Perhaps the differentiator will be the type of war being fought. In a type of warfare where you encounter the enemy in pockets (as we mainly did in Rhodesia) rather than in depth then it is the initial exchange of fire on making contact that makes the difference and allows small groups (sections, fire teams or sticks) to rapidly close with and kill the enemy without having to seek additional support from behind.
When we took on dug in and prepared positions in Zambia and Mozambique there were always preliminaries in the form of air strikes to soften up the enemy. But suffice it to say that in taking out bunkers and trenches the idea of launching a 9 man section attack did not make sense purely from the space point of view. In that only one man with a buddy behind him could deal with the type of bunkers we faced while the other two (including the MAG) covered them. The next stick also 4 men would be better employed to prevent enemy in other positions from interfering. Always we wanted the MAG right up there where we needed a high rate of direct fire.
In house clearing type situations (FIBUA) the MAG was needed but not right up front as everyone had to be prepared to enter doorways. We trained for this but never got anywhere near a Fullujah situation so you would need to ask those boys where they wanted their machine guns.
If the enemy is contacted where they are situated in depth (say in a defensive position) of say battalion strength your leading troops must pull back quickly before DF and other tasks come raining down on their heads. The MAG could be helpful in helping to disengage as well as using the other ideas mentioned such as smoke etc.
I genuinely believe that if there are those who believe that machine guns should be pooled at platoon and company level then is it not better to create an additional machine gun section or platoon as applicable? Are there still true believers in the effectiveness of indirect machine gun fire out there?
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