The Army We Need

[Tom Odom]

We should prepare our officers for these tasks until the policy-makers decide a better framework. The military's mission remains to succeed at whatever it is assigned to by the political leadership. Whatever skillsets are needed to accomplish those tasks are what should be trained.

I still contend we can, and must, do both.

Great post, Niel!

Give us a kiss,

Tom

[RTK]

It wasn't that we preferred, liked, or even should of been doing it - it was simply what was required if we wanted to have a chance at succeeding in our AO.

I'm no medic, fire support specialist, logistician, engineer (anymore), or mechanic, but I need some skill sets in those areas to be successful in my AO as well.

I'm not saying the Soldier shouldn't at least familiarize themselves with other skills sets that will make them better (we used to call this cross training), but they better be damned good with what they are supposed to do first.

ODB makes a great point, whether you're an SF ODA, a scout platoon, or a professional football team. Successful teams do the routine things routinely the correct way.

Basics and fundamentals are the core of what we do. Actions on contact don't change in a COIN environment from a tank-on-tank environment; they're the same four steps each time

1. Deploy and Report
2. Evaluate and develop the situation
3. Choose a COA
4. Execute the selected COA

I would submit the same basic methodology would work in a non-kinetic bilateral engagement at the shiek or local leader level.

Same goes for the IPB process when determining the areas IEDs will most likely be placed.

In terms of diplomacy, diplomatic status, or whatever the hell else we want to call it, I see it this way.

According to Webster's:

di·plo·ma·cy
Pronunciation: \də-ˈplō-mə-sē\
Function: noun
Date: 1796
1 : the art and practice of conducting negotiations between nations
2 : skill in handling affairs without arousing hostility : tact

I think what we're looking at is the second definition. The first, though I've seen it talked about above, doesn't really apply. Just because I make an agreement with the local shiek doesn't mean I've entered into the diplomatic stage of my career. Substituting "nation" with any other host of words doesn't foot the bill either and we need to be careful on what terms we sub in for "nation." Eventually we'll come all the way around and negotiating a good used car deal will include us in a host of diplomats.

I think what we're really talking about is the common sense approach to dealing with other people. The Golden Rule, as it were. What are the fundamental laws of human behavior and nature that we must follow keeping in mind the cultural differences between societies? What does the Law of Realistic Expectation say how the interaction, over a long period of time, will materialize. How do you deal logically with others (logical is a relative term as well, depending on the society) and what is the understanding of the culture and societal dos and don'ts? Given what I say to the local leader or what I do on patrol could and will influence the second and third order effects of how the locals deal with me in both the near and far term, I think this is what we really mean by "diplomacy."

[Ken White]

Good job RTK. That one and your training critique mean you can have New Years Day off -- unless you've got the duty...

[William F. Owen]

As a personal story, I took tons of grief from my soldiers in Tal Afar for the amount of local meals I ate and adopting the local habits - including the dreaded man kiss (cheek - I even worked my way up to the prestigious 4-kiss greet). However, those relations proved the basis of successful pacification of my sector, just as it later did for our BCT in Ramadi. It wasn't that we preferred, liked, or even should of been doing it - it was simply what was required if we wanted to have a chance at succeeding in our AO.

...and none of that is in any way contrary to what I suggest. Yes, win by any means, but you are military and that means you job is to employ the military instrument. Armed Forces should use "armed force." To whit,

"those relations proved the basis of successful pacification of my sector,"

Pacification being the operative word. If you can achieve your MILITARY MISSION by drinking tea, then all to the good.

I am not against raising the bar for officer training and education. I am supportive of exactly the opposite, but that education has got to be relevant to the full spectrum of military tasks.

What I am implacably against the idea that best practice is to transform an Army into an "armed social work organisation," or "nation building organisation" that have to pick up the ball because the other instruments of Government power are broken, negligent, stupid or lazy.

[Steve Blair]

What I am implacably against the idea that best practice is to transform an Army into an "armed social work organisation," or "nation building organisation" that have to pick up the ball because the other instruments of Government power are broken, negligent, stupid or lazy.

Not sure that the majority of us (and I know I don't) advocate such a change. But I'm also wary of the "it's not our problem...we just shoot" mentality. It would be nice if the world worked that way, but all too often it doesn't.

