The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[Infanteer]

For sure. The question is, does it require a unique skill set? Is planning at the operational level fundamentally different from strategy/tactics? I would say yes, and most military thinkers agree.

What exactly is contained in this unique skill?

Careful with semantics. Lets not confuse the term "operations" used in its broad sense with "operational warfare." Yes, a company commander can plan an operation, however, that does not equate to operational warfare. Operational warfare, in contrast with operations, only takes place in major formations, namely Corps and above, and possibly Division if properly augmented.

Canada's contribution to Afghanistan is a Brigade; this Brigade conducts logistics that go back to Canada, is a joint HQ and has an air component, and deals with the "Command" back in Canada. Does it practice "operational warfare", "tactical warfare" or both?

[M.L.]

What exactly is contained in this unique skill?

Without going into exhaustive detail, the ability to plan, conduct, and sustain campaigns and major operations which accomplish strategic objectives. This includes setting the conditions for tactical engagements and battles which link to strategic objectives or effects. Operational planners use operational concepts, such as Center of Gravity and Lines of Operation, to plan operational activities.

Canada's contribution to Afghanistan is a Brigade; this Brigade conducts logistics that go back to Canada, is a joint HQ and has an air component, and deals with the "Command" back in Canada. Does it practice "operational warfare", "tactical warfare" or both?

Tactical warfare. This brigade is necessarily linked logistically with its home nation, however, the conduct of operational warfare has less to do with the structure of a unit than its scope of responsibility vis a vis the theater of operations. In other words, an operational headquarters has certain characteristics (joint, logistics focus, etc...) because it is doing operational planning. This doesn't mean that all joint HQ with extended logistics are working at the operational level.

Structure is an outgrowth of operational responsibilities - operational responsibilities are NOT a consequence of structure.

[Infanteer]

M.L. - thank you for the response. You'll find some follow up questions below; I ask not for the sake of being difficult - I'm only trying to link personal experiences to what appears to be your very concrete definition of operational warfare.

Without going into exhaustive detail, the ability to plan, conduct, and sustain campaigns and major operations which accomplish strategic objectives. This includes setting the conditions for tactical engagements and battles which link to strategic objectives or effects. Operational planners use operational concepts, such as Center of Gravity and Lines of Operation, to plan operational activities.

Well, I don't know why one would plan a campaign or major operation to not accomplish strategic objectives, so I think we can simply go with the following:

plan, conduct, and sustain campaigns and major operations.

Does this seem agreeable?

Is the scope of this limited by a minimum geographic size? How about a minimum size of friendly forces? Does a Company that builds a District Stabilization Plan which focuses on a series of operations over a extended period of time constitute conducting operational art?

Tactical warfare. This brigade is necessarily linked logistically with its home nation, however, the conduct of operational warfare has less to do with the structure of a unit than its scope of responsibility vis a vis the theater of operations. In other words, an operational headquarters has certain characteristics (joint, logistics focus, etc...) because it is doing operational planning. This doesn't mean that all joint HQ with extended logistics are working at the operational level.

Structure is an outgrowth of operational responsibilities - operational responsibilities are NOT a consequence of structure.

Ok.

So when this HQ conducts a "Provincial Stabilization Plan", focuses on identifying insurgent centers of gravity within the Province and plans along key counterinsurgent lines of operation (stability, governance, development and security sector reform) it is not doing Operational Warfare?

[M.L.]

M.L. - thank you for the response. You'll find some follow up questions below; I ask not for the sake of being difficult - I'm only trying to link personal experiences to what appears to be your very concrete definition of operational warfare.

Well, I don't know why one would plan a campaign or major operation to not accomplish strategic objectives, so I think we can simply go with the following:

plan, conduct, and sustain campaigns and major operations.

Does this seem agreeable?

Very much so. I think your simple definition above trends toward an explanation of operational warfare. In my previous answer, I'd was trying to pull out some of the unique skills required to do what you state above.

Is the scope of this limited by a minimum geographic size? How about a minimum size of friendly forces? Does a Company that builds a District Stabilization Plan which focuses on a series of operations over a extended period of time constitute conducting operational art?

Operational art contains many tools for conceptualizing military operations at large. That doesn't mean we are working at the operational level. Again here, an overuse of the word "operation" contributes to our collective confusion.

There are no hard or fast rules, however, I'd have a hard time being convinced that a series of company operations would end with a strategic effect. Rather, these "operations" are more likely a series of tactical actions toward stabilizing a district. This may, in turn, serve an operational objective, such as stabilizing a key province (Kandahar, for example).

