One of the works I have found to be useful in better understanding societies, and why some work better than others, and others don't work at all, is "Trust - The Economic Value of Trust and Cooperation" by Francis Fukuyama.
To me, this was the book that made me understand the rationale for "Hearts and Minds" campaigns. They don't need to love us, but they have to trust us, and eventually trust each other.
Trust and cooperation are regarded as "externalities" (zero costs and values) by economists, but Fukuyama points out that this is wrong, because high levels of trust and cooperation reduce transaction costs. Conversely, it is very very expensive and time consuming to try and do a deal with someone you don't trust, or who does not trust you, if that is, you can do a deal at all.
Extending Fukuyama a little, I believe there is considerable evidence that failed states are that way because the levels of trust and cooperation between inhabitants progressivley decrease as one moves outwards from family, clan, tribe and sect to almost zero. I would be interested to know if this is in fact the situation in Iraq.
If this is in fact true, then it becomes clear that the primary purpose of the hearts and minds operations, as well as the conduct of the defence forces themselves, is to raise levels of trust and cooperation, primarily by providing enough security to allow citizens to develop (or redevelop) the necessary levels of trust and cooperation for a society to function.
Conversly, as I think we have seen, the insurgents wish to promote their version of "trust and cooperation" which purveys security as a product of adherence (or at least compliance) with the dictates of the insurgents. Any cooperation with us is punishable by death.
It also becomes obvious that any time anyone does something to make Iraqis distrustful of us, then we are making our task all that harder
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