BW,Finally some real Green Beret Thinking, massive cool man. Billy Jack would give you a Gold Star! US Politicians should look at this presentation to better understand what is happening in the US not just overseas.
It's a matter of cause and effect.
I take a minority viewpoint as to "cause", but came about that position through honest labor, study and experience. Might be wrong, but I'm comfortable with that possibility.
Therefore we take different positions on potential Effects as well as Cures. Quite reasonable.
But remember, those who based in Afghanistan to attack the US were largely Saudis. Don't try to understand the US-Afghan relationship to determine why citizens of Saudi Arabia would be compelled to launch suicidal attacks against the U.S.; you must study the U.S. - Saudi relationship to understand that one.
This is way bigger than Afghanistan, who like Poland, Israel and several other places in the world gets sucked into conflicts primarily because it is either key terrain in of itself or is merely the easiest way to get from Point A to Point B.
Like I said before, we have had massive mission creep in Afghanistan. If it was simply a matter of COIN we would have been helping the Taliban against the Northern Alliance. No, it was about U.S. interests there, and while the interests probably have not changed much, we keep changing our mind as to how best service those interests. I offer that General Robert's 130 year-old advice is still a valid COA to keep in mind.
As an aside, I made my final presentation to the morning brief here today. Again, just one man's insights:
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
BW,Finally some real Green Beret Thinking, massive cool man. Billy Jack would give you a Gold Star! US Politicians should look at this presentation to better understand what is happening in the US not just overseas.
Here's another way to look at it using different x and y axis- control over time.
Few's Model of Lifecycle of a Small War
I put that together as an example of when an insurgency starts from nothing, gains momentum, is full-blown, and then the host nation successfully quells it.
I think it flows nicely with COL Jones' Model IF we assume that control is a function of popular perception.of governance coupled with the actual governing measures of the gov't.
The key for me is that it is primarily about the populace's perceptions on these key causal factors. That if one is out on the ground doing Yeoman's work on "C-H-B-T"; but not addressing the causal perceptions, you are just spinning your wheels.
On the other hand, a major effort that targets the perceptions effectively, but does virutally no C-H-B-T may quell an insurgency decisively. Best is to target the perceptions as one's main effort, and then use your actions on the ground as supporting efforts.
Big Article today in the Washington Post about Presidents Obama and Karzai. This coming visit is so critical, and for my money both President's get it. Karzai must establish Legitimacy in the coming Shuras and Jirgas if the surge is to have a prayer. The coalition must appreciate that it is a supporting effort to Karzai establishing his own legimacy with his popualce, showing them respect, giving them a voice, and producing and distributing an equitable justice system. We can merely enable and shape conditions on the ground to assist.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
Concur, sir, and I think you nailed the important points on your second slide, IMO. I put my model together as a way of showing the lifecycle or history, not a how-to guide. I was trying to capture the current literature of McCormick and NPS, Rand, and SWJ into a simple picture to explain to young paratroopers.
BTW, vanishing point, an architecture term coined by Filippo Brunelleschi, would be the point when the insurgency is successfully suppressed.
Bob:
Thanks for the brief.
I'll memorize it.
Steve
The US-Saudi relationship might be less relevant than the relationship between AQ and the Taliban, which made the sanctuary possible, and the relationship between AQ and the Saudi populace, which made it necessary.
We all know that the US was not OB's first choice of target for his post-Soviet jihad. He wanted to go after the Saudi government. What he discovered was that many of the Saudis who were perfectly happy to support him when he was killing infidels in faraway Afghanistan wanted nothing to do with him when he was threatening to rock the boat at home. AQ was able to pull in a small number of highly radicalized supporters, but for the populace at large the message was simply rejected: even in the depths of the oil glut, a very bad time for Saudi Arabia, the message just didn't resonate.
Of course the Saudi security apparatus came down on OBL and his people, as anyone would expect, but they are not omnipotent. If the message was truly gaining traction the crackdown would have only accelerated its spread, as we've seen in so many other places (Ayatollah Khomeini, for one, was quite able to drive a successful insurgency from exile, because his message resonated with the populace).
Once in exile, OBL was in a hard spot... the jihad against the Soviets was over, the jihad against the Saudi royals had failed. The only way he could put himself back on the map was to force somebody to invade a Muslim country... hence the jihad against the US.
