Egypt's Spring Revolution (2011-2013)

[Dayuhan]

I have long ( going on 31 years...) contended that Carter's abysmal handling of the Tehran Embassy seizure, Reagan's foolish foray into Lebanon and the mishandling of that whole episode, Bush 41s failure to topple Saddam in 91 and Clinton's tail wagging (that's a celebrity buzz - pop culture reference not a veiled innuendo) led to the attacks in the US in 2001 (and others worldwide before that time). So I'm not a Reagan fan. However, while he didn't topple Marcos, he did take surprisingly and unusually (for the US outside a war) decisive action when many were urging him to not take the action he did -- that was my poorly stated point.That's always a wise course...

Going way OT... I'm not convinced that anything the US did was a decisive factor leading to the attacks in 2001. I suspect that the ultimate push coming to shove there was AQ's need for a foreign intervention in Muslim land to justify - and indeed to continue - its own existence.

My impression was that Reagan was pretty much the last holdout on the Marcos issue. Of course I watched it from this side rather than that, so there may be things I didn't see. I do know, though, that from the time of the disastrous (for Marcos) snap election and the blatantly obvious cheat, both State and CIA were desperately urging Washington to back away from Marcos, and I know for sure that the embassy people here were absolutely livid (not for the first or last time) over some of the pro-Marcos comments coming out of Washington. Seemed from here that by the time Reagan came 'round almost everyone else had already figured out that it was done.

One of the big differences between Manila '86 and Egypt '11, IMO, is that Manila '86 was triggered by local events, while events in Tunisia seem to have provided the spark for Cairo. Manila was the culmination of a chain of local events that allowed foreign observers to be better prepared and local players to be a bit better organized than they might have been in a more spontaneous outburst. The response to a failed election left a rival candidate and political apparatus in the picture, however tenuously, and created a possibility for rapid transition that is less evident in Egypt. In that sense, the Cairo spark may have been slightly premature.

It's often forgotten, of course, that the showdown in Manila was sparked not by Cory Aquino's supporters but by an opportunistic attempt at a military coup, which had it succeeded would not have led to a democratic transition.

That's what I meant by 'decisive' -- unusually rapid decision by the US to aid and abet what had indeed already been decided when the HKPP refused to fire on the protesters IIRC.

Again straying OT, but it's not entirely off (at least in my imagination) to look at key balance points in analogous situations...

It's often said that the tipping point in Manila was the refusal of the Philippine Marine contingent to fire on protesters at the EDSA/Ortigas junction on the afternoon of day 2. That was a dicey moment, and if they'd put a hundred PSG thugs in front of the Marines it would have been very different: there weren't more than 20 or 30 of us on the spot when it came right down to it... but it wasn't the tipping point, in my view. (And if anyone wonders, the story that "the nuns stopped the tanks" is a load of bollocks. There was not a nun in sight.)

I've also heard it said that the defection of most of the air force's helicopter assets early the next morning was the critical point, but again I disagree. It was a huge relief to those on the street who saw their arrival on the scene as a pretty major "this is gonna suck" moment, but it wasn't the tipping point.

The key, to me: a few hours after the helicopters landed in the opposition camp it was broadcast over radio and TV that Marcos had left the country. Often forgotten fact: up to that point, the crowds on the street weren't really all that big. Once the news of departure came out, within an hour the crowd multiplied exponentially. Pretty much all of Manila hit the street. The funny thing was... it wasn't true. I don't think it was an accident, either: it was inspired disinformation. By the time everyone realized that it wasn't true there were a million or so people on the street, and they just stayed. It was too obvious by that time that there was no way back for Marcos. That to me was the tipping point. Most of that crowd would never have committed if they thought Marcos was still there... but once they were out the outcome was just too obvious for anyone not to see it. There might be a lesson there somewhere about the utility of the barefaced lie at just the right moment.

I still wonder whose idea that was; never been able to find out.

[jmm99]

Although the author won't bet on a specific outcome, here are the three scenarios posited in Three Possible Scenarios for Egypt, February 3, 2011 · By Islam Qasem (Institute for Policy Studies - which has a "progressive" slant):

Hosni Mubarak is on his way out, but when and how remain open questions.
....
Scenario one: Mubarak and his lieutenants will try to ride out the unrest. They hope to wear out the crowds using the carrot-and-stick approach. They will promise to address political reforms, improve employment conditions, and allow freedom of speech. At the same time, they will display a show of power with the military scattered throughout the country and fighter jets sweeping low over the crowds. Come September, an election will be held in which Suleiman will do whatever it takes to get to the top. Suleiman and the rest of the military establishment believe that time is on their side as they take every necessary step to avoid a second uprising. Mubarak will step down as a great president who has served his country in an honorable way for 30 years. Meanwhile, the promises made of political reforms are unlikely to be kept. In sum, the status quo will be restored under the leadership of Suleiman.

