Syria: a civil war (closed)

[JMA]

If you believe that "intervention in Syria, or anywhere else, would put the US in a better position", why won't you tell us why? If there's no point in discussing matters with those who disagree, this place will get very quiet very quickly. Surely you cannot expect people to entertain your opinions if you're not prepared to reveal the reasons why you hold those opinions.

I am ignoring the majority of your post because your are obviously looking for someone to argue with... and I'm not taking the bait.

I have told you on a few occasions that you lack comprehension skills and this is once again evident in the final piece of your post (quoted above).

My position on Syria is simple...

I would support intervention in Syria (for much the same reasons I did for Libya) but would not support that intervention being carried out by the US (due to their extremely poor record with such interventions) neither would I support arming the opposition (for much the same reasons I stated for Libya).

That said... now go find someone else to play with.

[Dayuhan]

I would support intervention in Syria (for much the same reasons I did for Libya) but would not support that intervention being carried out by the US

So who do you think should do it, or is that also destined to remain a mystery?

If you insist on presenting strongly worded opinions, expect people to ask you to support those opinions with evidence or reasoning. That's not being argumentative, it's an established convention of rational discourse. It may be awkward, especially if you can't support the opinions with evidence or reasoning, but that's not the fault of those asking you to support your opinions.

Regarding this...

If a man is offered a fact which goes against his instincts, he will scrutinize it closely, and unless the evidence is overwhelming, he will refuse to believe it. If, on the other hand, he is offered something which affords a reason for acting in accordance to his instincts, he will accept it even on the slightest evidence. The origin of myths is explained in this way.

There was a time (we were all young once) when I was a great advocate of humanitarian intervention... of course nobody cared or listened, but I believed. Most Americans raised in liberal progressive environments have that cultivated instinct to help. It was only with the passage of time, and some painful scrutiny of a rather large body of evidence, that this instinct was gradually replaced by a much more restrained set of opinions.

Most of us have changed our minds on something, at some time.

[JMA]

So who do you think should do it, or is that also destined to remain a mystery?

If you insist on presenting strongly worded opinions, expect people to ask you to support those opinions with evidence or reasoning. That's not being argumentative, it's an established convention of rational discourse. It may be awkward, especially if you can't support the opinions with evidence or reasoning, but that's not the fault of those asking you to support your opinions.

Regarding this...

There was a time (we were all young once) when I was a great advocate of humanitarian intervention... of course nobody cared or listened, but I believed. Most Americans raised in liberal progressive environments have that cultivated instinct to help. It was only with the passage of time, and some painful scrutiny of a rather large body of evidence, that this instinct was gradually replaced by a much more restrained set of opinions.

Most of us have changed our minds on something, at some time.

Yes we were all young once... and some of us were soldiers too... now listen to me... go find someone else to play with!

[Dayuhan]

now listen to me... go find someone else to play with!

You'll want to recover that phlegmatic disposition long enough to recall that you don't give orders 'round here.

You've expressed certain opinions that need to be supported to be taken seriously. It's up to you to support them, is it not? If you're not willing to do that, why should you be ordering anyone else to listen to you?

[JMA]

You'll want to recover that phlegmatic disposition long enough to recall that you don't give orders 'round here.

Last time I said something like that to someone I got suspended.

You've expressed certain opinions that need to be supported to be taken seriously. It's up to you to support them, is it not? If you're not willing to do that, why should you be ordering anyone else to listen to you?

Let me help you here.

I am obviously different from the emotionally fragile USians of your generation and younger.

I am happy to be taken seriously by people I care about. I am not driven (it should be obvious by now) to attempt to seek acceptance by people I don't know and will never get to know and really don't need to know.

This discussion group is interesting and I have learned much here... but it gets trying when people without even rudimentary knowledge of the military speak as if they do. Always better to stay within the bounds of your expertise which in your case is what?

[Dayuhan]

I am obviously different from the emotionally fragile USians of your generation and younger.

I'm aware that you've a high opinion of yourself. The reminder is unnecessary.

