The US role in the Philippines (catch all)

[goesh]

Thanks for posting that success story. There are more out there like that and the Public needs to hear more of them. I remember when the Corps of Engineers completed their 1200th project in Iraq - I think it was a school renovation - and there wasn't a peep about it in the national media.

[SWJED]

A USA Today article I almost missed (thanks Max!) - In Philippines, U.S. Making Progress in War on Terror by Paul Wiseman.

Thousands of miles from the bazaars of Iraq and the mountains of Afghanistan, U.S. military forces are quietly helping defeat terrorists in the jungles of the southern Philippines, a forgotten front in the global war on terrorism.

Working behind the scenes with a rejuvenated Philippine military, U.S. special forces have helped kill, capture or rout hundreds of Abu Sayyaf guerrillas who have links to the Islamic terror groups Jemaah Islamiyah and al-Qaeda, Philippine and U.S. military commanders say.

The Abu Sayyaf, responsible for 16 years of bombings, kidnappings and beheadings in the southern Philippines, has been forced to flee into the mountainous terrain here on Jolo island in the remote Sulu Archipelago.

But its numbers are dwindling and its leadership almost wiped out, says Brig. Gen. Ruperto Pabustan, commander of Philippine special forces on Jolo.

"They are on the run," Pabustan says. "They are evading our troops now, and they are short of ammunition. … We are slowly neutralizing Abu Sayyaf."

American officials agree...

[PhilR]

I found this ICG report "The Philippines: Counter-insurgency vs. Counter-Terrorism in Mindinao" to be very good (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/d...n_mindanao.pdf). I will say off the bat that while I have been tracking the Philippine situation from a perch in Okinawa, I am in no way am qualified to say how accurate the ICG report is. My experience from Iraq is that their stuff is good, if somewhat dated and is skewed by whoever they were able to actually interview.
What I found interesting, however, is the distinction they draw between counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism. They assert that counterinsurgency seeks to split the insurgents from the people while counter-terrorism seeks to split the extremist terrorists from the more moderate insurgents. I'm not sold on the whole prospect, but I like the consideration of the complexity of the situation. It rang familiar to Iraq where there are multiple groups and the approaches that work with one, may actually make the situation worse by empowering (or threatening) another. In the case of the Philippines, the ICG asserts that the US success in Basilan and Jolo is driving the terrorists closer to Mindinao and may upset the balance between the government and insurgents (MILF, MNLF) there.
Actually, its much more complicated than that, but my point isn't whether the ICG is exactly correct in this instance, but their approach is a worthwhile call to always be aware of second and third order effects (a dirty word) from both "successes" and "failures" in counterinsurgency--to be wary of anything called a "model," which to unthinking minds gets applied where it shouldn't.

[Jedburgh]

Military Review, May-Jun 08: From Enduring Strife to Enduring Peace in the Philippines

....The conflict in the Mindanao has at least three interrelated dimensions: political, security, and economic. The point at which these three dimensions converge is marked by tension, but it also holds the potential for cooperation. It is towards this point that efforts for peace, in the form of amnesty, reintegration, and reconciliation (AR2), should be directed.2 AR2, a multi-staged and multidimensional approach to healing a fractured society, is fundamental to achieving a sustained peace. While there have been many attempts to pacify the Mindanao via AR2, these overtures have mostly been short-lived and narrowly focused. Hence, the conflict persists, and it will continue to do so until the GRP expands the breadth of its proposed AR2 solutions.....

[JACK165]