Scenario two: Mubarak steps down, but the regime does not. If the crowds remain on the streets, Mubarak will be forced to leave office to give the regime a chance of survival. The average Egyptian abhors Mubarak more than anything else. He has come to exemplify all of Egypt’s current failings. By dumping Mubarak, the military regime will not only attempt to avoid clashes with the people but also to win their support. At this moment, the most important thing for the military regime is to keep the reins of power in its own hands. Under this scenario, there will be no radical changes in Egypt’s domestic or foreign policy. Egypt will remain on the same path as in the first scenario.

Scenario three: Mubarak and the regime step down. What the people demand is a complete transformation of the political landscape: the resignation of the military regime that has dominated Egypt’s politics since the Free Officers’ revolution in 1952. A successful regime change in Egypt will have a domino effect throughout the entire region, ushering in a radically different Middle East. At home, the Egyptian society will have to endure a hard period of transition, during which lessons will have to be learned in political compromise, pragmatism, and consensus. At the same time, Islamists of all strips and colors will be emboldened. On the foreign policy front, no other country will feel the pain more than Israel. After all, Egypt and Israel fought four wars. Although a peace treaty was signed between the two countries, Egyptian society has never really legitimized it, and the late president Anwar Sadat paid for it with his own life. The second loser will be the United States. After decades of supporting Mubarak and pursuing narrow-minded policies in the region, U.S. popularity is at rock-bottom.

Logically, the third scenario should have variants; but I'm too ignorant of Egyptian political groups to suggest specifics. The Muslim Brotherhood gathered about 20% of the vote when it was allowed to present candidates; but that leaves a large slice for others.

Anyone with reasonable knowledge of Egyptian political groups ?

Regards

Mike

[Ken White]

Going way OT... I'm not convinced that anything the US did was a decisive factor leading to the attacks in 2001.

Not sure it's OT. 'Decisiveness' is an issue in this thread. The US government is, by design, not decisive. That lack of decisiveness arguably led to halfhearted measures -- easier to attain or perform -- in response to 30 years of provocations from the ME; not from Muslims -- though most were that -- from the ME. That lack of decisive action led to knowledge (not a perception but true knowledge) that the US could not and would not respond well and thus could be slowly nibbled at and the resultant irrtiation and attrition would cause overstretch at a minimum and self flagellating destruction at best.

I suspect that the ultimate push coming to shove there was AQ's need for a foreign intervention in Muslim land to justify - and indeed to continue - its own existence.

If by ultimate push you mean the aircraft flights, perhaps. However one should recall that the provocations started internationally with the attack at the Munich Olympics in 1972, accelerated over the next few years and first involved the US with the seizure of the Embassy in Tehran -- Osama was a 22 year old playboy at the time. Subsequent attacks and provocation were from the Muslim Brotherhood, a precursor to Hezbollah and various other, non AQ elements.

It's a great deal bigger than AQ who are nothing much to lose sleep over. Hezbollah is more worrying and the broader outlook even more so.

My impression was that Reagan was pretty much the last holdout on the Marcos issue... Seemed from here that by the time Reagan came 'round almost everyone else had already figured out that it was done.

That is my impression also. Thus my comment that the decision was surprising and unusual.

It's often said that the tipping point in Manila was the refusal of the Philippine Marine contingent to fire on protesters at the EDSA/Ortigas junction on the afternoon of day 2. That was a dicey moment, and if they'd put a hundred PSG thugs in front of the Marines it would have been very different: there weren't more than 20 or 30 of us on the spot when it came right down to it... but it wasn't the tipping point, in my view. (And if anyone wonders, the story that "the nuns stopped the tanks" is a load of bollocks. There was not a nun in sight.)

I bow to the guy who was on the ground...

I still wonder whose idea that was; never been able to find out.

He or she may not even realize that idea was a spark. Or they may have known precisely what it would do. Some thing can remain unknown unknowns...