I am happy to be taken seriously by people I care about. I am not driven (it should be obvious by now) to attempt to seek acceptance by people I don't know and will never get to know and really don't need to know.

I don't know why you'd see supporting your statements with evidence or reasoning as "seeking acceptance". I also can't see why you'd bother making statements if you're not prepared to back them up if questioned: it's called a discussion board for a reason. Stating fringe opinions and retreating to bluster and obfuscation when they're challenged is not consistent with any definition of "discussion" that I know of.

it gets trying when people without even rudimentary knowledge of the military speak as if they do. Always better to stay within the bounds of your expertise which in your case is what?

The discussion in progress on this thread is predominantly political, not military. In any event the credence any opinion gets here should depend solely on the reasoning and evidence presented to support that opinion.

I'd be curious to know what specific expertise supports your dramatically stated opinion that US leaders won't intervene in Syria because they're pissing their pants in terror of some still unspecified threat from Russia and China.

The repeated suggestion that these interventions could be achieved neatly and cleanly if only people were "competent" begs the question of what steps you think competent people would take, what you think the outcome would be, and why you think that. In the absence of that information, the claim of "incompetence" is less than compelling.

Just run your military credentials past me so I can try to understand where you are coming from here.

I asked the question so that you might display your knowledge.

If I challenged your assessments of the capacity to carry out such a strike, or the means by which such a strike might be carried out, that would involve military credentials. The question as asked involves the anticipated political response to a military action, not the action itself, and is essentially a question involving political expertise, not military expertise.

Again, it looks like you're evading the question because you can't answer it. Best way to change that perception is to answer the question.

You've proposed the three cruise missile theory and the process by which it would be implemented. No question or challenge there. The question is what political outcome you'd expect from those steps, and why.

Entropy's post above would be an excellent starting point for reasonable discussion of the prospects for intervention in Syria.

[JMA]

I'm aware that you've a high opinion of yourself. The reminder is unnecessary.

I don't know why you'd see supporting your statements with evidence or reasoning as "seeking acceptance". I also can't see why you'd bother making statements if you're not prepared to back them up if questioned: it's called a discussion board for a reason. Stating fringe opinions and retreating to bluster and obfuscation when they're challenged is not consistent with any definition of "discussion" that I know of.

The discussion in progress on this thread is predominantly political, not military. In any event the credence any opinion gets here should depend solely on the reasoning and evidence presented to support that opinion.

I'd be curious to know what specific expertise supports your dramatically stated opinion that US leaders won't intervene in Syria because they're pissing their pants in terror of some still unspecified threat from Russia and China.

The repeated suggestion that these interventions could be achieved neatly and cleanly if only people were "competent" begs the question of what steps you think competent people would take, what you think the outcome would be, and why you think that. In the absence of that information, the claim of "incompetence" is less than compelling.

I asked the question so that you might display your knowledge.

If I challenged your assessments of the capacity to carry out such a strike, or the means by which such a strike might be carried out, that would involve military credentials. The question as asked involves the anticipated political response to a military action, not the action itself, and is essentially a question involving political expertise, not military expertise.

Again, it looks like you're evading the question because you can't answer it. Best way to change that perception is to answer the question.

You've proposed the three cruise missile theory and the process by which it would be implemented. No question or challenge there. The question is what political outcome you'd expect from those steps, and why.

Entropy's post above would be an excellent starting point for reasonable discussion of the prospects for intervention in Syria.

LOL ... pass

[Fuchs]

The Israelis are "not suitable" for an intervention in Syria.

The Turks would possibly face imperialism rumours, as if they wanted to re-establish the Ottoman Empire.

The French would have no entry point, and their expeditionary forces would have troubles with the quite heavily-armed Syrian army. Their only option would be air strikes from the CdG (if the ship is operational at the time; dunno), but that wouldn't be much. Alternatively they might be allowed to use Cyprus as base for AdA strikes.

Same for the British; they couldn't do more than Cyprus allows.

Russia has rather been a supporter of Syria and will certainly not intervene.

