...…the following theses may be of interest regarding S/BCTs and the reconnaissance/third manoeuvre Bn conundrum;

Maj. C. D. Taylor, The Transformation of Reconnaissance: Who will Fight for Information on the Future Battlefield?, MMAS thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2005;
This research seeks to determine if reconnaissance operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom required engaging the enemy in close combat in order to be effective. Qualitative examination of the interviews from the Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group yielded seven consistent themes that impact on this primary research question. Those seven themes are summarized below:

1. Tempo drives reconnaissance

2. The movement to contact is the most common form of the offense

3. Adaptive enemies often do not fit doctrinal templates

4. Commanders required human intelligence more than imagery

5. Most useful intelligence is bottom up

6. Lightly armoured scouts cannot support high tempo operations

7. Divisional heavy cavalry squadrons tend to fight as independent manoeuvre units. (p.40)
Maj. D. Mark, Effective or Efficient: The Conundrum of the Armed Reconnaissance Squadron, MMAS thesis, USMC Command and General Staff College, 2009;
Brigade level reconnaissance units exist solely to allow the primary warfighting organization in the Army, the Brigade Combat Team, to have perfect Situational Awareness and Situational Understanding (SA/SU). However, much of the doctrine, organization, and technologies required to pursue RDO simply do not exist within the Army today. The Army's answer to the capability gap is the modular force and the centrepiece organization, the Brigade Combat Team. However, one of the primary failings of the modular
design was that the HBCT traded a manoeuvre battalion for a cavalry squadron. Although the ARS proves far more capable than the BRT it replaced, the ARS has lost its identity and has become a poorly resourced third manoeuvre element. As a result, the ARS does not even perform
reconnaissance missions well. Under the current construct, the ARS does not provide the brigade any unique capabilities (p. 23).

Maj. M. A. Dooley, Ignoring History: The Flawed Effort to Divorce Reconnaissance from Security in Modern Cavalry Formations, MMAS thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2006;
For all of the optimistic discussion in the latest version of FM 3-20.96 about making contact with sensors and developing a situation out of direct fire contact, there is little difference now between the realities of brigade reconnaissance squadron techniques and the capabilities of World War II ground reconnaissance. Other than the fact that reconnaissance squadrons no longer have the organic helicopter assets or armoured firepower formerly common to division cavalry, cavalry scouts must still execute their reconnaissance and security missions much as they have for the past sixty-five years. As a result, the newest reconnaissance squadrons no longer possess the critical assets historically required to bail themselves out of trouble once it is encountered.[...]
It seems the sensor troops that were to have sufficed as a replacement for organic combat power in the original FCS proposals are not controlled by the very reconnaissance forces that were to depend upon them. So long as the sensor systems remain controlled by brigade headquarters, the concept of sensor-to-sensor target handover, in most cases, will require constant coordination through multiple echelons of command. Without physical possession or operational control of sensor assets at the reconnaissance squadron level, the new HBCT and IBCT reconnaissance organizations technically do not even qualify to be labelled as “RSTA,” because they have no ability to acquire targets beyond the short range capabilities of normal ground recon troop assets. The much vaunted application of joint and precision fires, proclaimed in the latest version of FM 3-20.96 as a substitute for organic combat power, is thus not likely to occur efficiently if at all. (p. 72-4)
Maj. M. R. Howell, A CRITIQUE OF THE U.S. ARMY FORCE REDESIGN OF CAVALRY FORMATIONS WITHIN THE BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS MMAS thesis, USMC Command and General Staff College, 2009;
First, the new modular cavalry formations have severe flaws in their design. Second, the current mindset, doctrinal foundation and leader training focus of these cavalry formations have severe flaws in some of its key concepts. Finally, and most importantly, these new formations cannot perform the full spectrum of reconnaissance and security missions that cavalry formations doctrinally executed in the past. The combined effect of these flaws is likely to cause a serious capability gap to develop within BCT cavalry squadrons. These changes signalled a significant shift in the doctrinal roles and missions of the majority of current U.S. cavalry formations (excluding the 3d Armoured Cavalry Regiment). In sum, the transformation and modularization of the U.S. Army's BCT cavalry squadrons has had a negative impact on their effectiveness.(p. 1)