Meanwhile, in Egypt today:

The apparent indecisiveness in Washington is a feature not a bug. It has penalties, always has -- but the benefits make those shortfalls bearable IMO. Decisive action akin to Truman and Korea, Reagan and an airplane or either Bush and Iraq are the exception rather than the rule. I personally would not opt to change that for a more decisive form of government. We muddle along but get more right than wrong...

Likely will do so in North Africa -- and the ME; it'll just take a while.

[Fuchs]

... in response to 30 years of provocations from the ME; not from Muslims -- though most were that -- from the ME. That lack of decisive action led to knowledge (not a perception but true knowledge) that the US could not and would not respond well and thus could be slowly nibbled at and the resultant irrtiation and attrition would cause overstretch at a minimum and self flagellating destruction at best.

Ah, the old hawk song, where only shouts and fists supposedly work well on certain people. It's apparently a matter of attitude whether people believe this song or not.



I don't get your "30 years", though.

I can easily identify 33 years of provocations of Arabs by the U.S. (taking the first delivery of F-4 Phantom II in 1968 as marking).

30 years of provocations of the U.S. from the region seems otherwise a bit stretched, for I don't recall an earlier significant incident than 1979 embassy crisis. That was Iran (Persians, not Arabs!), though.
2001 - 30 = 1971. What exactly did Arabs do to the U.S. around that time?


Why exactly do you believe that the U.S. was not strong enough in its responses? I recall it bombed Libya in the 1980's quite strongly.


In short: I don't call this 'They are the aggressors and we powerful and patient people didn't push them back, but appeased them.' view.

[Ken White]

Ah, the old hawk song, where only shouts and fists supposedly work well on certain people. It's apparently a matter of attitude whether people believe this song or not.

Speaking of attitude...

One could suggest that the songs you believe are at least equally flawed -- if not more so...

But I digress. Lemme give you a hawkish comment. If you allow people to bulldoze you or shout you down, then they will. You, Fuchs, personally typify the antithesis of that because you do not allow that to occur. Nor should you. Nor should a nation tolerate continued -- note that word, continued -- provocations from a single source. Not a single party, a single source which may involve multiple parties. The Middle East was and is such a source and it does provide multiple parties with various grudges and strategies -- it is not monolithic.

We did tolerate such provocations from a single source, partly trying to be nice and partly assuming that as the provenance of theses acts varied there were different actors, multiple sources, involved. Wrong deduction, same crowd, different players.

I don't get your "30 years", though.

Not surprising, it's hard to see through bias blinders.

I can easily identify 33 years of provocations of Arabs by the U.S. (taking the first delivery of F-4 Phantom II in 1968 as marking).

You weren't paying attention -- you weren't even born, in fact. Crowbat is closer but even he's about eight years late (Google ArAmCo and look around). Franklin D. Roosevelt started diddling around in the ME in 1942, met Ibn Saud in the Great Bitter Lake in 1945...

30 years of provocations of the U.S. from the region seems otherwise a bit stretched, for I don't recall an earlier significant incident than 1979 embassy crisis. That was Iran (Persians, not Arabs!), though.

Allow me to repeat what I wrote:

"in response to 30 years of provocations from the ME; not from Muslims -- though most were that -- from the ME."

Note the ME, for Middle East, which includes Iran. The Iraniha , some of them at any rate, were upset with us for moving in to their country, uninvited and supporting the old Shah in 1943. The fact that the main intent was to force the then present USSR to back off and leave Iran often gets lost in all the ill informed left wing rhetorical flourishes. That long predates Bob's World's Operation Ajax in 1953 which placed that Shah's son on the throne. Regardless of motivation -- and erroneous assumptions, the Persians led the ME -- again, as they had for centuries. They broke the ice, so to speak in attacking the Great Satan -a and getting away with it. The Arabs then piled on -- ME way of warfare...

If you doubt that, you should spend some time there and get out on the street and talk to people. Not Academics, the elites -- the people.

2001 - 30 = 1971. What exactly did Arabs do to the U.S. around that time?

Just plotted. As a result of the Munich attack, Nixon directed a study (LINK) which got rolling (at the Deputy level, really) and produced a report which was remarkably prescient. So we've been interested since the early 70s (LINK), over 30 years -- and so was the opposition...

Why exactly do you believe that the U.S. was not strong enough in its responses? I recall it bombed Libya in the 1980's quite strongly.

