Adapt Or Die

[Tom Odom]

We need to remember the enemy in COIN. He, too, adapts or dies. If he plays his hand poorly and our side plays its hand just a little better, we win and he loses - vice versa. In the end, our strategy, operations, and tactics do not need to be perfect, just better than the enemy's. I wonder how many COINs have been won at the margins.

One really interesting question is why the Army and USMC have adapted so much more rapidly than they did in Vietnam. I suspect that it involves less resistance at more senior levels to change. Part of that has to do with 15 years of reasonable emphasis at CGSC on MOOTW/LIC/and all the other 100 names. Part of it has to do with pretty good doctrine for much of that time in FM 100-20 (1990) and JP 3-07 (1995) and related doctrine pubs like FM 100-23 for any who cared to refer to them. Clearly, some officers have had experiences that have made them ready to draw analogies to COIN ops in Iraq and Afghanistan. And, it seems likely, that unlike several past instances , there was a cadre of senior and relatively senior officers who, when brought together, could and did provide a critical mass for change on the ground.

John,

If I had to point to one factor above all the others I would point to the existence of a tailored CTC program. NTC led the way in Gulf War 91 as the flagship of the heavy forces. JRTC led the way in 2001, rather JRTC had paved much of the way already. The variety of "assymetric" tactics and forces had long been a staple of JRTC.

The other link as self-serving as this sounds was CALL. Now I say that as much as a philosophical answer as a factual answer because what CALL represents is the attitude and the idea that we should learn and adapt. Where we fall short is where we fail to live up to that idea.

Taken in tandem and and now looking back a bit, I would say that JRTC was more than ready in 2004-2005 with all the elements of COIN as they emerged in 3-24. The small unit leaders were already doing most of what 3-24 callls for. What was missing was an approach that drew senior acceptance of ideas like "the best weapons in COIN don't shoot." It was not that we did not understand that idea; it was that senior leaders had to be led and in some cases bludgeoned into listening to such ideas. There was too much movement to contact and not enough situational understanding.

I don't discount anything you said above, I just point to the CTCs where leaders could actually put in motion what the schools taught and learn from the experience. To me the classic was the brigade commander of the Rakkasans who told vistors in 2002 that he had considered all the variety of elements portrayed at a JRTC rotation (pre-9-11) to be unrealistic until he ended up dealing with them all in Afghanistan.

Best

Tom

[Nat Wilcox]

What was missing was an approach that drew senior acceptance of ideas like "the best weapons in COIN don't shoot." It was not that we did not understand that idea; it was that senior leaders had to be led and in some cases bludgeoned into listening to such ideas.

Tom, a question. When you say "senior leaders," who do you mean, exactly? The reason I ask is that one of the "stories" we civvies hear in some of the media is that (to some extent) the senior civilian leadership took a long time to decide that an active COIN approach was necessary. In this "narrative" of recent events, civilian leadership putting Petraeus in charge allowed your platoon and company leaders to really do what they knew needed doing a long time ago--not simply to the extent they could on their own initiative, but in an integrated and whole-hearted way, which is (probably) a lot more effective overall. But this narrative also lets senior military leadership "off the hook" so to speak: It places the blame with the secretary of defense and the rest of the administration.

I am sure that as with most things, it is a mixture of the two so don't exclude the middle if that is the right answer. Anyway I am curious how y'all see this.

[John T. Fishel]

Tom--

I didn't mean to discount the CTCs, especially JRTC about which I had heard many good things regarding these kinds of war since at least 1995. With respect to CALL (and FMSO, SSI, and the school houses) I guess the old phrase, "You can lead the horse to water but you can't make him drink." applies. But if enough horses go to the water some will drink it and that may be enough which was sort of the point I was trying to make.