Saudi-Arabia is an absolute monarchy that's more interested in getting over with the Arab Spring and the secular Syrian baathists than in protecting the Syrian people.

Jordan is too weak for intervention.

Iraq is too weak for intervention.

Lebanon isn't even strong enough to ward off Syrian influence domestically.

Italy and Spain have no significantly better intervention potential than the UK.



So who should in your opinion intervene? The Americans were the only ones crazy enough to sink trillions of dollars in the ability to beat up a medium-sized, very distant country that has a large and obsolete military.

[JMA]

So who should in your opinion intervene? The Americans were the only ones crazy enough to sink trillions of dollars in the ability to beat up a medium-sized, very distant country that has a large and obsolete military.

Good summary.

Most can't while those who could either won't or should not.

How does this, if at all, detract from the need curb the excesses of the Assad regime?

[Fuchs]

Good summary.

Most can't while those who could either won't or should not.

How does this, if at all, detract from the need curb the excesses of the Assad regime?

Which need?

3,000 people died in inter-tribal violence in province Pibor, South Sudan, at the beginning of this year. We didn't even notice, much less did a Western public discuss the prospect of intervention.

Why is there a need for action in Syria, but not in other places?

Looks to me as if it's not a need, but a personal preference.
The Syrians are having a civil war. I can resist the urge for calling for an involvement.

[J Wolfsberger]

Which need?

3,000 people died in inter-tribal violence in province Pibor, South Sudan, at the beginning of this year. We didn't even notice, much less did a Western public discuss the prospect of intervention.

Why is there a need for action in Syria, but not in other places?

Looks to me as if it's not a need, but a personal preference.
The Syrians are having a civil war. I can resist the urge for calling for an involvement.

And as Rod Liddle pointed out, by asking an obviously rhetorical question, we know very little about who the people in rebellion really are, while we know a great deal about Assad, the Ba'ath Party, the Alawite minority in power, and so on. If events in Egypt and Libya are any indication, regardless of the current gush-gush over the insurgents in many quarters, only the hard core, radical Islamist groups have sufficient organization, resources and clarity of goals to shape the end state after the overthrow of the the Assad regime. The rest will be sidelined.

At least for the present, the situation seems to be that the Arab League would like somebody to intervene, so that the "somebody" will be the bad guy rather than them. Otherwise, those Saudi and Jordanian aircraft, tanks and infantry would already be on the scene.

Meanwhile, the choosing of sides is leading to a rift between Hamas and Iran - which I think most rational people would consider a Good Thing.

I'm with you, Fuchs. Resisting the temptation to intervene is proving very easy.

[JMA]

And as Rod Liddle pointed out, by asking an obviously rhetorical question, we know very little about who the people in rebellion really are, while we know a great deal about Assad, the Ba'ath Party, the Alawite minority in power, and so on. If events in Egypt and Libya are any indication, regardless of the current gush-gush over the insurgents in many quarters, only the hard core, radical Islamist groups have sufficient organization, resources and clarity of goals to shape the end state after the overthrow of the the Assad regime. The rest will be sidelined.

At least for the present, the situation seems to be that the Arab League would like somebody to intervene, so that the "somebody" will be the bad guy rather than them. Otherwise, those Saudi and Jordanian aircraft, tanks and infantry would already be on the scene.

Meanwhile, the choosing of sides is leading to a rift between Hamas and Iran - which I think most rational people would consider a Good Thing.

I'm with you, Fuchs. Resisting the temptation to intervene is proving very easy.

It is important that the US does not intervene.

Ron Liddle was just filling space and providing fodder for those looking for reasons to oppose any intervention. His work is apparently necessary to help those unable to think for themselves.

So I guess you are right then... lets all just sit back and watch 1,000s of people being butchered. I wonder what that makes us?

[Entropy]

I'll go ahead and lay out my view and analysis regarding military intervention, specifically the use of military means toward a political end.

