New Rules of War

[zenpundit]

Dr. Marc,

The devil, however, is in the details and, let's face it, the details in both Iraq and Afghanistan morphed into the construction of "democracies" which was not part of the original, political calculus of cost; neither were the "insurgencies" .

Very true. Iraq was a stretch and Afghanistan morphing in under a half-century is an impossibility.

That being said, then why has the response to the economic "warfare" of various and sundry financial institutions not been dealt with in a similar manner? Why is he not advocating swarming by accountants which, IMHO, would have far more effect

Amen. For an anthropologist, you are a fine economist.

Ken,

Impressive response. You wrote:

That's merely one small point, a far larger issue is what capability those dollars bought and what combat effectiveness was or is produced. Cost effectiveness is too easily skewed to prove that money is being 'wasted.' What should be purchased for the spending is combat effectiveness. I have no doubt what so ever that the average Infantryman in Viet Nam was more capable than his WW II counterpart probably by a factor of two-- and I have no doubt that my serving Son and his contemporaries are miles ahead of us old guys, probably by another factor of at least two and quite possibly up to four. So yes, we're spending more but we're buying far more capability with fewer but considerably more expensive people.

Fuchs already carried on the discussion with you on effectiveness/efficiency, so I won't beat a dead horse.

Agree with you that combat-effectiveness per soldier has been greatly multiplied (very Cebrowskian ), and expensive technology is part of that. That's a good thing. I'm not looking for cost savings by going "cheap" on what individuals or small units use. Given pie-in-the-sky objectives by politicians, the military naturally tries to secure maximum deployment of personnel and resources when most of the realistic military objectives (as opposed to political/diplomatic/economic objectives) that can be acheived in any given situation short of a great power war require less. Sometimes much less because the military is often used as a blunt instrument for inherently political and murkily complex problems ( ex. Lebanon 1980's, Somalia and Haiti 1990's) to which they are ill-suited as the primary instrument of national policy.

I fully understand the perspective of military specialists needing to plan a campaign or a mission from the point of effectiveness over cost. They should. However, the purpose of civilian leadership in is to ensure that the war effort is sustainable over time until victory is acheived, which means setting parameters and priorities whether it is "Germany, First", "Don't go north of the Yalu" or "we're building carriers not battleships". Our national political leadership have pursued the war on terror generally in a way that maximizes expenditure without maximizing effect. As we are waging war on borrowed money, we ought to, at least, bring our strategic goals into alignment with what the military is most likely to be able to accomplish and put more heft into the activities of HUMINT operators, diplomats and economic development rather than chase diminishing returns with marginal dollars.

Wilf,

Tet was significant. It did not loose the war, or even represent a turning point. It wasn't Kursk or Stalingrad. - and was the North better of with Nixon than LBJ?

LBJ was inept in foreign affairs and Nixon was adept. After Tet both sought a negotiated settlement with North Vietnam, but the difference is LBJ had no idea even how to begin such a process and Nixon did; moreover, he intended to try and drive a hard bargain with Hanoi. Nixon's foremost worry in the summer of 1968 was that LBJ would give away the store to the Communists in order to get Humphrey elected.

Nixon had a strategy, unlike LBJ. He was no less determined to "win."

We agree that Richard Nixon had a strategy. Unfortunately, winning in Vietnam was not part of it and never was ( to use one of your phrases, such a position is "evidence-free"). In Nixon's own words he was looking for "unexplored avenues to probe" in "finding a way to end the war".

Nixon began moving beyond Vietnam as a national priority in 1967 when he penned "Asia After Vietnam" for Foreign Affairs. This position hardened after his pre-presidential campaign world tour. The idea that Nixon intended to "win" is belied by the record of Kissinger's Paris talks and numerous other documents.

Sorry but it was. It was instrumental in the coup in Cambodia and it knocked out all the major NVA base areas for two years. No single action did more military damage to the NVA than the Cambodian invasion. It was military action focussed on military forces, and yes it had strategic effect.

Sorry, it was not. With Cambodia, Nixon gave his military leaders - whom he did not trust, nor who trusted him - far more of what they had been asking to do for years but this was in part because of the demands he was imposing on them with the pace of troop withdrawals. Arguably, Cambodia bought GVN a breathing space and was the right thing to do but it was not (and did not) going to compel Hanoi to come to terms. It was on Saigon, not Hanoi that the USG ultimately imposed peace terms.