Part 1
I think we can agree that the limited press the JSOTF-P/AFP operations in the Southern Philippines has received has been largely positive. The strategy is working and there has been definable progress. I would like to offer some specific examples of how and why the operation was successful.
I recently graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School where I wrote a thesis that examined the recent US/GRP operations in the Southern Philippines, specifically Basilan and Sulu. The paper outlines the strategy that SOCPAC and the JSOTF-P developed to assist the AFP and improve their capacity to counter the ASG while addressing the conditions of relative deprivation on Sulu and improving the perceived legitimacy of the GRP. I also have the benefit of having served at the JSOTF-P during Operation Ultimatum in 2006-2007.
Laying the ground work:
Concerned by indications of a significant Al Qaeda presence in Mindanao and increased terrorist activity, PACOM and SOCPAC began working on a plan to improve the capacity of the GRP to address this internal challenge.
The first step in developing the strategy to combat terror in the Southern Philippines was to reestablish the US/RP mil to mil relationship that had been virtually severed in 1992. In February 1999, the Philippine government ratified the Visiting Forces Agreement which restored protections to U.S. military personnel deployed to the Philippines. This was the first step in renewed cooperation between the U.S. and GRP and was essential in paving the way to reestablishing U.S./RP military exchange training. The seven years of little US military exchange and aid had taken a toll on the AFP and degraded their capacity.
The next step was to coordinate the legal justification for U.S. assistance.
To reinforce and demonstrate U.S. respect for Philippine sovereignty, PACOM and SOCPAC planners worked with the GRP to develop the legal justification to support the presence and assistance of US forces. Fortunately, the U.S. and RP had previously signed a Mutual Defence Treaty (MDT). The U.S. is the only country with which the RP has a MDT. As planning progressed, this document became the framework on which the future strategy would be built. The importance of this document cannot be overstated. The MDT was the cornerstone document that supported U.S. military assistance to the Philippines, but there was a problem. The MDT was written to address outside threats and the Philippines was facing internal threats of insurgency and terrorism. Opponents to U.S. involvement within the GRP were adamant that U.S. involvement was not supported by the Philippine Constitution or the MDT. In response, PACOM representatives and the Arroyo administration drafted the Terms of Reference (TOR) for Balikatan 02 which outlined and clarified the extent of U.S. assistance. The TOR stated that the U.S. presence in the Southern Philippines would not exceed six months; U.S. forces would not participate in combat operations although they were authorized to defend themselves if attacked; all operations would be AFP-led; and U.S. personnel would always be accompanied by AFP personnel. This agreement was followed by the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement and Kapit Bisig which further reinforced the legal justification and extended the US presence.
During my thesis research, I interviewed Undersecretary Edilberto P. Adan, Executive Director for the Office of the President, Presidential Commission on the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFACOM), who told me that these documents have withstood close scrutiny and frequent challenges by members of the Philippine Congress. The establishment of the US Task Force and its continuing efforts depend on these agreements.
By 2000, with the kidnapping of several U.S. citizens by the ASG and an overall increase in attacks by terrorist and insurgent groups, President Arroyo approved a SOCPAC plan to address the threat. The plan included improving the counterinsurgency capacity of the AFP as well as establishing a counter-terrorism capability which included establishing the Light Reaction Companies (LRC) a counterterrorism force, A Naval Special Operations capability, Security Assistance funding and training for Army units in Mindanao and the establishment of a Joint Special Operations Group (JSOG) to coordinate the efforts of Philippine Counter Terrorism Forces. These forces played a significant role during Operation Ultimatum in targeting the ASG and have proven a highly capable force.

These initiatives pre-dated September 11, 2001 and the GWOT and set the conditions for the deployment of US forces to Basilan as part of JTF-510 and later the establishment of the JSOTF-P and operations on Sulu Island.

The Sulu Strategy:
The COIN model that was developed for Sulu expanded on the Basilan Model and included valuable lessons learned during the previous three years.
The strategy included four lines of operation:
• PSF Capacity Building: The JSOTF expanded assistance and advice to include not only the AFP, but also Philippine police and other security forces. The goal was to assist them in providing a secure environment for the Sulu residents.
• Targeted CMO: The JSOTF assisted the RP in conducting engineering, medical, dental, veterinarian projects as well as fund and facilitate major projects to improve local quality of life and demonstrate GRP concern for regional citizens.
• Intelligence Operations: Collected, fused, and disseminated timely and accurate intelligence to the right agencies.
• Information Operations (or influence ops): Emphasized the success of GRP efforts in the first 2 lines of operation to change perceptions about GRP legitimacy.
The desired end-state was that “the increased capacity of the PSF in combination with reduced local support to terrorists will deny the enemy sanctuary in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago as well as the use of vital Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCS).