The problem with the assumption that AQ's jihad is a response to US policy is that it places the US at the center of the picture, often ignoring or downgrading other factors and other relationships. In our minds we may always be at the center of the picture, but from other perspectives it may not necessarily be so. Certainly the US stands as a symbol of the rise of the secular West and the fall of Islam, but in terms of specific policies... other than the continuing irritant of reflexive support for Israel, I can't think of anything we could have changed, pre-9/11, that would have made a difference.
The picture of Afghanistan makes sense, but it all seems to hinge on the assumption that the US and the GIROA are and are perceived to be two separate entities... again, I get the feeling that the problem is being treated as an intervention in a pre-existing fight between a Government and an insurgency. Certainly we want to see it this way, but is that how the Afghans see it?
Do the Afghans see the GIROA as their government, not a product of and extension of a foreign intervention? Do they see the conflict as a fight between the GIROA and the insurgents, with the foreigners assisting the GIROA... not as a fight between the Taliban and the foreigners, with GIROA as a threadbare front for the foreign invader?
If the answer to those questions is affirmative, the picture you're drawing makes perfect sense. If it's not, then we are assuming conditions that do not exist.
Wash post's Josh Partlow explains the ins and outs of the Shinwari fiasco:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...050903257.html
The idea was to work with the Shinwari tribe to oppose the Taliban in exchange for $1 million of special construction contributions for the tribe (and guns and pick-up trucks, and prestige for the tribe). The result: new inter-tribal conflicts; opposition by State and Afghanistan; deal all screwed up.
Perhaps a well-intentioned effort, but poorly conceived, and poorly executed. The old parables about "No good deed goes unpunished.""This clash split the Shinwari in two," said Malalai Shinwari, a parliament member. "It will take years and years to rejoin these two tribes together."
I'd love to see some evidence that "development" aid has any chance at all of getting a community to reject the Taliban and/or connect to any level of the state government. I'm not holding my breath.
Blue only looks good in 3-D...
Biggest problem with development aid is the majority is spent on people projects and people have notoriously short attention spans and are remarkably ungrateful...
I wouldn't hold my breath either.
I suspect that our definition of "good governance", in many places, overrates "development" and "service delivery" and underrates ownership. There are a lot of people in the world who would prefer "bad" government that's theirs to "good" government from afar. Given their long-term experience with governance from afar, it's often hard to blame them.
To this day I really don't understand the reasoning that went into the decision to build such a centralized government structure in Afghanistan. Surely there must have been reasons... but what were they?
Dahayun:
Sure. The opposite of Iraq (provincial w/ weak central government).
If each province,district in Afghanistan had its own voice, it might pick folks who's allegiances, family/tribal ties, and communities actually oppose a central government in Kabul, or certain factions of it. Uzbeks, Tajiks, Hazara, Pashtun, etc...
The unspoken theory was, if provincial/district officials are appointed by a central government favorable to us, then the sub-national government will be favorable to us. How's that working out????
We're control freaks.
We fail miserably at it but just cannot help trying again and again...
If you look at the plan for how the Constitution was supposed to be written (lots of public consultation by a large drafting committee over an 18-month period and an orderly loya jirga to ratify), and then look at how it actually was written (divided drafting committees, secretive process, last-minute changes by Karzai and the international community and a disorganized jirga), it becomes clear that there was no reasoning - at least not outside of a very small circle powerful Afghans and a lot of non-Afghans.
To the extent there was any sanity in the process, it was modeled after the 1964 constitution. The problem is that in 1964 there was an existing state and bureaucracy upon which to build. The 1964 constitution merely replaced an earlier constitution and improved upon, within the context of a functioning government. In 2004, there was nothing. That would be like the US attempting to stand up the entire federal gov't apparatus that we have today, but to do it in 1776. I'm sure the colonies would have taken nicely to the volumes of federal statutes and regulations that we currently have.
Schmedlap:
The back stories from those involved at the constitutional level have to do with the maneuvers to keep out the King, and put something in to our liking. Long, winding story.
Your analogy is spot on. How the hell could you implement it?
But, remember that there still was a civil service core left in the early 2000 era. They left afterwards (or got wired in).
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