So when this HQ conducts a "Provincial Stabilization Plan", focuses on identifying insurgent centers of gravity within the Province and plans along key counterinsurgent lines of operation (stability, governance, development and security sector reform) it is not doing Operational Warfare?

Doing "Campaign Planning" is currently fashionable in U.S. brigades. This is an operational tool that helps conceptualize, frame, and link things like, security, governance, and economics. However, this doesn't mean brigades are doing operational warfare - they are just using the tools.

The size of a unit, its area of responsibility, the tools it uses to plan, etc... are not necessarily indicative of operational warfare.

They key question to ask is whether the campaign/operation being planned sets the conditions for tactical success that in turn creates a strategic effect. This is the "linking" of tactics to strategy that must be accomplished in the operational realm.

[William F. Owen]

Operational art contains many tools for conceptualizing military operations at large. That doesn't mean we are working at the operational level. Again here, an overuse of the word "operation" contributes to our collective confusion.

So Operational Art is not related to "Operational Warfighting?" I thought one expressed the other?
By tools, do you means staff procedures used to aid planning?
Does conceptualizing mean "planning?"

They key question to ask is whether the campaign/operation being planned sets the conditions for tactical success that in turn creates a strategic effect. This is the "linking" of tactics to strategy that must be accomplished in the operational realm.

Sorry, to me the campaign/operation being planned sets the conditions for tactical success is tactics. Intelligence, Logistics, planning, and Command are the realm of tactics and I cannot see how calling them the "Operational Level" makes it any different.

....and I thought the "Operational level" was related to Corps and Divisions with Corps assets?

[M.L.]

So Operational Art is not related to "Operational Warfighting?"

I didn't say that.

I thought one expressed the other?

You thought wrong. You don't believe in operational warfare, so I don't expect you to understand it.

By tools, do you means staff procedures used to aid planning?

No.

Does conceptualizing mean "planning?"

No.

Sorry, to me the campaign/operation being planned sets the conditions for tactical success is tactics. Intelligence, Logistics, planning, and Command are the realm of tactics and I cannot see how calling them the "Operational Level" makes it any different.

Fair enough. Great opinion - you are welcome to it.

....and I thought the "Operational level" was related to Corps and Divisions with Corps assets?

You said that, not me.

[wm]

When in doubt, go to the doctrinal literature. The following is a list of definitions from JPub 1-02. Seems to me to be pretty clear what distinguishes the operational level of war from the tactical and strategic. Also the definition of operational seems rather straightforward.

(interestingly, IMO, is the fact that battle is referenced but the J Pub has no definition for it)

engagement — . . . 2. A tactical conflict, usually between opposing lower echelons maneuver forces. See also battle; campaign

campaign — A series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. See also campaign plan. (JP 5-0)

campaign plan — A joint operation plan for a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space. See also campaign; campaign planning. (JP 5-0)

campaign planning — The process whereby combatant commanders and subordinate joint force commanders translate national or theater strategy into operational concepts through the development of an operation plan for a campaign. Campaign planning may begin during contingency planning when the actual threat, national guidance, and available resources become evident, but is normally not completed until after the President or Secretary of Defense selects the course of action during crisis action planning. Campaign planning is conducted when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major joint operation. See also campaign; campaign plan . (JP 5-0)

major operation — A series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by combat forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operational area. These actions are conducted simultaneously or sequentially in accordance with a common plan and are controlled by a single commander. For noncombat operations, a reference to the relative size and scope of a military operation. See also operation. (JP 3-0)

operation — 1. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission. 2. The process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign.

operational art — The application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs — supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience — to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. Operational art integrates ends, ways, and means across the levels of war. (JP 3-0)

operational level of war — The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to achieve the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. See also strategic level of war; tactical level of war. (JP 3-0)

tactical level of war — The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. See also operational level of war; strategic level of war. (JP 3-0)

strategic level of war — The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to achieve these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve those objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans. See also operational level of war; tactical level of war. (JP 3-0)

[Ken White]

...Operational planners use operational concepts, such as Center of Gravity and Lines of Operation, to plan operational activities.

That could be construed as use of proper jargon delineates august Operational planners from the great unwashed...

It could also lead one to give great credence to this comment by WilF:""Your case is based on a 1980s invention of Corps Operations."" While I realize that is not strictly true it is FACT that all those operational art concepts were in existence and were used prior to the introduction of the operational level concept to the US.

