Tunisia: catch all

[Bob's World]

...My guess -- and it is no more than that -- is that most of the Eastern European experience wil not be transferable to North Africa or the ME. Just as Malaysian and Indonesian Muslims differ and both those are quite different than the Arabs of the ME, geography and demographics shape destinies and attitudes.

For assessments of potential and / or predictions of possibilities and probabilities, great familiarity -- let me emphasize that 'great' -- with a region and its people will enable a reasonably astute prediction when coupled with quantitative and qualitative data whereas the date sets alone will not suffice. Passing familiarity (my two years in the ME or four in Korea for example) do not equip one to make competent judgments. It takes long experience with actually living in a culture to do that -- and all peoples separate into cultures...

That's the difficulty with even phenomenal brainpower as in Sachs and Shreve applied to people problems, they miss the nuances -- and cannot stand the quirks...

Ken, completely agree, and you have far more experience than most. Its pretty crazy how much sway a handful COIN experts have based on 1-2 tours to Iraq coupled with a little PhD work on the topic of western colonial COIN experience.

My only caveat to this is that most experts on cultures know very little about insurgency, which leads to equally flawed assessments of how things might play out. Now, I don't know how Arab cultures will respond to a very similar window of information empowered opportunity on a populace subjected to years of outside influenced controls, but I can contribute keen insights on the general dynamics of insurgency at the human nature level.

Too much of our current flawed approach to the war on terrorism is that we have relied too much on "cultural experts" who have made it far too much about religion; and on CT and COIN experts who have made far too much about a couple different families of tactics for addressing particular aspects of a problem, but not very good at addressing the larger drivers of the real problem. In fact, the main goal of my work is to provide a more effective theoretical framework for all of those experts to lend their expertise against.

It is not a pursuit for "the answer" is the pursuit for a more effective context. Counter culture, counter terror, and colonial intervention models dressed up as COIN just are not working. What amazes me is how many assume that they should.

(Oh, and to clear up a comment I made a couple days ago regarding a "Malaya in the Desert," what I meant was an opportunity to bring previously excluded members of the populace into full participation, coupled with the removal of overt and perceived external controls over that same political process. As I have stated elsewhere, I believe these are the factors that contributed most to the enduring stability of that nation and are what are missing in so many Middle Eastern nations that are flaring up today.)

[Ken White]

Its pretty crazy how much sway a handful COIN experts have based on 1-2 tours to Iraq coupled with a little PhD work on the topic of western colonial COIN experience.

I could have a lot of fun with the phrase "COIN experts" but that would be penny ante...

Agree. As I do with this:

My only caveat to this is that most experts on cultures know very little about insurgency, which leads to equally flawed assessments of how things might play out.

Absolutely. On this next one, though, I have a comment:

Too much of our current flawed approach to the war on terrorism is that we have relied too much on "cultural experts" who have made it far too much about religion; and on CT and COIN experts who have made far too much about a couple different families of tactics for addressing particular aspects of a problem, but not very good at addressing the larger drivers of the real problem.

I agree with the statement but would add that our (the Army's) ineptitude due to lack of doctrine and, more importantly, lack of training and acts of indiscipline in early days in Iraq and, to a lesser extent, in Afghanistan were partly due to the two factors you cite but were mostly simply the result of inadequate training and education on the part of most element -- of all components, branches and commands; everyone involved in decision making capacities. The cultural and the COIN mavens did not help, indeed, they possibly in some cases did more harm than good.

It is not a pursuit for "the answer" is the pursuit for a more effective context. Counter culture, counter terror, and colonial intervention models dressed up as COIN just are not working. What amazes me is how many assume that they should.

True. It is worrisome that too many in high places fail to understand that. Really worrisome.

As I have stated elsewhere, I believe these are the factors that contributed most to the enduring stability of that nation and are what are missing in so many Middle Eastern nations that are flaring up today.)

Also agree.

It does seem the Administration is finally starting to find its feet with respect to Egypt, I note multiple and synchronized calls for 'an orderly transition.'