Forthcoming National Interest Article on COIN

[SteveMetz]

The editor butchered it.

[Ken White]

note your interesting corollary of flawed COIN efforts and our flawed cities.

The linkage that occurs to me is the US Congress...

[Gian P Gentile]

Ditto to what Ken said; very good piece.

I especially liked it because it places limits on what American military power can realistically accomplish. This is an especially important point for policy makers to consider.

But ref the other thread on Coin I still disagree with your premise that we should treat, when we do get involved in them, counterinusrgency wars as something other than war. I think that in so doing this you actually make it easier for policy makers to violate the analysis that you provide in this article because by telling people that it is not war but something else it somehow creates the idea that people wont die and it will be easy.

[Ken White]

. . .
...I think that in so doing this you actually make it easier for policy makers to violate the analysis that you provide in this article because by telling people that it is not war but something else it somehow creates the idea that people wont die and it will be easy.

Particularly since, from a national perspective, I suspect we are generally unwilling to support the length of time, political dexterity and depth of commitment required to prevail (as Steve does point out)...

And COIN is never easy; relatively simple as conflicts and the TTP go; yes. Easy; No, never.

[Ron Humphrey]

The editor butchered it.

I like the article overall and I can buy most of it.

I do have a question though about your statement regarding concerns of interference or puppetry by other large interests being unfounded or not having come to fruition.

Although it's true the whole world didn't go communist on us during the cold war there was quite a bit a expansion which was of issue, Right?

Also can we really say today that if we're not involved someone else won't get involved instead?

[SteveMetz]

I like the article overall and I can buy most of it.

I do have a question though about your statement regarding concerns of interference or puppetry by other large interests being unfounded or not having come to fruition.

Although it's true the whole world didn't go communist on us during the cold war there was quite a bit a expansion which was of issue, Right?

Also can we really say today that if we're not involved someone else won't get involved instead?

I can't think of a single successful communist insurgency during the Cold War that really threatened a vital national interest (excluding China).

But the point I was trying to make is that the strategic costs of extensive, protracted involvement in counterinsurgency outweigh the damage that a hostile regime can do to us. Put differently, we're good at regime removal but we're not so good at counterinsurgency. So rather than break our military and our budget on a counterinsurgency, we make a modest effort and, if it fails, we just go to the new regime and say, "If you do X, Y, and Z (e.g. support transnational terrorism or support insurgents trying to overthrow your neighbor), we will come in and remove you. Then we'll leave. But you will no longer be in power."

[Ron Humphrey]

I can't think of a single successful communist insurgency during the Cold War that really threatened a vital national interest (excluding China).

But the point I was trying to make is that the strategic costs of extensive, protracted involvement in counterinsurgency outweigh the damage that a hostile regime can do to us. Put differently, we're good at regime removal but we're not so good at counterinsurgency. So rather than break our military and our budget on a counterinsurgency, we make a modest effort and, if it fails, we just go to the new regime and say, "If you do X, Y, and Z (e.g. support transnational terrorism or support insurgents trying to overthrow your neighbor), we will come in and remove you. Then we'll leave. But you will no longer be in power."

If we look at South America wasn't the whole thing certain groups of leaders going after other groups of leaders in order to forestall expansion?
I'm afraid to go to much into detail considering I don't remember where I read what and when

I can go with the premise of establishing precedence to bring more bite to our bark though

[SteveMetz]

If we look at South America wasn't the whole thing certain groups of leaders going after other groups of leaders in order to forestall expansion?
I'm afraid to go to much into detail considering I don't remember where I read what and when

I can go with the premise of establishing precedence to bring more bite to our bark though

But in Latin America we eschewed massive direct involvement in counterinsurgency. We provided fairly significant counterinsurgency support. I have no problem with that. What I take issue with is reaching the conclusion that if a partner regime is not able to manage and execute a counterinsurgency campaign on its own, we'll come in and do it for them. What I'm suggesting is that a regime that is too incompetent or unpopular to defend itself is a bad bet. What we tend to do is demonize the insurgents so as to convince ourselves that this bad bet is worth making.