Doing "Campaign Planning" is currently fashionable in U.S. brigades. This is an operational tool that helps conceptualize, frame, and link things like, security, governance, and economics. However, this doesn't mean brigades are doing operational warfare - they are just using the tools.

Or misusing them...

That goes back to my original and I believe rather important issue on this sub-thread: ""My point is the rather more important issue that Military folks are too often slaves to doctrine"" as exemplified by this quote from BG (Ret) John S. Brown: ""They were reinforced by an emphasis upon the operational art in the basic course, and thus the tendency of all recent officer graduates of the service school systems to use concepts and vocabulary that facilitated its use.""

Wilf may have a problem with operational art. I do not, it exists and is useful. I do have a major problem with the misuse of doctrinal concepts and seeming military elitism obscuring reality, muddling good tactical planning and operations and the creation of oversized Staffs that lend little to actual warfighting. For, as you also said:

Structure is an outgrowth of operational responsibilities - operational responsibilities are NOT a consequence of structure.

That is too often forgotten -- by too many...

Over a good many years I've seen too many Army concepts the led to an almost cult like following and belief in the awe and majesty of a particular subset of Soldiery or skill being annointed. That "airborne mystique" foolishness will get you killed; SF and SOF are handy but are far from being the epitome of combat soldiering; Aviation is now a branch but has not really done itself many favors. Similarly, Operational Level Planners and SAMS graduates are not necessarily the solution to all Army problems. Not that anyone has said they are -- but I do see a trend...

[M.L.]

It could also lead one to give great credence to this comment by WilF:""Your case is based on a 1980s invention of Corps Operations."" While I realize that is not strictly true it is FACT that all those operational art concepts were in existence and were used prior to the introduction of the operational level concept to the US.

Couldn't agree more. However, you will note a common theme throughout my posts that the operational level existed since Napoleon; it just wasn't labeled as such. The terminology wasn't introduced until the 1980s, but the concepts have been around for a while.

Mr. Owen's argument is largely based on the absence of operational-level terminology from the historical record. My counter-argument is that the words matter very little since the ideas were there. As a demonstration, I repeat my previous observation:

The word "strategy" appears exactly once in The History of the Peloponnesian War. Yet, this is one of the most influential books on strategy ever written, and is required reading in most strategic studies programs. Similarly, the absence of the words "operational warfare" from history doesn't really tell us that much. As I have said before, it is better to focus on ideas rather than words.

[Ken White]

Couldn't agree more. However, you will note a common theme throughout my posts that the operational level existed since Napoleon; it just wasn't labeled as such. The terminology wasn't introduced until the 1980s, but the concepts have been around for a while.

I think you just reinforced my point. We have a terminology (not totally a concept) introduced about 30 years ago and it has already permeated the Army and use of the concepts have filtered down by your own admission to BCT level -- and folks tell me that it also appears at Bn level -- the mis-application you wrote of earlier...

Mr. Owen's argument is largely based on the absence of operational-level terminology from the historical record. My counter-argument is that the words matter very little since the ideas were there...

True and, IMO, an esoteric argument between two hard heads -- no insult intended, I also fit that description, just not into fighting this particular issue -- my concern is rather with the appropriate application versus inappropriate use of ANY military technique.

The Operational Level as holy grail is blatant misuse. Operational art is a concept, it has applicability in some cases, none in others. Its use in the wrong situation is at least wasteful and time consuming for little to no benefit and at worst is going to get people killed unnecessarily.

As the Actress said to the Bishop, it's not what you have, it's how you use it...

[Chris jM]

To rudely interject into this debate with a straw-man argument of my own...

How about viewing this argument as a framework whereby government policy is set/translated into the levels discussed:

- Strategic Policy (how AfPak is to be shaped IOT disrupt violent extremism, deny AfPak to AQ and stabilise the Pak nuclear capability)
- Operational/ Theatre-level Policy (conduct a COIN-based campaign around the key pop centres while conducting FID IOT achieve transfer)
- Tactical Policy (ROEs/ Clear-Hold-Build process/ priorities on minimising civ and FF cas)

Military forces are only ever able to operate tactically, but the tactical effects can be in support of either strategic, operational or tactical policy depending on their employment, task, etc.

Viewing the three 'levels' of war as distinct elements of policy-making, rather than a physical level in which one functions, seems to be an elegant solution to some of the points either side of the debate.

[M.L.]

To rudely interject into this debate with a straw-man argument of my own...