[ODB]

I had to for my own sake dig out the trusty old Websters dictionary to see what it said a diplomat was.

Diplomat: one employed or skilled in diplomacy.

Could we be any broader? So then I went up one word to diplomacy.

Diplomacy: 1. the art and practice of conducting negotiations between nations 2. TACT

Finally I looked up tact.

Tact: a keen sense of what to do or say to keep good relations with others

I didn't post these to insult anyone. The point I'm getting to is that in the sense diplomacy is tact then yes soldiers are diplomats. When soldiers start getting into negotiations then we are wrong, minus those who have this skill set. I think some of the problem is in the broadness of the terms soldier and diplomat/diplomacy. When one gets down in the weeds then we can start to see the relevance of both.

IMO soldiers at all levels need to be tactful, therefore diplomats, but hard lines need to be drawn when it comes to soldiers conducting negotiations and therefore being diplomats in this sense.

Simplier way would be to say all soldiers need to be tactful. Then figure out at what levels or who as soldiers need to be negotiators?

RTK can type and research faster than I, looks like I need some work on the basics.

[RTK]

I had to for my own sake dig out the trusty old Websters dictionary to see what it said a diplomat was.

Diplomat: one employed or skilled in diplomacy.

Could we be any broader? So then I went up one word to diplomacy.

Diplomacy: 1. the art and practice of conducting negotiations between nations 2. TACT

Finally I looked up tact.

Tact: a keen sense of what to do or say to keep good relations with others

I didn't post these to insult anyone. The point I'm getting to is that in the sense diplomacy is tact then yes soldiers are diplomats. When soldiers start getting into negotiations then we are wrong, minus those who have this skill set. I think some of the problem is in the broadness of the terms soldier and diplomat/diplomacy. When one gets down in the weeds then we can start to see the relevance of both.

IMO soldiers at all levels need to be tactful, therefore diplomats, but hard lines need to be drawn when it comes to soldiers conducting negotiations and therefore being diplomats in this sense.

Simplier way would be to say all soldiers need to be tactful. Then figure out at what levels or who as soldiers need to be negotiators?

RTK can type and research faster than I, looks like I need some work on the basics.

ODB: I like you. You need to post more.

Ken: My only duty these last two weeks has been to grow out a beard and sit on my duff watching football. I may have to come in "on my own time" tomorrow.

[Cavguy]

IMO soldiers at all levels need to be tactful, therefore diplomats, but hard lines need to be drawn when it comes to soldiers conducting negotiations and therefore being diplomats in this sense.

No disagreement in the ideal - but - what do you do as a military member when negotiations with local leaders are required and there are no civil reps available?

That is the crux of the problem. Hell, we couldn't get the PRT out of Mosul to come to Tal Afar or Ramadi. A good recent article cited USAID was hampered because it wasn't allowed to leave Kabul. Things have gotten better in Iraq but I doubt many COPs in A-Stan have access to a DoS rep when needing to negotiate with a local leader. And until DoS enters the chain of command it's kind of like the famous observation about the Pope - "How many divisions does he have?" Local leaders know who has the power, and deal with those who have real power.

The task for the forseeable future in the current conflicts falls to the military. Whether we should do it or are the ideal organization is irrelevant. Civil capacity (if ever developed/funded) is one or more decades away. So in the meantime, I argue we must prepare our soldiers to succeed in the environment they face. If this means "not my lane" tasks, then so be it.

I just fundamentally disagree with those who say the military shouldn't train this because it shouldn't be their mission. As long as political masters keep us engaged in such conflicts and refuse to transform the civilian establishment to meet those demands, the military would be negligent and irresponsible not to prepare its officers and NCO's in command positions for such challenges.

I will happily hand this over to DoS when we create more foreign service officers than the Army has Soldiers in its bands, or the political leadership takes the task away. The military serves the state and is expected to win. Therefore, we must do whatever it takes to win, even if it's a non-military task.

[Steve Blair]

No disagreement in the ideal - but - what do you do as a military member when negotiations with local leaders are required and there are no civil reps available?