[Ron Humphrey]

But in Latin America we eschewed massive direct involvement in counterinsurgency. We provided fairly significant counterinsurgency support. I have no problem with that. What I take issue with is reaching the conclusion that if a partner regime is not able to manage and execute a counterinsurgency campaign on its own, we'll come in and do it for them. What I'm suggesting is that a regime that is too incompetent or unpopular to defend itself is a bad bet. What we tend to do is demonize the insurgents so as to convince ourselves that this bad bet is worth making.

I would think we're pretty much in agreement then.
Honestly I'm pretty sure the plans were never to go in and do what we are doing now, but you make a mess you have to clean it up, and any time there is major change in a countries leadership there is going to be a mess.

The overarching concern you have may be somewhat a moot point in the long run but I guess considering politics and its ability to screw things up it's probably good to get out the no-go recommendations ahead of time

[SteveMetz]

I would think we're pretty much in agreement then.
Honestly I'm pretty sure the plans were never to go in and do what we are doing now, but you make a mess you have to clean it up, and any time there is major change in a countries leadership there is going to be a mess.

The overarching concern you have may be somewhat a moot point in the long run but I guess considering politics and its ability to screw things up it's probably good to get out the no-go recommendations ahead of time

You're right there. I've kind of played around with that idea: with conventional war, there is usually a discrete decision point when the president can weight options and balance benefits against costs and risks. With counterinsurgency, there is seldom such a discrete decision point. We find ourselves enmeshed through a series of seemingly minor decisions.

What I'm trying to say is that I think we overestimate the strategic costs of disengagement. And we do ourselves a double disservice by this. It leads us to throw good money after bad. And, it takes away the incentive for our partner regime to undertake deep, hard reform. I'm convinced that one reason the government and military of El Salvador undertook the reform that allowed an eventual resolution of the conflict was because they were convinced that Congress would cut them off if they didn't. The elites in South Vietnam or Iraq never believed we'd walk away, so they refused to undertake reforms (which would have cost them in both power and money).

Phrased differently, we need a strategy of "tough love."

[Danny]

I have argued in the air power posts here at the forum and over comments to the blog entry by Major General Dunlap that the country never again will give us ten to twelve years to conduct COIN operations, although I was castigated for saying so.

http://www.captainsjournal.com/2007/...terinsurgency/

And I have also argued that timeliness was missing from the campaign, extending it and strengthening the insurgency to the point that we fueled the fire rather than extinguishing it.

http://www.captainsjournal.com/2006/...l-wars-manual/

The rest of your paper is interesting, and I am not per se commenting on it or your other theses or arguments in it. But I am mentioning that I agree in the superlative with you that the David Galula ten year COIN operation (these were not your words, they are mine and mine alone), while interesting, is an artifact of history. Professionals might like to think about it and train on it and read about it and wish for it -- but modern day America will never support a campaign through two and a half Presidential administrations. Things have changed too much. Pie in the sky, says I.

This is why I have been so interested in the campaign in Anbar (and in particular, Fallujah, Operation Alljah), because it has occurred as if on steroids -- in three years as opposed to ten.

[Granite_State]

I can't think of a single successful communist insurgency during the Cold War that really threatened a vital national interest (excluding China).

But the point I was trying to make is that the strategic costs of extensive, protracted involvement in counterinsurgency outweigh the damage that a hostile regime can do to us. Put differently, we're good at regime removal but we're not so good at counterinsurgency. So rather than break our military and our budget on a counterinsurgency, we make a modest effort and, if it fails, we just go to the new regime and say, "If you do X, Y, and Z (e.g. support transnational terrorism or support insurgents trying to overthrow your neighbor), we will come in and remove you. Then we'll leave. But you will no longer be in power."

