Sure. I'll repeat my opinion:Originally Posted by JMA
Under the Putin administration, Russia has emerged from the shadow of the collapse of the USSR. Since 1991, Russia has participated in ten conflicts with a 70% success rate. Russia still has many challenges but given the reference point of the chaos of the Yeltsin administration, today's Russia is much more capable and confident than it was 20 years ago.
However - that's not the reference point for Russia's elite. The perceived height of Russia's status was in its previous incarnation as the USSR and that's what the current regime (an alliance of nationalists and realists, with some technocrats) is pursuing. Hence the risk-taking behavior (i.e. Georgia and Ukraine conflicts) to restore its former status. Sometime during the first Putin administration, the nationalists and realists finally made a break from the policies inherited from the liberals in the Yeltsin administration. Instead of democratizing Russia and transforming it into a West-phalian nation-state, they've reverted to restoring the imperial system of the USSR (and Empire).
All of this is taking place within two contexts: the escalating confrontational characteristics of the U.S.-Russian dyadic, and the shifting of the balance of international power as U.S. entered its period of retrenchment. The confrontations between U.S. and Russia really started during the Clinton years but really came to the fore under Bush - at a time when Russia was also more confident in its own capabilities. That collapse in relations untethered Russia from the last of its committments to the U.S. and its integration into the Western community (capped by its membership in the WTO). The period of U.S. retrenchment also invited opportunitist states that preceive their relative power increasing relative to the U.S. - namely China and Russia. States are more risk adverse when pursuing gains instead of defending against losses, so more aggressive behavior is an indicator of a reduction of risk (i.e. U.S. deterrence). What signals has the U.S. given to Russia between 2001 and 2014? Color revolutions, invasion of Iraq, financial crisis, response to Georgia, Yanukovych affair, ABM treaty, missile defense, withdrawal of U.S. European forces -- all of these things are signals. What message(s) do they convey about U.S. capabilities and the stability of the international system? Namely that U.S. power is in relative decline and that the norms of the international system championed by the U.S. are optional. Since 2003, U.S. credibility has been significantly damaged as a result.
The same problem exists in the U.S. What are American reference points, perceived and ascribed status? If perception exists of relative U.S. decline and Russian gain, that heightens the feeling of insecurity, even if there are worlds between U.S. and Russian capabilities.
So now we come to Ukraine. Russia perceives itself with increased capabilities and confidence, but not sufficient status. It also perceives U.S. relative decline - hence the constant calls for a multi-centered international system. The U.S., in turn, is insecure given the outcomes of the War on Terrorism and the continued political infighting that has paralyzed effective government. That hasn't changed U.S. policies - the execution of the smart power campaign to topple Yanukoyvch and install pro-Western officials fits in the tradition U.S. playbook. But Russia called our bluff; the U.S. had no back up plan (military or otherwise) hence the desperate campaign to build a coalition around sanctions. The U.S. is still operating with the frame that it is a hegemon, but it is not - Iraq, Libya, Syria, Iran, et. al proves this. It doesn't mean the U.S. is not the strongest power, it just means U.S. power relative to other states or combination of states is not as strong as originally believed.
Where does that leave us? Sanctions are a political response - (1) they require coordination and commitment from multiple parties, making them difficult to implement (where are China's sanctions on Russia?); (2) they rarely change state behavior, and (3) they are signals to U.S. allies and domestic polities that U.S. is committed to protecting its status (the commitment of which is compelled by framing the U.S. as a guarantor of European security in the first place). A military response is also ineffectual for reasons discussed above - what does a U.S. security commitment to Ukraine look like? That leaves diplomacy.
This is really a question about the balance of power within the U.S.-Russian dyadic - is Russia now a peer competitor to the U.S. or not? And if it is, the secondary question is: what are the implications for the U.S. international security system?
A strategy to address Russia must be constructed within this frame, and it must be honest about U.S. and Russian capabilities and limitations. Russia is acting the role of spoiler because the Russians are honest about their limitations - hence their 70% success rate in conflict. The Russians are confident in their capabilities but know they cannot compete directly with the U.S. - hence the participation in Iran, Syria, Ukaine, etc. Obstructing the U.S. strategy buys them time since the passage of time favors the gaining power and disfavors the declining power. Russia does not benefit for the status quo so it will actively work to change it. Spoiling is a strategy for a state that is strong enough to influence the outcome but not strong enough to dictate it.
Recognizing Russia as a spoiler also implies that there are a range of strategies for dealing with spoilers in the international system. Mainly, that is either building a collective response or of integrating the spoiler into the international system. They are both difficult for their own reasons. Ukraine is a part of this process - it's not a conflict in isolation and its outcome will have consequences for the U.S. Russian dyadic and the international community. We should not rush to failure because our passion about Ukraine's liberty compels us to act immediately.
How do we want to shape the international security environment? What kind of relationship do we want with Russia and why? What can be done to improve U.S. capabilities and credibility?
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