Dutch state liable for three Srebrenica deaths

[jmm99]

I found the Doe story and the video (which is mostly Prince Johnson talking, being fanned by a gal and drinking Budweiser regular).

That story and the Bosnian story revived some thoughts I've been harboring for a little while - since our "police action" in Korea.

The thoughts are not fully formed, and scarcely dogmatic. Here's the hypothesis: "humanitarian interventions" - whether UN or otherwise - tend to be morality plays. Those plays are scripted by politicians (UN, regional, domestic), where soldiers easily become props - "cardboard soldiers". Since they are not really soldiers, can one expect them to act like soldiers ?

The "ideal" (as opposed to realities in Bosnia and Liberia) certainly existed in the mind of another JM (John Milius) and the Marines in Milius' "The Wind and the Lion", where the Wiki sums up the situation:

Gummere, Chadwick and his aide, Marine Captain Jerome, tire of the Sultan's perfidy and the meddling of the European powers and decide to engage in "military intervention" to force a negotiation by seizing the actual seat of power, the Bashaw's palace in Tangier. Jerome's company of Marines, supported by a small detachment of sailors, march through the streets of Tangier, much to the surprise of the European legations, whose forces are with the Sultan at distant Fez, and overwhelm the Bashaw's palace guard, taking the Bashaw hostage and forcing him to negotiate.

By such coercion, the Bashaw finally agrees to accede to the Raisuli's demands. But during a hostage exchange, Raisuli is betrayed and captured by German and Moroccan troops under the command of Von Roerkel, while Jerome and a small contingent of Marines are present to secure the Pedecarises. While Raisuli's friend, the Sherif of Wazan, organizes the Berber tribe for an attack on the Europeans and Moroccans, Eden attacks Jerome and convinces him and his men to rescue the Raisuli to uphold the word of President Roosevelt that he would be unharmed if the Pedecarises were returned safely.

A three-way battle results, in which the Berbers and Americans team to defeat the Germans and their Moroccan allies, rescuing Raisuli in the process. In the United States, Roosevelt is cheered for this great victory, and the Pedecarises arrive safely back in Tangier.

Now, this is historical fiction (made up stuff); but it precisely frames the issue of moral courage presented in both the Bosnian and Liberian situations.

The rifle company captain in "The Wind" passed the test; but then he was far from a "cardboard soldier" and had considerable "freedom of action".

If you can do so, without boiling blood and blowing a fuse, comment ?

Regards

Mike

[JMA]

I found the Doe story and the video (which is mostly Prince Johnson talking, being fanned by a gal and drinking Budweiser regular).

That story and the Bosnian story revived some thoughts I've been harboring for a little while - since our "police action" in Korea.

The thoughts are not fully formed, and scarcely dogmatic. Here's the hypothesis: "humanitarian interventions" - whether UN or otherwise - tend to be morality plays. Those plays are scripted by politicians (UN, regional, domestic), where soldiers easily become props - "cardboard soldiers". Since they are not really soldiers, can one expect them to act like soldiers ?

The "ideal" (as opposed to realities in Bosnia and Liberia) certainly existed in the mind of another JM (John Milius) and the Marines in Milius' "The Wind and the Lion", where the Wiki sums up the situation:



Now, this is historical fiction (made up stuff); but it precisely frames the issue of moral courage presented in both the Bosnian and Liberian situations.

The rifle company captain in "The Wind" passed the test; but then he was far from a "cardboard soldier" and had considerable "freedom of action".

If you can do so, without boiling blood and blowing a fuse, comment ?

Regards

Mike

Mike,

IMHO it is all about that higher level of courage being moral courage. Among those who have seen combat to a repeated and significant degree they have been tested with regard to physical courage. Some greatly.

Sometimes physically brave men collapse like a wet paper bag when their convictions are challenged and they need to make a stand at risk of death or physical harm.

I was never challenged in terms of moral courage as the two mentioned above were. My anger may well be the result of subliminal fear that I too may collapse under those circumstances.

A start to the understanding of all this is the seminal work of Moran, 'The Anatomy of Courage' ( http://ow.ly/oIYeM ) now available on Kindle.