Not at all strongly; better than nothing perhaps -- maybe not. Sometimes minor efforts like that do more harm than good and make one look rather ineffectual. All of our ME responses were like that, ineffectual -- until Iraq (and that wasn't as good as it should have been because DoD and the US Armed Forces did not do a good job)

The US is always more concerned with domestic politics than it is with the broader world. Nixon's effort produce some good results which were ignored. Carter totally mishandled the hostage crisis by actually sending the Ayatollah Ruhollah K. a letter saying he would not use force. Khomeini had been about to direct the Students (note that world, ponder Taliban and look at Tunisia and Egypt today...) at the Embassy to release the hostages but upon receipt of Carter's letter, told then to continue the march. Reagan Failed utterly in first sending troops to Lebanon in 1983, second in allowing State to tie their hands and thirdly in doing little to nothing about the Embassy and troop billet bombings and latterly by withdrawing -- that merely encouraged everyone to believe the US had no staying power. In his defense, he learned from that and thus the Libyan attack in 1986, though it was really not much of an effort. Follow him with Bush 41 failing to topple Saddam -- some moderately good reasons not to but in the ME a very different message was received. Then Somalia and Clinton's feeble effort, all of which failed to impress anyone.

In short: I don't call this 'They are the aggressors and we powerful and patient people didn't push them back, but appeased them.' view.

We can differ on that.

All of which is off thread. So if you want to continue this, let's do it by PM.

[Fuchs]

I took your "ME" as "Arabs" because it makes no sense to discuss 9/11 and Iran together.

The Munich assassinations were about Arabs and Israel, not about the U.S. - this cannot seriously be counted as ME-born provocation against the U.S..

You still did not explain which Arab/ME actions of around '71 pointed the beginning of provocations against the U.S..
This is central to your earlier idea that the U.S. did not respond appropriately to provocations for three decades. No provocations = no lacking response.

Even worse, the whole idea that the U.S. was too soft/dovish towards ME powers/extremists/whatever seems to be clearly unhistorical to me.

------

About Egypt: Foreign agents may play a great role, but considering the possibility that a dictator might use rumours about this for his political survival, I'm for skipping unproven theories and for not adding rumours to the mix.

Most if not all intelligence services are apparently (see 20th century history) rather ineffective at inciting popular revolts anyway. They have much "better" track records with sponsoring extremists or military coups.

[Ken White]

I took your "ME" as "Arabs" because it makes no sense to discuss 9/11 and Iran together.

If one does not realize the linkage and pervasive influence of the Persian Empires (plural) throughout the area on mores and attitudes, I can understand that. OTOH, if one is aware of that, the linkage is obvious. As I said, the Persians have been out in front of the Arabs for centuries...

They had as much if not more influence on the ME and eastern North Africa than did Islam and far more than did the Ottomans.

The Munich assassinations were about Arabs and Israel, not about the U.S. - this cannot seriously be counted as ME-born provocation against the U.S.

In order; Of course they were, True - I didn't say it was.

However, it was the first big transnational terrorist attack against the West and emanating from the ME. It was a harbinger of things to come and it was extremely important because the west got a wakeup call and except for the formation of GSG 9, mostly ignored it...

That is true of the US, Nixon wisely said let's take a look, we did, saw what was going to happen -- and did nothing. Mostly because of domestic politics (It seems de rigueur in the US for a new Administration to disavow ANYTHING the previous Admin did...). We sat on our hands and let a problem develop when we could have taken diplomatic and economic steps to forestall or defuse the problem. Contrary to what you seem to believe, every comment that inadequate action was taken does not entail attack or a military response -- those are usually, IMO, ill advised. However, I do believe that if they are necessary, as they occasionally are, they should be effective. I'd even go a step further and say that if such measures are employed, necessary or not, they should be effective and not just futile swats. Those can result in doing more harm than good (witness most of the past 30 years...[from today]).

You still did not explain which Arab/ME actions of around '71 pointed the beginning of provocations against the U.S.

Sorry, thought it would be obvious. Apparently not. This is 2011, just barely. Thirty years ago would make it 1981 and Reagan would have been recently inaugurated and the Hostages released. I should have been more precise and instead of saying 30 years (meaning a not stated 'from today' and as a rough or approximate figure) should have written "since 4 November 1979..."

This is central to your earlier idea that the U.S. did not respond appropriately to provocations for three decades. No provocations = no lacking response.