I won’t go into a blow by blow on Operation Ultimatum here for fear of making this so long that no one will read it but I would like to cover some key indicators of the success of the Indirect Strategy on Sulu and Mindanao.
*Continued in next blog*

[JACK165]

Part 2

Capacity Building: The JSOTF-P set out to improve the capacity of the AFP to conduct both kinetic and non-kinetic operations.
Preparing the AFP units on Sulu for Operation Ultimatum presented the JSOTF-P with some significant challenges. In late 2005, before the JSOTF-P had arrived on Sulu and Special Forces detachments had not begun exchange training with the AFP, the AFP launched Operation Shadow, an offensive on Sulu to destroy the ASG. The offensive involved artillery and aerial bombardment of areas on Sulu believed to be ASG safe havens and caused significant damage to property as well as the population’s approval of the government. The AFP operation also experienced significant logistical challenges and after just 12 days, unable to resupply combat units, the AFP returned to their bases and ended the offensive.
Once you compare that outcome with the performance of the AFP during Operation Ultimatum you begin to get a sense of just how much progress the JSOTF-P had made in increasing the capacity of the AFP to conduct combat operations. Op Ultimatum lasted 8 months during which time the AFP remained largely in the field in pursuit of the ASG. On D-Day, of Op Ultimatum, the AFP conducted two simultaneous, nighttime, beach landing assaults and over land movement to 5 separate ASG targets, hitting them simultaneously. The AFP sustained themselves in the field while receiving some transportation support from the JSOTF-P. The JSOTF-P also assisted in the development of a partnership between MIG9 (the AFP intelligence unit organic to WESMINCOM) and the LRC which resulted in several highly successful raids.
The AFP also demonstrated dramatic improvements in conducting Joint Operations including air and maritime assets. Initially hesitant to employ OV-10s in conducting close air support, the JSOTF-P worked with pilots, improving their bombing accuracy. The improved accuracy of these strikes led the AFP ground forces, especially JSOG units, to employ these assets more frequently. The JSOTF-P also assisted the AFP in developing basic NVG capabilities which greatly enhanced the AFP's ability to conduct nighttime infil and Medevac operations.
The Bottom line is that the AFP was able to keep the ASG under tremendous pressure which in turn significantly disrupted their operations, movement and ability to conduct attacks on Sulu or in other parts of the Philippines.
Civil Military Operations:
As planning began for Op Ultimatum, the AFP was concerned with the MNLF on Sulu becoming involved in the fighting. The AFP had fought a major war against the MNLF in the 1970’s and tensions were still high. Through negotiations with MNLF leaders the AFP was able avoid a confrontation with the MNLF. This achievement is significant because it kept the thousands of MNLF members out of the fight and allowed the AFP to pursue the ASG. A similar agreement with the MILF in Mindanao called for the MILF Central Committee to denounce the ASG and JI as bandits and outlaws, clearing the way for the AFP to conduct operations in MNLF and MILF areas against ASG and JI targets. I would argue that the ongoing peace negotiations between the GRP and the MNLF and MILF contributed significantly to the success of these agreements to not interfere with AFP operations. The MNLF/MILF desire to resolve their claims for independence and continue to participate in the peace process forced them to become more moderate, or at least publicly. This meant that they had to distance themselves from more extreme members of their groups. While the MNLF likely still provided some support to the ASG/JI on Sulu during Op Ultimatum, they avoided any implication of major support which allowed AFP to more effectively pursue and target them. The situation with Commander Kato and Bravo is similar in that the MILF Central Committee publically distanced themselves from the “Rogue Commanders” which effectively split the MILF and allowed the AFP to target them.
After the successful operations on Basilan, the AFP, who in the past had sometimes employed a more heavy handed approach, embraced the effectiveness of the Indirect Approach. Although they admit in after action reports that they underfunded CMO initiatives during Op Ultimatum, they are working hard to correct this shortcoming. In September 2007, the AFP established the AFP National Development Support Command (NDSC). This command was established to centralize government, non-government, and military efforts to conduct civil-military operations. The establishment of the NDSC institutionalized the valuable lessons learned during the Basilan, Bohol, and Sulu. The NDSC is a unified command and has become the Philippine government proponent for CMO, development, and disaster response. The
NDSC also has operational control of all AFP engineer units as well as the authority to establish task forces to operate in support of regional unified commanders. This command will also coordinate the efforts of all Civil Affairs, SOT, and SALAAM teams in the specific region to maximize synchronization of effort. The NDSC mission “is to undertake development projects in support of national development programs to establish a physically and psychologically secure environment conducive to socio-economic growth.”

