Isn't this monograph kinda off the mark...
I thought it was an interesting argument but to me it failed to differentiate between strategic and operational. I'm just a lowly nug and may be a little slow here at ILE but what does FM 100-5 or FM 3-0 have to do with strategy--which seems to be the main issue they have. I mean, the name of the manual is "Operations." Perhaps its a definitional issue but shouldn't strategy involve more than one branch of services and possibly--probably heresy--more than one department in the executive branch? The argument the authors make that the operational level of war "operate[s] free from unwelcome interference from strategy...(67)" is, IMHO, flawed. If they truly believe this, they fail to answer the question why. If you like the DIME model, FM 100-5 and FM 3-0 are really only a subset of the M--the failue of the USG to have a true strategic (i.e. longer term that the 1 year mandate of the NSS) plan is probably a huge contributing cause. The rest of the USG is not fully integrated into the strategic plan and therefore strategy devolves into the land of operations. The authors conclusions--specifically the CvC arguments about war and politics--I think are valid, but by laying the blame at the feet of the operational level they miss the true issues in contemporary warfare linking politics, strategy, and tactics.
Well in 1909 the British teaching of "Military Operations" considered only "Strategical Issues" and Tactics - explicitly stated . Operations were essentially how "Armies" did "stuff". _ "Advancing along a coast line." "Movement by Sea." Success in both Tactics and Strategy required competent and well planned "Operations."Originally Posted by wm
I think what all the above is telling me is that the idea of an "Operational Level" - as popularly conceived, needs to be held to rigour.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
The Operational level is the tactical level of corps and theater headquarters.
I concur that some of the stuff about operational art is probably muddy thinking. We could probably make a case that it is really still just tactics--i.e., fire and movement/maneuver--but the distances are greatly expanded--not that big an issue given the improved capability to communicate over the longer distances and thereby view/direct the action.
The first part of your post however equivocates on the meaning of operations. I think the basic 1909 point is to distinguish the strategic and tactical issue in military operations from issues in support of those operations (in the manufacturing world I think the distinction is between operations, as production, and support as logistics, sales, HR and all the other stuff military folks lump under combat service support). The other sense of operations in your post applies to classes of activities used to execute a military event, such as a river crossing operation as a way of maneuvering on or near the battlefield, covering force operations as a way of hiding your tactical dispositions from an enemy and channeling its attack into a desirable (on your part) location for the defensive tactics you intend to use.
Last edited by wm; 10-14-2009 at 06:34 PM.
Vir prudens non contra ventum mingit
The greatest educational dogma is also its greatest fallacy: the belief that what must be learned can necessarily be taught. — Sydney J. Harris
That's true in German usage, nominally true for most but the US Army
has a tendency to get bogged down with minutia and adopt the latest, best thing as the holy grail. The authors of the monograph point out -- not too cleanly -- that our fetish with 'the operational level' tends to make us try to apply it where it isn't appropriate. Their problem is that since they apparently were not there when the Army adopted the 'operational art' and probably have little experience around the institution that is the US army (as opposed to the people in that Army), they misread our inability to apply what's needed when it's needed as a flawed adaptation instead of what it is; inflexibility and an excessively slavish approach to 'doctrine.' They pointed their attack upstream instead of downstream where it's more appropriate.
(With a note that we, the people in the Army aren't that inflexible or slavish -- but the institution is. Very much so. Sadly)
I would submit that your point is irrelevant to the discussion of a void in strategic thinking on the interagency level, the purported theme of the book under discussion. Did you read the paper?I submit that it is rather hard to engage in strategic thought when a senior leader is too busy making sure the platoons and companies are minding their Ps and Qs.
While that might be true, it has nothing to do with the absence of strategy on the Department of State or any other national agency. You seem to be confused between tactical and strategic because all you refer to is inside the military at the operator level, none of which is discussed in the book to which this thread's title (and indeed the title of the book) refers.Now it might well be the case that this overwatch of one's LTs/CPTs happens because the more senior folks are not capable of strategic thinking and devolve to doing what they know. It might also just so happen that they are precluded from doing strategic thinking by their own higher level leadership and fill the void by micromanaging the company grades.