Caesar would be thrashing around in his grave see that "Death Before Dishonour" has so little value in todays world.

Among the Brits it was spoken of "dying well". Sadly even there I understand the concept has become negotiable. Remembering Basra and Musa Qala in recent memory. This pattern or surrender in exchange for safe passage seems to be becoming an acceptable option in British military culture.

An American view on the issue, William Ian Miller's 'The Mystery of Courage' is worth the cost and the reading time.

[davidbfpo]

Rightly what happened in Srebrenica should be remembered, it clearly is by the Bosnian Muslims and the Dutch who have a sense of shame for what happened.

I know that there is a detailed official Dutch report on what happened. IIRC an impossible mandate to 'protect' a Muslim enclave deep within Bosnian Serb controlled area, some provocations by armed Muslims - who then fled back to the UN 'protected' area, a peacekeeping Dutch unit not prepared for combat and lack of air support.

Less certain my recollection was that neither UNPROFOR or UN HQ appreciated the realities on the ground; a common freature in UN "peacekeeping" alas, which can be explained and criticised.

How the Dutch Colonel can be condemned for leaving, let alone be shot, eludes me.

[jmm99]

Mark,

First, some "book" keeping. You suggested Moran's book a long time ago. I've read it twice and some sections more. It doesn't address surrender issues as I recall (it has no index).

William Miller has been at Michigan Law since 1985 (well after my time). It appears that a lot of his Yale Law polish has been dented. Perhaps enough so that he might even be ready for primetime at Michigan Tech. In any event, I've ordered used hardcovers of his The Mystery of Courage and Eye for an Eye - basically for shipping costs.

The last book deals with:

Analyzing the law of the talion--an eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth--literally, William Ian Miller presents an original meditation on the concept of "pay back". Miller's unique theory of justice offers redemption via retaliation. It espouses the view that revenge is a highly structured phenomenon that requires a deep commitment to balance in order to get even in a strict but fair manner. As a result, we find that much of what is assumed to be justice, honor and respect is just a way of providing a means of balancing or measuring valuations.

I'll see how well it matches my own construct of retribution, reprobation and specific deterrence.

The present topic would be simpler if surrender were not an option - as in the Camerone and Iwo Jima traditions; or, in the tradition of Ulzana's Raid (1.5 hrs).

Somehow, that movie (IMO: 5 stars) was made without political correctness - not exaulting either the Cavalry or the Indians; but portraying all as human beings. From Wiki:

Set in 1880s Arizona, it portrays a brutal raid by Chiricahua Apaches against European settlers. The bleak and nihilistic tone showing U.S. troops chasing an elusive but murderous enemy has been seen as allegorical to the United States participation in the Vietnam War.

In the movie, Ulzana dies. In reality, his band of 10 killed 38 and lost 1 - he and the rest survived, Hiking Apacheria - Searching for Ulzana.

However, surrender today is an option - whether admitted as such or euphemisized as "deemed captured".

The official Code of Conduct (DODI 1300.21, January 8, 2001 (pp.11-12) is attached as a pdf, is quite sparse, and includes some lawyerly weasel words - which I think detract from the code's force.

The basic thrust of the Code is that voluntary surrender is always dishonorable, but one may view himself as being "captured" - which is not dishononable. Here's the Explanation:

E2.2.2.1.1. Surrender is the willful act of members of the Armed Force turning themselves over to enemy forces when not required by utmost necessity or extremity. Surrender is always dishonorable and never allowed. When there is no chance for meaningful resistance, evasion is impossible, and further fighting would lead to their death with no significant loss to the enemy, members of Armed Forces should view themselves as "captured" against their will versus a circumstance that is seen as voluntarily "surrendering." They must remember that the capture was dictated by the futility of the situation and overwhelming enemy strengths. In this case, capture is not dishonorable.

Guidance for a unit commander is even sparser, and limited to this:

IF IN COMMAND, I WILL NEVER SURRENDER THE MEMBERS OF MY COMMAND WHILE THEY STILL HAVE THE MEANS TO RESIST.
...
E2.2.2.1.2. The responsibility and authority of a commander never extends to the surrender of command, even if isolated, cut off, or surrounded, while the unit has a reasonable power to resist, break out, or evade to rejoin friendly forces.

