How do We Train to Match our Actions to Our Narrative?

[Rob Thornton]

Some great posts - and I pretty much agree with all that has been said - but there is one thing that Marc T said that I think deserves some more thinking:

select actions that condition expectations.

What if we substituted "select" for "plan"? What if found a way to insert "reinforce" after "select"?

Part of this gets to understanding the potential effects your actions (and the various reactions and inter-actions of the other participants) have, and then detrmining if those were actually the effects you achieved. Not easy by any stretch in the conditions we're operating in. Each element - platoons, companies, BNs, BCTs, & higher echelons are going to have their own understanding of what reality is, and what effects their actions are generating. Overcoming bias at each level is key, but not easy.

More to chew on I guess.

Best to all, Rob

[Rob Thornton]

are two terms we use to achieve things. I guess what I'm thinking about is how actions (and inactions) are often incongruent and achieve desparate effects on (the narrative). There is both a synchronization and communication piece to this. I think the tools are largely there - be they terms or staffs - the thing is how we use them - its not just what we look at, but how we look at it, and how we articulate it to the different pieces that are at work in this environment. Even in the best of circumstances - the ones where nobody is shooting at you - things that seem like they should be easy are often some of the most difficult - training reduces the friction.

We do planning an execution pretty good in one sense - we've incorporated planning and training into our training pretty well (at the BCT level and below), but our planning and training is primarily geared toward finite type events - a rotation of one flavor or another, and within that sharp, tactical operations - that is what MDMP is geared for. What may be needed is to adapt that thinking to something broader. I don't want to use the term "campaign" - but that word probably comes closer in terms of a limited linear description. I think this is as much a military organizational culture issue as it is anything else. Like I said, still lots to chew on.

Best, Rob

[Eden]

Some honest questions from a guy who thinks you are on to something, but still doesn't quite get it.

1. I often hear it said that the enemy's narrative is 'better' than ours, that he is whipping us in the information war. Is that true, or is that just one of those truisms that people have come to accept? How is that measured? Who establishes and monitors the metrics? Or are we just using that as an excuse for our failures? My experience in Afghanistan is that Al-Qaida's and the Taliban's narratives were largely rejected by the natives. Suicide bombers and random violence were counter-productive within Afghanistan, though they may have played well elsewhere.

2. Is it possible to approach a place like Afghanistan with a single narrative? Can we develop a common narrative that is acceptable both to the Afghans, to our international partners, and the Great American Public? And our soldiers, by the way? Can we even develop a single narrative that is acceptable to the layered, nuanced, complex culture of Afghanistan? Again, my experience is that the indigenous peoples are not stupid. They understand our agenda; it's just that many segments reject while others are suspicious of our ability to sustain it.

3. If the answers to the above are no, do we strive to create alternate narratives tailored to different audiences? How do we wall these narratives off from each other so they don't leak to other audiences? Or do we just ignore certain audiences and accept the fact that they will reject our messages? Someone used an example about how WWII's narrative was simpler. True. Does that imply that diametrically opposed narratives can only be resolved through brute force, and that the 'softer' tools of information war are sometimes useless?

[marct]

Hi Eden,

Some honest questions from a guy who thinks you are on to something, but still doesn't quite get it.

1. I often hear it said that the enemy's narrative is 'better' than ours, that he is whipping us in the information war. Is that true, or is that just one of those truisms that people have come to accept? How is that measured? Who establishes and monitors the metrics? Or are we just using that as an excuse for our failures? My experience in Afghanistan is that Al-Qaida's and the Taliban's narratives were largely rejected by the natives. Suicide bombers and random violence were counter-productive within Afghanistan, though they may have played well elsewhere.

Metrics are a tough one - we do have the techniques for getting them, but I have grave doubts about their validity in a war zone.

