Doing what? I don't understand the question.Originally Posted by gute
...but I'm intrigued as I have always considered the M2/M3 to be very poor conceptually and doctrinally.
Mech Platoon: CAB or ACR
As we know the U.S. Army has structred armor and infantry into into modular BCTs. The Heavy Combat Team is comprised of two Combined Arms Battalions: two mech infantry companies and two armor companies. The mech platoons ride around in four M2 Brads that are suppose to hold seven guys each. The standard mech platoon is unable to move a regular size platoon with three rifle squads and a weapons squad. This gives the mech commander about 100 dismounts - 200 for the battalion.
The 3rd ACR squadron/troop is organized into 3 troops with two platoons of M3s (six M3 each) and two platoons of four tanks each. How about organzing the mech platoon/CAB the same way - instead of M3 use the M2, each troop has two full-size infantry platoons with eight tanks - thats approximately 84 dismounts per troop x three troops for approximately 250 dismounts for an additional 50 dismounts for the battalion. A fourth troop or company has 14 tanks.
Question: Would this organization be effective? Has it been tried before? Is there an advantage/disadvantage to using the ACR troop organzation for mech infantry?
I guess the army could achieve the increaded manpower by adding two additonal Brads to each mech platoon in the current CAB mech companies.
Doing what? I don't understand the question.
...but I'm intrigued as I have always considered the M2/M3 to be very poor conceptually and doctrinally.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
A general problem exists, and I'll try to illustrate this with a scenario.
A heavy brigade moves through a country such as let's say Belarus. The route has alternately agricultural areas and forests on the roadside.
The brigade approaches a forest that it's supposed to cross ASAP, the vanguard troops are being ambushed in the forest after the recce troops easily slipped through.
The first attempt to move through the forest with tanks fails, and the brigade commander suspects a well-equipped and competent enemy infantry company along the forest road.
His infantry dismounts; four companies, in theory 400 men, but in reality only a few more than 300.
Artillery, mortars and infantry attempt to break through, but the effort is slow because at most two tanks can support the infantry on the narrow road and it's indeed fighting against a strong infantry company.
Finally, the dismounts barely overwhelm the enemy company thanks to the expenditure of a good share of the artillery and mortar ammunition, but they're reduced to only a few more than 200 capable infantrymen. Several IFVs were lost as well.
Next forest the same, except that this time there's not enough infantry left to meet the challenge. The brigade commander is forced to report that he's unable to execute his mission because two infantry companies were enough to stop his heavy (mech or whatever) brigade.
In the end, the operational commander accepts that the infantry element of his heavy brigades is too weak and restricts their movement to open terrain where their routes are longer, their observation easier and their routes more predictable. 0:1 for the enemy.
No matter how the brigades are being organized - there won't be enough infantry for anything but desert or open plains warfare if all infantry rides in IFVs.
You're a master of
understatement...
Why would an armoured bde be moving through such terrian in the first place? What is their mission? Surely a proper IPB analysis would have flagged up mobility corridors, areas and routes that were potential mobility blocks to the maintenance of operational tempo. Higher up commnders shpould then have attached one-two infantry battalions to the bde to enable them to move through the abive terrain which would then be detached after their particualr contribution to the mission was accomplished.
Also, the problem with the BFV series was doctrinal. There were never meant to carry full infantry sctions but rather "close protection" squads (or "tank marines" in Fullers felicitous phrase). Their METL were restricted to local security for the mech unit, limited local area defensive tasks, assult on entrenched ATGM teams (which hadn't already been supressed by on board weapons - and the infantry firing through those terrible firing ports!!!) and other misions designed to augment and maintain mechanised tempos. They were simply not "true" infantry (in a METL sense) but resembled mounted escorts.
However, I have always admired the US Armoured Cavarly formations and think that six BFVs per platoon, each carrying a six man fireteam (organised into three sections of two vehicles each) would be an ideal set-up. It would also leave room for an attached FOO, or COLT, HUMINT operater, Medic, &c.
Under current MTOEs, the mech infantry platoon dismounts 3 x 9-man rifle squads. The only thing lacking from the light platoon is the weapons squad's 2 x M240 and 2 x Javelin, which, IMO, is more than made up for by the 4 x 25mm, 4 x M240 and 4 x TOW. The CO has 9 x 9-man rifle squads (81 pax), the BN has 18 x 9-man rifle squads (162 pax) and the BCT has 36 x 9-man rifle squads (324 pax)
The issue of seating for attachments is valid.
Having 6 x M2s in the mech platoon would be nice, but I think it would be more complicated to C2 (3 x 2-vehicle sections plus 3 x 9-man squads is 6 elements for the PL to C2, vice 5 currently, in what is already the most complicated platoon. The M3 scout platoon is fought as 3 x 2-vehicle sections, or 2 x 3-vehicle sections, the limited dismounts are part of the sections). AFAIK, the US has never tried the 3 x vehicle section platoon in the infantry. In the mid-90s, we tried having a squad dismount from each section (the 2 x 9 + 5 platoon), but decided that was too light on dismounts, so we went to the current 3 x 9 model.