I couldn't find a great deal written about the morals and ethics of surrendering. The best formal piece I found (a 192 page monograph) is 1989 Klimow, Surrender - A Soldier's Legal, Ethical, and Moral Obligations; With Philippine Case Study (C&GSC, 192 pp.). The Battling Bastards of Bataan webpages have a number of in-depth pieces on Bataan and the Death Marches.

The introduction sums up the problem - the issues are not something that people want to confront:

Surrender presupposes defeat, and because of this disparaging implication, it is easily ignored as a subject in the military. Any instruction or training regarding surrender or capitulation is likely to encompass only the actions American service members must take when capturing enemy combatants. The prospect of American surrender, particularly of whole units, is all but unthinkable.

American soldiers are hardened against surrender through discipline and training which fosters a military ethic of fighting the enemy as long as there is a means to resist. Even after the physical means to resist are exhausted -ammunition is depleted and the enemy has surrounded friendly forces -service men are expected to attempt escape and evasion rather than capitulation. The United States military ethic recognizes surrender as a viable option only when further resistance would be suicidal. Revulsion to the act of surrender is perhaps superseded only by American society's desire to preserve the lives of its sons and daughters in uniform.

This monograph seems to me a very good study of the issues generally and in the Bataan-Corregidor context specifically. Singapore and Percival would seem similar - perhaps, a morals and ethics study has been done on that ?

This seems a start on the surrender issue for those of us that haven't had to deal with it in real life. The Bosnia hostage situations may have involved added factors; although the P.I. did involve hostages, both military and civilian.

Does anyone here at SWC have personal experience in deciding whether or not to surrender, especially on the unit commander level ?

Regards

Mike

[JMA]

Mark,

First, some "book" keeping. You suggested Moran's book a long time ago. I've read it twice and some sections more. It doesn't address surrender issues as I recall (it has no index).

William Miller has been at Michigan Law since 1985 (well after my time). It appears that a lot of his Yale Law polish has been dented. Perhaps enough so that he might even be ready for primetime at Michigan Tech. In any event, I've ordered used hardcovers of his The Mystery of Courage and Eye for an Eye - basically for shipping costs.

The last book deals with:



I'll see how well it matches my own construct of retribution, reprobation and specific deterrence.

The present topic would be simpler if surrender were not an option - as in the Camerone and Iwo Jima traditions; or, in the tradition of Ulzana's Raid (1.5 hrs).

Mike, as always your research is impeccable.

(a quick response as I am going out for a long day away from all communications)

We may be starting to talk at cross purposes. I am looking more at the trigger in the mind of the commander or soldier that leads to a surrender decision. Even in wars where it is 'better' to die in combat (like a man) than to surrender and be tortured or starved to death men surrender. I don't believe that surrender is based on sound tactical grounds but rather something that happens in the head of the individual decision maker. I would like to try to understand that.

[jmm99]

from JMA
We may be starting to talk at cross purposes.

Besides, like the embattled captain on the bridge, "I have not yet begun to talk."

Seriously, I don't see the "cross purposes" - nor, to this point, any crossed verbal swords.

I see your primary thrust as:

A good defensive position can be defended by determined troops against impossible odds. ... I am looking more at the trigger in the mind of the commander or soldier that leads to a surrender decision.

I take the following as received wisdom - from the 1989 (original) version of the USMC's basic manual, Warfighting (and retained in later editions):

Chapter 1. THE NATURE OF WAR
...
"Positions are seldom lost because they have been destroyed, but almost invariably because the leader has decided in his own mind that the position cannot be held."
-A. A. Vandegrift

Alexander Vandegrift was a military visionary. In 1909, as a 22-year old 2nd Lt., he wrote "Aviation, the Cavalry of the Future".

What am I missing ?

Regards

Mike

[JMA]

What am I missing ?

....

Regards

Mike

Not much it seems...

Let's repeat your Vandegrift quote:

"Positions are seldom lost because they have been destroyed, but almost invariably because the leader has decided in his own mind that the position cannot be held."
-A. A. Vandegrift

Happy that my position is much the same as this.