Watergate and the 73 Oil crisis doomed SVN greatly more than the very minor reversals of Tet five years before

Watergate certainly rendered Nixon and later Ford of extending air power and military assistance to GVN as the USG had promised Saigon. Tet however did not doom GVN, it changed American perceptions of the war and political support for it here at home.

[William F. Owen]

Arguably, Cambodia bought GVN a breathing space and was the right thing to do but it was not (and did not) going to compel Hanoi to come to terms. It was on Saigon, not Hanoi that the USG ultimately imposed peace terms.

So what did compel Hanoi to start peace talks?
By 1972, Nixon is sending more Carriers, mining North Vietnamese harbours and increasing the bombing. NVA desertions reach record levels. Military force is getting Nixon what Nixon wants - flawed as those desires maybe.

My point is that even as late as 1973, the Vietnam War was America's to loose. This had all moved things on a very far way from the very minor tactical effects of Tet, 4-5 Years earlier!!

[marct]

Hi Zen,

Very true. Iraq was a stretch and Afghanistan morphing in under a half-century is an impossibility.

Yeah, what more can I say on that one .

Amen. For an anthropologist, you are a fine economist.

Oi vey! I guess we never can get rid of some of our roots (I was originally accepted into university in economics .....).

[zenpundit]

Late is always better than never!

It might be worth comparing apples to apples. The two efforts are of completely different kinds in oh so many fundamental ways. As a simple example consider constancy of purpose in the two conflicts (and that is problematic because OIF and OEF are, and were, not one conflict.) From the Allies’ perspective, World War II had a fairly constant scope

Actually there's no more logical reason to keep WWII conceptually aggregated than the War on Terror. There's very little the kind of fighting Stillwell did in Burma had in common with the invasion of Sicily, strategic bombing of Germany or the Battle of the Coral Sea. The lack of constancy and magnitude of scope was itself a great challenge for Marshall and the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Were it not for Hitler's gratuitous stupidity in declaring war on the US, FDR would have faced a serious political obstacle in linking the war in Europe to America's war with Japan.

Where is the double blind test that shows that small units do better than “big battalions” in a given operational scenario? Comparing the effort from the initial days of OEF in Afghanistan with how things happen to be proceeding on the ground today is another example of comparing apples to oranges.

Having a priori ruled out using case studies, even those occurring in the same battlespace conducted by the same military within a short period of time, what is your proposal for conducting such a double-blind test of combat operations?

[wm]

Actually there's no more logical reason to keep WWII conceptually aggregated than the War on Terror. There's very little the kind of fighting Stillwell did in Burma had in common with the invasion of Sicily, strategic bombing of Germany or the Battle of the Coral Sea. The lack of constancy and magnitude of scope was itself a great challenge for Marshall and the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Were it not for Hitler's gratuitous stupidity in declaring war on the US, FDR would have faced a serious political obstacle in linking the war in Europe to America's war with Japan.

Unlike World War II, the current conflicts, OIF (soon to be Operation New Dawn or OND) and OEF, will not really matter much in the great scheme of things should the coalition's efforts be less than successful. The magnitude of evil being confronted there pales in comparison to that manifested by the opposition during WWII. (By the way, had Hitler not declared war on the US, I submit that FDR would have had little trouble getting the US involved in the ETO once the evil of the Nazi regime became apparent to Americans.) That is the connection I was trying to suggest in my early post about constancy of mission. I see the point about operational/tactical differences in different WWII theaters to be a non sequitur. Of course the techniques used varied depending on whether operations were cfonducted in CBI, North Africa, the Russian steppes or the frozen Karelian Peninsula; that is the essence of METT-TC. What did not change was the strategic mission: to compel the aggressor Axis nations to surrender unconditionally. There was no mission creep, as much as Churchill and Patton may have wanted it.

Having a priori ruled out using case studies, even those occurring in the same battlespace conducted by the same military within a short period of time, what is your proposal for conducting such a double-blind test of combat operations?

I don't think I ruled out case studies a priori. In certain circumstances, case studies would be an excellent approach. In fact I suspect that a properly constructed and presented case study approach is germane in the present analysis. I was also not proposing that we use a double blind test in combat. What I was suggesting is that an appeal to consequences as a means of comparing the goodness of alternatives is not likely to be an appropriate methodological approach for the current subject.
Instead, I would argue from analogy (which is the essence of the case study approach) and would look for data upon which to make a basis for analogy. In the case at hand, I would like to know whether you could cite some examples that are relevantly similar, examples where big battalions did not get the job done and some other examples, also relevantly similar, where small units did achieve the desired results. As part of the discussion, I think you also need to cash out what counts as desired results and justify that normative position. If neither of these pieces is missing, then I submit that your position,

using big units where smaller ones work with greater efficiency and effectiveness is a poor tactical choice.

is merely handwaving. It may in fact be the case that an effective and efficient solution is not what the national leadership is really after here, just as it may not really matter what tactical choices one makes because strategic and/or operational considerations may far outweigh the tactical ones.

