Curmudgy,Originally Posted by TheCurmudgeon
Your kidding right!!
No he doesn't know much about insurgencies and he is not interested in holding somebody else's terrain for which they will fight to the death for.......What he does know alot about is WINNING which is what this country needs to start doing instead of holding territory.
Warden apparently thinks,
.Warden championed and perfected the concept of approaching “the enemy as a system.” Rather than throwing armies against armies and air forces against air forces, Warden’s strategies involve analyzing an enemy’s military forces as parts of a much larger whole. In the Persian Gulf Air Campaign, Warden dismantled the enemy’s ability to function. You can incapacitate the functioning of your opponent from a system standpoint
We have tried this for decades and not once was it successful. It sure as hell didn't defeat Iraq during DESERT STORM, but relentless targeting of their fielded forces, along with a decisive ground assault did. Targeting the C2 and other systems were supporting efforts, and the overall impact of that that targeting is not possible to assess. The results of the highway of death, the ground campaign, all combined with a PSYOP effort resulted in mass capitulation.
That was a conventional fight, and even then a systems approach had questionable effect. The insurgency is not a systems of systems that conforms to linear thinking, it is composed of a think and adapting adversary who has dealt with our air power previously. This approach is simply an attempt to script write, much like the flawed EBO concept, where if we do X, then Y will happen.
On the other hand, can airpower disrupt, maybe even halt ISIS in their tracks? It certainty can if we have the intelligence to effectively direct it. Ultimately if the Iraqi government wants to win they certainly need to take and hold their sovereign territory, that isn't conventional, it is simply common sense. They are a legitimate state if they can't control their territory, and if ISIS is controlling it then they're winning. I think ISIS could handle getting pushed back a little by a combination of air and ground forces. Unless they're stupid they'll adapt a Fabian strategy and avoid a decisive battles and wage a war of attrition, I think we been down this road before. If we expect too much from air power, like winning, we'll once again be very disappointed. On the other hand, we should use our air power to the extent possible to disrupt and degrade ISIS. A win by ISIS is not in our interest.
There is a different solution appearing after the ISIS drove back the massive Iraqi attack on Tikrit to a point 25 kms from Tikrit----even the Samarra relief column is not moving much from the sheer weight of IED strikes on the convoys.
In Der Spiegel from today there is an interview with the senior Chief of Staff for the Iraqi ISIS Response Staff who basically states all three ethnic groups must have their own regions and openly critiques the marginalization of the Sunni's by Malalki and he is a Shia.
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/auslan...-a-978172.html
Better Link To Warden Interview
Here is a much better Youtube link to the radio interview of Colonel Warden that goes along with the above listed article. if you listen closely and are familiar with real systems thinking you will find that what people say Warden says as opposed to what he actually says and means is a alot different.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DjyF...ature=youtu.be
No Slap, not kidding. There is a vast difference between interstate combined arms war and instrastate insurgencies. "Winning" in one forum has little or nothing to do with winning in the other.. Only someone who had not been involved in the fight in Iraq or Afgahanistan over the last decade could think otherwise.
You forget that we made short work of the Iraqi Army in 2003-4, yet could not win in the long run. It is the long fight that matters, not the opening palys of the first quarter, as the Colonel likes to think
Last edited by TheCurmudgeon; 06-30-2014 at 05:37 PM.
"I can change almost anything ... but I can't change human nature."
Jon Osterman/Dr. Manhattan
---
An interesting thought from Col Warden.
What he should have added is do a 'Sri Lanka' and all will be Quiet on the Iraq Front.
Devastate the whole place so that they are left picking up the pieces for the rest of their lives and never in a position to trouble anyone.
Of course, the UN is in the pocket and Human Rights Pollyannas are under control, right?!
Hakuna Mata!
Last edited by Ray; 06-30-2014 at 06:47 PM.
Ray, Sri Lanka has one advantage that makes it unique ... it is an island. There is no border sanctuary. Not so with Iraq.
Although, turning the area into a wasteland does have its advantages ...
