Culmination Point

[wm]

The outcomes of battles are difficult to predict: wars, not so much. When both sides have a strategy of chewing up the other side's planes, tanks and infantry, (WWII) Hitler's chances of victory became pretty slim once the US fired up its factories.

You've already skewed the analysis. It was not at all clear in 1940 that the US would become the arsenal of democracy. The US might also have changed its plan in 1943 and elected to negotiate with the Germans. (I suspect we were in a fight to the end with the Japanese after Pearl Harbor, but that same level of animosity was not as present WRT Germany--ulike in WWI.)

Despite Hannibal's tactical brilliance at killing roman soldiers, the fact that both sides had the same strategy - kill the other sides soldiers - and the fact that Italy had so many more people than Carthage made an Italian victory almost inevitable.

Again this only became inevitable after the end of the period of Fabian delay, and the Roman decision to invade Tunisia. After Cannhae or Lake Trasimene, I do not think the outcome was so inevitable.

I will agree, however, that inevitable is a word that can only be used in hindsight. Just because Hitler never had an atomic bomb, doesn't mean that in 1943 it was possible to say that he never would. And I'm sure that if Hannibal had gotten his hands on gunpowder he would've figured out how to use it effectively. You can never assume that the playing field won't change.

Nor can you assume that the aims of those on either side of the playing field won't also change, in either a rational or less than rational way. This latter was my main point.

[Rank amateur]

You've already skewed the analysis. It was not at all clear in 1940 that the US would become the arsenal of democracy.

No but it was obvious sometime before Adolph married Eva. Therefore, the culmination point was somewhere between those two points in time.

After Cannhae or Lake Trasimene, I do not think the outcome was so inevitable.

I agree - so the cumulation point hadn't been reached yet - but I still would've bet on the Italians. (There was a reason Hannibal didn't sack Rome, in spite of being urged to.) The Romans still had more resources to execute their strategy and I would've bet that Hannibal wouldn't be able to alter that equation.

Again this only became inevitable after the end of the period of Fabian delay, and the Roman decision to invade Tunisia

Careful, it almost sounds like you're saying there is a point before the end of a war where victory becomes inevitable.

I agree with you that the concept is most useful in hindsight, but I agree with Rob that it has some strategic relevance. (I think it would've been useful if a few people had realized that toppling Saddam's statue was a photo op, not a culmination point.) I also agree with Tom. The article over states things, but preparing the world for "Things are better, so we don't need as many troops now" is a good thing.

[wm]

I agree - so the cumulation point hadn't been reached yet - but I still would've bet on the Italians. (There was a reason Hannibal didn't sack Rome, in spite of being urged to.) The Romans still had more resources to execute their strategy and I would've bet that Hannibal wouldn't be able to alter that equation.

THe reason Hannibal did not sack Rome was becaue he did not have the wherewithal to do so. He chose instead to try to detach the Socii by showing them that Rome could not protect them--probably a strategic blunder on his part (sort of like what Al Qaida in Iraq did to lose popular support), but I imagine Hanniball thought it seemed like a good idea at the time (reminds me of that story Steve McQueen tells in The Great Escape about the guy jumping into the cactus).

Careful, it almost sounds like you're saying there is a point before the end of a war where victory becomes inevitable.

I thought you might pick up on that.
I would say that a complete Roman victory became more likely after the legions landed safely in Tunisia. However the issue of battling elephant-equipped armies still made the outcome highly suspect. If it became inevitable, that inevitability appeared as the Carthaginian army fled in disarray from the field at Zama.

I agree with you that the concept is most useful in hindsight, but I agree with Rob that it has some strategic relevance. (I think it would've been useful if a few people had realized that toppling Saddam's statue was a photo op, not a culmination point.) I also agree with Tom. The article over states things, but preparing the world for "Things are better, so we don't need as many troops now" is a good thing.

As the subsequent posts from RTK and Tom indicate, a culminating point does have a useful meaning, just not in the way that Scales seems to be using it in his essay. It has operational and tactical relelvance and maybe strategic relevance in a conventional, symmetrical war. I see Scales' usage as being akin to a "turning point" or a crisis, as defined in literature.

[PhilR]

Precise doctrinal definitions are useful at the lower levels because they allow the rapid transmission of meaning through fewer words. The common understanding is needed for unity of action.
As we move up the scale to the strategic level, I beleive that precision in language is less relevant. Rather than trying to sum something complex up into a neat phrase or term, its takes somewhat more skill to explain what is meant--succinct doctrinal concepts fall short of the mark (as do sound bites).
I think that this is revealed in all of the postings so far, where the richness of the situation in Iraq requires more explanation than that contained in the definition of "culminating point." I will agree, however, that Scales' choice of the the term reveals his own summation of all of the information. The danger is that now becomes a lens that colors the analysis of further information: "If this is the culminating point, then we expect X to happen, or if Y happens, it means this or that." If that assumption (culmination) is not continually re-evaluated, it will then lead to further misreading of the situation.

[Gian P Gentile]

The danger is that now becomes a lens that colors the analysis of further information: "If this is the culminating point, then we expect X to happen, or if Y happens, it means this or that." If that assumption (culmination) is not continually re-evaluated, it will then lead to further misreading of the situation.