The success of the CMO approach had not gone unnoticed by the MILF
who had begun to conduct their own MEDCAPS and CMO projects in Central Mindanao.
The effectiveness of the JSOTF-P’s indirect strategy is illustrated by the quote from the Deputy Chairman of the MILF Committee on Information, Khaled Musa, who stated in an article posted on the Central Committee website April 2007, that the AFP/U.S. Indirect Approach
was “more lethal than brute force.”

*Continued in next blog*

[JACK165]

Part 3

Information Operations:
SOCPAC and JSOTF planners developed a comprehensive IO strategy to
support the deployment of AFP and U.S. forces to Sulu. This phased strategy had been
effective in driving a wedge between the foreign fighters and the local population by
publicizing the manipulative and self serving nature of the foreign fighters by
highlighting the brutality they used on the populace. In the next phase, the information
strategy was able to separate the population from the insurgents by advertising the
improved socioeconomic conditions due to the improved security situation. It also
discredited the ASG by highlighting their brutal attacks on the population. The JSOTF
also developed excellent rapport with many RP journalists and gave them a direct line to
the JSOTF Commander and his staff. By doing this, the JSOTF staff encouraged
journalists to contact the JSOTF directly to get the Commander’s explanation of
developing situations. In this way, the AFP/JSOTF was able to get the correct story out
quickly and effectively. The JSOTF developed iron clad credibility by providing quick
responses to media inquiries and quantifiable proof to support the JSOTF position.
Media analysis conducted by the SOCPAC MOST team and Brand Labs
demonstrates a significant trend in Philippine media coverage of the Sulu operation. In
late 2005, when the U.S. first began deploying to Sulu, the media carried mostly negative
stories about the U.S. involvement. By August 2006, less than one year later, the number
of negative stories had dropped to a minority percentage. In April 2008, MOST
reported media coverage of Balikatan 2008 consisted of 306 articles of which the
majority (58 percent) were neutral and viewed as objective. Thirty percent were
assessed as negative and 11 percent were positive. This was a significant improvement
over the 2005 media coverage.
In September 2007, an ASG pamphlet was found on Sulu that illustrated that the IO themes were reaching the ASG leadership. The pamphlet bore the publishers mark of H.I. Media Bureau and had been prepared by Abu Hamid Al-Luzoni. Abu Hamid Al-Luzoni was otherwise known as Ahmed Santos, the leader of the Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement (RSIM), a group known to have assisted the ASG in conducting the Superferry bombing in 2005. In the pamphlet, titled in
English, “Frequently Asked Questions,” the ASG leadership defended their actions and
provided a counter-argument to the themes distributed by the AFP/JSOTF. The ASG
document asserts that their jihad was legitimate and they make a feeble attempt to support
this assertion with quotes from the Koran. In a series of questions and answers, the
ASG explained why it was necessary to kill fellow Muslims and civilians describing
them as not being true Muslims because they work with the enemy (Shaytan forces)
against the Mujahadeen. They also explained their rape of women as their right and choice under “Sabaya,” that was defined in the pamphlet as taking a woman as a concubine. The pamphlet goes on to explain why Al Harakatul (the original name for the ASG) conducts kidnap for ransom, will not accept peace negotiations, and does not do drugs. The pamphlet provides a thoroughly unconvincing argument and an excellent example of a product intended to counter a successful information campaign.

I hope that this information sheds some light on how and why the Indirect Approach strategy was and continues to be successful in the Southern Philippines. I think the important lesson to take away from this operation is that SOCPAC and the JSOTF-P did not apply a template from some previous campaign but instead recognized that the strategy had to be built around the context of the local conditions. Developed from in-depth assessments and analysis, the strategy was constantly reassessed and modified to address the specific conditions where effects were needed. Lines of Operations (The Joint Pubs definition) were applied and sequenced differently from area to area and from island to island. While the Indirect Strategies of Basilan and Sulu do not offer a template for other areas they do provide some significant lessons learned and a starting point for developing a successful counterinsurgency strategy in other conflict areas.

Major Jonathan Hastings
Student, CGSC

[ODB]

Thanks for posting that success story. There are more out there like that and the Public needs to hear more of them. I remember when the Corps of Engineers completed their 1200th project in Iraq - I think it was a school renovation - and there wasn't a peep about it in the national media.

The more we succeed.