Try recomputing with that 1979 start date, see if that works, don't forget to count the Embassy bombings (all of them), attacks on the World Trade Center (all of them), the Barracks bombings (all of them), the aircraft hijackings and bombings (all of them) and I think you'll come up with a fair total over the first 22 of that 30 plus years. Not quite one major attack a year but not far off, either.

Throw in the ship attacks plus Viet Nam and Somalia -- which you may not deem important in this context but of which many in the ME and Asia are well aware and often cite, not least including Bin Laden and Zawahiri, the Egyptian and Abu Yahya al-Libi -- the Libyan AQ strategist. .

As an aside, you seem to accord the 2001 attacks far more importance than I do. While extracting a higher body count and having great symbolic effect, it was just another attack IMO, just one more (or three or four more, depending upon how one counts) atop all the others over the [from 2001] previous 22 years (and that's a figure I've used often on this board...).

Even worse, the whole idea that the U.S. was too soft/dovish towards ME powers/extremists/whatever seems to be clearly unhistorical to me.

If one paid attention -- and few outside the US had or have any reason to do so -- one might come to a different conclusion. I did, do and have...

Most if not all intelligence services are apparently (see 20th century history) rather ineffective at inciting popular revolts anyway. They have much "better" track records with sponsoring extremists or military coups.

True. So we can agree on that.

Also on Egypt -- that first comment of mine above -- "linkage and pervasive influence of the Persian Empires (plural) throughout the area on mores and attitudes" -- applies to Egypt as well...

[Fuchs]

Come on, if you argue with the Persian empire, I can argue with the Roman Empire, Alexander's successor states (Greek), the Byzantine (effectively Greek again) Empire and - this blows a 2,300 y.o. empire to pieces - the Ottoman Empire, which controlled the region for centuries well into the 20th century (Turks).

You overstate the influence of Persians/Iran in the Arab world badly.
They're a different crowd and the actions of some people in Tehran in '79 had as much to do with later AQ-style terrorism as did the attack on the Embassy in Saigon.


Moreover, you're moving goalposts. You CANNOT have meant 1979 with your 30 years statement without having written nonsense.

(...)That lack of decisiveness arguably led to halfhearted measures -- easier to attain or perform -- in response to 30 years of provocations from the ME;(...)

You were clearly writing about 30 years with only halfhearted measures. This could impossibly include the last nine years. It would at most have been 22 years (79-01) of half-hearted measures, not 30.

Furthermore, the bombardment of Libya in 1986 with 60 dead cannot seriously be considered half-hearted. A full war would have been disproportionate and unnecessary.


I still don't buy this revisionist view that the U.S. was overly passive and Arabs/ME/Muslims/whatever were the provoking party.
At most, the history of the post-WW2 relationship between the U.S. and the Arab world could be called troublesome and full of minor offenses/skirmishing from both sides (with the biggest offenses being the invasion of Iraq, decades of support for Israel and 9/11 - in this order).

[jmm99]

Foreign Affairs Coverage of the Crisis in Egypt and the Middle East - Summary: A collection of continuing Foreign Affairs coverage of the crisis in Egypt and the Middle East (most recent posted this week):

The Muslim Brotherhood After Mubarak: What the Brotherhood Is and How it Will Shape the Future
Carrie Rosefsky Wickham
February 3, 2011
Portraying the Muslim Brotherhood as eager and able to seize power and impose its version of sharia on an unwilling citizenry is a caricature that exaggerates certain features of the Brotherhood and underestimates the extent to which the group has changed over time.

The U.S.-Egyptian Breakup: Washington's Options in Cairo
Steven A. Cook
February 2, 2011
With the political era of Hosni Mubarak coming to an end, is the strategic relationship between Cairo and Washington similarly finished? The Obama administration must scale back its ambitions to affect change in Cairo.

Israel's Neighborhood Watch: Egypt's Upheaval Means that Palestine Must Wait
Yossi Klein Halevi
February 1, 2011
With Hezbollah calling the shots in Lebanon and Islamists poised to gain power in Egypt, Israel sees itself as almost completely encircled by Iranian allies or proxies. Where does this leave the future of a sovereign Palestine state?

Letter From Cairo: The People's Military in Egypt?
Eric Trager
January 30, 2011
As protests continue in Egypt, both sides -- the protesters in the streets and the Mubarak regime -- are wondering exactly which side the Egyptian military is supporting. Does the army hold the key to the country's political endgame?

