Re-structuring the BCT

**Fuchs** · 06-30-2010

Operational deception is a problem for MI analysts and commanders, not for recce folks in the field. They report what they have.

Large-scale deception works rarely, and almost never without the assistance of the fooled ones. The German army had almost no air reconnaissance on the Eastern Front after summer of 1944 and never got seriously surprised again.
Large operations require large preparations.

I'm sure it was possible to learn about Tet in advance as well, but sometimes MI and commanders provoke being fooled by being too fixed in their beliefs.

Nevertheless, recce can yield the opposing commander's intent.

Again - judgment of recce reports is not the problem of recce folks in the field.
Everything can be misunderstood - even orders (charge of the light brigade...).

**Ken White** · 06-30-2010

Originally Posted by Fuchs

Operational deception is a problem for MI analysts and commanders, not for recce folks in the field. They report what they have.

True -- and they can be and have been fooled by tactical deception...

I'm sure it was possible to learn about Tet in advance as well, but sometimes MI and commanders provoke being fooled by being too fixed in their beliefs.

Totally true -- and a belief that they knew the opponents intent lulled them into not expecting the magnitude of the attacks. Thanks for recalling that...

Nevertheless, recce can yield the opposing commander's intent.

How?

Again - judgment of recce reports is not the problem of recce folks in the field.

True and no one here is saying that it is as nearly as I can tell. However, recall that some Commander, somewhere, is going to make use of those reports to determine capabilities and to try to infer probabilities. He will not in most cases be able to get into the mind of his opponent.

What Wilf and I are saying is that you can ascertain capabilities and even, if you're lucky -- or really good -- probabilities but you can not determine the opposing commanders intentions. Further, that even if you were able to do so, he can change in a second to do something unexpected and you can be working of what was or has become an erroneous conclusion. You have to ass u me intentions, never a good plan...

**TAH** · 06-30-2010

Ken and Wilf say potato Luchs and I say patato

Within some limits, agressive recon/recce gives you insights into what the enemy may do next. However, there is a chance that that's exactly what the sneaky SOB wants you to think.

Target on the Mover ???

**Ken White** · 06-30-2010

Originally Posted by TAH

Ken and Wilf say potato Luchs and I say patato

Within some limits, agressive recon/recce gives you insights into what the enemy may do next. However, there is a chance that that's exactly what the sneaky SOB wants you to think.

Target on the Mover ???

Your "within some limits" sort of equals my "...you can ascertain capabilities and even, if you're lucky -- or really good -- probabilities but you can not determine the opposing commanders intentions." (all emphasis added / kw). That's sorta semantic, I guess...

As an aside, I agree with you on the principles of cavalry / reconnaissance operations and capabilities with the caveat that recon by stealth can work in MCO and it has been done by us if rarely. Other armies do it more often, we just don't usually have the patience for it ala your comment on OpTempo (as desired by some Cdr somewhere...).

So, as on old Cav Colonel once said "...we just go out looking for trouble and to do that, you have to have armor."

**Fuchs** · 06-30-2010

Here's a really simplified description of ground recce. I just feel like dropping it here.

Commanders send small units on reconnaissance missions till they run into a deadly ambush in order to avoid that the whole formation runs into deadly ambushes.

From this point of view, it's no wonder that modern ground reconnaissance doesn't seem to be highly successful. Nowadays, we want to keep all own troops away from deadly ambushes.