"I can change almost anything ... but I can't change human nature."
Jon Osterman/Dr. Manhattan
---
You Just Made My Point!
Curmudgy,
I don't think you had joined this discussion group at the time so you are probably not familiar with some of Warden's earlier comments that I posted from years ago when this Fiasco first started.
1- when we first went into Iraq he warned that we should be careful about being jubilant to soon because "All we have is a beachhead in the middle of 1 billion undefeated Muslims" turned out to be pretty accurate.
2-I posted a copy of a letter to the editor that wrote warning of the dire consequence that would happen when we decided to disband the Iraqi Army which would leave the entire country in an unstable situation. Again turned our to be pretty accurate.
3-But I agree he probably doesn't think much about the way we are thinking of insurgencies because it is not working! Whether we like it or not the " Enemy Is Still A System" and he is smart enough to know that we are not going to turn the Sunni into Democrats nor the Shia into Republicans and have a nice democracy in the Middle East. What is possible is to use American Airpower to support local Arab Armies to achieve our true interest in the region.
1. I don't think the statistical evidence supports the theory that "airpower alone" is a practical strategy; now if we're looking at producing specific political outcomes then I suppose that, in theory, under some conditions airpower alone could be successful. I'm not aware of any examples of this, however.
2. Is ISIS a 'system' or a 'network'? Does the distinction matter? In a system, you destroy a component or sub-component in order to produce failure in the system as a whole. In a network, if you destroy a component or sub-component, the rest of the network still operates. And there is an argument to be made that any organic organization is not a system, but a network.
3. The problem with ISIS is that it represents a fundemental contradiction in American foreign policy in the Middle East and the difficulty is in deciding which component of our policy should be discarded.
When I am weaker than you, I ask you for freedom because that is according to your principles; when I am stronger than you, I take away your freedom because that is according to my principles. - Louis Veuillot
Responses in order of the questions:
1-Your right on this point. Which is why Warden points out in the PPT that the Peace plan comes first then the War Plan then decide if you need an Air plan or an Army,Navy,Marine plan, etc. However the overthrow of Guatamala in 1954 was accomplished by Airpower and Airpower alone after the Army plan failed, but of course that never happened since it was a CIA Air Force that was used.
2-It is a system and it does matter. Simply attacking a personnel Network(Ring #4 IMO) is not going to get you the results you want, especially in War. This is a point that is often overlooked about Warden's rings, he has always maintained that you need to do something to ALL of the rings as close to Parallel as possible depending on your available resources. Attacking in Parallel hellps with the fact that war is the most unpredictable and dangerous activity that man engages in so it is best not to take chances.
3-I pretty much agree with this one, so has Warden, you can hear part of that in the radio interview when he talks about Left over Wilsonian thinking.Which is reference to President Wilson's "we will make the world safe for democracy speech"
You are correct that I am not familiar with his earlier works. They may sway my opinion, but I doubt it.
The reason we are not "Winning" is because we are incapable of achieving the political objective. See http://warontherocks.com/2014/05/dem...obayashi-maru/. You cannot kill or bomb your way out of an insurgency. It is a political beast from start to finish. Military types don't like to think that all problems cannot be solved with high explosives, so they deride this fact, but they cannot change it.
The prescription he offers is not going to "Win" anything but a longer war. That is the reality. Too many people want simple explanations to complex problems. That has been our problem since 2001. I am sorry, but reality is knocking on the door. It is not a pretty reality. It is not one that can be solved by air power. It is just a dark, ugly reality that humans are the way they are.
The good Colonel seems to forget Clausewitz' maxim that war is merely political policy conducted by other means. Bombing is not going to achieve the political policy objective of a democratic Iraq secure within its traditional borders. We screwed the pooch on that in 2003-4.
There are two ways this plays out. Either 1) we replace the dictator we overthrew with a dictator who is capable of viciously suppressing sectarian differences, or 2) the state of Iraq ceases to be. That is the political reality that we have been fighting against for over ten years. Better targeting or thinking of the enemy as a system are merely better tactics. Tactics alone cannot achieve strategic objectives. They certainly cannot achieve the desired political objectives
Last edited by TheCurmudgeon; 06-30-2014 at 11:38 PM.