Starting with Percival's surrender in Singapore in 1942 of a force of 138,000 men which was a huge embarrassment to the British and a major Allied setback in the war. "It was the largest surrender of British-led forces in history."

Percival's WW1 record was good during which he was awarded the Military Cross, Croix de Guerre and the Distinguished Service Order. From Wikipedia: "He ended the war as a respected soldier, described as "very efficient" and was recommended for the Staff College."

So what happened here? What about his character was missed? Can modern officer and soldier selection select out for this?

Now compare him to this character:

"All right, they're on our left, they're on our right, they're in front of
us, they're behind us...they can't get away this time"
- Lewis B. "Chesty" Puller, USMC



"For a desperate three hours his battalion, stretched over a mile-long front, was the only defense between vital Henderson Airfield and a regiment of seasoned Japanese troops. In pouring jungle rain the Japanese smashed repeatedly at his thin line, as General Puller moved up and down its length to encourage his men and direct the defense. After reinforcements arrived, he commanded the augmented force until late the next afternoon. The defending Marines suffered less than 70 casualties in the engagement while 1400 of the enemy were killed and 17 truckloads of Japanese equipment were recovered by the Americans." (http://www.tricitymarines.com/puller.htm)

You got to hand it to the yanks they have some endearing characters...

[JMA]

Mark,

First, some "book" keeping. You suggested Moran's book a long time ago. I've read it twice and some sections more. It doesn't address surrender issues as I recall (it has no index).

William Miller has been at Michigan Law since 1985 (well after my time). It appears that a lot of his Yale Law polish has been dented. Perhaps enough so that he might even be ready for primetime at Michigan Tech. In any event, I've ordered used hardcovers of his The Mystery of Courage and Eye for an Eye - basically for shipping costs.

I await your review on Millar's "Eye for an Eye".

Moran does cover the essentials in the fourth chapter 'Moods'. Can't cut and paste the section from Kindle to here with any ease. (sure the publisher wouldn't mind the advertising)

But this is worth typing out:

"In the presence of danger man often finds salvation in action. To dull emotion he must do something; to remain immobile, to stagnate in mind or body, is to surrender without terms."

Miller has 19 references to 'surrender'. Next time.

[jmm99]

but, need some "tweaking" to even start considering your questions:

So what happened here? What about his character was missed? Can modern officer and soldier selection select out for this?

"here" and "his" being Singapore and Percival; "there" (my word) being the Canal (and Chosin) and Puller.

Put another way, what made the 1st Marine Division special ? Answer: nothing; they were just Marines.

Regards

Mike

[davidbfpo]

Just a thought and remaining with the Srebenica example. Would the Dutch commander, plus his command, have taken a different decision minus the blue beret?

The USMC example cited was a UN mission, so it is far more than a blue beret.

[JMA]

Rightly what happened in Srebrenica should be remembered, it clearly is by the Bosnian Muslims and the Dutch who have a sense of shame for what happened.

I know that there is a detailed official Dutch report on what happened. IIRC an impossible mandate to 'protect' a Muslim enclave deep within Bosnian Serb controlled area, some provocations by armed Muslims - who then fled back to the UN 'protected' area, a peacekeeping Dutch unit not prepared for combat and lack of air support.

Less certain my recollection was that neither UNPROFOR or UN HQ appreciated the realities on the ground; a common freature in UN "peacekeeping" alas, which can be explained and criticised.

How the Dutch Colonel can be condemned for leaving, let alone be shot, eludes me.

Stay tuned here David. The surrender decision in my opinion is triggered by the victory of fear over courage. An isolated private soldier may surrender when surrounded while others will choose 'take a few of them with him'. It is, however, unforgivable IMHO for a commander to surrender his force before a shot has been fired. A good defensive position can be defended by determined troops against impossible odds - take many cases of British Platoon Bases defending magnificently against massive odds in the early days of Afghanistan.

[carl]

I was never challenged in terms of moral courage as the two mentioned above were. My anger may well be the result of subliminal fear that I too may collapse under those circumstances.

That was eloquent.

General comments on this thread.

I don't know how much interest this thread is getting but I am hugely impressed by the erudition and insight shown in the discussion.

