OK I can go with that.
It implies that these units/regiments have to some degree lost contact with the basics, yes?
Secondly exactly how would they address this and the other 'problem areas'? I remember well that we were able to very quickly identify what was wrong and where it was wrong... it took a little longer to fix it. Meaning that the vast majority know what the problem is and just sit around waiting for a unique soldier to start to kick over the traces and take the situation by the scruff of the neck. Then they all fall in behind him in lockstep saying "I told you, this is what we should have done a long time ago."
Rhodesia was easier because we had a young regiment (RLI) and a brand new one (Selous Scouts - commanded by an exceptional man) to turn the situation on its head. Reid-Daly was hated by many because he had a hot-line to the top and could cut through the bureaucracy at will. It was a standing joke that he had more to fear from a knife in the back from jealousy on our side than from the enemy.
With big established armies change is like trying to turn a super-tanker in rough seas.
The one option that should possibly be explored is to create composite units and formations manned by volunteers from all over or by sub-units being attached for a tour. This would cut through the RC (resistance to change) problem where a brigadier and his brigade come complete with all their own regimental baggage.
Bookmarks