And carl, since we're on the topic of the demographic of American officers, let's talk about where they come from. The trend for both officers and enlisted is overrepresentation of whites and blacks, and enlistees from the South. A single college in the South can easily commission more officers than the whole of New York City. Recruits are overwhelmingly middle class in origin. But of the top ten states by percentage of quality recruits, only 2 are in the South (South Carolina and Louisana). Then there's this gem:

According to a report released in December 2010 by The Education Trust entitled “Shut Out of the Military: Today's High School Education Doesn't Mean You're Ready for Today's Army,” 1 in 5 high school students failed to qualify for enlistment in the Army based on their Armed Forces Qualification Test score.3 Students of color were more likely to fail the test. For future recruit pools, DoD may need to reconsider the value placed on a high school diploma if educational standards do not produce enough recruits able to pass the Armed Forces Qualification Test.
What does this mean? (1) The military does not accurately reflect the demographics of the American population from which it is drawn. If projections of ethnic group growth are accurate, and enlistment patterns remain the same, this difference will only increase. (2) Non-defense investments (i.e. education) is important in establishing the quality of recruits prior to them ever stepping into a recruiter's office. Today, only 1 in 4 candidates 17-29 are estimated to be eligible for enlistment. (3) This is the origin of the divergence thesis between the armed forces and the population - if the people are different, so are the values, and what are the consequences for the country and democratic governance if its military is not drawn from the same population as society at large?

The readiness of the armed forces to fight and win the nation's wars begins at home. By the time the soldier reaches the battlefield to close with and destroy the enemy, most of his odds have already been decided by the thousands of micro-decisions leading to that event - and not only in the officer corps, but across the country. By then it's too late to figure out if the soldier has the right weapon or equipment or values or education or training. That's the part of our strategy that's missing.