the larger thrust of MAJ Smith's article. I suppose I got it intellectually (Lat. scio - I know) after a couple of months of reading posts here (including most of Smith's). I've been getting it emotionally (Lat. credo - I believe) more recently. You sum it well here.

from mikef
Niel’s article speaks for my generation of officers muddling through what seemed like a “new” form of warfare to us. We did not grow up with the mentorship of Vietnam vets in our outfits. We studied the “real” battlefields of the Fulda Gap.

In a sense, we were running backs focused on debating the merits of the “in and out” offense. Should we run directly up the middle or sweep outside? We measured success in terms of our yards per carry, perfecting the guard or tackle pull, and getting bigger, faster, and stronger. Creativity and innovation came with counters, options, and tight-end motions. In reality, executing a perfect tank gunnery or navigating through a successful NTC rotation was our Superbowl- how seemingly trivial in today's world. We busied ourselves with concern over uniform standards, minimizing DUI's, and carefully choreographing our USR scores.

Dusting off a Krepenivich or Galula book was like discovering a passing game. You mean the quarterback can throw the ball??? WTF??? First, we were mad at ourselves for not thinking about it first. Second, we were immensely frustrated to find out that this passing game had been around for hundreds of years. Why didn’t our coach tell us about this???
My reaction to the above (and this thread) was WTF happened within the Army to "Lessons Learned" after Vietnam ?

Brief explanation: I managed to educate myself pretty well about Korea and Vietnam - the key events of my pre-Baby Boomer cohort (born ca. 1925-1945). After the last chopper left the roof, I still kept up with Vietnam as books came out; but my focus shifted to SW Asia (primarily the terrorists) and Afghanistan (payback for Nam). Saw Gulf I under Bush I; and Gulf II under Bush II - and what can you say about the initial stage in each (A+). I realized we had a serious problem in Iraq when the National Museum was looted. As to the Army's system of continuing military education, naive me assumed that the small war aspects of Vietnam, Afghanistan, etc. were being taught and implemented as a significant part of every officer's education and training. If I was reading this small wars stuff, I assumed the nabobs were also reading it - even if their primary commitment was to more conventional warfare. I guess not so.

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Still it was hard for me to believe that the Army (as an institution) could be that stupid. But, when Smith (in a post a couple of months ago - not sure of exactly when) used the term "criminal negligence" causing deaths, I thought: "Pretty damn strong words, boyo." Words that would not be lightly used by a serving officer, unless he really believed them. And, others here agreed. Anyway, there is daylight in this swamp (JMM).

Brief comment on "criminal negligence": Before writing this in draft on my wp, I did seriously search through MCM 2008 for all instances of negligence. The sole question was this - can I find a UCMJ provision under which I could mount a plausible prosecution (assuming arguendo that I could somehow determine which "someones" to prosecute). The answer is that there is not; not even under Art. 134. So, my unsolicited legal advice is to avoid charging "criminal negligence", at least publically. The rest of the facts should be powerful enough to carry your case - and, if not, hyperbole will not be of any help.

PS: - we are getting our first snow of the year (just a few inches). So, tomorrow the hillside should be nice and white - a Grandma Moses view.

I'll be back later with more blah-blah on learning methodology; where with some better definition of terms and explanations, we might actually end up with a synthesis. Mike's point seemed to deserve more primacy.