[William F. Owen]

There's very little the kind of fighting Stillwell did in Burma had in common with the invasion of Sicily, strategic bombing of Germany or the Battle of the Coral Sea. The lack of constancy and magnitude of scope was itself a great challenge for Marshall and the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Hmmm.... I'm not sure I get your point. In WW2, as with today, combat is combat. Sure there are theatre specific peculiarities, but so what?
Infantry men in Burma and Sicily would have a very great deal in common. Yes there are differences, but why are they relevant, beyond the obvious?

Am I missing the point?

[Rex Brynen]

To get back to Arquilla's original argument about the need for smaller/smarter/more flexible/networked forces as a necessary response to networked insurgents using a "swarm" approach, it struck me today that we actually have a paired comparison of two militaries, organized along radically different lines, faced with insurgencies in similar human and physical terrain:

1) Ba'thist Iraq versus various Kurdish insurgencies, and the 1991 uprising in the south

2) US/coalition/Iraqi forces versus various Iraqi insurgencies, 2003-present

The ponderous, hierarchical, Soviet-style Iraqi military was, by any possible measure, for more successful at suppressing insurgents than has been the much more flexible, modular, networked US military... quite the reverse of what Arquilla's argument would suggest.

The answer, as I'm sure everyone realizes, is rooted in the willingness of the Ba'th to use force in certain ways, and the balance of terror that it was thereby able to establish. Don't get me wrong--I'm not suggesting the "Roman" (or Ba'thist) model as an appropriate approach for post-Cold War Western COIN and stability operations. I am suggesting that what has changed here is not so much the rise of the "swarm" but the very much greater importance of the changing social, political, normative, legal, and informational milieu within which COIN operations take place.

[William F. Owen]

The ponderous, hierarchical, Soviet-style Iraqi military was, by any possible measure, for more successful at suppressing insurgents than has been the much more flexible, modular, networked US military... quite the reverse of what Arquilla's argument would suggest.

Excellent point.

[Ken White]

My first thought on reading about the the swarms in the article was of a US or generally western 'swarm' element operating under western constraints confronting an opponent who did not operate under those constraints...

[Ron Humphrey]

Trying to keep up with you guys is becoming ever more difficult. Although I think I have been able to track with the majority of the conversation i have one ?

IF your looking at "swarming" in relation to war is it too much of an oversimplification to start back at square one and look for examples of swarming in other arenas first to get perspective?

I think someone else mentioned biological examples so for me that automatically brought to mind animals(Bees)(Bats) and cells(reproduction/viruses,etc)

In the former Why is it that bees however small can take down a much more robust opponent is it because even though they be outmatched in capability they out number the target. In this case doesn't the swarming relate more to the fact that no one attacks at one place at one time, but that they may repeatedly attack the same place many times. Just depends on time and space available.

One more example brought to mind was water. Why is it that something that takes a very specialized tool to breakdown(earth,rocks.etc) can be worn down by water in such fashion as it is. Is it not that the water flows to such space as it is afforded and never ceases to seek new paths . Isn't this another type of swarming.

Long and short
Is it too "simplistic" to say that the key strength in swarming might be found in its ability to recognize and act on any vacuum afforded in a given path

[wm]

The ponderous, hierarchical, Soviet-style Iraqi military was, by any possible measure, for more successful at suppressing insurgents than has been the much more flexible, modular, networked US military... quite the reverse of what Arquilla's argument would suggest.

The answer, as I'm sure everyone realizes, is rooted in the willingness of the Ba'th to use force in certain ways, and the balance of terror that it was thereby able to establish. Don't get me wrong--I'm not suggesting the "Roman" (or Ba'thist) model as an appropriate approach for post-Cold War Western COIN and stability operations. I am suggesting that what has changed here is not so much the rise of the "swarm" but the very much greater importance of the changing social, political, normative, legal, and informational milieu within which COIN operations take place.