Certainly military leaders fill the void; that in itself while not ideal does not mean that FM 100-5 1986 and the operational level of war instigated or justified that encroachment. Voids get filled as you say. But in the case of operational art as it was laid out in the FM 100-5 in 1986 and as it provides the theme for this monograph, it had no role in "devouring strategy." The issue predated the supposed cause.Or, it might be the case that in the absence of strategic thinking from their civilian seniors, military seniors try to fill the void without overstepping their legal bounds by creating something in between strategy and tactics. Enter one understanding of operational art, a poor compromise not unlike the M551 Sheridan. (But see more below in my response to Wilf.)
Beyond that, roger on inherent tendencies to micro-manage. We focus on leader development and as those leaders advance in grade, many continue to believe they were the best (fill in the blank) that ever walked the earth, a belief that mandates that they micro-manage for to not do so would be a personal failure. We add to that tendency by creating C2 systems that encourage leaders to abuse the capabilities systems, and we continue to build ever larger staffs to somehow take advantage of the same "manpower" saving C2 systems.
Tom
I believe that Chris Nunn had it right with this post:
I was trying to cash out how it happens that the authors' claim, quoted by Chris above, may have come to pass.
100-5 had little to do with strategy at the national/interagency level. Nor should it have done so in my opinion. It was an Army doctrinal publication that ought to have explicated how the Army "operates" to complete, successfully, the missions it is directed to perform as a part of the execution of national strategy in a given conflict.
Strategy comes in many different flavors, which is why it may be preceded with different adjectival constructions like "national," "economic," "diplomatic," and "military." One might expect to find some discussions on military strategy in an Army doctrinal publication devoted to a high level discussion of the various ways of conducting military operations but to include in such an Army document a discussion of how to work an inter-agency approach to accomplish a national objective seems inappropriate. Perhaps a publication called Military Strategy would be more apropos, but it too would not resolve the lack of a national strategy lamented by the authors.
To iterate from above, I was trying to point out possible causes for a lack of national strategic thinking within the Army. One may be due to the fact that Army leaders are spending too much time being tacticians. As a result they do not have enough time left over to practice and perfect their strategic level thinking. I will not rehearse the other two alternatives previously posted.You seem to be confused between tactical and strategic because all you refer to is inside the military at the operator level, none of which is discussed in the book to which this thread's title (and indeed the title of the book) refers.
Last edited by Steve Blair; 10-15-2009 at 01:35 PM. Reason: Fixed last quote
Vir prudens non contra ventum mingit
The greatest educational dogma is also its greatest fallacy: the belief that what must be learned can necessarily be taught. — Sydney J. Harris
That is another longstanding issue and another pet rock. Certainly selection for attendance at the War College plays into that as the key qualification os tactician, one each battalion commander. Most of them will never deal with strategy again and the ones that go on to GO will learn by doing. It always struck me that FAOs--the real ones who go out into their AOs--deal with strategy and politics constantly, yet at best can hope to make the correspondence list.To iterate from above, I was trying to point out possible causes for a lack of national strategic thinking within the Army. One may be due to the fact that Army leaders are spending too much time being tacticians. As a result they do not have enough time left over to practice and perfect their strategic level thinking. I will not rehearse the other two alternatives previously posted.
Still I will say that overall I remain very satisfied with the strategic thinking exhibited by most practicing senior leaders; where national stragegy gets skewed is the absence of equivalent civilian thinkers with equivalent practical experience,
Tom
I followed this debate with interest at the time, and have a question to put forward relating to the existence of an operational level of war. Although I'm resurrecting a dormant thread, my question seems to fit in with the original logic of the article, if not the subsequent debate. One disclaimer is that while I have read the article posted at the start of this thread twice, I struggle to understand more than 20% of what was being said - it really was not subaltern-proof, what with the lack of pictures, long words and lack of powerpoint animations! As such please excuse and point out any obvious errors of fact or logic I may have made.