In the movie Go Tell The Spartans the last scene or two depicts guys doing the right thing regardless. The only people I ever heard of doing something almost exactly similar were some Frenchman in Indochina. They ran an irregular force of mountain tribesman and gave them their personal word that they would stick by. When the French pulled out those guys didn't. They stayed and they died. The American cultural bias about French courage is a bit curious in the light of that kind of behavior.

My ill informed opinion about surrendering is in two parts. The first is the observation that when wars start, it takes a long time for people to really accept that it is real and people will kill you or others without a thought, that they really don't give a damn if you approve or not. That perhaps is a component in the surrenders of big forces by Hull, Percival and the Dutch commander. To my knowledge, the Dutchman had never seen real combat, nor had Wainwright and it had been a long time since Percival and Hull had seen any. All those surrenders were in the beginning of the war. Maybe part of it was they just hadn't had time to accept what surrender in a war really means.

On the other hand, you have a guy like Puller. He knew. He had fought and fought at intervals frequent enough that he would have had no doubt what surrender in wartime could mean, especially to Japanese. Besides, it was the Marines.

On an individual level, maybe it is just the triumph of hope over imagination, or lack of imagination. When soldiers were taken by American Indians say for example, in the War of 1812, they knew what was probably going to happen to them, or should have. But many surrendered anyway.

JMA makes a hugely important point about the British and Basra. What happened? It wasn't that long ago that the Glowworm fought the Hipper. And contemporary with Basra were the prolonged platoon fights in Afghanistan. What happened?

[jmm99]

Thanks to Ken and JMA:

Ken
Very interesting stuff and a far cry from what the American public currently expects.

JMA (quoting Andrew Thompson)
'If blue-helmeted UN peacekeepers show up in your town or village and offer to protect you, run. Or else get weapons. Your lives are worth so much less than theirs.'

which led me to look for a siege I vaguely recalled (Chateau-Gaillard); and to find Thompson's article (JMA's link doesn't work for me). They led me to think a bit more about what I bolded in what Ken and Thompson said.

First to Chateau-Gaillard, which has many references; here are two. Wiki -The Siege of Chateau Gaillard:

The local population sought refuge in the castle to escape the French soldiers who ravaged the town. The castle was well supplied for a siege, but the extra mouths to feed rapidly diminished them; between 1,400 and 2,200 non-combatants were allowed inside, increasing the number of people in the castle at least five-fold. In an effort to alleviate the pressure on the castle's supplies, Roger de Lacy, the castellan, evicted 500 civilians; this first group was allowed to pass through the French lines unhindered, and a second group of similar size did the same a few days later. Philip was not present, and when he learned of the safe passage of the civilians, he forbade further people being released from the castle. The idea was to keep as many people within Chteau Gaillard to drain its resources.

Roger de Lacy evicted the remaining civilians from the castle, at least 400 people, and possibly as many as 1,200. The group was not allowed through, and the French opened fire on the civilians. They turned back to the castle for safety, but found the gates locked. They sought refuge at the base of the castle walls for three months; over the winter, more than half their number died from exposure and starvation. Philip arrived at Chteau Gaillard in February 1204, and ordered that the survivors should be fed and released. Such treatment of civilians in sieges was not uncommon, and such scenes were repeated much later at the sieges of Calais in 1346 and Rouen in 14181419, both in the Hundred Years' War.

Pennell, Highways and byways in Normandy (1900), "Chateau-Gaillard", p.27-31, goes into the misery suffered by the civilians caught between the armies; and that Philip's act of mercy occured only after he personally met with some of the starving civilians who begged him to show mercy.

Pennell also describes how the castle was captured and adds to the Wiki:

Wiki
With supplies running low Roger de Lacy and his garrison of 20 knights and 120 other soldiers surrendered to the French army, bringing to an end the siege on 6 March 1204.

Pennell, p.31
In the days when iron protected against iron, it took a good deal of fighting to kill a man, and it is said that only four men fell in this last encounter. Philippe Auguste rewarded Roger de Lacy for his courage by giving him liberty. The English garrison marched out of the castle, and the golden fleurs-de-lys floated over the proud donjon. Chateau-Gaillard had fallen, and with it Normandy was lost to England.