As I've noted before on other threads, I think that the US Army has had a gap in the "middle" between mech and light since the introduction of the Bradley. BG was de Czege identified this in 1985 or 1986. The SBCTs begin to correct this gap, but the force is out of balance- most of the force should be organized along the SBCT lines, with a ratio of 27 / 9 / 12 ratio of infantry / "tank" (MGS) / recon platoons. A "heavier" variant of the SBCT, with 1:1 replacements of ICV with M2s and MGS with M1s, while retaining that balance, would be a better general purpose organization, IMO, with a few HBCTs retained as the breakthrough/counterattack force (much like the armored divisions in WW2, with a similar percentage of the force).
@Tukhachevskii:
You have truly internalized the deficiencies as normal. Those deficiencies weren't normal pre-70's, though. There was a fabled time when armies had enough infantry (or at least no greater lack of infantry than of most other things).
There were even armour corps operations through forest areas (Ardennes anyone?) for the sake of surprise (you know, the opposite of limiting yourself to a handful of tactically acceptable corridors, which does essentially announce your route to the enemy!).
Look at a map; the utter inability to advance through slightly defended forests and settlements limits the manoeuvre options of a brigade to only 2-4 even on such open and relatively tank-friendly terrain as Belarus or the Ukraine. Armour brigades on rails.
Most if not all NATO brigades are fair weather brigades; good for only a few weeks on desert-like terrain or alternatively too light and therefore unable to defend themselves on open ground.
There was a time when it was perfectly self-evident that a first rate army is supposed to be able to fight offensively on all terrain, not only on open plains.
I agree that mechanized infantry was originally not meant to be true infantry, but tank-accompanying infantry. It was the same with German Panzergrenadiere and Soviet Desants; they were mostly meant to sweep trenches and suppress very short range AT weapons (Panzerfaust, Panzerschreck, Bazooka).
The armour divisions that had Panzergrenadiere on APCs or Desants on tanks had truck-mounted infantry as well, though.
Sadly, modern armour and even mechanized "infantry" brigades aren't combined arms formations any more; they lack a serious infantry component. "Combined arms" has long since become a mere slogan. There are even examples of armour and mech infantry brigades that lack organic indirect fire support, but that's another story.
WW2-experienced generals would likely attest that our force planners are incompetent (or worse) if they were able to look briefly on our TO&Es.
Thanks gentlemen.
Mr. Owen and Mr. White: Why is the M2/M3 poor conceptually and doctrinally?
82redleg: You answered my unclear question. Problems with C2 with a six vehicle platoon seem to make sense. Also, 4x25mm and TOW more then make up for the lack of a weapons squad - good point. General consenus on this forum recommends adding a third manuever battalion to the BCT - would adding a Stryker battalion to the HBCT (replace the MGS with the M1) fill the gap? A heavier SBCT is interesting - maybe a CV90 type ICV and the M1. The infantry divisions (1,2,3 and 4) would have the heavier SBCT while 1AD and 1CAV have the HBCT?
Fuchs: I take it you are not a fan of the HBCT Combined Arms Battalion?
I'm rarely a fan of anything that didn't already prove its excellence and wasn't invented by myself.
I suggest to look at my arguments, not at what I (dis)like.
Fuchs: What would a true Combined Arms formation look like? If you were organizing the U.S. Army HBCT, IBCT and SBCT what would they look like in both armor and infantry?
In the briefest of terms, from a conceptual view confused about what it does. It's designed to fight along side MBTs' yet lacks MBTs protection, and firepower. It carries too few men and is far too big.
The problems with the concept provide the same problems with doctrine.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Israel must be on the right track with the Namer ICV - believe it is based on their MBT.
I) No size fits it all
II) Not every formation needs to be combined arms, some can be meant as attachments or to get attachments.
III) I'd spend ~20% of everything on reconnaissance, cavalry, skirmish troops that are not bound to any formation, but answer to a Corps.
These skirmishers are the key to my idea of a corps structure and operational art. The decision is in the skirmishing, all else is either about delaying or about mopping up quickly broken forces.
IV) No divisions.
V) Heavy brigades would be meant to go into very unfair, advantageous battles mostly. Routine tasks would include almost no LOS combat.
VI) Expert and reserve infantry formations would be separate; expert infantry would be similar to the best marines, ranger and Jäger units while reserve infantry would offer the cheap, quick training, quantity element.
The heavy brigades structure would be about 2-3 rather large combined arms (mortars instead of arty) battlegroups (~ Kampfgruppe) and one support group (providing support in a large radius to the battlegroups, skirmishers and other forces + additional infantry bn on APCs).