My basic question is that is it possible to measure or identify an operational level of war? I'm not hoping to create artificial and thus meaningless labels around the inherently chaotic activity of war, but the whole label of an 'operational' level of war seems very vague in doctrinal definitions. The reason I want to do this is that my army seems determined on 'strategising' every single act we undertake - the strategic corporal means a Platoon HQ must be a strategic entity, therefore the entirety of a Bn HQ is strategic, so on and so forth. It's a rather self-defeating process as it gets us nowhere bar inflating the self-importance of some, but it's a difficult proposition to argue against.
Also, if it were possible to identify where the operational level of war exists, it would also be possible through historical analysis to identify the evolution of operations and check the validity of the points raised in the original paper.
To remain within the conventional framework of the tactical/ operational/ strategic level of war, I consider the following to be as accurate a measure of each level as is possible:
The Tactical Level of War - identified by military elements that interact directly with the enemy, terrain and/ or civilian elements as part of their core function.
The Operational Level of War - identified by military elements that achieve their tasks solely within their own chain of command.
Thus, this level receives direction from the strategic level and enacts it through the tactical elements in a two-way process whereby they filter tactical information and assessments to the strategic level.
The Strategic Level of War - err, the level above that of the operational? I'm lost as how to qualify a strategic level of war and am spectacularly unqualified to do so, but that to me is less important in the current debate as defining an operational level of war.
Does the above framework hold any merit? It should be relatively easy to identify in historical analysis those levels of command that worked solely within their own chain of command and this, in my definition, constituted the operational link between the tactical and the strategic.
My understanding of the levels of war is very incomplete and fragmented but I would appreciate any feedback as this is a topic of personal and professional interest to me.
Last edited by Chris jM; 05-05-2010 at 08:41 AM. Reason: spelling
'...the gods of war are capricious, and boldness often brings better results than reason would predict.'
Donald Kagan
I do not think there is an "Operational Level." I think it's rubbish and have thought so for some time. - and especially since reading Naveh and Simpkin who were both professed to be experts in understanding and describing it.
What the Russians coined as the "Operational Level" was basically "Formation and Divisional Tactics."
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Theory and Practice
The operational level is something that may be worthwhile in theory, but not in practice. I think examining all the linkages between setting national ends/ways/means (strategy if you like) all the way down to low-level actions (tactical, if you must) is well worth a lifetime of study and thought. Its useful to have definitions and categories for this theory and useful to argue about how all this interacts. For my part, I don't see "operational" as a "level" inserted between the strategy and tactics, but rather a connecting file or "nervous system" between national actions of setting goals and apportioning resources, and lower level concepts to use/arrange those resources to achieve the goals. Maybe its not operational, but rather “lower strategy,” or even “higher tactical.” I'm not sure, but I know there are connections and understanding the connections is critical to creating something coherent and effective.
"In practice", senior officials and commanders should not deal in terms of the theory, but in terms of the reality facing them. The theory can provide clues on the connections and considerations they should take into account. However, what is really important is the mission they are given, the resources they have, the environment they are in, the other actors they have to coordinate with, etc. Putting the levels of war into doctrine has led to many of the problems addressed in the SSI document such as commands either acting or failing to act based on their self-defined (or doctrine-defined) placement in the levels of war hierarchy. In my mind, the U.S. Navy has proceeded furthest in this area, to their detriment, by creating a table that aligns levels of war with specific command levels (NWP 3-32 Maritime Operations at the Operational Level of War). However, as identified in the SSI pub, other commands have used “operational level” as either excuse or justification to plan and execute outside of what the reality of their situation would recommend.
Phil Ridderhof USMC
I tend to agree with Fuchs, above...
LINK.
I tend to agree with Wilf and PhilR, there is no such thing as an Operational level but it's not a major issue. If one just has to use the term for some reason, I believe Fuchs is correct. It was and is a Continental European construct and applicable to warfare there. It, as a term and concept, can be elsewhere employed but it is subject to dangerous misuse.
The Operational level of war applies to the Theater level and their employment of subordinate commands (be they Armies, Corps or Divisions) and it applies in only major conventional force on force combat (that does not preclude the use of SOF or irregular warfare as Operational assets or techniques). Operational level methodology entails maneuvering major formations in consonance with strategic aims in order to facilitate tactical success. Anything other than that is either Strategic or tactical.