That is the crux of the problem. Hell, we couldn't get the PRT out of Mosul to come to Tal Afar or Ramadi. A good recent article cited USAID was hampered because it wasn't allowed to leave Kabul. Things have gotten better in Iraq but I doubt many COPs in A-Stan have access to a DoS rep when needing to negotiate with a local leader. And until DoS enters the chain of command it's kind of like the famous observation about the Pope - "How many divisions does he have?" Local leaders know who has the power, and deal with those who have real power.

The task for the forseeable future in the current conflicts falls to the military. Whether we should do it or are the ideal organization is irrelevant. Civil capacity (if ever developed/funded) is one or more decades away. So in the meantime, I argue we must prepare our soldiers to succeed in the environment they face. If this means "not my lane" tasks, then so be it.

I just fundamentally disagree with those who say the military shouldn't train this because it shouldn't be their mission. As long as political masters keep us engaged in such conflicts and refuse to transform the civilian establishment to meet those demands, the military would be negligent and irresponsible not to prepare its officers and NCO's in command positions for such challenges.

I will happily hand this over to DoS when we create more foreign service officers than the Army has Soldiers in its bands.

I'd only add that this isn't just restricted to our current conflicts...it's been around for the majority of the Army's existence. It's easily forgotten that Army officers were for a time the first government representatives to contact foreign national groups (the Native tribes). I will agree that for many years this was more a Navy thing, but it was still an historical reality.

Tact, diplomacy...call it what you will (and I'm also the first to admit that there is a difference between inter-government Diplomacy and the lower-level stuff that most officers and some NCOs will be faced with...but the local level will always be with us unless Sate gets MUCH bigger or we stop sending anyone outside of CONUS). The fact remains that in many places the military IS the face of the US government that many will see first (right or wrong) and we need to be prepared to deal with that.

Sometimes I think we spent so much time preparing for a war that never came that we lost sight of what we'd really been doing before and were being called on to do "on the cheap," as it were.

[ODB]

No disagreement in the ideal - but - what do you do as a military member when negotiations with local leaders are required and there are no civil reps available?

That is the crux of the problem. Hell, we couldn't get the PRT out of Mosul to come to Tal Afar or Ramadi. A good recent article cited USAID was hampered because it wasn't allowed to leave Kabul. Things have gotten better in Iraq but I doubt many COPs in A-Stan have access to a DoS rep when needing to negotiate with a local leader. And until DoS enters the chain of command it's kind of like the famous observation about the Pope - "How many divisions does he have?" Local leaders know who has the power, and deal with those who have real power.

The task for the forseeable future in the current conflicts falls to the military. Whether we should do it or are the ideal organization is irrelevant. Civil capacity (if ever developed/funded) is one or more decades away. So in the meantime, I argue we must prepare our soldiers to succeed in the environment they face. If this means "not my lane" tasks, then so be it.

I just fundamentally disagree with those who say the military shouldn't train this because it shouldn't be their mission. As long as political masters keep us engaged in such conflicts and refuse to transform the civilian establishment to meet those demands, the military would be negligent and irresponsible not to prepare its officers and NCO's in command positions for such challenges.

I will happily hand this over to DoS when we create more foreign service officers than the Army has Soldiers in its bands, or the political leadership takes the task away. The military serves the state and is expected to win. Therefore, we must do whatever it takes to win, even if it's a non-military task.

That is why I submit to get at the heart of the problem we as an Army need to decide who as soldiers and at what level need to be able to conduct negotiations. That I don't know at this point, I have my thoughts and ideas but then again we all do and that is how we get in these messes.

I know the right answer is make the Washingtonites get off their collective asses and do what they are paid to do. If I work for any gov't agency/department and I'm in theatre well guess what moving around country facing the dangers are the risk inherent to my job. They need to get over it as do some of our own when it comes to this. Force them to do their job. We need to stop feeding the machine what we think it wants to hear and feed it what it needs to hear. Sorry for the rant there, but got refocus the other day. Talking with a buddy and told him I was going to stop bitching about many issues because it wasn't helping, he told me when they don't wanna listen talk louder!

[Tom Odom]

We we train it here via street level engagements and more formal senior engagements.

