COIN case: LRA Lords Resistance Army

**carl** · 10-23-2009

I have two questions.

The first is, has anyone heard more about the UPDF ops against the LRA in the CAR?

Second, if the LRA is or will be in Darfur, how will the terrain there affect their operations and effectiveness? I have to read more but I am under the impression the LRA does most everything afoot. In that part of the world, everything seems to be done mounted, either on a Toyota or a horse.

**Michael F** · 10-23-2009

LRA kill five people in South Sudan’s Raja County
Friday 23 October 2009 02:30. Printer-Friendly version Comments...

By Manyang Mayom

October 22, 2009 (WAU) - The Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) official spokesman Major General Kuol Deim Kuol, said five people were killed during an attack by Ugandan rebels on a village in Western Bahr-El-Ghazal State.

Joseph Kony, leader of the rebel group the Lord’s Resistance Army (AFP) On Saturday October 21, 2009, at around 11pm, Lord Resistant Army (LRA) rebels attacked a camp of Darfur Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) at the village of "Kor-Al-Madina" in Western Bahr-El-Ghazal State killing three elements of southern Sudan Police (SSP) and two civilians on the spot.

Kor-Al-Madina is a small village at 24 miles away from Raja County of Wau, the capital of Western Bahr-El-Ghazal state.

The LRA rebels runaway with three rifles belonging to the killed three policemen. They also abducted unspecific number of displaced people, Deim said. He pointed out that LRA is moving toward southeast of Raja county with abducted people.

This LRA attack had overwhelm civilian in this camps of Raja county, so when SPLA heard gunfire exchange between police and rebel, then our battalion of 333 rush to rescue the situation.

"The LRA is now heading with abducted people to southeast of Kor-Al-Madina toward the Sudan and the Central Republic of Congo border."

As it has become difficult for Joseph Kony rebels to operate in southern Sudan, since last September the SPLA s military intelligence found fresh footprints of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) from Central African Republic heading toward Raja County of Western Bahr-El-Ghazal state. At the time the SPLA spokesperson said the Ugandan rebels are heading to Darfur.

"In September, we said that LRA is moving toward Darfur and might have links with Khartoum; this attack in Raja County has confirmed today that LRA is seriously moving to Darfur with backup from Sudan Arm Forces (SAF)," he said.

Raja commissioner Mr. Luwis Ramadan has also confirmed the report saying that three policemen and two civilian have been killed in the hottest attack by the LRA in Western Bahr-El-Ghazal State territory.

The Commissioner further added that on Wednesday attack the LRA has kidnapped about twenty one people and LRA rebel but he failed to determine the direction of the group saying they headed to unknown direction with the abducted people.

The Sudanese government denied SPLA claims that the leader of Uganda Lord Resistance Army (LRA) Joseph Kony relocated to the western region of Darfur.

Salah Gosh, the adviser to the Sudanese president and former director of the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) said that the SPLA claim is untrue.

He said that the SPLA is resorting to "fabrications" and "political maneuvers" to "distort the image of the Sudanese army".

(ST)

**Michael F** · 10-23-2009

Originally Posted by carl

I have two questions.

The first is, has anyone heard more about the UPDF ops against the LRA in the CAR?

Second, if the LRA is or will be in Darfur, how will the terrain there affect their operations and effectiveness? I have to read more but I am under the impression the LRA does most everything afoot. In that part of the world, everything seems to be done mounted, either on a Toyota or a horse.

I'm not a specialist but i'll try to give answers that maybe will lead some "wiser" contributors to add their contribution.....

First, the UPDF has made some progress in CAR (where apparently their presence has been reported on several occasions) but the new operational environment, the presence of pro-Karthoum rogue groups,...surely will require the UPDF to get some adaptation time. The LRA is also known to refrain from attacking local populations when settling in an area (it's only after a certain time and under pressure that they will attack villages in the proximity of their CoG). So both the LRA and UPDF activities are going under the radar in CAR.

Second, the "LRA", IMO, is not in Darfur. Some advanced elements of the LRA are close to Darfur. The LRA CoG is in CAR. The region of Raja and Southern Darfur is geographically different from what we use to see on telly about Darfur. It's greener,...more Elephant grass/low forrest like in the Doruma area or Yambio area. The LRA troops there are so in a known tactical environment in what relates to forrest cover,... The LRA can move quite a distance on foot (50 Km a day).