2. Is it possible to approach a place like Afghanistan with a single narrative? Can we develop a common narrative that is acceptable both to the Afghans, to our international partners, and the Great American Public? And our soldiers, by the way? Can we even develop a single narrative that is acceptable to the layered, nuanced, complex culture of Afghanistan? Again, my experience is that the indigenous peoples are not stupid. They understand our agenda; it's just that many segments reject while others are suspicious of our ability to sustain it.

In short, that would be a limited "yes" to all. Basically, you need to develop and deploy a grand narrative (see above). This was done in Afghanistan originally, but was pretty much displaced by the time of the 2003 Loya Jirga to a social narrative from the US. A really bad mistake that is slowly being fixed by co-creating a social narrative for Afghanistan.

The best option, in my opinion, is to assume that you will have to co-create a specific social narrative within a larger grand narrative. It's not really possible to go into an area with a pre-cut, one-size fits all narrative and assume it will work (well, you could but you would then have to be labelled as a Darwin Award winner due to shear stupidity).

3. If the answers to the above are no, do we strive to create alternate narratives tailored to different audiences? How do we wall these narratives off from each other so they don't leak to other audiences? Or do we just ignore certain audiences and accept the fact that they will reject our messages? Someone used an example about how WWII's narrative was simpler. True. Does that imply that diametrically opposed narratives can only be resolved through brute force, and that the 'softer' tools of information war are sometimes useless?

The short answer is that you can't wall off one audience from another and any attempts to do so will fail miserably. This isn't to say that your narrative won't change over time; of course it will. As to whether or not diametrically opposed narratives can only be resolved by force, I would have to say that force is one option for their resolution, but not the only one. In some cases, it is possible to create a shared narrative that will contain the resolution of the two - not simple mind you, but possible.

Marc

[Spud]

2. Is it possible to approach a place like Afghanistan with a single narrative? Can we develop a common narrative that is acceptable both to the Afghans, to our international partners, and the Great American Public? And our soldiers, by the way? Can we even develop a single narrative that is acceptable to the layered, nuanced, complex culture of Afghanistan? Again, my experience is that the indigenous peoples are not stupid. They understand our agenda; it's just that many segments reject while others are suspicious of our ability to sustain it.

NATO/ISAF has one (and it’s not bad either if excessively wordy). The real issue in a place like Afghanistan is getting a fractured (in the nicest possible sense) coalition to use that narrative from the political-strategic through to the tactical.

The current strat-political game of one upmanship over who's pulling more weight and which countries are truly fighting is completely drowning out the narrative and significantly impacting on the information battlespace. There is no single report in AFG media or the worldwide media that doesn't highlight the differences (perceived or otherwise) in national approaches to the op.

Call me a simple former section commander but if we all signed up to ISAF and ISAF wants to promote a certain narrative shouldn't every contributing nation align to it? We're in no way different to anyone else ... in fact our new Government has been leading the drive down this route just to highlight its differences with the previous administration (and score a few points along the way).

Of course if we can't get that strat narrative sorted, all of the real information issues then fall out. Case in point what do we call our adversary in AFG? "OMF" (mum and dad have no idea what that means), "ACM", "Taliban" (several countries including the AFG Government want to open political negotiations with the people representing the Taliban movement so by putting everyone in the same boat we're potentially impacting on this LOO) "Taliban extremists", "Insurgents" "Nutbugs in a Pakhul with an RPG"... it goes on ... if you check the media releases for the current 32-odd nations in ISAF there's about 15 different descriptors for who we're actually fighting. In reality that should be simple to fix but then what to do with the counter-narc problem?

[Eden]

Call me a simple former section commander but if we all signed up to ISAF and ISAF wants to promote a certain narrative shouldn't every contributing nation align to it? We're in no way different to anyone else ... in fact our new Government has been leading the drive down this route just to highlight its differences with the previous administration (and score a few points along the way).

Any narrative that all members signed up to would not be a useful document. Just as our enemies, our friends are motivated by different agendas, some of them hidden.

You have the serious players, the countries that believe the war in Afghanistan must be fought in order to eliminate the region as a useful sanctuary/training base/recruiting pool for international terrorists.