Well put Rex, but I suspect that the answer is not quite as simple as tipping "the balance of terror." Neither the Ba'athists nor their opponents were fighting with home field advantage (or both were). As natives, they could be very effective because they shared the language and culture of their opposition. In contrast to that, while its opponents were able to follow Mao's precept of swimming ln the ocean of the people, the Coalition, consisting of outsiders, was not quite as lucky . The Baathists, being locals, knew what kind of bait to use to catch the fish. The coalition forces were much more like tourists on a fishing trip far from home. They weren't even sure which pools were stocked, much less what kind of tackle to use.

Furthermore, I doubt that the "importance of the . . social, political, normative, legal, and informational milieu within which COIN operations take place" has changed much since when Titus finished up the work of his father Vespasian and quashed the Jewish Revolt in 70 AD or when Marius and Sulla won the Social War of 91-88 BC. What may be different is how well various forces involved in fighting against insurgencies, insurrections, and revolts recognize and apply those parts of METT-TC (or whatever fancy acronym du jour one wishes to apply) which reflect that milieu.

[zenpundit]

WM wrote:

I don't think I ruled out case studies a priori. In certain circumstances, case studies would be an excellent approach. In fact I suspect that a properly constructed and presented case study approach is germane in the present analysis

No, you arbitrarily ruled out the most germane case study available a priori is all, because it was favorable to small units and of immediate relevance to the current conflict. However, we are in agreement that properly constructed case study approach is a useful methodology. Good, this is progress. We can come back to case studies in a bit.

I was also not proposing that we use a double blind test in combat. What I was suggesting is that an appeal to consequences as a means of comparing the goodness of alternatives is not likely to be an appropriate methodological approach for the current subject.

I never said that you proposed it, WM. What you suggested was that a double-blind test was an appropriate standard of proof for my proposition to have to meet in order to be accepted as valid:

Where is the double blind test that shows that small units do better than “big battalions” in a given operational scenario?

I agree that a double-blind test could provide some convincing evidence to help support or alternatively, to falsify, my proposition that there are some scenarios where small units are better tactical choice than large ones. What I asked of you was that you in turn explain how such a double-blind test of combat operations might be constructed.

I appreciate all the effort you are expending in attempting to school me in basic logic, but along the way, it might be more helpful if you practiced some yourself. Either answer the question and demonstrate how a double-blind test of combat operations might be conducted (the experimental ethics alone should prove to be fascinating explanation) or admit that it was never an appropriate standard of proof to apply in the first place.

Oh, and speaking of non sequiturs.....

Unlike World War II, the current conflicts, OIF (soon to be Operation New Dawn or OND) and OEF, will not really matter much in the great scheme of things should the coalition's efforts be less than successful. The magnitude of evil being confronted there pales in comparison to that manifested by the opposition during WWII

[Fuchs]

The ponderous, hierarchical, Soviet-style Iraqi military was, by any possible measure, for more successful at suppressing insurgents than has been the much more flexible, modular, networked US military... quite the reverse of what Arquilla's argument would suggest.

They failed to defeat the Kurds and they had it easy with the Shi'ite rising just as the MC had it easy at Fallujah.

The Iraqi army did furthermore not do the job (that it did) alone. Saddam had powerful intelligence service(s?). That was crucial for the suppression of the kind of low level resistance that the foreigners faced since 2003.

----------------

About swarming: I'm beyond the typical age for it (I'm 33), but let's out myself as someone who played a bit online, mostly in pvp (player vs player) battles.
The example is very useful in regard to swarming.

#1
The basic mode of pvp is that everyone "fights" as an individual, merely taking into account what others do. A team without voice communication acts often like an animal swarm, pack, herd. They move into position and suddenly one decides to attack and all attack. This sudden decision can also define what target will be attacked or the route or direction of attack.

#2
This becomes much more effective when voice communication is being added. Targets are called, one calls for patience, help is being requested, reports are made and the attack is usually timed.

#3
A team with voice comm and a leader becomes more effective, quicker and less wasteful (in regard to time, firepower, opportunities).

#4
There's also the possibility of a very leader-controlled encounter with a great degree of control. This mode is extremely slow, but it's very capable in predictable, complex situations. It's rarely used in pvp, but very common in pve (player versus environment, that is: against computer-controlled opponents).

#5
Then again a team that has played together for a while can be very different again; voice comm loses relevance because they know what to do, when and how. They can again approach the basic mode of operation; keep eyes open and try to do what's necessary to win. Central control can be reduced to three or fire commands with a total of less than 20 words - in a "fight" of 10-30 minutes.
The effect is usually superior to all previous modes despite the similarity with the first one.