Stan did it on the ground in Goma in 4-way formal negotiations between the the USJTF, the USAF (a foreign power ), the Zairians, and the French

Steve has it. Nothing in my study of history or experiences in the ground suggests that nice, neat definitions reflect operational necessity.

Tom

[Ken White]

No disagreement in the ideal - but - what do you do as a military member when negotiations with local leaders are required and there are no civil reps available?

That is the crux of the problem...Local leaders know who has the power, and deal with those who have real power.

Seems to me that everyone commenting on the thread has acknowledged that to one degree or another.

The task for the forseeable future in the current conflicts falls to the military. Whether we should do it or are the ideal organization is irrelevant. Civil capacity (if ever developed/funded) is one or more decades away. So in the meantime, I argue we must prepare our soldiers to succeed in the environment they face. If this means "not my lane" tasks, then so be it.

I think the disconnect is here -- I see no one disagreeing with any of that paragraph but several have implied that such disagreement exists. The issue is, I think two fold:

(1) Who should set the parameters for the positions taken by members of the Armed forces in dealing with local entities of what ever kind. Wilf, Gian and I say it should be the civilian politicians to whom the Armed Forces in democratic nations are responsible but all acknowledge that actions on the ground may lead to occasional military precedence in setting such policy. Occasional is totally understandable and acceptable; constant OTOH is not a good idea...

(2) Our training is not as good as it should be; Most of us seeming disagreeable types including ODB and RTK agree that some training in the areas of human relations, culture (du jour) and US policy is not only desirable but necessary. What we want is better training on ALL the basics principally on the combat functions core requirements but certainly including those things. I, for one have said that we should never have stopped doing that (we did it pretty well from the early 60s to 75).

Thus, I don't think anyone disagrees with you on this:

I just fundamentally disagree with those who say the military shouldn't train this because it shouldn't be their mission...

Or this:

I will happily hand this over to DoS when we create more foreign service officers than the Army has Soldiers in its bands, or the political leadership takes the task away. The military serves the state and is expected to win. Therefore, we must do whatever it takes to win, even if it's a non-military task.

Steve Blair posted this while I was pecking:

"Tact, diplomacy...call it what you will (and I'm also the first to admit that there is a difference between inter-government Diplomacy and the lower-level stuff that most officers and some NCOs will be faced with...but the local level will always be with us unless Sate gets MUCH bigger or we stop sending anyone outside of CONUS). The fact remains that in many places the military IS the face of the US government that many will see first (right or wrong) and we need to be prepared to deal with that.

I suggest that is a great encapsulation of what ALL of us on this thread have been saying. As the Bishop said to the Actress, "We aren't arguing over what you are; we're haggling about the price."

[reed11b]

Embedded DoS workers when situation calls for it? I wonder if the apparatus for this could be hashed out and how much veto power would DOS liaison and the AO commander have over each other? Relates back to the DOS vs. DOD region differences thread. I would like to see the concept of DoS military liaisons go forward, 1) to help the DOD remember that it has to plan for the end of hostilities prior to the end of hostilities and 2) to increase the DoS level of real world experience in an effective and rapid manner.
Reed
P.S. The art of diplomacy is regional IMHO, and not a defined skill set, so generalist training in it for officers is only going to detract from core competencies for minimal benefit. Training for the region being deployed too as part of the train up makes a great deal of sense, but do we not already attempt to do this as much as possible?
P.S.S. Must learn to type faster, Not sure any of my comments are relevent after Kens last post.

[William F. Owen]

I just fundamentally disagree with those who say the military shouldn't train this because it shouldn't be their mission. As long as political masters keep us engaged in such conflicts and refuse to transform the civilian establishment to meet those demands, the military would be negligent and irresponsible not to prepare its officers and NCO's in command positions for such challenges.

OK, I an accept that, but what I orginally took issue with was Nagl's statement,

Your nation needs you to be a diplomat as well as a warrior, because we can’t kill or capture our way to success in this fight; victory comes from building local institutions that can stand on their own. But your nation also needs you to tell us what you need to fight your fight better, to build an Army that is truly a learning institution able to defeat adaptive insurgent enemies.

Operational success is gained by protecting the civilian population, and that may well mean killing or capturing. It did in Malaya, Kenya, Aden and Cyprus.