You have the team players, countries that believe NATO must be supported and be successful in order to achieve the larger goals of international order and security.

You have the aspirant players, those who participate because they believe this is the best way to earn NATO membership, US dollars, and/or domestic support for their militaries.

Then there are the wannabes, states that believe they have to provide support if they want to be taken seriously as international middle-weights.

Some countries fall into one or more categories. Overlay this welter of motivations with domestic political considerations, varying degrees of aversion to casualties, and legitimately different approaches to warfighting/stability operations, and you can see that constructing something like a coherent 'Why we Fight' narrative is doomed to failure.

[marct]

Call me a simple former section commander but if we all signed up to ISAF and ISAF wants to promote a certain narrative shouldn't every contributing nation align to it? We're in no way different to anyone else ... in fact our new Government has been leading the drive down this route just to highlight its differences with the previous administration (and score a few points along the way).

Any narrative that all members signed up to would not be a useful document. Just as our enemies, our friends are motivated by different agendas, some of them hidden.

And, just to add another case in point, not accepting the proffered narrative (actually the grounds and warrants establishing the jus ad bellum) is the reason why Canada isn't in Iraq.

Just a comment, though... It is possible to establish core symbols - "principles" if you will - that are mutually acceptable and allow each nation (or group) to produce their own narratives around that core cluster.

[Rank amateur]

you can see that constructing something like a coherent 'Why we Fight' narrative is doomed to failure.

I have to disagree. "What happened on Sept 11 is wrong and we want all the help we can get fighting it," was working: international banking restrictions, police around the world making arrests etc. It took a core value that almost all people agree with - massacring innocent civilians is wrong - and allowed them to adopt it to the own identities. (Canada can help by... The UK can help by... Egypt may understand the frustration but ...)

Fewer people signed up to "Saddam is part of the problem." Leaving aside the issue of whether that change was right or wrong, it is possible to have a broad consensus. (Even the Germans agree now that we were on the right side in WWII.)

Most people believe in the right to self defense. It's very hard to convince the world that we need to start a war, much easier to convince them that they should help us finish it.

[Steve Blair]

I have to disagree. "What happened on Sept 11 is wrong and we want all the help we can get fighting it," was working: international banking restrictions, police around the world making arrests etc. It took a core value that almost all people agree with - massacring innocent civilians is wrong - and allowed them to adopt it to the own identities. (Canada can help by... The UK can help by... Egypt may understand the frustration but ...)

The Sept 11 narrative worked to a degree, in certain areas....but it's certainly not a unified narrative with 100% buy-in. Even in our own country it didn't get 100% buy-in. It's easy to dismiss the conspiracy folks and assorted wing-nuts, but they are an audience. Also, I'm not sure that the narrative was necessarily adopted by other countries in the sense that I think you mean...

My take on narratives is somewhat different, since I come from a history and not anthropology or sociology background. I tend to see how the narratives shift over time, and how the perspective of a particular period gives them a different view on events than a current writer might have. I also tend to agree with Marc that the informal ("darker" to use his term) narrative is much more powerful as it's based on more primal considerations (and often passed on by someone the listener 'knows' or 'respects').

[marct]

Hi Rob,

What if we substituted "select" for "plan"? What if found a way to insert "reinforce" after "select"?

You know, Wilf is absolutely right in saying that a lot of the basic actions are cross-cultural and not that hard; they just require a little thinking through. Also, another point that I should have made clear is that narratives are all about risk reduction and predictability, which was a point made by RA.

Maybe one way to get the training down would be to mix some "market research" with some "combat ops". Let's take an SOP for, say, a cordon and search; run a bunch of volunteers (both Americans as your control group and US supporters from the host nation) through it and get their reactions to it. Where it would diverge from the normal market research is that you would then start pulling apart their emotional response and their explanations / interpretations of what they were feeling and how they were understanding it.

