Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
We over-Armor our Recon elements because we do not have the patience to wait for effective, time consuming reconnaissance to be completed, we just load up on Armor and go out looking for trouble. Dumb...

We've identified a lack of effective Reconnaissance capability as a tactical and operational shortfall again and again -- we still haven't really fixed it, mostly because we're unwilling to buy dedicated equipment (or adequately train our people) and have impatient Staff Officers who are unwilling to wait for information...
This happens to be relevant to my interests.

(1) The U.S. idea of a cavalry mission (dedicated force for recce, security, vanguard, rearguard) makes sense, but the execution is strange.
- too many helicopters organic at too low level (apparently too much funds for helos!)
- design of a brigade-sized "Regiment" for a mission that should be done by dispersed battalions, if not companies
- either heavy tracked or 4wd light approach

Armour, combat, heavyness, speed - that's all fine for recce, counterrecce, security, advance guard, rear guard - but it's just part of the solution. A turbine-driven MBT in a cavalry force is a very strange choice, of course.
Mobility (especially road range and reliability of mobility-critical components) should be emphasized over protection and firepower. Their combat role should be more akin to fencing with a Rapier than to a Roman legionary's charge.

The light "stealth" approach is also fine, but it takes time as you mentioned, and should thus be an effort that's even more independent of the plans of the brigades (combat formations). The slow, light approach should cover areas, establish picket lines or observe places of special interest. The stealth recce should be in place long before a Bde intends to move into their direction - just in case.
This requires many small and enduring teams - LRS basically.

The idea that you send recce elements ahead is outdated. It stems from a time when the mobility was very different and many divisions were advancing shoulder-to-shoulder or in the undefended areas behind a penetrated front line. Nowadays you have your brigades with some spacing and need to know what's up in the gaps and ahead. Recce needs to cover huge areas, not merely tell what lies ahead on a few favourited routes. Field manuals come close to recognize this, but force structures don't.
We have too many support and combat troops and too few recce elements. keep in mind; killing is easy nowadays once you have a positive ID and coordinates (+ movement vector) about the enemy.

The brigades should really be the triremes in an ocean of recce troops who already drowned every foe who was too weak to swim; ready to ram with speed and force, if possible multiple vs one.


All the new lightly armored 4wd observation cars (such as Fennek, or HMMWV with LRAS) can do very little in my opinion. They're a terribly expensive solution for the stealth part and useless for the "combat for recce superiority" and "cavalry" mission. 8x8-based recce vehicles are even more questionable because of their size. Luchs is great for route recce, but the concept is simply too expensive.