Applying the lessons of late 19th/early 20th century asymmetrical warfare

[M-A Lagrange]

When an "advanced" society tries to intervene in a less advanced society, the "tarbaby effect" can generate an unpleasant surprise. blindly assuming our own superiority, we blunder in & snatch up the tarbaby, intending to bring order out of chaos. It's hard to look dignified, sophisiticated & in charges when you're covered in tar, mud, fur & feathers.

Could you come with a specific reference to Tarbaby effect?

So given a morally justifiable end, you can employ "effective" means? This is extremely context dependant, but I do agree that it is the purpose to which force in employed that should largely (not exclusively) define its political merit. However almost every NGO in the world rejects that view.

By William F. Owen

This is the perception the military has of the NGO. NGO position is less and less clear and orthodox on that particular point. Many would like to find a Leviathan to protect them (first) and the populations (when they are secured). The real question being which political power is found legitimate by NGOs to be respected as a legitimate user of force. I was once discussing the very same issue with a friend from MSF. He came with this comment: “we (MSF) love the rebels. We do not like the official armies of any countries but we love the rebels.”
This, for me, resumes all. The main problem with NGO is not they do not like force and the use of force. They want to rebel against any form of authority. But if this is what you see on the ground, this is far from being what you see in the HQ. In all HQ of the world, NGO are doing what governments are telling them. NGO are quite a traditional actor into war. They will be on the side of legitimate power and the more they criticize it, the more their actions are supporting it. Well, in some cases, as in Israel may be, it would not be the case. But otherwise, what you discribe is almost enterely due to NGO/military love/hate relation.

[William F. Owen]

This, for me, resumes all. The main problem with NGO is not they do not like force and the use of force. They want to rebel against any form of authority.

As long as they (NGOs and even media) admit that they are not neutral and are actors in the conflict, with a political agenda, which therefore allows certain actions to be taken against them, I have no problem.

They will be on the side of legitimate power and the more they criticize it, the more their actions are supporting it. Well, in some cases, as in Israel may be, it would not be the case. But otherwise, what you discribe is almost enterely due to NGO/military love/hate relation.

Not sure what you mean by "as in Israel", but whose legitimacy, when and where?
EG:After Israel evicted the Jordanians from the West Bank in 1967, they became the "occupying power." Occupations can be legitimate, as can protecting yourself by all and any means.

[M-A Lagrange]

As long as they (NGOs and even media) admit that they are not neutral and are actors in the conflict, with a political agenda, which therefore allows certain actions to be taken against them, I have no problem.

Why do you want to take actions against them?
NGO are the best allies of military power nowadays. They are looking for someone to protect them from weapons carriers or fighters who do not respect their neutral status.

The only thing being their legal status in war zones are asking you to be more subtile than brutal. (I even saw mormons funding muslim NGO in Afghanistan.) What is important is the psyop you conduct with. Not against NGO work but to integrate NGO and to win hearts and minds.

By definition, for NGO, occupying powers are the bad guys. All you have to do is making sure that you control their funds sources and then NGO have an open position against you but do the job for you. But coordination of aid and harmonised approach is may be the most difficult to achieve.

[William F. Owen]

Why do you want to take actions against them?

I don't want to. I may have to. Especially those who are using NGO status to mask military activity.

NGO are the best allies of military power nowadays. They are looking for someone to protect them from weapons carriers or fighters who do not respect their neutral status.

That description does not apply to all NGOs. If they want your protection, they must come under your control, and do what you tell them.

The only thing being their legal status in war zones are asking you to be more subtile than brutal. (I even saw mormons funding muslim NGO in Afghanistan.) What is important is the psyop you conduct with. Not against NGO work but to integrate NGO and to win hearts and minds.

Well this just buys into the "hearts and minds" fallacy. You assume that hearts and minds are important in all conflict. That is simply not true. Obviously you should not do those things that undermine your political aim, but that does not axiomatically mean you should care what the enemy population think.

By definition, for NGO, occupying powers are the bad guys.

Are they really that stupid and simplistic?

[M-A Lagrange]

Are they really that stupid and simplistic?

I’ll start by the easiest. No, they are not that simplistic once you have reached a certain level. But basically, in average 75% western expatriated relief worker are like that. Occupation always had and has bad publicity. By definition you are illegitimate as you are imposing a form of regulation by the use of force. You have to have in mind that they just believe they will impose the Humanitarian order on the world. Governments are not perceived as a partner or a power. They are perceived as threat. A government using force is then by definition a threat to Humanity.

I don't want to. I may have to. Especially those who are using NGO status to mask military activity.