The Psychology of Food Riots: When Do Price Spikes Lead to Unrest?
Evan Fraser and Andrew Rimas
January 30, 2011
The connection among rising prices, hunger, and violent civic unrest seems intuitively logical. But there was more to Tunisia's food protests than the logic of the pocketbook. The psychological element -- a sense of injustice that arises between seeing food prices rise and pouring a Molotov cocktail -- is more important.

Letter From Beirut: Crime and Punishment in the Levant: Lebanon’s False Choice Between Stability and Justice
Michael Young
January 26, 2011
In bringing down its government last week, did Lebanon just witness a coup d’etat or did it narrowly dodge civil war? Either way, Damascus, Tehran, and Washington are all watching.

Morning in Tunisia: The Frustrations of the Arab World Boil Over
Michele Penner Angrist
January 16, 2011
Last week's mass protests in Tunisia were less a symptom of economic malaise than of a society fed up with its broken dictatorship. Should the other autocratic regimes in the Middle East and North Africa be afraid?

Is El Baradei Egypt's Hero? Mohamed El Baradei and the Chance for Reform (broken link)
Steven A. Cook
March 26, 2010
The return of Mohamed El Baradei to Egypt has raised questions about the country's political system and the rule of President Hosni Mubarak. Is reform possible, and if so, is El Baradei the man to lead it?

Back to the Bazaar
Martin Indyk
January/February 2002
The United States has an opportunity to set new terms for its alliances in the Middle East. The bargain struck with Egypt and Saudi Arabia after the Gulf War seemed successful for a decade, but now the United States is facing the consequences: Washington backed Cairo's and Riyadh's authoritarian regimes, and they begat al Qaeda. The Bush administration should heed the lesson.

Cheers

Mike

[CrowBat]

Crowbat is closer but even he's about eight years late (Google ArAmCo and look around). Franklin D. Roosevelt started diddling around in the ME in 1942, met Ibn Saud in the Great Bitter Lake in 1945...Allow me to repeat what I wrote:

Aramco's original involvement in exploring oil in Saudi Arabia was "business" (and not particularly successful at first); nothing special as such. It turned a "provocation" when the US upheld al-Sauds on the throne and practically turned the country into a military protectorate, in the 1940s and 1950s.

So, I must admit, I'm as confused at this analogy as Fuchs appears to be.

"in response to 30 years of provocations from the ME; not from Muslims -- though most were that -- from the ME."

Note the ME, for Middle East, which includes Iran. The Iraniha , some of them at any rate, were upset with us for moving in to their country, uninvited and supporting the old Shah in 1943.

They couldn't get more upset over what the USA were doing in 1943 than they already were over what the British and the Soviets did in 1941. Then, note that the Shah's son - Reza Pahlavi II - was placed on the throne instead of his father by the British, and already in 1941-1942: what the Americans did in 1953 was "just" to return the same Shah Reza Pahlavi II to the power - and this with help of the same clergy that later stole the revolution of 1978. As such, that was also no "ME provocation", but an US intervention and a provocation. The "payback" bill was delivered in 1978-1979...

Regardless of motivation -- and erroneous assumptions, the Persians led the ME -- again, as they had for centuries. They broke the ice, so to speak in attacking the Great Satan -a and getting away with it. The Arabs then piled on -- ME way of warfare...

I'm sorry, but you're really mixing two entirely different things here. If the "Persians" lead the way, then certainly not with their example of "attacking the Great Satan". Then, their biggest "attack" on the USA before 1979 was the Shah's drive to increas oil prices, in the early 1970s.

Quite on the contrary. What created the modern-day antagonism against the USA was a) Johson admin's decision to abandon the policy of neutrality in the Arab-Israeli conflict, after the 1967 War, and b) the Israeli victory during that War. This brought the al-Sauds and Wahhabists to the idea that a religiously motivated fighter can win wars, and from that moment onwards they began promoting and financing Islamist extremism all around the world. It's easy to follow this development on the basis of activity of various resistance/terrorist groups, (Palestinian as well as others): originally, they had nothing to do with religion at all (on the contrary, many were centrists or even leftists), nor were active against the USA. This began to change after the 1967 War.

And now watch the US reaction to this development: Al-Sauds became the "best friends", and their financing of the development of a major terrorist base in Pakistan was supported as well - with argumentation of the fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Zia ul-Haq, who was instrumental in turning Pakistan into the Islamist quagmire as we know it today (with extensive Saudi financing), became Reagan's favourite and Pakistan was left to make its own nuke...

As a result of the Munich attack, Nixon directed...