First of all, I think there are three "categories" in which military force could be used:

1. Regime change, by whatever means.
2. Change the balance of power between Assad’s forces and the opposition so that Assad’s forces cannot conduct mass killings.
3. Compel Assad to make a political decision to stop the mass killings or reconcile with the opposition.

Let’s examine the utility of military force in each case:

First, regime change:

• Regime change is something military force can achieve by following, very roughly, the Libya model. Another example is the post Desert Storm counter-factual where the Iraqi Shia rebels receive a proxy air force to finish Saddam off after we decimated his conventional forces. The US does have a lot of experience at this sort of thing - see also Afghanistan in 2001-2002.
• The problem is, however, that whatever the circumstances, we can’t control how regime change occurs or turns out in the end. It’s a pretty big gamble and the odds are good that the result will not be pretty. The stakes are a lot greater in Syria than Libya because Syria is bigger, more populous, better armed, has chemical weapons, is more geographically strategic, and plays an important regional role with it's alliance with Iran and involvement in factional Lebanese politics. It's not clear at all how things would turn out if we upset that apple cart, but I think the result would look a lot more like Iraq circa 2006 than Libya 2011.
• The best case for regime change is a successful coup, but that’s not something we can create or control through military force. It's also not clear that an Alawite successor would view the rebels any differently than Assad and it's highly unlikely anyone but another Alawite could stage a sucessful coup.
• Even if Syria transitions smoothly to a new government, the effect will likely be that Syrians will still die, they'll just be different Syrians. A Marine officer over at Tom Rick's blog said: "Killing several thousand Syrians so they don't kill several thousand other Syrians only to leave the nation knowing that several thousand more will die is not protecting anyone." That sums it up IMO.
• The worst case is an open and brutal civil war in a highly militarized country rife with internal divisions that also happens to have a lot of chemical weapons.

The second option is to use military force to change the balance of power between Assad and the opposition. There are two basic ways to do this.

• First is to create no-fly/no-drive zones, (using the Southern/Northern watch model) or something similar like "humanitarian corridors" which some advocate for. A bigger version of this the Bosnia partition model which would require an enduring ground-force commitment to separate the warring parties. Any of these options could be accomplished militarily, but there are some serious downsides. The most obvious problem is that such measures are inherently temporary. At some point the NFZ or enforced partition will end. Perhaps a political solution could be negotiated while the parties are separated, but that is not likely for a whole host of reasons I won't belabor here. If a political solution isn't reached, and the political will to continue spending resources enforcing the "peace" ends, then the situation would likely return to the status-quo ante.
• The second option involves attriting Assad’s military and security forces while strengthening the opposition so that Assad no longer has the capability to conduct the mass killings even if he still has the intent. This is a task the US military could accomplish, though it would take a long, sustained air campaign. The problem with this option, however, is what then? Either the situation will slide again into Assad’s favor (a return to the status quo ante), or the opposition will be strong enough to overthrow Assad (see regime change), or you end up with a stalemated civil war in which neither side has a decisive advantage. None of these options sound very good to me and they would all involve killing a lot of Syrians, not protecting them.

The third option is to use military force to compel Assad to come to a political solution with the opposition instead of using violence. This seems the least-realistic of the options and the one least-likely to be accomplished with military force. Is Assad the kind of man who can be bullied into compliance? It's possible I suppose, but it would be uncharacteristic for the typical dictator in Assad's circumstances. And if the interventions in Libya and Iraq are any guide, the political mission creep will tend to try to box Assad in and provide no option but to fight until the bitter end. There's also no guarantee that the opposition would accept any offer from Assad (much less agree among themselves), especially since their primary demand is that Assad step down from office. In my judgment, this option is mostly fantasy abetted by wishful thinking.

There is a fourth option which focuses on punishment as the goal. Although it wouldn't prevent mass killings, it would "send a message." I'm talking, of course, about the tried and true punitive raid. For Syria it would have to be pretty big and would likely last a couple of days - look at Operation Desert Fox for an example of what it might look like. The operation would likely strike regime targets and key strategic facilities. It won’t stop the killings, won’t topple the Assad regime, but at least we could be satisfied that we “did something" even if that "something" is counterproductive.