The area support function of the support group is rather unorthodox while the battlegroups (or Kampfgruppen) would look like something from the 40's or 50's (1st Heeresstruktur, ~58-62).
Reserve infantry battlegroups and heavy skirmisher companies could work together with a heavy brigade in order to add certain capabilities and tricks.
This does certainly sound like a patchwork of strange stuff. I didn't mention all the reasoning in it, just the superficialities.
It makes a lot of sense in a 40+ pages draft (that's meant to be published as a 200 pp. book, not online).
In short: I('d) develop a corps concept, not a brigade concept.
What Wilf said. I am particularly horrified at the
overall size and the wasted space. For huge vehicle to carry only six dismounts -- five if you leave one to pass 25mm ammo up to the turret as is the norm is borderline criminal IMO. That goes to only three or four if you're short a man or two in the squad (which is typical). The height of the vehicle makes it a shot or missile magnet. It is over-armed for its role; the TOWs encourage tactical misuse. It's range limited...
It's supposed to be an infantry carrier -- it's not, it's a light tank. Too light...
The vehicle was a compromise in too many respects. Instead of the needed heavily armored, accompany the M1 vehicle (like a Namer) AND a battle taxi for volumes of Mech infantry (M-113 updates) AND a decent Cavalry Scout vehicle (M-113 would also work for that...) we got a compromise vehicle on a drug deal between the Chief of Infantry and the Chief of Armor. The former would support buy of the M1; the latter would support buying the M2 and its M3 variant. Both agreed to give up something, Armor the Future Scout Cavalry System and Infantry the XM-8 Protected Gun system. Bad deal all 'round...
It's perhaps noteworthy that the two Cavalry Regiments in Europe at the time of adoption called the M3 Cavalry BFV the 'burning fighting vehicle' contending there'd be a trail of hulks all over Europe if the USSR were to attack. They also sensibly lobbied to get rid of that humungous turret and replace it with a .50 cal overhead weapons station (thus allowing 7-8 dismounts...) to lower the profile.
Some U.S. commanders removed the Bradley from the first line (2003) and let them move behind the MBTs because the threat of 60's RPGs became too intense.
HAPC + cheap APCs is the way to go.
If I were organizing the US Army, I would retain the 3 tier system, but rebalance. Overall, I prefer big BCTs, when going modular, we should have used the assets of the old Force XXI division to produce 2 very large, very capable BCTs, instead of 4 minimally capable BCTs.
IBCTs: initial/immediate is 8 only (reduction from 20ish), all on ABN status and active duty; in addition to severely restricted terrain, the other are that truly "light" formations excel in is rapid deployment/forced entry; second step is get the third maneuver battalion back, if necessary trading the current recon SQDN down to a separate troop; sequentially, add a fourth maneuver battalion and convert the WPNS Cos to rifle companies, retaining a single TOW company in the BCT, preferably on something light and armored (Wiesal maybe, something in that class anyway) instead of HMMWV.
SBCTs: I like this organization, convert most BCTs to this model (29 of 45 active BCTs, 1/2 to 2/3s of the ARNG); retain identical organizations, while producing variety by modifying the vehicle systems used, M2s or even M113s, maybe a more modern ICV replacement; M1, M8 AGS or something like Centauro for an MGS replacement; not sure about the RV, but we could probably find some variant that shares parts in the modified organizations; organizationally, the AT CO should go into the infantry BNs (maybe as a platoon in HHC), and a fourth CO added to each BN; an STB to C2 all the current separate COs; some other minor organizational changes (HUMINT consolidation, probably need increased EN capability with sappers in the maneuver battalions and bridging in the STB, etc); the key is that all of these middle-weight BCTs are organized identically, just differing equipment
HBCTs: again, reduction from 17-20 (whatever we are at now) to 8 active, converting the rest to SBCTs (ARNG is 1/3 - 1/2 HBCT, remaining SBCT); logic on this reduction is that we executed OIF 1 with the equivalent of 4 HBCTs from 3ID, 8 allows us to maintain that capability- if we need more, we can activate the ARNG and accelerate the active forces in the ARFORGEN cycle; ultimately, build a third CAB, and return the sapper/gap crossing to the CABs with bridging/roadbuilding/construction engineers in the STB;
Got a reference for this? First I've heard of it. My friends that took Bradley's on the Thunder Runs, and multiple rotations since all talk about how survivable they are.
The most recent source I recall was a monograph on armoured recce (or cavalry). Maybe I'll find it.
I have no clue who had what when but could
the various mods make a difference? IIRC, the base and A1 mods differed only in missile fit but the A2, A2(ODS) and A3 were all successive upgrades with increased survivability as a goal??? Dunno...
I do know that many guys from both the 2d and 11th ACRs at the time the Wall came down were not Bradley fans...
I've read of 2ACR in 1991 leading with M1s vs M3s (IIRC, at 73 Easting).
Never seen anything about it in 2003. By then, most or all should have been at least M2A2, right?
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