Well… there always had and will always be. The first ones were not the enemy. So we have to just agree this enters into intelligence management.
As an example I will use a US NGO in Lebanon, in cities under Hezbollah administration. They use to fund huge projects implemented by Hezbollah NGOs and administration. Who was doing masked military activities?
The difficulty of using NGO as a weapon is basically found in the fact you cannot destroy your enemy and even less its effects. Social services delivered by the enemy to its population, whatever is the political back ground, will always have better publicity than yours. So you have to turn it in your advantage. It’s by the funds you can do it.

That description does not apply to all NGOs. If they want your protection, they must come under your control, and do what you tell them.

It applies to all NGO. It is not because the NGO is the best friend of your enemy it is not the best friend of a military power. Being protected by the Geneva Convention is an advantage for all and an obligation for all parts of the conflict. You cannot kill or arm NGO workers, properties and even less the medical facilities, vehicles and staff: basic constraints for all. All do not decide to apply it, OK, but this is not the point.
Your approach of NGO management is too direct. The bargain has to be apparently invisible. NGO will not do what you want for protection. Protecting them is your obligation. What you look at is having NGO doing what you want as part of their general activities. The dichotomy military and civilian has to be respected. (NGO are contesting your moral legitimacy in who is regulating war.) So you have to show that it is you who integrates their network.

Well this just buys into the "hearts and minds" fallacy. You assume that hearts and minds are important in all conflict. That is simply not true. Obviously you should not do those things that undermine your political aim, but that does not axiomatically mean you should care what the enemy population think.

The hearts and minds fallacy does not apply to conflicts settled in time for generations. It will be difficult to win the heart and the mind of an Israeli and a Palestinian. But I separate hearts and minds as a technical expression and the real object of counter insurgencies: social services distribution to support loyalist military activity.
This is as important than to know what the population thinks. In recent conflicts, as Iraq, what has been undermining all is the delay of reinstallation of basic social services and order. The longer you wait before addressing those simple issues, the larger you open the door to insurgency and, if you’re lucky, to civil war between all the factions who are trying to contest you the power vacuum. Civilian will go for the one who will protect them in a large understanding of protection.
Occupation is not limited to hold. Hold is a transition phase which has to integrate the roots of build. In my opinion, hold and build are mixed. Separating them is what leads to insurgencies.

In somehow, I find ironic this re invention of colonial warfare under new names.

Camps are another issue by the way. They have a different legal status than an occupied land. They also fall under a different organization of political power. Would recommend Michel Agier On the Margins of the World: The Refugee Experience Today (http://www.amazon.fr/Margins-World-R...8632871&sr=1-1) and his new book but I do not know if it is available in English: gerer les indesirables des camps de refgier au gouvernement humanitaire. (Managing the unwelcomed, from refugees camps to humanitarian government).

[William F. Owen]

Occupation always had and has bad publicity. By definition you are illegitimate as you are imposing a form of regulation by the use of force.

Says who?

Sorry, nice try and putting their case, but I see no reason to assume that folks not doing exactly what I tell them, are anything more than a major problem, just the same as media folks who are not embedded with me and under my control.

[Dayuhan]

Wilf, that approach is likely to earn you a lot of enemies and alienate any friends you have. That's fine if you have the capacity to control everyone around you, all by yourself, all the time, forever. Those of finite capacity might want to consider the possibility that their ability to control may eventually erode to the point where that kind of control is no longer possible. That's especially true of those who need external support and who require the regular consent of their own populace.

[Dayuhan]

Occupations can be legitimate, as can protecting yourself by all and any means.

Legitimacy is in the eye of the beholder, is it not? Most actions are seen as legitimate by those doing them, otherwise they wouldn't be taken. Those to whom they are done might have a different perspective, as might the neutral observer. I think one might also find an example or two in history of actions undertaken in the name of enhanced security that actually degraded security in the long run. Military action is often initiated in the name of self-defense or protection; it's a claim that deserves to be scrutinized.

[William F. Owen]

Legitimacy is in the eye of the beholder, is it not? Most actions are seen as legitimate by those doing them, otherwise they wouldn't be taken.

So? Why do I care what the other side thing? I am forcing my will upon them. My survival is more important than theirs.

Those to whom they are done might have a different perspective, as might the neutral observer.

-again, so what? Speaks to the political aim of the conflict.

I think one might also find an example or two in history of actions undertaken in the name of enhanced security that actually degraded security in the long run. Military action is often initiated in the name of self-defense or protection; it's a claim that deserves to be scrutinized.

Sure, but again so what?
What looks good on day one doesn't look good 3 years later. You can't tell the future and violence is instrumental to what it is used against, not things that have not yet occurred, or may be flow down effects.
If folks new their wives would divorce them they wouldn't get married.