Swarming can be seen as simply "keep eyes open and use your brain" and nothing special. It's quite different from orthodox tactics, though.

Let's call #1 incompetent swarming, #2 leaderless cooperation, #3 mission tactics, #4 order tactics and #5 competent swarming.

I assure you that #3 is superior to #5 in a crisis, but that's the only exception to the otherwise universal superiority of #5 in PvP.


I observed these patterns and results in different games, with German and international (English-speaking) players, over years and with very different game mechanics. Teams were 5 to 40 players strong.

I'm convinced that I observed universal, natural human behaviour patterns (at least for males, age group 16-45).

#5 works usually best. Do not take it lightly, and don't despise it for a superficial similarity to #1. Incompetence is possible in any system.

It may be difficult to extrapolate this stuff to the behaviour of small units or units instead of individuals. Nevertheless, "swarming" is something that we should look at.
History (a trend away from authoritarian control in the Western world) suggests that we probably know enough about leadership by exogenously enforced authority, but probably not enough about decentralized, independent yet cooperative forms of coordination.

A modern military is a bureaucracy. I served long enough in the Bundeswehr to know what this means. Such a bureaucracy has a tendence to develop according to the preferences of the bureaucratic hive mind. That does not need to be optimal, it's certainly averse to self-organisation ("disorder") and there's pretty much a technological lock-in in favour of what we know as orthodox military doctrine, command & control.
Others who do not get "educated" by such a bureaucratic can revert to more "natural" modes of operation. They do not need to break through a technological lock-in barrier. They may actually use methods that are superior in sizeable niches.

[jmm99]

and MAJ Shannon's thesis. The FP article by Arquilla, The New Rules of War, mentioned the Mongol "Crow Swarm":

Simultaneous attack from several directions might be at the very cutting edge in conflict, but its lineage is quite old. Traditional tribal warfare, whether by nomadic horse archers or bush fighters, always featured some elements of swarms. The zenith of this kind of fighting probably came with the 13th-century Mongols, who had a name for this doctrine: "Crow Swarm." When the attack was not carried out at close quarters by charging horsemen, but was instead conducted via arrows raining down on massed targets, the khans called it "Falling Stars."

Classing the highly organized Mongol forces under Subodai (I'd call them conventional light and heavy cavalry) as "traditional tribal warriors" seemed a bit suspect to me, so I Googled up "Crow Swarm" and "Mongol". I found a master's thesis by MAJ William D. Shannon (USMC), Swarm Tactics and the Doctrinal Void: Lessons from the Chechen Wars (June 2008), U.S. Naval Postgraduate School (John Arquilla was a thesis advisor).

MAJ Shannon's issues (pp.16-17 pdf):

Is there potential to turn swarming concepts into doctrine for U.S. forces? In order to answer this question, this thesis will ask the following questions:

• Are there relevant historical precedents that provide sufficient analysis to explore development of swarming concepts?

• Does the concept of swarming address any gaps in military doctrine?

• Can we [U.S. forces, and more specifically, Marines] incorporate swarm tactics into our doctrine for use in the offense and defense without drastic changes to organization, command, control and communications (C3), training, and logistics?

and Conclusion (pp.91-92 pdf):

G. CONCLUSION

The research conducted here and in other scholarly and professional publications, coupled with military doctrine and experimentation, all but leads to the conclusion that there is potential to develop doctrinal swarming concepts. This is based on developing answers to the three research questions posed in Chapter I.

First, that the Chechen Wars did provide additional information and lessons learned in relation to not only the war in general, but to this thesis’ independent variables, regarding the use of swarm tactics.

Second, reviewing doctrine and warfighting experiments has confirmed the existence of doctrinal void in the area of swarm tactics, which implies a need to construct doctrinal swarming concepts, engage in experimentation, and promulgate swarm TTPs in doctrine and training.

Finally, with the implementation of the DO concept, our knowledge from the first two research questions and previous scholarly research on swarming, a potential future swarming doctrine concept foundation is set. This would allow Marines and other forces to employ swarm tactics offensively and defend against and repulse enemy swarms. The only thing left for us to do is “do it.”

So, tossing out another piece of red meat to be swarmed on ....

Regards

Mike

PS: MAJ Shannon presents four "swarming" examples from history (pp. 18-23 pdf)

1. The Mongol Swarm ....

2. Napoleon’s Retreat from Russia ....

3. The Winter War ....

4. The Soviet Afghan War ....

I expect there will be some controversy about those examples.