The US Army should not be made to have a raison d'etre as being a force to build "local institutions."

...and bearing in mind what the US Army has achieved in 6 years compared to what the UK managed in Malaya in the same time span, the US Army is clearly a learning organisation. What ever the US Army is doing right now, seems to be working.

Now to clarify. I have no Axe to Grind with John Nagl in particular. The Ax I am grinding here is with the "transformation of War" crowd who are pedalling an ill-conceived agenda to restrict military force into irrelevance, and take will some day take it off the table as an instrument of policy. There are no new and better ways of war. There are simply the ones we know work. They are mostly bloody, cruel and violent, and history is an excellent guide, correctly read.

"Rounds Complete. Guns to rest. Mission ends. Will establish comms on the schedule."

[Ron Humphrey]

The US Army should not be made to have a raison d'etre as being a force to build "local institutions."

...and bearing in mind what the US Army has achieved in 6 years compared to what the UK managed in Malaya in the same time span, the US Army is clearly a learning organisation. What ever the US Army is doing right now, seems to be working.

Although as I think I have stated before I think I agree with your premise that War is War and the only real differences are to be found in the approach to fighting one, I'm not sure I can buy the concern that choosing to fight less / diplo more(in the most general and tactful sense) necessarily leads one down the road to eradication of need for a fighting force. Consider that in order to create and maintain any kind of norm amongst populace whether it be foreign or domestic there must be sufficient capability to enforce said norms otherwise the requirements are actually a moot point.

IMHO the same goes for fighting, if there is not a set of requirements that one is fighting to attain then exactly what purpose does the conflict actually seek to fulfill. Call it what you will (*cause, laws, tradition, faith, fiction, folly) there is always a guiding premise to why war happens and as such it does seem important to focus at least minimally on those things which have less to do with what your fighting and more to do with why.

I might propose that the reason Israel is involved in Gaza right now has more to do with the fact that the other countries around it choose to leave the burden of dealing with those who represent at least as great a threat to themselves more because its easier politically for them to do so and not because they support groups such as Hamas and or Hezbollah. As such is it not important for a party such as the US to learn to explain to others in a somewhat tactful but forceful manner that they don't get to sit it out if they truly want to become a part of the greater global community in any form other than simply word.

Now to clarify. I have no Axe to Grind with John Nagl in particular. The Ax I am grinding here is with the "transformation of War" crowd who are pedalling an ill-conceived agenda to restrict military force into irrelevance, and take will some day take it off the table as an instrument of policy. There are no new and better ways of war. There are simply the ones we know work. They are mostly bloody, cruel and violent, and history is an excellent guide, correctly read.

"Rounds Complete. Guns to rest. Mission ends. Will establish comms on the schedule."

It would seem that in order to get the kind of conversations needed to take place at the political level a certain level of discourse which would of course be uncomfortable for those who focus on the how to's of battle itself. That would be do to the fact that a majority of those who actually make the decision of when and where you fight have not actually had to fight for much more than financing and political recognition. This is not said not to denigrate them but rather in helping to equate the understandings they have with your own. Nagl and others have gotten the goat of many within the defense community but it may be more important to see what kind of effect their messages have had on those within the political structure and accept that maybe just maybe in the end it might not have been such a bad thing.

I completely agree with you in that wars don't really ever change, people on the other hand just might, and that is something which I'm afraid we tend to forget way to often.

[Ken White]

...Nagl and others have gotten the goat of many within the defense community but it may be more important to see what kind of effect their messages have had on those within the political structure and accept that maybe just maybe in the end it might not have been such a bad thing.

Sigh. History says you have a good idealistic view that will sadly go unrewarded...

...people on the other hand just might, and that is something which I'm afraid we tend to forget way to often.

Sigh again. See my previous comment.

[Ron Humphrey]

Sigh. History says you have a good idealistic view that will sadly go unrewarded...Sigh again. See my previous comment.

