New Guidance on Counter-Insurgency

[Michael C]

I am currently at a training exercise so I will quickly try and reply to all.

First, towards the UK folks, I am trying to get it downloaded. As soon as it is I will post again and I will email it to you if you have an email.

Second, to Mike F. You don't really say anything with which I disagree. I believe security operations have a precise place and I believe counter-force operations have a place. The correct thing is analyzing the percentages. In a given insurgent population maybe only five percent are irreconcilables: those who have to be killed or captured. You also mention turning the population which I think is always better than killing the enemy.
You also made some great points on IO which is how it should be conducted. The only thing I would add is that once you live in the population and eliminate armed propaganda in the villages, then conduct regular shuras, eventually you will ask the people to turn in the bad guys so they can reconcile. Surprisingly they will and the violence will lower dramatically. The key is not killing the right people, its securing and living with the right people. This is also much easier when partnered with local units, not conducting solo operations.
When it comes to comparing population-centric COIN with other theories, people frequently say like what? Well, my first answer is fire-power reliant theories that the US Army used in the beginning of the Iraq war, the Afghanistan war until now, and throughout the Vietnam war. Firepower and vague concepts of maneuver replaced interaction and intelligence gathering. Above all, though, US army might say they do not advocate that, in practice that is the majority of their actions.

To William F. Owen: I don't think we see eye to eye but I don't think small little forum posts will change that. The problem with "correctly applied combat power as the essential element of irregular warfare" is defining correctly applied power. Is it fire power? Is it living with the population? Is it partnering with the local security forces? Is it gathering more accurate intelligence?
It seems like correctly applied power is a euphimism for conducting kinetic operations on the insurgent or irregular forces. And, frankly, I don't think we can shoot our way out of this operation.

[William F. Owen]

To William F. Owen: I don't think we see eye to eye but I don't think small little forum posts will change that. The problem with "correctly applied combat power as the essential element of irregular warfare" is defining correctly applied power. Is it fire power? Is it living with the population? Is it partnering with the local security forces? Is it gathering more accurate intelligence?

Well you may yet be surprised.

• Is it fire power? - Yes, but 5.56mm and 7.62mm applied against armed targets, clearly identified and engaged within ROE.
  It is not 454kg JDAMS, Hellfire, or 155mm, unless very clear criteria are satisfied
• Is it living with the population? Yes, as and when it merits benefit.
• Is it partnering with the local security forces? Yes, especially if they can trained to operate in ways that acknowledge both their limits and strengths and not just as less capable mirrors of yourselves.
• Is it gathering more accurate intelligence? Absolutely! That is about the most important thing you can do!

It seems like correctly applied power is a euphimism for conducting kinetic operations on the insurgent or irregular forces. And, frankly, I don't think we can shoot our way out of this operation.

It's not a euphemism. It is exactly what I mean.

If I can find 30 armed insurgents on the move, away from any population, why should I not attempt to engage and kill all of them? Are you seriously suggesting we should not do this?

If however, I risk killing civilians, or I am not sure as to the identity of those 30 armed men, then I'll seek to conduct operations to clarify their identity, till I can successfully engage them, or consider them not a threat.

[Infanteer]

If I can find 30 armed soldiers on the move, away from any population, why should I not attempt to engage and kill all of them? Are you seriously suggesting we should not do this?

If however, I risk killing civilians, or I am not sure as to the identity of those 30 armed men, then I'll seek to conduct operations to clarify their identity, till I can successfully engage them, or consider them not a threat.

Changing one word highlights the sillyness of dividing war simply on what clothes one side decides to wear to battle....