The distinction made by the French in the treatment of Chateau-Gaillard civilians, vs its knight and soldiers, was a "we-they" distinction based on class and status. The common "we-they" distinctions based on e.g., race, ethnicity, geographic distance ("out of sight, out of mind") certainly did not apply. In fact, the civilians (from an area on the Ile de France - Normandie border) were more closely related to the French army than to the English Chateau-Gaillard garrison.

This event, like many others, illustrates what that time's public expected - and what lives in that era were "worth" more than others. Here, "worth" is not an accounting item, but is the relative concern (along a spectrum) that a person has for the lives of people at the given Chateau-Gaillard or Srebreneca.

The Thompson situation expands the facts and issues to the present - and raises added issues, starting with How many more must die before Kofi quits? Former UN human rights lawyer Kenneth Cain says the secretary-general could finally redeem himself by saving lives - after years of lethal passivity (by Kenneth Cain, The Observer, 3 April 2005):

... Next to these tributes [to the Rwandan slain] is another installation - a reproduction of the infamous fax by the UN Force Commander, General Romeo Dallaire, imploring the then head of UN peacekeeping, Kofi Annan, for authority to defend Rwandan civilians - many of whom had taken refuge in UN compounds under implicit and sometimes explicit promises of protection.

Here, too, is Annan's faxed response - ordering Dallaire to defend only the UN's image of impartiality, forbidding him to protect desperate civilians waiting to die. Next, it details the withdrawal of UN troops, even while blood flowed and the assassins reigned, leaving 800,000 Rwandans to their fate.
...
I am co-author of a book critical of Annan's peacekeeping legacy, "Emergency Sex (and Other Desperate Measures): True Stories from a War Zone." My co-author, Dr Andrew Thomson, penned a line that drove the UN leadership to fire him. Lamenting UN negligence in failing Bosnian Muslims whom it had promised to protect in its 'safe area' of Srebrenica - where 8,000 men were slaughtered - Thomson wrote: 'If blue-helmeted UN peacekeepers show up in your town or village and offer to protect you, run. Or else get weapons. Your lives are worth so much less than theirs.'

Let me be clear about myself. My level of concern is very graduated and very much based on geographic distance. You all know what I think about interventions in Eurasia and Africa; and that I'm no fan of the UN. That being said, if one decides to intervene, one intervenes with both feet well planted; and provides all that is required to execute both non-violent and violent actions.

The Cain-Thompson book was cited in this report, Promote Freedom or Protect Oppressors: The Choice at the UN Review Summit (by John Bercow MP and Victoria Roberts; September 2005)

pp.28,29-30

Humanitarian Intervention

As part of their obligation under the responsibility to protect, states must be willing to take action to protect human rights. There is a continuum of action from using mediation to sanctions to the use of force. In order to increase the prospect of action being taken to suppress the violation of human rights, the UN should accept the proposed five principles to judge whether intervention should go ahead. They are seriousness of threat, proper purpose, last resort, proportional means and balance of consequences.
...
Member states must be willing to make peace-enforcement and peacekeeping operations most effective. One of the most powerful arguments against humanitarian intervention is that intervention often seems to do more harm than good. Traditionally peacekeepers have lacked the mandate, resources and military might to carry out their mission. The international community must be willing to invest in training, logistics and hardware for their missions.

What is more, the developed world must be willing to send in its troops. Dr Andrew Thompson, in his book on UN peacekeeping, wrote If blue-helmeted UN peacekeepers show up in your town or village and offer to protect you, run. Or else get weapons. Your lives are worth so much less than theirs. States must accept that there will be casualties in any enforcement effort. The notion of peaceful peacekeeping is a contradiction in terms. As in any military operation, the goals of the mission must dictate the actions taken. It is quite wrong for states to prioritise the safety of the troops over and above the safety of the civilians they are supposed to protect.

This report (on a whole it sounds like Susan Rice and Samatha Power to me) simply has too much "humanitarian intervention", "responsibility to protect", etc. for me to swallow. But, I fully agree that, if an international or regional organization, a state or group of states, decides to intervene, it can't do it half-heartedly. On the other hand, I'd be a damn liar if I said what Bercow says:

It is quite wrong for states to prioritise the safety of the troops over and above the safety of the civilians they are supposed to protect.