Right, I agree and to build on this statement Scales has used the word "culmination" as metaphor for things that defy his ability to express in clearer language. When I read the Scales piece it was like he was just substituting "culmination" for other metaphors like: "tipping point;" "turning point;" "we have the ball and the initiative;" "light at the end of the tunnel" sorts of things. And as PhilR points out it is almost binary-like in its conception. That there was this before, we are now here at the culminating point, and something wil happen next. An overly simplistic description of the complexity that defies simplification in the land from where PhilR writes.

[RTK]

Precise doctrinal definitions are useful at the lower levels because they allow the rapid transmission of meaning through fewer words. The common understanding is needed for unity of action.
As we move up the scale to the strategic level, I beleive that precision in language is less relevant. Rather than trying to sum something complex up into a neat phrase or term, its takes somewhat more skill to explain what is meant--succinct doctrinal concepts fall short of the mark (as do sound bites).

If this is the case, then what's the point? IF all the terminology hits terminal velocity above a certain level, maybe that's what wrong at the "Big Map, Small Hand" level. Bigger question is, should we be willing to accept this as truth?

We've talked about this before on this board. As a tactics instructor it makes absolutely no sense to me that doctrinal terminology is not relevant above a certain stage. I have a feeling many of you disagree with me on this.

[wm]

If this is the case, then what's the point? IF all the terminology hits terminal velocity above a certain level, maybe that's what wrong at the "Big Map, Small Hand" level. Bigger question is, should we be willing to accept this as truth?

We've talked about this before on this board. As a tactics instructor it makes absolutely no sense to me that doctrinal terminology is not relevant above a certain stage. I have a feeling many of you disagree with me on this.

RTK,
I would assert that any use of terminology has relevance in a context. Sometimes the context sets the relevance automatically, sometimes the relevance must be explained. I thinlk that Scales' use of culminating point in his article falls into the latter class of usage. As PhilR noted, at tactical and operational levels, the terminology has a perfectly transparent usage in the definitions you provided from JP1-02. The usage by Scales is a much more opaque metaphor.

For example, I would not use 'culminating point' in a current operation except to describe to my higher that my force had reached such a point that it was unlikely to be of much further operational use until given a chance to rest, refit, and reset. (And I probably would say my unit had or was becoming combat ineffective instead.) I do not see Scales using it in that way. I am not clear to whose culminating point he is referring--could be Coalition forces, could be insurgents, could be a subset of either or both, could even be all forces across the entire AOR. As you pointed out indirectly, as a mimimum, we need to know what scale map he has in mind when he uses the term. It would also be helpful to know to which "color' of unit symbols he is referring.

[John T. Fishel]

many classes at CGSC where we tried to explain the term "culmination point" to eager young majors. It was part of the blocks on Operational Art and was always the most difficult of concepts. I came to think of the epitiome of a tactical culmination point as the second day at Gettysburg, the far left of the Union line at Little Round Top. Both Oates and Chamberlain had reached their culmination point when the latter ordered the bayonet charge that broke the Rebel attack. Oates' culmination point came moments before Chamberlain's but at the end of the charge neither force could continue doing what it had been doing.

Perhaps, a good example of an operational or theater strategic culmination point is the series of fights that Grant initiated in the Summer of 1864 and carried out through the siege of Petersburg when Lee, finally, could no longer continue what he was doing.

A national strategic culmination point was nearly reached that summer and fall when Union soldiers appeared to be dying needlessly in the battles in Virginia and Sherman showed no sign of taking Atlanta. The Democrats appeared likely to elect McClellan President with the result of a negotiated peace that would have sundered the Union. Had Sherman not taken Atlanta before the election the Union would, I think, have reached its national strategic culmination point because it no longer had the will to fight.

So, I suspect that the DOD definition of a culmination point is probably pretty good and can be addressed at all 3 levels of war. (Please note that I did not use Iraq or any other contemporary examples. I leave those applications to others, preferably after the turkey is finished.)

Cheers

JohnT

[Global Scout]

Since the AQ threat is global I don't think defeating AQI (if we have) equates to a strategic culminating point for the long war (GWOT) or even the war in Iraq since it is multi-headed problem; however, we may be close to reaching a tactical or operational level culmination point against AQI.

I don't have strong feelings on this, but as food for thought, I think a culmination point for an insurgency or terrorist group/movement is generally more difficult to identify and/or define than it is a for a nation-state at war, especially without the benefit of hindsight. Insurgencies can ebb and flow, so any set back for the insurgents should probably best be viewed as temporary until the passage of time has proven otherwise, and it will take time (perhaps years) to see if this is truly a culmination point for AQI.

To help rebuild the USG's damaged credibility military professionals should probably steer away from perhaps overly rosey assessments, and simply focus on the facts, which fortunately is good news. However, if the situation takes a turn for the worse the speaker or author will be requoted a thousand times in an attempt to make him look like a fool and destroy his/her credibility. Let the politicians do that, as they seem to relish in their delusions.

For those of you that teach culmination points, do you have any examples of culminating points for insurgencies that I could use as examples when I mentor officers and NCOs?

[marct]

Hi John,

So, I suspect that the DOD definition of a culmination point is probably pretty good and can be addressed at all 3 levels of war. (Please note that I did not use Iraq or any other contemporary examples. I leave those applications to others, preferably after the turkey is finished.)

I've been reading this discussion with some interest and trying to get a handle on what the term actually means. PhilR's point about language actually struck me as very relevant, and shifted my understanding quite a bit.

John, do both terms refer to shifts in organizational isomorphic vectors leading to a catastrophe point? This is what they seem to be referring to, but without that mathematical models. If that is the case, then it should be possible to map and plot them out.

Marc