taxonomy for insurgency, because it is as close to unique as any war can be.

Agreed. But if you look at the first line of the Rand study:

Insurgencies have dominated the focus of the U.S. military for the past seven years, but they have a much longer history than that and are likely to figure prominently in future U.S. military operations. Thus, the general characteristics of insurgencies and, more important, how they end are of great interest to U.S. policymakers.

It seems that the authors of the study consider the conclusions applicable to the current conflict. That’s what I was questioning.

we attempted much more than just creating a national authority; we sought to construct an entire governmental structure reaching down to the district level, disenfranchising both the traditional (tribal) and organic (warlords) local power centers. Moreover, this had to be a government that could survive the withdrawal of our forces at some unspecified future date, so it had to gain a certain amount of popular support - in other words, it required 'legitimacy' beyond that afforded through the right of conquest.

Unfortunately, we allowed competitors to arise who were trying to fill the governance vacuum at the same time we were. The difference between 'us' and 'them' is that they have no intention of withdrawing, ever. They will be able to sustain their version of an Afghan government with their bayonets, rather than rely strictly on popular support or legitimacy.

Won’t a political vacuum always call up competition for the right to fill it? Maybe instead of seeing the indigenous actors that arose to try and fill that vacuum as “them” or “the competition” we could have tried to work with them… after all, as you say, they are at least indigenous and will not be withdrawing. They may well represent those local power structures that we have disenfranchised, and as such they might well enjoy as much or more popular support and legitimacy than our version of governance.

It seems that somewhere along the line our original goal in Afghanistan – drive out AQ and assure that they don’t return – was elevated to the much larger goal of constructing “an entire governmental structure reaching down to the district level”. That’s a beautiful goal, but I’m not sure that we’ve the capacity to achieve it, or that the Afghans particularly want foreigners to design and build their government.

Does foreign intervention to elevate one faction above others constitute an end to a civil war - or do these foreign interventions simply prolong it?

Did we intervene to elevate one faction above others? I don’t think so. Seems to me we intervened purely in pursuit of our own interests, to remove a “government” that we disliked and assure that the subsequent government would not provide a safe haven for AQ. The faction we ended up elevating didn’t exist prior to our intervention.

The core conflict at the moment is us vs the Taliban, and I don’t see how you can call that a civil war. If we were intervening in support of a pre-existing government, yes, that would be civil war with foreign participation. That's not what we're doing. We're an occupying power trying to install a government that suits us, and our enemies not unreasonably perceive us to be their primary antagonist. If the dominant party to a conflict is a foreign occupying power, I can't see that conflict as a civil war.

[William F. Owen]

Possibly so, but what applicability do US definitions of legitimacy have to Afghanistan? Isn’t it the Afghans who have to decide whether or not a government is legitimate? If we decide for them and try to kill all who disagree we may find ourselves set for a whole lot of killing.

All true. This is why wars happen. It's the US Policy that created the current conflict.

[Dayuhan]

All true. This is why wars happen. It's the US Policy that created the current conflict.

Which brings back my original question: if a conflict is initiated and sustained by an outside power pursuing objectives unrelated to any pre-existing conflict in the area in question, is it really reasonable to treat that conflict as an insurgency?

[William F. Owen]

... is it really reasonable to treat that conflict as an insurgency?

THAT is the problem! Why are "Insurgencies" any different from any other form of conflict? It's moronic to assume that there is some distinct form of conflict, called an "insurgency" that some how is "different" from other forms of conflict.

Welcome to the wooly thinking that created FM3-24 and all the other "Insurgency" fiascos.

[Dayuhan]

THAT is the problem! Why are "Insurgencies" any different from any other form of conflict? It's moronic to assume that there is some distinct form of conflict, called an "insurgency" that some how is "different" from other forms of conflict.

Welcome to the wooly thinking that created FM3-24 and all the other "Insurgency" fiascos.

Part of the problem is that we seem to lack a functioning definition of what an insurgency is. If, for example, we define an insurgency as a populace or portion thereof fighting against is own government, we can point out some distinct features and some distinct possibilities, as such:

- People who fight their own government generally do so for reasons

- Sometimes those reasons are valid and understandable

- If the government can be convinced or compelled to resolve those reasons, it may be possible to end the insurgency without the need to go out and kill, destroy, and maim until the will of the insurgents is broken.