It's really hard to select actions unless you know what the effects are and, all too often it seems to me, training (and research) concentrates solely on the physical effects of an action and leaves out the mental and emotional effects.

Marc

[marct]

I just realized that I didn't finish where I started to go with Wilf's observation. Basically, the emotional reactions are close to universal, but he mental / interpretive reactions may, and probably will, be different. Again o the C&S example, North Americans are pretty much conditioned by SWOT narratives to recognize the "kick the doors down, secure the building / people" type of action, always "knowing" that they will be able to fight back latter in court. What would Iraqi's predict from the same action? Well, they have pretty much been taught that it means you are dead (under SH), that you will be shipped of to be tortured and humiliated (an AQ narrative, but definitionally in keeping with US actions [i.e. AQ defines those actions as "torture"]), and that you are being treated as "worthless" and with no "power" hence "dishonoured". The emotional reactions are similar, but the interpretations are different.

Marc

[Rob Thornton]

Eden - I'm wrestling with some of the same questions - I'm also looking for answers - but realizing that the best we might do is to get some discussion going with some combined grey matter.

One of the best pieces of advice I got was from a guy named "Robbie Robertson" - he said "if you can't do anything else, try and follow the Golden Rule". It seems awfully simple, but he did say "try" I think because he realized that in some case it may not be possible. Is the "Golden Rule" with a "try" a broad enough narrative to encompass our actions, but still focused enough to provide direction? I don't know. I think you nail the challenges on the head by identifying the various interests that must be addressed - and managed. So while there is a developmental piece - it seems there are also implementation and management pieces.

I think RA has made mention of this many times (he is in marketing) - where people try and sell products, if they have the resources, or are smart - they first see if there is a market for that product. In some cases if your product is dependent on a supporting infrastructure, or supporting product - you may have to develop those things first - or you might be wasting your time. Somebody else may come along with a product (or message) that fits better, it may not need to have the infrastructure, or it may just be more appealing because the idea sells better the way its packaged, or because the salesman is better (or could just be better at making us and our product look worse). This is one area I think the enemy - broader then Afghanistan or Iraq - has an advantage and is able to leverage. This does not prevent him from being stupid occasionally and missing the mark - consider that it was not just our action in Iraq that created the opportunity - but the actions of others to include the enemy. The enemy promised one product, but once the wrapping was off there was no proof in advertising. We have also on occasion made this jump, although we may have done so unwittingly - we think the receiver of the message understands our actions the way we perceive them, but because of culture and disparate interests - the receive a different message. To make matters worse, we sometimes confuse ourselves.

Like you said, I don't think indigenous peoples - in fact they often are able to understand things better then we can, based on their perspective. However, everybody can suffer from bias - our perceptions are colored by who we are - many of these are subliminal. Some of the most telling indicators I've seen were when folks I know to be among the most rational of people - made statements that were only part in jest. Even people who have long exposure are colored by their experiences, their environment and their culture. So even if in a rational discussion about our agenda (or someone else's) they may not believe it. This requires physical demonstrations, often over a sustained period - shorter for some, longer for others. The interactions that take place among the audiences also matter - as well as their exposure to events outside the physical, but ones that are left open to interpretation.

This is where I think the enemy succeeds - he does not at first need to prove all that much - he just has to discredit us in our efforts. He has the advantage of the cultural home turf - complete with a kind of interior lines. He does not have to build much, sustain much, etc. We see this in our own political tactics - if you can't or don't want to write, introduce, pass or cooperate with the other party (or those within your own party) - just throw stones at the other guy's plan or campaign - further don't just attack the message, find ways to attack the messenger. It is politics. It is an economy of force operation - now when you must govern its a different story - but if your intent is to govern by force, to impose, then once you are in power - all you have to do is keep the other guy from removing you. This is where I think the enemy has the advantage - until he has to transition to governing - look at the Hell that was Fallujah when the enemy took over.

There is an element of human nature here - Marc could probably speak to it better - but it is timeless.

It still needs some thinking.

Best, Rob