I (figuratively sitting here on my a$$ and, as a US citizen, sending our troops to bad places and into worse situations) will always prioritize the lives of American troops over the lives of remote peoples. That's the way I am; and that's one more reason why I'm a reluctant intervenor.

I also realize that executing a mission may require troops to sacrifice themselves - a "forlorn hope" attack; letting people take pot shots at you (as on the Mexican border); or being killed to protect people that are totally remote from you. That is the point made by Carl and it's valid:

In the movie Go Tell The Spartans the last scene or two depicts guys doing the right thing regardless. The only people I ever heard of doing something almost exactly similar were some Frenchman in Indochina. They ran an irregular force of mountain tribesman and gave them their personal word that they would stick by. When the French pulled out those guys didn't. They stayed and they died.

The French and Indochinese dying together in North Vietnam were from Roger Trinquier's special operations group. That story was a tragedy. The fictional "Go Tell The Spartans" (Wiki) is a great film.

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

Go Tell the Spartans - "Why I'm still a Major" (Youtube clip, 4min).

Regards

Mike

[JMA]

Found this gem in Keegan's: Face of Battle http://goo.gl/Mfsmb9

Battle of the Somme:

By 4 p.m. Captain Sparks recognized that his tiny force, now under attack by thirteen German infantry companies from three different regiments, was about to go under. He sent the following message back across no-man’s-land: ‘I am faced with this position. I have collected all bombs and [cartridges] from casualties. Every one has been used. I am faced with three alternatives: (a) to stay here with such of my men as are alive and be killed, (b) to surrender to the enemy, (c) to withdraw such of my men as I can. Either of these first two alternatives is distasteful to me. I propose to adopt the latter.’ Using discarded German rifles and ammunition, he and four N.C.O.s made a final stand in the German front trench while the other survivors escaped into no-man’s-land. There most of them, including Sparks, hid until darkness fell and allowed them to regain the British lines. During the day, the London Scottish, which had numbered 856 at dawn, had been reduced by death or wounds to 266.

Sparks figured it out while personally under fire... not in some remote HQ far from the front line.

I wonder what happened to Capt Sparks? Top man if there ever was one!

[jmm99]

Mark,

Gommecourt - The Battle

London Scottish - Beset by the 170th Regiment on two flanks the London Scottish now were faced with fresh troops from the 15th Reserve Infantry Regiment attacking down the communication trenches from Rossignol Wood. As they defended their small enclave the senior officer, Maj Francis Lindsay, was shot and killed leaving Capt Sparks of A Company in charge. Faced with the choice of surrender, annihilation or retreat he chose the latter and organised a covering party while the able bodied and lightly wounded were got away into No Man's Land. One of the last to leave, Sparks, took shelter in a shell hole until after dark before returning to the shattered British lines.

and Leadership in Combat: An Historical Appraisal (USMA; pp.244):

There most of them, including Sparks, hid until darkness fell and allowed them to regain the British lines. During the day, the London Scottish, which had numbered 856 at dawn, had been reduced by death or wounds to 266.

This last book may be a gem; just found it and haven't read it. BLUF:

The OPMS study Group asked the History Department at USMA to study successful combat leadership to identify the trends and characteristics that should be institutionalized in the development of Officers. There were only two restrictions: that the actions studied be in actual combat and that it must clearly involve leadership not management. The characteristics found were indispensible to combat leadership, but not necessarily vital or sufficient to accomplish other essential military tasks.

The USMA Study unit, organized under LTC Kenneth E. Hamburger, examined over 200 American and and foreign examples in all periods. Both succesful and unsuccesful examples were intensively analysed and discussed to sift out desirable, undesirable, and neutral characteristics. In addition, preservice experience, upbringing, education, service record, physical condition, personal temperment and morality, and life following the incident were studied.

There was surprising consistency among successful combat leaders regardless of historical period, country or condition of combat. Early in their lives, the traits that made them successful were discernible in some form and were enhanced, but could not be induced, through experience. In no case did a unit in combat overcome the deficiencies of its leader; in almost all cases the leader overcame startling unit deficiencies and incredible problems in mission definition, enemy physical and moral strength [etc., etc. etc.] ... and his own anxiety.