I'm sorry to interrupt here, but Nixon did not wait for the Munich attack: Kissinger began his tenure with ignoring Sadat's peace-proposal from 1970. That aside, the US intervention in the Arab-Israeli conflict was already going on since at least 1969 (see deliveries of F-4s, which started in 1969 and prompted the Soviet intervention in Egypt, in 1970). It was continued through 1970 (see Kissinger's development of the politics of "ignoring" the Israeli nuclear weapons, and his ignoring of Sadat's peace proposal) and later on, all well ahead of Munich.

One could draw similar parallels - once more related to Egypt - to Reagan's reaction to Sadat's assassination, in October 1981. That was the moment Egypt (plus Sudan at the time) was granted US$1 billion + in military aid for the first time, and the USA launched a host of military and intelligence operations against Libya (does "Early Call" ring any bells here?), which eventually lead to knocking out of that country, in the 1990s. Simultaneously, through all of this time, absolutely nothing has been undertaken to decrease the spread of Wahhabism by the Saudis.

The US is always more concerned with domestic politics than it is with the broader world. Nixon's effort produce some good results which were ignored. Carter totally mishandled the hostage crisis by actually sending the Ayatollah Ruhollah K. a letter saying he would not use force. Khomeini had been about to direct the Students (note that world, ponder Taliban and look at Tunisia and Egypt today...) at the Embassy to release the hostages but upon receipt of Carter's letter, told then to continue the march.

Sorry, but this sounds very much like a misinterpretation to me. Khomeini was surprised by the take-over himself, at first, though he certainly did not wait for any letters from Carter before, only two days later, sending his own thugs to take over from the students. So, he did not escalate the situation because of Carter's (undisputable) "weakness", but for his own reasons.

Reagan Failed utterly in first sending troops to Lebanon in 1983, second in allowing State to tie their hands and thirdly in doing little to nothing about the Embassy and troop billet bombings and latterly by withdrawing -- that merely encouraged everyone to believe the US had no staying power.

I never heard any Arab or Islamist complaining about this. I do recall, though, bitter complaints about the defeat of the "Arab issue" by the Israelis in Lebanon, and the Libyan deafeat (at the hand of a CIA-supported "liberation movement") in Tchad, in 1982. That's why I still find this analogy....well, without foundation.

All of which is off thread. So if you want to continue this, let's do it by PM.

Some of this is crucial for this thread. Particularly Reagan's "installation" of Mubarak and opening of the US military aid program for Egypt: without these two actions, who knows what would Egypt look alike nowadays...?

[Ken White]

Aramco's original involvement in exploring oil in Saudi Arabia was "business" (and not particularly successful at first); nothing special as such. It turned a "provocation" when the US upheld al-Sauds on the throne and practically turned the country into a military protectorate, in the 1940s and 1950s.

So, I must admit, I'm as confused at this analogy as Fuchs appears to be.

So let me add to the confusion.

ArAmCo was the nose of the Camel. No more, no less. A Camel that had FDR's full knowledge and support. Quite full. Devious old dude, he. Wanted to see British and French Colonies disappear the better for American companies to sell in those 'former' colonies and spheres of influence...

Re: The British and Soviets in Iran. True. Both those folks are soundly detested, the US is merely mildly disliked by most Iraniha. That is obviously a generalization but I believe it to be fairly accurate as such.

On Reza and Reza II the perception in Iran was, some years ago, that the US had lobbied for the old man and then been persuaded by the British to support the son and that the US did so. The 1953 coup was as you note supported by the same Clergy that did indeed steal the 1978 Revolution.

The Shah drove to increase oil prices in the 1969-71 period in an effort to convince the US to support his demand for more and better weapons which were being denied him by the then US Administration (my pet strory being the denial of sale of a dozen O-2s which the IIAF got around by ordering them from Reims Aviation...). It worked. The tale of how the Phantoms came to be sold is a cautionary tale in itself and I do not know all the details but do know US domestic politics were heavily involved and Kissinger just pushed the opportunity...

On the Johnson decision to increase support for Israel, you are of course correct and there is no question the results were much as you say and as the common knowledge hold. I did not address the US errors and shortfalls, errors and just plain stupid actions that in many cases led, quite understandably and correctly IMO, to the hostility toward us because, while germane to that hostility, I presumed they were all common knowledge and should be understood. They are of course important in context and in fairness but not important to my point of a pattern of US flawed responses. There have been many errors on both sides of this equation and they are not going to be easily forgiven. The good news is that the US attention span is so short, we'll get over it. For the ME, that is not likely to be the case -- and for the US, that should but may not be a cautionary.