How about viewing this argument as a framework whereby government policy is set/translated into the levels discussed:

- Strategic Policy (how AfPak is to be shaped IOT disrupt violent extremism, deny AfPak to AQ and stabilise the Pak nuclear capability)
- Operational/ Theatre-level Policy (conduct a COIN-based campaign around the key pop centres while conducting FID IOT achieve transfer)
- Tactical Policy (ROEs/ Clear-Hold-Build process/ priorities on minimising civ and FF cas)

Military forces are only ever able to operate tactically, but the tactical effects can be in support of either strategic, operational or tactical policy depending on their employment, task, etc.

Viewing the three 'levels' of war as distinct elements of policy-making, rather than a physical level in which one functions, seems to be an elegant solution to some of the points either side of the debate.

An excellent observation. The idea of stratified levels of war is probably inappropriate. Instead, we could imagine each of these concepts as spheres existing within the larger sphere of policy.

Your observation above tracks with Clausewitz, "War is a continuation of policy by other means." All actions in war must ultimately serve political objectives...even tactical actions.

[M.L.]

... my concern is rather with the appropriate application versus inappropriate use of ANY military technique.

The Operational Level as holy grail is blatant misuse. Operational art is a concept, it has applicability in some cases, none in others. Its use in the wrong situation is at least wasteful and time consuming for little to no benefit and at worst is going to get people killed unnecessarily.

No argument here. The misuse of concepts is rampant (center of gravity comes to mind in the US system). My argument with Mr. Owen is with the existence of operational warfare. The fact that the concepts are misunderstood and/or badly applied is a related but separate issue. Just because something is misused doesn't make that something inherently bad.

[Ken White]

Just because something is misused doesn't make that something inherently bad.

Too many year in and watching the critter that is the US Army lead me to take strong exception. If something can be misused, it will be. Murphy rules, particularly in combat.

That is particularly true in the structured, heirarchial military environment. The solution is to, when misuse is detected, rapidly examine the issue and institute corrective measures. The US Army does not do that at all well. It is too bureaucratic to spot misuse until it is thoroughly embedded in the muscle memory of the organism; It is loth to take corrective measures because that means one GO would have to publicly criticize -- even if indirectly -- others, an absolute no-no; and / or admit that the 'system had erred -- another no-no; and lastly, the pet corrective measure is to punish everyone by introducing even more bureaucratic rules.

Ponder reflective belts in a combat zone. For that matter, ponder reflective belts in an Armed Force not in combat. Some dubious implications there...

Ergo, it is imperative that the potential for misuse be thoroughly understood and steps to mitigate the potential disasters be takenbefore a program is introduced. That really was not done with 100-5 (either edition of profound -- if different * -- impact). Unfortunately, it is rarely done with much of anything in the Army...

The US Army does not do take steps to preclude misuse of doctrine, equipment or ideas, either -- it is too eager to be seen as an intellectual catchment that is the equal of the vales of academe (scary thought, that...) and to be 'professional' in all things. That factor plus the too rapid turnover of senior personnel into too many quite different jobs and overlapping bosses and subordinates which creates short term-ism and 'my watch-itis' preclude sensible assessment of potential unintended consequences.

Someday, when you're old and gray, recall that some old Dude on an internet message board said "Mark my words, the proliferation and misuse of SAMS and Staffs as well as the Operational Level of War theme will each in their own way cause grave problems for the Army and that last will likely result in unnecessary deaths."

Laugh now -- but recall later...

* Also ponder those significant differences within six short years of 'immutable' Doctrine with a capital 'D.'

[William F. Owen]

Wilf may have a problem with operational art. I do not, it exists and is useful.

Well I don't have a problem with "Operational Art," if its the art of planning operations. Not just useful. It's essential.

Here are my "problems."

a.) There is simply no need to interject a concept between Strategy and Tactics. It isn't need. Most military men never needed it. Why do it? (it may exist as an "idea", but there are many "ideas" that lack utility)

b.) The idea of "levels of war," is not useful, especially when expressed in terms of Strategic, Operational and Tactical. For example, you can't have Strategic, Operational and Tactical "Mobility" in ways you can usefully define.

c.) The claim that Napoleon "invented" the operational level is without evidence or any form of proof. What Napoleon did was conceptually no different from what Marlborough did in 1704, and Napoleon studied Marlborough! Based on the idea that the operational level of war is "battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces," then this exactly defines how Hannibal and Ghengis Kahn fought. If the Operational level existed for the last 200 years, then it always existed!
If anyone can furnish any actual historical evidence to the contrary, I will happily study it in detail.

d.) The whole concept of "Operational Level" is, IMO, steeped in a lack of clarity. The definitions used in JPub 1-02 are not rigourous. Warfare is done by Command, so Corps, Division, Formation, etc. Commands make plans and issue orders. That is simple, effective and proven to work. What proven advantage does the "Operational level" deliver.