[Ken White]

#5
Then again a team that has played together for a while can be very different again; voice comm loses relevance because they know what to do, when and how. They can again approach the basic mode of operation; keep eyes open and try to do what's necessary to win. Central control can be reduced to three or fire commands with a total of less than 20 words - in a "fight" of 10-30 minutes. The effect is usually superior to all previous modes despite the similarity with the first one.
...
#5 works usually best. Do not take it lightly, and don't despise it for a superficial similarity to #1. Incompetence is possible in any system.

Totally agree. However, you also said:

I assure you that #3 is superior to #5 in a crisis, but that's the only exception to the otherwise universal superiority of #5 in PvP

and I can also agree with that

Thus my constant contentions that (a) we do not train as well as we should; and (b) METT-TC is the ultimate ruler of all things...

[Rex Brynen]

They failed to defeat the Kurds and they had it easy with the Shi'ite rising just as the MC had it easy at Fallujah.

The sole reason, of course, that they failed to defeat the Kurds was de facto US protection of northern Iraq--hardly a fair test. They did, however, effectively suppress them in 1975 (following the withdrawal of Iranian support) and again at the end of the Iran-Iraq War (ditto).

[Infanteer]

The ponderous, hierarchical, Soviet-style Iraqi military was, by any possible measure, for more successful at suppressing insurgents than has been the much more flexible, modular, networked US military... quite the reverse of what Arquilla's argument would suggest.

Was it? Or was it the Ba'athist political system that was more effective.

US forces seemed just as adept at crushing flare ups (Fallujah) as the Republican Guard. The Ba'athist Regime dealt with the day-to-day stuff and Paul Bremer and CPA Law simply could not.

Juxtapose the two - would the ponderous, hierarchical, Soviet-style Iraqi military be effective at suppressing irregular opponents in Texas? They would probably be aiming to "modularize" and gasping for a "population-centric" solution by now as well....

As for the swarming bit, I'm having trouble following it - is an area ambush a swarm? Satellite patrols? What's new about "spreading out"?

[Firn]

As for the swarming bit, I'm having trouble following it - is an area ambush a swarm? Satellite patrols? What's new about "spreading out"?

I think it means something different to a lot of people. Having read a bit about biological swarms, swarm intelligence and self organization I would argue that you can use it for a lot of things. For example:

Fish derive many benefits from shoaling behaviour including defense against predators (through better predator detection and by diluting the chance of capture), enhanced foraging success, and higher success in finding a mate. It is also likely that fish benefit from shoal membership through increased hydrodynamic efficiency.

Fish use many traits to choose shoalmates. Generally they prefer larger shoals, shoalmates of their own species, shoalmates similar in size and appearance to themselves, healthy fish, and kin (when recognized).

On the other hand:

The nasute soldiers of the neotropical termite Nasutitermes costalis function as scouts by exploring new terrain for food in advance of the worker caste and regulate foraging activity by laying trails composed of sternal gland pheromone. Additional soldiers are at first recruited in large numbers, and subsequently workers appear as the pheromone concentration increases. The role of the nasutes in the organization of foraging is extremely unusual for the soldier caste in social insects and appears to be a component of a foraging/defense system that controls the recruitment of foragers and effectively deters attacks by ants, the most fierce and important predators of termites.

In this swarms the self organization makes sure that termite soldiers get recruited through sophisticated communication, told the objective (food), the intent and to observe METT. By using a combination of stealth and saber they reach the objective, recruit immediatly huge reinforcements "to get there first with most", use the stronger form (defense) and chemical shots to fend off attacking ants, exploit their success and mount after the successful action a fighting retreat.

Only half-joking
Firn

[Dayuhan]

Was it? Or was it the Ba'athist political system that was more effective.

US forces seemed just as adept at crushing flare ups (Fallujah) as the Republican Guard. The Ba'athist Regime dealt with the day-to-day stuff and Paul Bremer and CPA Law simply could not.

Juxtapose the two - would the ponderous, hierarchical, Soviet-style Iraqi military be effective at suppressing irregular opponents in Texas? They would probably be aiming to "modularize" and gasping for a "population-centric" solution by now as well....

I'm not sure Saddam's effective suppression of internal dissent can be attributed purely to his "ponderous, hierarchical, Soviet-style military". Did he not also employ a quite ruthless internal security police, supported by an extensive network of informants? It would seem to me that the function of Saddam's military in suppressing actual regionally distinct instances of rebellion could be duplicated or improved by an effective occupying force, but that it would be difficult or impossible for a foreign power to replicate Saddam's internal security police, a considerable difference.