Nixon waited for the Munich attack to get interested in international terrorism as a weapon. That was the point. The political maneuverings you cite were indeed provocative to the ME -- again, I did not mention US provocations that caused the, uh, rather intense dislike and resultant action that emanated from the ME. My point was that 30 years (from 2010-11 ) of the not mentioned US provocations led to 30 years of ME provocations in an effort at retaliation (deserved, perhaps) and that the US failure to properly respond to those puts us pretty much where we are today. Let me emphasize that my idea of proper response was not and is not all military.

I think this:

Sorry, but this sounds very much like a misinterpretation to me. Khomeini was surprised by the take-over himself, at first, though he certainly did not wait for any letters from Carter before, only two days later, sending his own thugs to take over from the students. So, he did not escalate the situation because of Carter's (undisputable) "weakness", but for his own reasons.

is not correct. Khomeini was indeed surprised (as to an extent were the Students themselves...) but he had very early notice from Brzezinski that no force would be used. Exactly what happened and his thinking, neither of us could know.

This is a valid complaint:

...but have a strong feeling you're throwing quite a lot of unrelated events on the same pile, while ignoring the US involvement in many of them. At least you blame wrong people for attacks on the USA. I also don't agree with the premise of the US - generally - acting "lamely", or being provoked.

to a great extent, particularly in that the posts you've read on this thread do not address US stupidity in many areas (though I have mentioned them in other threads). They were omitted for brevity (heh...) not to deny or obfuscate.

The events are in fact unconnected -- but they are also a pattern. That pattern gets ignored by too many and can -- will -- lead to more US errors...

For example:

In what way are - for example - Islamists from Egypt that turned so extreme they are not accepted even by their own "brothers" (from the Brotherhood), related to the Persians?

Sorry, not the least.

Furthermore, if you continue connecting these dots...and to bring us back to the actual topic of this thread: don't you find it at least "curious" that the people that run the AQ and became involved in actions against the US, emerged after Mubarak came to power, and since the USA began delivering extensive military aid to Egypt? Prior to that the MBs did not care the least about Washington. If you study them more closely, you find out that their motivation has nothing to do with the Iranian Shi'a, but with the Saudi Wahhabists. They turned against the USA after the US troops "violated the holy soil" of Saudi Arabia, in 1990. They were trained by the ISI in Pakistan in projects financed 50:50 by the USA and the Saudis, and ignored by the US while spreading their ideas from Marocco and Nigeria, via India to the Philippines.

I think you made my point...

A series of unrelated but flawed policies and perceptions on both sides; the ME as an entity and its multi varied polity and the US, equally multi varied; has put us where we are today. The US as the nominally more rich and seemingly powerful has an obligation IMO to be much smarter about what it does and how it does it -- but that does not remove the actions of varied actors from the ME over a period of years in a pattern that have led to yet more stupid actions.

The issue of this sub thread to me is that flawed US reactions to events trigger more events and thus the self replicating pattern becomes embedded. That cycle need to be broken.

You also mentioned Somalia: as of 1981-1983, Somalia was a recipient of the US military aid, as a counter... Now, do you think Ethiopia or Somalia ever "provoked" the USA, or any US admin to have been "soft" to them too?

Not at all. What many in the world fail to realize is that the US government reinvents itself at 2, 4, 6 and /or 8 year intervals due to our political process. That is no excuse for blundering in policy and international relations but it is the reason for a good bit of it. Those elected on the cycles mentioned do not react to the international community -- they react to US domestic politics, period. Perhaps they should be more internationally aware (certainly many of us think so) and they are getting better due to enhanced communication (if only our news media were better -- but that's another thread) but US domestic politics drive much of our 'diplomacy.'

All the things you cite with respect to the horn of Africa are true -- but the point I was making was that Bush 41's effort to send US Troops to Somalis was flawed because we just sent targets (as did Regan in 1983...). That was exacerbated by Clinton's stupid directive to "get Aideed" and that in turn was not helped by the badly flawed tactics of JSOC and the Rangers; the upshot was that Clinton ordered a withdrawal and that withdrawal was seen by the would be desert raiders of much of the ME as a weakness. It was a weakness but it got misconstrued...

This sub thread is about misconstrueing

That said, Bob's World has some good points with which I agree also.