"I can change almost anything ... but I can't change human nature."
Jon Osterman/Dr. Manhattan
---
I respectfully disagree on this point. Saddam Hussein ruthlessly suppressed everyone and his government included a large number of high ranking Shias. The absence of sectarian conflict is what enabled the Hussein government to function. This false narrative is part of the current problem in formulating an effective response and it's part of the cause of Iraq's instability in the first place since the US administration actively institutionalized sectarian differences in the post-Hussein political system. Sustainable democratic governance is not created through active division of the population.
When I am weaker than you, I ask you for freedom because that is according to your principles; when I am stronger than you, I take away your freedom because that is according to my principles. - Louis Veuillot
AP, you could be right. However, I think that history has demonstrated in Iraq, Syria, and even places like Kosovo that, in places where there are traditional sectarian differences that have been suppressed via extreme cohesion, once that suppressive force is released those old hatreds surface with a vengeance. Until they are properly addressed, there will be no peace.
However, I will argue against your ideas that sustainable democratic governance is not created through active division of the population. I believe that democracy is easier to achieve where there are bonds that hold the target population together. The idea of power sharing is easier to accept where there is not already a strong distrust. There is trust among homogenous groups. I believe that democracy is actually easier to achieve in a homogenous population than in a sectarian one. I believe the research on the matter will back me up. Again, see http://warontherocks.com/2014/05/dem...obayashi-maru/.
Last edited by TheCurmudgeon; 06-30-2014 at 11:49 PM.
"I can change almost anything ... but I can't change human nature."
Jon Osterman/Dr. Manhattan
---
That's true to an extent. But "traditional sectarian differences" implies that they not inherent and that they are mutable. The escalation and descalation of conflict goes through phases over time and across generations; some time periods better or worse than others. Each of those countries you cited have long periods of both, and in the eras of peaceful co-existence normalcy consisted of mixed neighborhoods and marriages, and significant cross-cultural polination. Ethnicity is a specific frame not always correctly selected and accurately applied, and sometimes, like the recent conflict in Iraq, it takes on a life of its own after some instigatation. This is actually true in nearly all instances of intensifying inter-ethnic conflict, including cases of genocide. Once one group decides to seize power for itself (or is placed into power by an external force), the situation compels all other groups to act accordingly. Identifying division is an act of alienation in itself, and institutionalizing it in the political system invariably leads to conflict since someone is always the out-group. This is what the United States did in Iraq by attempting legitimize in law the religious differences of the population. It's a structural problem, not a cultural one.
"Those old hatreds" did not "surface with a vengeance" in Syria, Iraq, and Kosovo until instigated by intervention. In the case of Iraq, it was the failure of the Bush administration to replace the Hussein regime with an effective government - instead, the CPA dismantled government entirely starting with the security forces and administration. And we held on to the narrative of Baathists = Sunnis = repressive minority to justify their legal alienation in the new political system. And in Syria, it was the instigation of armed groups through US allies while the US itself worked diligently to destablize the Assad regime, obstructing Syria's ability to actually keep its civil society together.
There's a reason why the West has generally abolished laws distinguishing rights and priveleges on the basis of race or religion.
When I am weaker than you, I ask you for freedom because that is according to your principles; when I am stronger than you, I take away your freedom because that is according to my principles. - Louis Veuillot
Again Warden Has Been saying.....
Pretty much the same thing for some time. If you listen to the radio interview he brings these same points up during that interview. Also if you look at panel #2 of the PPT I posted he explains that Military force does not work against Religious,Cultural or Politcal belief systems. So the Military should not be tasked to do something for which Military cannot accomplish. I know you are busy but look at the PPT and listen to the actual inteview if you get the chance.
P.S.
I would add that we the USA cannot kill our way out of an insurgency but the COIN case involvoing the Tamil Tigers shows that it can be accomplished by the Home team.
