The Army: A Profession of Arms

[Bob's World]

There are two things we tend to do that I find worrisome:

1. Intel-driven operations that look for a threat to defeat as the root of every problem.

2. "Means"-driven operations that look for "Ways" to employ the Means we posses to defeat the threat derived by the Intel guys.

Question: Was Iraq the best "Ways" to defend America, or was it merely the best Ways to employ the heavy conventional Means that we possessed to engage the threat identified by the Intel guys???

There was no feasible way to employ those means in Afghanistan at that time, so they sat idle as senior leaders fretted over the threats painted by the Intel community. Where else could we possibly employ them, Iran?? (Probably lends some insight into why that bogeyman keeps getting tossed onto the table as well).

Imagine if when VP Cheney said "Sir, we need to go finish the job your father started with Saddam, besides the intel guys were just telling me that they've long suspected he possesses weapons of mass destruction" (ok, truth in lending, I have no idea what the VP recommended to the President); the Chairman would have spoken up that such an operation would take 90% of the current active force, or require at least 18 months to mobilize, train, and deploy an enhanced force made up of National Guard units; coupled with a "small draft" to ensure we had adequate troops in the pipeline.

Do we still go to Iraq? I doubt it. It was never essential, it was just the convenient Ways that fit our Means. The requirement to build a war fighting force in order to wage war provides the time to gain a broader perspective of the situation than the one provided in a morning intel brief in the Oval Office with a handful of senior leaders. In the Cold War we did not have that luxury, we had to have a larger than normal standing army to help deter that first push. We have different deterrence requirements today, and should shape our force to meet them.

No, in today's environment the US can be defended quite well by a much smaller force that the one we fund today. Trimming off the NATO mission and allowing the Europeans to resource their own national security would be a good step toward right-sizing, as would trimming off a half-dozen equally obsolete Cold War positions in Asia and the delusions of nation building as an answer to insurgency.

It is time for a return to strategy-driven operations; perhaps then we'll stop searching for round holes (Intel-driven) to pound our square peg (Means-driven) through.

Just a thought.

[Bill Jakola]

There

Do we still go to Iraq? I doubt it. It was never essential, it was just the convenient Ways that fit our Means.

Bob's W,

Great point and I completely agree that whatever force we build will tend to be used in ways that are more convenient to the strengths of that particular Army. So the question is what type of profession of arms should build. That in essence is the reason for this discussion the CSA asked us to have.

I value your end, ways, means, perspective as it really highlights the connection between the decision of what type of Army we make to what type of national strategy and policy we can follow. "Build it and they will come" may work for a field of dreams but in the real world we should think deeply about such decisions.

Do we need a large forward deployed force to keep us safe at home; maybe not, perhaps a smaller more expeditionary force would serves us better. But either way our political leadership may ask us to do things we did not anticipate, so a core aspect of any force should be the ability to adapt while engaged in the fight. The more adaptable the force the more easily it can transition along the full spectrum of conflict. Some may point out that such an adaptable force is also easier to use and thus more likely to be used. Providing political leaders with a profession of arms means they may be less inclined to solve problems with other means, but not providing such a force would leave the nation less prepared.

As a profession, we should strive to provide the most effective force possible within our means and trust the political leadership to use it appropriately. As a profession we should not attempt to limit our political leaders by designing a less than optimal force.


Bill Jakola