In conclusion, I see the "Operational level" as something like Manoeuvre Warfare, and EBO. Something that at best adds nothing, bar sophistry, and at worst is highly counter-productive.

[M.L.]

c.) The claim that Napoleon "invented" the operational level is without evidence or any form of proof....

I was going to leave this entire entry alone since it is basically a rehash of previous arguments. However, the above statement merits a brief response.

I never claimed that Napoleon "invented" the operational level. Although there has been some discussion to that effect, the broad consensus is that the first vestiges of operational warfare "emerged" during the Napoleonic era.

To say that someone "invented" it is like saying that someone "invented" strategy. On the contrary, operational warfare, like strategy, is an evolving conglomeration of ideas.

[jmm99]

from ML
....the broad consensus is that the first vestiges of operational warfare "emerged" during the Napoleonic era.

As I think has been obvious, my interest in this topic is historical and in the 19th century texts (CvC, Jomini, Mahan, Halleck, Bigelow, as examples). I don't have the professional competence to judge what "operational warfare" and the "operational level of war" are or are not in the present-day; or whether the present-day usage of those terms (obviously replete in US manuals) is good, bad or indifferent.

What I do see in the 19th century is replete with references to the planning and execution of operations and campaigns - and a very rich vocabulary (of what I would call "terms of art") dealing with operations and campaigns; as well as something of a hierarchy of divisions (e.g., theatre of war, theatre(s) of operations, zone(s) of operations).

What are the "vestiges" of "operational warfare" in the Napoleonic era as you see those "vestiges" ? If those "vestiges" exist, they are not readily apparent to me. I see a very well developed "operational art" in what I've read (cited above); but I do not see "operational warfare" and the "operational level of war" until into the 20th century - e.g., Fuller as cited by the Brit LTG in his article.

Regards

Mike

[slapout9]

Copy of an article from (JFQ latest edition) one the other CvC threads. Has some stuff to say about the Operational Level of War, it appears he agrees somewhat but not completely with Wilf. It is a very good article at any rate IMO.


http://www.ndu.edu/press/war-and-its-aftermath.html

[M.L.]

As I think has been obvious, my interest in this topic is historical and in the 19th century texts (CvC, Jomini, Mahan, Halleck, Bigelow, as examples). I don't have the professional competence to judge what "operational warfare" and the "operational level of war" are or are not in the present-day; or whether the present-day usage of those terms (obviously replete in US manuals) is good, bad or indifferent.

What I do see in the 19th century is replete with references to the planning and execution of operations and campaigns - and a very rich vocabulary (of what I would call "terms of art") dealing with operations and campaigns; as well as something of a hierarchy of divisions (e.g., theatre of war, theatre(s) of operations, zone(s) of operations).

What are the "vestiges" of "operational warfare" in the Napoleonic era as you see those "vestiges" ? If those "vestiges" exist, they are not readily apparent to me. I see a very well developed "operational art" in what I've read (cited above); but I do not see "operational warfare" and the "operational level of war" until into the 20th century - e.g., Fuller as cited by the Brit LTG in his article.

Regards

Mike

Mike,

I agree that the operational level as we know it emerged in WWI, specifically 1916-18, as the combined arms battlefield.

However, some of what we now lump into operational warfare did emerge during the Napoleonic wars. The French Revolution gave rise to a new era in warfare in the sense that virtually all the resources of the state were mobilized for war. Among the many impacts of this change, two seem salient here. First, it broadened the necessary scope of strategy (to include non-military considerations, such as a state's economic base). Second, it gave rise to huge land forces, and as you say, the rough outlines of modern command echelons began to emerge.

This meant commanders had to coordinate the activities of large units which were not necessarily collocated, and perhaps even in multiple theaters (think US civil war). Furthermore, these activities had to be linked to broader strategic objectives related not just to military means, but to the state itself, as well as the people of the state.

The operational level did not emerge suddenly and totally in the early 1800s, nor did it do so in 1918. Rather, it emerged over a long period of time between Napoleon and WWI. Certainly, it continues to evolve, but the combined arms battlefield of 1918 is not too much different from, say, Desert Storm in 1991.