Any additional thoughts ???????

**carl** · 10-24-2009

We have a lot of Ugandan guards here and i like to ask them about the LRA. One told me tonight that the UPDF has people continuously in the DRC, South Sudan and CAR gathering intel on the LRA. When they get a good location, UPDF forces are dispatched as a strike force to hit them. The biggest problem is, the guard says, that there are people in the UPDF who tip off the LRA because of tribal sympathies. The LRA is so foot mobile that they don't need much of a warning to be well out of the area when the strike force hits.

If true, I infer that UPDF units are not continuously on the trail of LRA groups. This is disappointing to me. I don't see how any info can stay good long enough to get a strike force there in time, especially given how fast the LRA can move. I was also surprised that tribal loyalty could play a part in this.

I don't know how much if any the guard said was true but that is what he told me.

**Michael F** · 11-03-2009

Originally Posted by carl

.... The biggest problem is, the guard says, that there are people in the UPDF who tip off the LRA because of tribal sympathies. The LRA is so foot mobile that they don't need much of a warning to be well out of the area when the strike force hits.

If true, I infer that UPDF units are not continuously on the trail of LRA groups. This is disappointing to me. I don't see how any info can stay good long enough to get a strike force there in time, especially given how fast the LRA can move. I was also surprised that tribal loyalty could play a part in this.

I don't know how much if any the guard said was true but that is what he told me.

This would be surprising to me.

Just imagine the UPDF is tipped off about the position of a group...
Where does this kind of info comes from ? Informants inside the LRA...doubtfull (because of Kony's paranoia), Witnesses...doubtfull as there is no communication network that would allow the info to be passed in a matter of a few minutes to the UPDF (CAR, GARAMBA and Southern Sudan are not "communication and IT" areas). Even so, it would take a 1 to 2 hours to move a UPDF strike force (even with their very few helicopters).
I guess INT collection is mostly done by tracking and scouting on the ground.
The same UPDF small units does both the INT collection and the strike action before the opportunity vanishes, i guess.

About sources inside the UPDF, it seems dubious. First, as explained above, with small search & destroy UPDF squads, the LRA can not have an informant in each one. Second, these sources would have little time to inform the LRA.

I do believe that exLRA troops are involved in the hunt against the LRA (In UPDF's 105th Bn). These know the LRA tactics, habits, acholli languageand the terrain better than most UPDF troops. They are perfect to track down their former kidnappers and most probably would not cooperate with them at all cost...but the very existence of this unit makes it an easy scapegoat if operations fails...("there was an acholli mole").

Only guessing...

**M-A Lagrange** · 11-04-2009

There are several problematics in the LRA hunt.
The first one is the leakage of information. One of the parameters is that Kampala is not really playing "franc jeux". Kampala does have many interests in keeping the LRA as an active threat in DRC and in South Sudan. Does not mean they do it but this could be affecting their motivation. Also, if DRC is a chaotic failed state, South Sudan is a unborn dead body. So keeping the LRA active gives a good reason to Kampala to deploy troops up to CAR. I would call that the Rwandan strategy.
The second thing is that LRA released an important number of former members. When they are not integrated into UPDF, they are sent back home or to the refugees camps in South Sudan by the UN. They receive no psychological support, no reintegration programs… Even UPDF is complaining about UNICEF Sh@@ty work.
As former LRA members cannot reintegrate, they replicate what Kony taught them for a living.

Hope this helps to understand the mess.

**davidbfpo** · 11-05-2009

Hurrah!

Senior Lord's Resistance Army commander Charles Arop, who was implicated in leading a massacre on Christmas Day that killed at least 143 Congolese, has surrendered to the Ugandan military, the army spokesman told AFP on Thursday.

"He was only left with one fighter so what choice did he have?" Lieutenant-Colonel Felix Kulayigye said, adding that Arop surrendered on Tuesday to Ugandan forces stationed in the northeast of the Democractic Republic of Congo.

http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20091105...gorebelsunrest

davidbfpo