So in the end, I don't think a military intervention is, at this point in time, justified when compared to the risks and consequences, both intended and unintended.

[JMA]

Which need?

3,000 people died in inter-tribal violence in province Pibor, South Sudan, at the beginning of this year. We didn't even notice, much less did a Western public discuss the prospect of intervention.

Why is there a need for action in Syria, but not in other places?

Looks to me as if it's not a need, but a personal preference.
The Syrians are having a civil war. I can resist the urge for calling for an involvement.

I see where you are coming from... but I did not say intervention in other areas/places is not needed. This is a thread about Syria, we are talking about Syria.

Would you agree that there are scales of potential involvement/intervention?

[Fuchs]

Would you agree that there are scales of potential involvement/intervention?

Is the country under attack?

If not: Their defence is no topic for our security policy.
If yes:

Are they allied (by treaty!)?

If yes: Collective defence, we are all under attack.
If not:

Are we really sure they are becoming victim of a genocide?

If not: Keep an eye on the topic, all else is an issue for the UNSC.
If yes: Check whether we can do something about it.

Can we do something about it?

If not: Go back one step.
If yes: What can we do about it? (Military intervention is just on possibility.)

...

[JMA]

Is the country under attack?

If not: Their defence is no topic for our security policy.
If yes:

Are they allied (by treaty!)?

If yes: Collective defence, we are all under attack.
If not:

Are we really sure they are becoming victim of a genocide?

If not: Keep an eye on the topic, all else is an issue for the UNSC.
If yes: Check whether we can do something about it.

Can we do something about it?

If not: Go back one step.
If yes: What can we do about it? (Military intervention is just on possibility.)

...

Understandable but too simplistic I suggest.

Most such decisions are driven by a mix of political and emotional motivations. There are a lot of factors which lead to a given set of circumstances being pressed home into the national psyche resulting in action being taken and those can safely be ignored.

[jmm99]

If Turkey were to proceed with a conventional armed intervention - a 1 on 1 with Syria with full commitment of military forces by both states, who would win ?

No US-NATO support of any kind for the Turks; and Russia and China stay out of it completely (other than making noises about "aggressive war", etc.).

Regards

Mike

PS: This headline from TZ, ‘Turkey seeks parliamentary authorization to avert Syrian threat’ (7 Mar 2012), is seriously misleading because Davutoğlu speaks throughout in the conditional.

[JMA]

... a conventional armed intervention - a 1 on 1 with Syria with full commitment of military forces by both states, ...

Why would there be a need for an intervention on this scale?

Can you put your finger on where the problem lies?

[Dayuhan]

Why would there be a need for an intervention on this scale?

Realistically, do you think Assad, his military forces, and his substantial base of civilian support are going to disappear or give up in the face of anything less than an intervention on that scale? Surely you don't really believe that they will tuck their tails between their legs and submit to a foreign will simply because somebody fires a few cruise missiles at them...

[J Wolfsberger]

Realistically, do you think Assad, his military forces, and his substantial base of civilian support are going to disappear or give up in the face of anything less than an intervention on that scale? Surely you don't really believe that they will tuck their tails between their legs and submit to a foreign will simply because somebody fires a few cruise missiles at them...

Well, if JMA thinks otherwise he's kept it secret. He doesn't ".. support that intervention being carried out by the US (due to their extremely poor record with such interventions)," he doesn't want the rebels armed, and he agreed with Fuchs' summary of the possibility of other actors intervening, so that pretty much takes everything off the table except for his three cruise missile option. Oh, and the usual "viewing with alarm," "strongly disapprove," "condemnation by all civilized people" and useless economic sanctions the Syrians are pretty much already ignoring.

Of course, a decapitation strike in Syria would lead to complete chaos as everyone fought for position in the aftermath, with no telling what kind of resulting state of affairs. I hope JMA will explain to us why this is "good planning" as opposed to what he considers the U.S. record of "bad planning."