But isn't "failed states" the new "WMD", the thing we're supposed to be most scared of? It's certainly become the main justification for why we're still in Iraq.

[slapout9]

I have argued in the air power posts here at the forum and over comments to the blog entry by Major General Dunlap that the country never again will give us ten to twelve years to conduct COIN operations, although I was castigated for saying so.

http://www.captainsjournal.com/2007/...terinsurgency/

And I have also argued that timeliness was missing from the campaign, extending it and strengthening the insurgency to the point that we fueled the fire rather than extinguishing it.

http://www.captainsjournal.com/2006/...l-wars-manual/

The rest of your paper is interesting, and I am not per se commenting on it or your other theses or arguments in it. But I am mentioning that I agree in the superlative with you that the David Galula ten year COIN operation (these were not your words, they are mine and mine alone), while interesting, is an artifact of history. Professionals might like to think about it and train on it and read about it and wish for it -- but modern day America will never support a campaign through two and a half Presidential administrations. Things have changed too much. Pie in the sky, says I.

This is why I have been so interested in the campaign in Anbar (and in particular, Fallujah, Operation Alljah), because it has occurred as if on steroids -- in three years as opposed to ten.

Funny you should mention that...at the SMART WARS and SMART STRATEGIES workshop I went to Colonel Warden made a big point of saying Strategy without time is no Strategy at all

[SteveMetz]

I have argued in the air power posts here at the forum and over comments to the blog entry by Major General Dunlap that the country never again will give us ten to twelve years to conduct COIN operations, although I was castigated for saying so.

http://www.captainsjournal.com/2007/...terinsurgency/

And I have also argued that timeliness was missing from the campaign, extending it and strengthening the insurgency to the point that we fueled the fire rather than extinguishing it.

http://www.captainsjournal.com/2006/...l-wars-manual/

The rest of your paper is interesting, and I am not per se commenting on it or your other theses or arguments in it. But I am mentioning that I agree in the superlative with you that the David Galula ten year COIN operation (these were not your words, they are mine and mine alone), while interesting, is an artifact of history. Professionals might like to think about it and train on it and read about it and wish for it -- but modern day America will never support a campaign through two and a half Presidential administrations. Things have changed too much. Pie in the sky, says I.

This is why I have been so interested in the campaign in Anbar (and in particular, Fallujah, Operation Alljah), because it has occurred as if on steroids -- in three years as opposed to ten.

What I've tried to suggest is that the public and Congress will tolerate about three years of major, direct involvement. It will tolerate a long period of advisory, support, and indirect involvement. To me that says we need to be able to really surge a massive capability quickly because the clock is running. In Iraq, we didn't get serious until the three year window of opportunity had passed.

My feeling on Dunlap's argument is that there is a lot of truth and value to it. My problems are: 1) it comes close to equating strategic success with servicing targets; 2) it as much a barely camouflaged ploy to retain service budget and force structure as it is a idea for a more effective American strategy.

I've literally screamed at my Army colleagues when they use the word "Army equities." I contend the Army has no business having "equities." That's like talking about the accounting department's "equities" in a corporation. I often suspect that idea would be met with utter comprehension within the Air Force.

[Rob Thornton]

I've literally screamed at my Army colleagues when they use the word "Army equities." I contend the Army has no business having "equities." That's like talking about the accounting department's "equities" in a corporation. I often suspect that idea would be met with utter comprehension within the Air Force.

Steve that is just plain scary, that combination of words has that business/short term investment feel to it that I hate and feels so at odds with everything else we say we stand for. I think that getting comfortable with terminology like that helps make politicians, appointees and perhaps others see this as a "business" and see us as "assets and liabilities". We should work to identify ourselves in terms that reflect how we want to be seen - maybe - people, leaders, soldiers, combat vehicles, weapons, etc. I'd prefer to be referred to as a "knuckle dragger" vs. and "equity" or a "share".

