TRADOC Losing Its Edge?

[Pete]

My original beef was with a "personality" who decided to take an ad hominen swipe at TRADOC in general and General Dempsey in particular, and cited as an example the creation of FM 3-24 which in fact was perfect illustration of TRADOC writ large and CG, TRADOC in particular (then General Wallace) acting/not-acting exactly as designed...

Actually it wasn't Tom Ricks who brought up the subject of FM 3-24 in his blog, it was me in the post that started this thread. In the comment section to Rick's online article on Friday I made a point of saying that it was the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center that was the agency responsible for writing the manual. The reason I mentioned FM 3-24 is because I suspect there's a reluctance within the Army to consider converting two or three active duty mech infantry divisions to a lighter TOE more suitable for COIN operations. Some company grade officers have also remarked that the COIN instruction at the branch basic and career courses isn't that great.

[Ken White]

...because I suspect there's a reluctance within the Army to consider converting two or three active duty mech infantry divisions to a lighter TOE more suitable for COIN operations...

That would be a huge mistake.

They've already added 'light' Bdes to heavy Divs and that isn't going to end well.

[Rob Thornton]

There is an interview over at National Journal Online with GEN Dempsey. The title: Adaptability is Power

Best, Rob

[Rob Thornton]

From Lt. Gen. David Barno quoted in today's Best Defense blog by Tom Ricks:

Quote:
I recently heard a senior Army leader describe assignments in the institutional Army as 'taking a knee' -- an astonishing put down reflective of this troubling shift in the Army culture. Remember -- this is the part of the Army that has responsibility for the doctrine, education, training and leader development upon which the successes of recent years were built. Many talented officers now avoid these key jobs, and civilian contractors are often taking their place -- to include a number of instructors at the Army's command and staff college, for example.

For the rest, click on:

http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts...ot_the_villain

I can't say for sure they are avoiding the assignments, some of it is due to operating force demands. However a hole is a hole, and I suspect there will be more of them and one sourcing solution will be contractors, another DA civilians.

I'm also not totally convinced of the quality issues associated with the use of civilians to teach ILE. From my perspective, the folks that taught my ILE class were very good, they were not outmoded or outdated, and they were very curious about our uniformed experiences and encouraged and facilitated working them into the course. At the top of the schools there is a uniformed leader who charts the course of what will be taught.

What concerns me is not the quality of the instruction, or the ability of the instructors to deliver the material (or take advantage of the students' experiences), rather its the question of determining if the things that are taught are in line with what we say we desire and require out of leaders. Until we answer the question of what we want our leaders to be capable of at each grade or position it will be hard to determine if what they are being taught is right or wrong, or can be improved upon. I think we could say the same for the other generating force responsibilities as well.

Best, Rob

[Fuchs]

What's "taking a knee" in this context? To rest?

[Steve Blair]

What's "taking a knee" in this context? To rest?

Giving up or surrendering, more or less.

[Rob Thornton]

Quote:
Originally Posted by Fuchs
What's "taking a knee" in this context? To rest?

Giving up or surrendering, more or less.

Steve, I think in this case the context did imply taking a break from operational assignments, or MTO&E units - or in today's terms deployments.

However, I have not seen that to be the case, Niel Smith is an example of a guy who prior to attending ILE was in a generating force assignment to help Army integrate COIN lessons into big Army. Niel not only benefitted Army by this assignment (and through his efforts many others), but also got some insights into how other parts of the Army work which I think benefitted him and may provide him with insights as he moves on to increasing positions of responsibility and authority.

There was a discussion on another thread about guys working in post BQ (branch qualifying) assignments as part of TRADOC and how they are selected - this not only includes time at Leavenworth, or the various branch school instructor positions, but also assignments in the NCR (National Capital Region), ACS (Advanced Civil Schooling), service academies, CTCs (Combat Training Centers) etc. Add to that a growing requirment for Army to augment MTO&E units and staff in theater to meet requirments for advisors, contracting officers, and a host of other functions and pretty soon Army is running the marathon at sprint speed. Indeed there are holes all over, so I'm not sure anybody is really taking a knee - but I do know that there are an awful lot of balls in the air, and I'm not sure we know which ones are glass, or why they are glass - hell, they may all be glass.

Best, Rob

[Rob Thornton]

OK - I fianlly got the link to work. I think its a combination and depends upon a point of view. I think it is also indicative of the stresses on the force. Its a good interview with LTG Barno, and he brings up some very important points.

Best, Rob

[Pete]

What Gen. Barno is saying is reminiscent of what Chief of Staff Gen. "Shy" Meyer was saying about the "Hollow Army" after the Vietnam War. Granted, today's problems are different, but the operational tempo is wearing the institution out.