As always greatly appreciate the reminder that more often than not life doesn't quite go the way we think it should. And as I have found growing up many of those same things my parents had to rain on my parade about I now tend to do the same to my own. That said I do enjoy the fact that at least for now I still get to believe that things can be better. At some point I'll have to be the curmudgeon; but not quite yet

Just a side note though, when I was young I remember a president who pointed out that the very fact we seek to make things "better" is where we draw our greatest strengths from. Seems to me that trying to make things better isn't quite the guaranteed failure we usually think it will be.

In the last two hundred years we have been through periods where multiple groups of people were treated as less than others. Tradition, cultures etc stood in the way of moving past that yet we did. As of next month we will have someone representative of just one of those groups become the president and all indications are thats taking place because a large enough group of people thought there can be something better and voted accordingly. The curmudgeon in me might say they most likely will be sorely mistaken in their expectations but in all honesty I hope not. Thus continual efforts made to ensure thats not the case.

Just never been able to accept not doing something simply due to the fact it probably won't work. Kinda like the saying -
You'll never win the lottery if you never buy a ticket.

Thank you though I don't know if you know how much the wisdom of your years is appreciated by those of us who seek to learn rather than just know

[Bill Moore]

Cavguy,

Thanks for your post. Until you stated the obvious I thought I was blogging with aliens (or worse my old SWJ friends were replaced by aliens! Remember the old science fiction movie where the aliens placed a pod next to the victims bed at night, and the pod would replicate the person? It was classic, and I know it relates to IW somehow).

The bottom line is that State doesn't have the capacity, so forget about what should be, and lets deal with reality. Problems have to be solved, sometimes significant problems that are more political in nature than military, and we're frequently the only ones the local populace will turn to, and we often "want" to be the only ones the people will turn to (note that when I say we, that can mean U.S. forces or the HN forces we're supporting, whoever we want to win). If we don't fill this void, then someone else will, and it won't be DoS. In Afghanistan it may very well be the Taliban.

ODB, the military isn't wrong when it conducts negotiations. The requirement to be able to negotiate has long been recognized in the Special Operations community, and SWC (the Army SOF schoolhouse) has open source lesson plans and video courses on how to conduct negotiations. Negotiation may be a specified or implied task depending on the situation. In smaller scale operations like the OEF-Philippines and when I participated in JTF Liberia, DoS conducted the effective diplomacy, just the way we would like to see everywhere, but in more remote, or larger scale problems, or in extremely hostile situations the military may have to do it. Fortunately, in Special Forces we generally don't have guys who say, "not my job man", if it needs doing, we'll do it. After a slow start effective conventional force leaders came to the same realization.

I think we're agreeing more than disagreeing. Irregular Warfare (like the term or not) is largely political in nature at the local level, not just at the nation-state level. I agree with Bob's World post in one of the forums, where he said that the issues we're dealing with are the result of failed foreign policy (failed diplomacy). While I don't think the problems' origins are confined to failed foreign policy (let's face it, the HN owns 95% or more of the responsibility for failing, we don't need to own that guilt), the point is still valid in that what they and we were doing at the political level obviously failed. Once you have a broken society, political system (Iraq, Afghanistan) do you fix it from the top down or bottom up?

You'll be able to answer that one when you can tell me what the sound of one hand clapping is. Have a Happy New Years.

Bill

[Ken White]

Ron: No intent to temper idealism, after all that turtle wouldn't get anywhere unless he stuck out his neck a bit. Just a caution to remember that politicians have short attention spans and memories and are prone to try to reinvent wheels and that doing it right is not generally one of their priorities...

Bill:

"I think we're agreeing more than disagreeing."

Oh man. Me, too.

"Once you have a broken society, political system (Iraq, Afghanistan) do you fix it from the top down or bottom up? "

Neither. You just hold the window open while they either fix it or don't and you better be prepared for either result.

[ODB]

Seems to me that really what we are all saying in our own ways is that we are failing in our training.

With that said how do we fix it? Who do we train and when?

Where is it taught? Is it something added to all advance courses (NCO and Officer)? Or is it done earlier on?

Then when do we revisit that training, part of pre-deployment preparations along with everything else that we are required to suck down?

Do we turn it into it's own course that conducts MTTs?

Have to be honest the few hours I got at SWCS was not enough, felt it should have been more indepth. But then again the senarios training later on really paid off. Definately not something easily trained in death by powerpoint.