Reconciliation and COIN in Afghanistan

[Dayuhan]

Speaking from an insider perspective, the real problem with the Foreign Service is cultural.... This attitude is reinforced at the organizational level by the fact that the Foreign Service is dominated by the regional bureaus, with the European Affairs Bureau (EUR) being the first among equals.

That's consistent with my observations... and I suspect that the eurocentric culture is going to cause us some problems down the line, not only in matters of stabilization and reconstruction. The rest of the world is becoming ever more significant, Europe is not the center of the universe, and we badly need to develop new peer-to-peer approaches to emerging nations that we once treated as subordinates, threats, or simply as irritations.

Although it pains me (a little) to admit it, State probably is not capable of taking on the reconstruction and stabilization role. A stand-alone expeditionary corps is the logical solution but as others have noted it will never happen because of interagency turf issues.

The ideal would be a multilateral agency, which could tap a wider range of expertise and avoid much of the baggage associated with direct American involvement... but of course that's even less likely to happen.

1. Only works with "States"

2. Does CT

3. Does COIN

4. or does Stabilization and Reconstruction.

We need a Foreign Office that leads the designs and implements foreign policy.

That's what State does. I think they could do it a lot better, but that will require new directions from above and a conscious attempt to change the culture within.

State is at least theoretically equipped and tasked to develop and implement foreign policy. The military and to a lesser extent CIA are equipped and tasked to manage CT and COIN. Nobody is equipped and tasked to manage stabilization and reconstruction, so these tasks are simply ignored, or handed off piecemeal to those who have neither the capacity nor the inclination to perform them.

I quite agree with your assessment of local perceptions of the Karzai government, but what to do about that problem remains a problem. Of course we can dump him and bail, but that almsot certainly means the return of the Taliban and of AQ, which would sacrifice the objective of the entire operation.

This just underscores the difficulty of creating and installing governments in other countries. It's exceedingly difficult, and if the first go doesn't work you can't simply dissolve the government you've created and have another go. If it doesn't work as planned it's easy to end up strapped to a government that cannot stand, but which you cannot allow to fall. Bad place to be.