Best, Rob

[SteveMetz]

Steve that is just plain scary, that combination of words has that business/short term investment feel to it that I hate and feels so at odds with everything else we say we stand for. I think that getting comfortable with terminology like that helps make politicians, appointees and perhaps others see this as a "business" and see us as "assets and liabilities". We should work to identify ourselves in terms that reflect how we want to be seen - maybe - people, leaders, soldiers, combat vehicles, weapons, etc. I'd prefer to be referred to as a "knuckle dragger" vs. and "equity" or a "share".

Best, Rob

You'd be amazed at how often it comes up. And at very senior levels.

The Strategic Studies Institute has, over the years, been criticized for not "promoting Army equities." Every time I hear that I feel the need for a Howard Dean primal scream.

[Rank amateur]

But the point I was trying to make is that the strategic costs of extensive, protracted involvement in counterinsurgency outweigh the damage that a hostile regime can do to us. Put differently, we're good at regime removal but we're not so good at counterinsurgency. So rather than break our military and our budget on a counterinsurgency, we make a modest effort and, if it fails, we just go to the new regime and say, "If you do X, Y, and Z (e.g. support transnational terrorism or support insurgents trying to overthrow your neighbor), we will come in and remove you. Then we'll leave. But you will no longer be in power."

Nice to see my thoughts expressed by someone people might actually listen to. We might want to add, "Bomb the hell our of your palaces, party headquarters, army, secret police etc." Since new regimes will understand the US reluctance to take causalities, they are much less likely to call our bluff if we threaten bombing which we can do without causalities.

Phrased differently, we need a strategy of "tough love."

Thirty percent of the country is going to call that "cutting and running." How could we execute your recommendations in the current political environment?

[SteveMetz]

Thirty percent of the country is going to call that "cutting and running." How could we execute your recommendations in the current political environment?

Funny thing (well, not I mean funny like I'm a clown, not like I amuse you, I make you laugh) but I was just writing a section on that. I was arguing that President Bush seems inclined to a high risk/high potential payoff leadership style. In terms of the initial intervention in Iraq, he greatly overstated the certainty of his case. Since then, he has portrayed the only options in Iraq as "victory" or "cut and run."

But here's what I tried to suggest: our conundrum is that to get the public and Congress to support involvement in counterinsurgency in the first place, we have to overstate the threat and the extent of American interests. Americans don't want their sons and daughters dying for something that is peripheral. That then limits our strategic flexibility because it creates the impression that disengagement would be disastrous. It would be a defeat.

To me, that is just one more reason why the United States is ill equipped to undertake major counterinsurgency operations. My solution is that we no longer "do" counterinsurgency, but we do peace enforcement/stabilization. Two strategic and political advantages of that: it makes it easier to disengage when the costs exceed the expected benefits (while Clinton's withdrawal from Somalia and Reagan's withdrawal from Lebanon may, as commonly believed, give al Qaeda, Saddam Hussein and others the impression that the United States can be influenced by terrorism, they were probably the right moves). So long as we treat counterinsurgency as a variant of war, that means that one side (the side we support) is "right" and the other is "wrong." Americans don't like ties.

Second, casting the activity as peacekeeping/stabilization rather than counterinsurgency (with its Cold War overtones) will make it easier to attract multinational support.

[selil]

.....President Bush seems inclined to a high risk/high potential payoff leadership style. In terms of the initial intervention in Iraq, he greatly overstated the certainty of his case. Since then, he has portrayed the only options in Iraq as "victory" or "cut and run."

Steve are you actually Al Gore? I'm listening to "Assault on reason" on my 2 hour commute each way to school. He said almost those exact words... eeery. No moral or political value attached just scary.

[SteveMetz]

Steve are you actually Al Gore? I'm listening to "Assault on reason" on my 2 hour commute each way to school. He said almost those exact words... eeery. No moral or political value attached just scary.

No. Actually, he is me. A high school science project.

I got a "C."