In short, insurgencies often happen because a government sucks, and in these case the easiest way to resolve the insurgency is not to kill all the insurgents but to improve the government.

I think these conclusions are perfectly valid. I know they can work, because I've seen them work. Unfortunately, I don't think they apply to Afghanistan, because that fight isn't about a populace or portion thereof fighting against is own government, it's about a portion of a populace fighting against an occupying foreign power.

[William F. Owen]

Part of the problem is that we seem to lack a functioning definition of what an insurgency is.

I do not agree. The whole problem is that we seek a definition of insurgency, to save anyone actually having to to think.
The root cause of the all the problems is a desire to believe that there is something called "insurgency" that is distinct and definable.

As we now the equally nonsensical idea of "Hybrid threats" it seems that there is no thinking behind any of this.

[Dayuhan]

If we're going to use the term we need to define it. The term seems pretty well entrenched, so something approaching a consensus definition might be useful.

Whatever we choose to call them, intra-state conflicts where a portion of a populace fights its own government seem distinct enough to warrant special study of the problems and opportunities associated with them, which are not necessarily shared with inter-state conflicts.

[William F. Owen]

If we're going to use the term we need to define it. The term seems pretty well entrenched, so something approaching a consensus definition might be useful.

Agreed

Whatever we choose to call them, intra-state conflicts where a portion of a populace fights its own government seem distinct enough to warrant special study of the problems and opportunities associated with them, which are not necessarily shared with inter-state conflicts.

Call them "Small Wars" or "Irregular Warfare." I'm very happy with Revolts and Rebellions. There have been at least as many revolts and rebellions as Wars between nations, peoples, and/or societies, so none of this is new except for the silly language.

[Dayuhan]

Call them "Small Wars" or "Irregular Warfare." I'm very happy with Revolts and Rebellions. There have been at least as many revolts and rebellions as Wars between nations, peoples, and/or societies, so none of this is new except for the silly language.

Revolts and Rebellions are excellent terms for what they describe. "Small War" or "Irregular Warfare" are a bit broader... the conflict in Afghanistan, for example, could be called "Irregular Warfare" (given the number of troops currently committed I'm not sure it deserves to be called "small"), but it is certainly not a revolt or a rebellion.

To some extent the issues are semantic, but not entirely: when you call a thing something it's not, that conditions perception and response.

As far as the Rand study goes, it's interesting and I'm sure useful in many ways, but I'm not sure its conclusions can be easily applied to Afghanistan. I also do not quite understand how anyone can produce a 270 page academic monograph analyzing insurgencies that does not present a definition of insurgency right up front.

[Bob's World]

I will offer to this thread on "how insurgencies end" that if it erupts into violence again within 20 years in that same popualce, that the previous insurgency was merely suppressed, most likely through brute force, but that the underlying causal factors.

Too often militaries and governments slap themselves on the back and chalk a "W" up in the history book, when in fact all they did was beat the populace into submission.

So, in my book, the end of violence is not the end of insurgency, it is the resolution of the failures of governance that is causing the populace to revolt, along with the end of violence that ends an insurgency.

[William F. Owen]

Too often militaries and governments slap themselves on the back and chalk a "W" up in the history book, when in fact all they did was beat the populace into submission.

If the violence is ended or reduced, it is a WIN. The military has ensured that the transfer of power did not take place using armed force. That is success by any measure.
If the locals vote in the party that got beaten in the insurgency, then OK. They didn't get there using force.

So, in my book, the end of violence is not the end of insurgency, it is the resolution of the failures of governance that is causing the populace to revolt, along with the end of violence that ends an insurgency.

Bob, you are a soldier, NOT a policy maker. Your job is killing. An "insurgency" is the us of violence. No violence, no insurgency! Without violence Folks are back to politics and the insurgency has been defeated.

The sole job of the US Forces (and UK and NATO) is to defeat the opposing armed force. IT IS NOT to create governance, or democracy or do "nation building!"