Regards

Mike

- and, from Peter Hart's book on the Somme, he was H.C. Sparks, who according to the Roll of the Ancients joined the regimental association in 1930, was a founder of the The Glenworple Highlanders, and died 15 Oct 1933.

Another good combat leader from the Somme was Frank Maxwell (the "Brat"), portrayed in The Somme - From Defeat To Victory (Documentary based on Hart's work; 1 hr), starting at 40:00 to end, Tiepval in Sep 1916 - Maxwell was KIA at Ypres in 1917. The Somme's first day is the first 40 min (focus on the Salford Pals).

[KenWats]

Thanks to Ken and JMA:
which led me to look for a siege I vaguely recalled (Chateau-Gaillard); and to find Thompson's article (JMA's link doesn't work for me). They led me to think a bit more about what I bolded in what Ken and Thompson said.

I'll elaborate on what I was thinking when I typed that. We Americans have a few generations raised on stuff like the A-Team or GI Joe, where there's always a good parachute after the plane gets shot down - or the bad guys dive out of the truck before it explodes. We hardly expect our enemies to get killed in combat, much less innocent civilians. So, when we see deliberate harm to "innocent civilians", even for military gain, well... the reaction is not so good.

Questions that come to my mind (may not be related, and apologize if I'm wandering off topic)
What if the US treated the siege of Fallujah like Caesar treated Alesia?
Would there have been any military gain if it had?
Would this have changed the calculus of the defenders?

Going back to Alesia. Vercingetorix tried to break out, somewhat coordinated with a relief force attack on the outside of Caesar's siege lines. After a desperate battle he failed and the following morning Vercingetorix turned over his weapons and surrendered.

Why? He knew his people were going to be enslaved/executed. He personally should have had a reasonable expectation he'd be paraded around as a trophy. He's starving and without hope of victory, but living in defeat seems pretty bad to me too. Wouldn't it be worth it to stick it to the Romans as much as possible? Evidently not. Maybe this isn't a good example as it's so long ago that I don't know that we can possibly understand what's going on in V's mind. On the other hand, I can't think that there could be many worse people to surrender to than a bunch of irritable Romans. Maybe I don't have much imagination

[jmm99]

All I know is Caesar:

LXXXVIII. ... Vercingetorix, having convened a council the following day, declares, "That he had undertaken that war, not on account of his own exigencies, but on account of the general freedom; and since he must yield to fortune, he offered himself to them for either purpose, whether they should wish to atone to the Romans by his death, or surrender him alive." Ambassadors are sent to Caesar on this subject. He orders their arms to be surrendered, and their chieftains delivered up. He seated himself at the head of the lines in front of the camp, the Gallic chieftains are brought before him. They surrender Vercingetorix, and lay down their arms. Reserving the Aedui and Arverni, [to try] if he could gain over, through their influence, their respective states, he distributes one of the remaining captives to each soldier, throughout the entire army, as plunder.

XC.--After making these arrangements, he marches into the [country of the] Aedui, and recovers that state. To this place ambassadors are sent by the Arverni, who promise that they will execute his commands. He demands a great number of hostages. He sends the legions to winter quarters; he restores about twenty thousand captives to the Aedui and Arverni; he orders Titus Labienus to march into the [country of the] Sequani with two legions and the cavalry, and to him he attaches Marcus Sempronius Rutilus; he places Caius Fabius, and Lucius Minucius Basilus, with two legions in the country of the Remi, lest they should sustain any loss from the Bellovaci in their neighbourhood. He sends Caius Antistius Reginus into the [country of the] Ambivareti, Titus Sextius into the territories of the Bituriges, and Caius Caninius Rebilus into those of the Ruteni, with one legion each. He stations Quintus Tullius Cicero, and Publius Sulpicius among the Aedui at Cabillo and Matisco on the Saone, to procure supplies of corn. He himself determines to winter at Bibracte. A supplication of twenty days is decreed by the senate at Rome, on learning these successes from Caesar's despatches.

Caesar treated the Aedui and Arverni differently; and that seems to have worked in their home territories.

Regards

Mike