Last edited by slapout9; 07-01-2014 at 06:10 AM. Reason: stuff
The LTTE case is unique and one has to understand why it cannot be done in Iraq.
The animosity of the Buddhist majority towards the Tamil is historical and they don't honestly recognise that Tamils belong to Sri Lanka. Therefore, there is no love lost if the Tamils exist or they are wiped out.
The animosity is more intense because the Tamils flourished under the British since they learnt English and were in positions of influence that were open to the 'natives'.
On the other hand, the majority Buddhist Sri Lankans looked upon the British as interlopers who came to subjugate them. They boycotted the British and did not learn English and so were left out in the blue whereas the Tamils (who in the first place the Buddhists did not feel belonged to Sri Lanka or Ceylon then) were ruling the roost, after the British.
One of the thing the Sri Lanka Govt did was abolish English and adopted Singhalese Only (the majority Buddhist's language) so that the Tamils did not have the advantage. Then more restrictions were placed. This cause the Tamil heartburn and the LTTE was born.
Therefore, given the equation, wiping out the Tamils ruthlessly and without a care for Human Rights, was not taken to be a crime, and instead applauded.
This cannot be replicated in Iraq.
The Muslim world is not that small a demographic size as the Tamils in the island of Ceylon.
The Muslims are a huge number around the world and increasing.
Any Sri Lankan replicating will have serious repercussions and no country is ready for that, because even now, the chaos that the Muslim fundamentalists are capable of doing and are doing, is more than what can be chewed!
Last edited by Ray; 07-01-2014 at 08:26 AM.
I looked at the slide set. It was not terribly helpful. Full of platitudes like "short is good, long is bad"; "If you can't do it quickly, maybe you should not do it at all"; "get out at the right time and place" (my stock broker tells me the same thing); "you must have clear, concise, measurable national objectives". I don't think any of our plans to date were designed to violate these rules. In fact, I would say that the early days of Iraq were all about "short is good, long is bad", which is why there was no plan for Phase IV because there was not supposed to be a Phase IV. We had "clear, concise, and measurable national objectives" back in 2004, but no one bothered to check if they were achievable.
"I can change almost anything ... but I can't change human nature."
Jon Osterman/Dr. Manhattan
---
Prime Directives Not Platitudes
Curmudgy,
I think they are more guiding precepts or prime directives based upon his experiences. But from the Link to the article you posted at War On The Rocks you must be a Star Trek fan. so here is an episode on the Prime Directive.......could be about our involvement in Iraq and the long term fight between the Sunni and Shia or anybody else for that matter. As they say Art imitates life.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FLHH-mE94Pk
My experience in my country has been quite contrary to your statement that - Military types don't like to think that all problems cannot be solved with high explosives,
Actually, it is the politicians who think that military actions alone can solve insurgencies while they dither over trying to find a political solution and then dither away endlessly.
Even in the Second Iraq War, the Plan envisioned the tactical aspect but only to the point of how to win the military aspect and not how to disengage once the military action was over and occupy to implement the political plan.
Events thereafter indicate a series of 'spit and paste' jobs which lacked any political vision, resulting in the chaos that ensued and still ensuing.
The issue is that it is incumbent to 'think through' the Plan and coalesce the political objectives with the military plan, and also how the political objectives will take over from the military once the military action is over, in a seamless manner.
In most cases, I think the military does it part of the Plan well, but then the politicians seem to lose their way since they cannot think beyond the immediate.
That leaves the military holding the can, with the hapless politicians hoping that 'something' is conjured so as to exit the mess with as much of 'saving face', as is possible.
Here, in this dilemma of the politicians, 'whiz kids' amongst the military keep alive this false hope with gung ho ideas and schemes.
It is totally an incorrect surmise that gung ho military actions can replace political solutions. It fact, military action without political actions, is the sure shot elixir to lose whatever is gained.
I could go on and indicate how Indian UN contingent do better than most in war ravaged countries, including Somalia which was a horror to many. But then that would not be on topic.
Last edited by Ray; 07-01-2014 at 07:58 AM.
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