Nat--

Military senior leaders are usually seen as 06 and up (COL, GEN, Navy CAPT, Admirals). Some of it is perspective. For the junior guy, the BN commander is a senior leader (LTC). For the General, it is the 4 stars, and the civilian leaders such as the Deputy Assistant Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries, Undersecretaries, Secretaries, and POTUS. As the trooper who just posted points out, there is still a long way to go and a lot of blame among senior leaders at lower levels as well as higher. Still, I am encouraged when I see people like GEN Petraeus, LTG Odierno ( who really seems to have grown since he commanded 4th ID) Mike Meese, Dave Kilcullen, John Nagle, Con Crane, et. al. and the influence they have had and are having.

Cheers

JohnT

[Tom Odom]

Tom, a question. When you say "senior leaders," who do you mean, exactly? The reason I ask is that one of the "stories" we civvies hear in some of the media is that (to some extent) the senior civilian leadership took a long time to decide that an active COIN approach was necessary. In this "narrative" of recent events, civilian leadership putting Petraeus in charge allowed your platoon and company leaders to really do what they knew needed doing a long time ago--not simply to the extent they could on their own initiative, but in an integrated and whole-hearted way, which is (probably) a lot more effective overall. But this narrative also lets senior military leadership "off the hook" so to speak: It places the blame with the secretary of defense and the rest of the administration.

I am sure that as with most things, it is a mixture of the two so don't exclude the middle if that is the right answer. Anyway I am curious how y'all see this.

Nat,

My definition of senior leader these days really starts with the brigade commanders at full colonel for that is where they really start to have the flexibility to adapt or demonstrate their inability to do so.

I would agree on the inability of the senior civilian leaders to recognize an insurgency when senior military leaders were saying one was afoot, notabaly Abizaid and later Pace.

John T


Agreed on the mulutiple watering holes. I have used that analogy myself, trying to give the horse the choice between drinking or drowning. I had a young man in my office the other day and he was looking at the books after announcing he was there to see "the CALL stuff." He would pull something off the shelf and then put it back. Finally my NCO asked him if he was looking for something in particular, He said, "No. I don't put much stock in this written stuff. I just get out there and do..."

He left moments later and after confirming with my sergeant that I had heard what I thought I had heard, I told him, "That young man clearly prefers to learn by making mistakes, hopefully they won't get him or his soldiers killed."

Some horses just drown.

Tom

[Nat Wilcox]

Thanks, Tom and John T.

I have used that analogy myself, trying to give the horse the choice between drinking or drowning. I had a young man in my office the other day and he was looking at the books after announcing he was there to see "the CALL stuff." He would pull something off the shelf and then put it back. Finally my NCO asked him if he was looking for something in particular, He said, "No. I don't put much stock in this written stuff. I just get out there and do..."

He left moments later and after confirming with my sergeant that I had heard what I thought I had heard, I told him, "That young man clearly prefers to learn by making mistakes, hopefully they won't get him or his soldiers killed."

Some horses just drown.

Why, I might just print this up to hand to certain grad students at appropriate moments (though it is a very sad thought). With or without appropriate attribution as you wish, of course.

[Tom Odom]

Thanks, Tom and John T.



Why, I might just print this up to hand to certain grad students at appropriate moments (though it is a very sad thought). With or without appropriate attribution as you wish, of course.

if it helps them learn, feel free, Nat

[John T. Fishel]

Nat and Tom--

Great line!!!!

I'll have to follow Nat's lead with my undergrad and grad students.

JohnT

[arty8]

For what it's worth, CALL made the difference between success and failure during my unit's pre deployment and mob train up and our first couple of weeks here in Iraq. I've been a fan of CALL almost since it's beginning and a single small book--"Security Force Handbook" was just the ticket. I ordered over 100 copies to be delivered to Ft. Dix, NJ, our MOB site. I told my troops that these books were written in blood and when soldiers from our first sergeant to our newest private came to my tent to get a copy I knew that my job was done. Upon arrival in Iraq, I knew exactly what questions to ask during our relief in place. I can only hope that the big army exapands CALL instead of closing it down during the next drawdown.