They are, and I applaud their use of UW where appropriate, but I think the article makes a number of mistakes imputing Putin's reasoning based on our reaction.
Was that really a faint, or was it the back-up plan in case additional assistance was required?For its intervention in Crimea, the Russians used a so-called snap military exercise to distract attention and hide their preparations.
I believe that is imputing motivation based on the results.While the Kremlin retains the option of mounting a large-scale intervention in eastern Ukraine, the immediate purposes of the air and ground forces massed near Ukraine appears to be to deter the Ukrainian military from cracking down in the east and to dissuade the United States from providing substantial military support.
We tend to see what we think is there rather than what is there.
My second point is that, while the UW strategy used was effective, it has limited utility outside of this situation. It would not work in locations without a substantial sympathetic population. The artilce both makes that point and avoids it.
UW is a tactic that requires some depth of knowledge about the human domain. So, without an accurate assessment of the sentiment of the local population, something we are not good at, UW should probably not be seen as a magic bullet. That said, it is a very powerful tactic in the right situation.Admiral Stavridis agreed that Russia’s strategy would be most effective when employed against a nation with a large number of sympathizers. But he said that Russia’s deft use of cyberwarfare, special forces and conventional troops was a development that NATO needed to study and factor into its planning.
“In all of those areas they have raised their game, and they have integrated them quite capably,” he said. “And I think that has utility no matter where you are operating in the world.”
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