Militarily, lacking a major conflict against a peer force, virtually all effort is going to be tactical as, in the West, we emphasize civilian control of the military. Strategy thus becomes the responsibility of the Government (hopefully, with military advice if the armed forces are to be employed) and the Forces are or should be responsible only for Operational and Tactical employment in the execution of that strategy.
One thing for sure, no Corporal or Platoon is going to be Operational or Strategic. That's a dumb and dangerous misnomer. Situation dependent, a Battalion might be a strategic force. More likely, a Brigade, Task Force, Division or Corps with a General Officer commanding can be but such a force is unlikely to need or even be able to employ Operational level methodology.
Error occurs when one attempts to apply Operational level concepts and methodology to inappropriate settings. To wit, the Coalition in Afghanistan. Afghanistan itself IS the operational level for this war. Strategy put us there, everything done there is tactical.
In most western COIN efforts, the nation involved is the de facto Operational level, it becomes the Theater as operations will generally be limited to that nation only and maneuver of large formations will not be necessary -- or even desirable. Strategy places forces in that nation, all that then transpires there is tactical. Tactical operations, as always, can have strategic effect. Similarly, Strategic decisions can have tactical effects. Rules of engagement developed politically for example. Or a decision to not deploy or use certain military assets, equipment or units. Conversely, a political decision that forces the use of certain elements can have an effect.
Operational decisions can have strategic and / or tactical effects. An effort to employ Operational level processes in an inappropriate setting can also have strategic and tactical effects and they will almost always be adverse. See Afghanistan...
Instead of calling it the Operational level, didn't we used to call them Campaigns? Or is that something else? Campaigning sounds more military, Operation sounds like you are going to the Hospital.
Yep. We did that until we got overinvolved with
Europe and all things European in the 80s...
Except that within campaigns you would have operations, like Operation Overlord or Operation Market.
Nothing that results in human progress is achieved with unanimous consent. (Christopher Columbus)
All great truth passes through three stages: first it is ridiculed, second it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.
(Arthur Schopenhauer)
ONWARD
...and those operations were really battles.
The term "Operation" has found a very wide meaning in the past 70 years. It used to be confined to military theory and physicians, but it's been applied much wider since then.
The Bundeswehr began to apply it to pretty much every planned combat action. I'm not sure when this began, but I know examples from '95 and I suspect that it's a post-Cold War thing.
Operations are performed by Doctors on the unsuspecting...
Operations can be the title or part thereof of an office, officer or other entity. Operation __(insert name here)___ can be whatever anyone wants it to be as Fuchs says. The Operational level of war is just that. operations (small 'o') are what units do...
operations (small 'o') are also performed by computer programs and subsets thereof...
To preclude confusion, I suggest re-titling 'The Operational level of war' to 'the Mediocre level of war' (based on the number of Corps Commanders relieved over the years...).
Which brings up a question. How can COIN be the 'graduate level of war' (which is fallacious, it's the middle school level of war -- chaos and hormones driving pettiness and all round immaturity to new new levels) with no Operational level per se? *
* GO make work employment ala Field Forces / XXIV Corps in Viet Nam and similar later examples do not count.
I don't think that COIN has no operational level. It's just not being used because people are too stubborn and not daring enough.
see PM
Interesting...
We can differ. I don't think it has an operational level in the traditional sense and I do think Operational level techniques are being used in COIN -- both in Afghanistan and Iraq -- or, more correctly, misused. Badly...
Partly for the reasons you state, partly due to the ability of insurgents to become farmers until the pressure goes away...
I can't see the argument being proved
The paper neds a rewrite and to substantiate the argument. It fails to substantaite its claims in the introduction or even explain them.
East Timor was not a failure of military strategy, and it was too small to claim any theory of an operational art. It failed because the poltical groups in East Timor, who were split along differing lines of personalities long before independence, were usurped by Mari Alkatiri's FRETLIN group. Threw the East Timorese political parties plans into disarray. There are other reasons I am happy to explain off line.
The paper wrongly promotes Tukhachevsky as the star of the operational art, but it was Sveckhin and to a lesser extent Kamanev who started it, although Tukhachevsky put it into practice. The Operational art was based on the needs of various fronts during the Russian Civil War.
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