Re-structuring the BCT

[Fuchs]

Recce/scouts/whatever tied to Bn/Rgt/Bde can only cover a small radius around those units/formations adequately. They cannot scout ahead in a two-hour-march radius before the HQ has decided on the direction of the march.

The availability of eyes and fists ahead is important - and any such lack reduces the mobile warfare proficiency (especially the agility of command and formations). Stumbling around blindly is no fun when the pinata is aiming a gun at you.

Recce attached to divisions was OK in WW2 when recce had top speed of 60-80 km/h, tanks of 40 and infantry on foot ... well, you get the point.
Recce hasn't this speed advantage any more. We've used all-motorised forces since 1940 (UK), 1944 (U.S.) or 1955 (Germany). We need a new concept for recce.

Let me emphasis the recce-shall-already-be-in-place-before-a-formation-knows-it-want-to-move-to-that-place point.
This becomes as impractical for individual formations just as city walls have become impractical for city garrisons with ever-larger artillery ranges. They gave way for front lines (a higher level effort) that provided all cities with a defensive line that was shorter than the sum of city walls of a single province.
Defensive lines are about circumference; 2*pi*r. The area to be covered by recce is about circular area; r*r*pi. It grows much faster.
If nothing else, geometry and history tell us that we have a defect with our force structure.

Recce should be a corps-level job today (this is unlikely to become visible in our smallish training exercises). The combat units and formations use vanguard, security elements and if need be they can feel for a short range with a recce team. This is the "keep eyes open" part of the job. The real recce should be a Corps thing and should provide ~90% of the non-combat info on the enemy.
We should give the Corps several Cavalry Regiments of several autonomous companies ("squadrons" if you want) each and a LRS Bn or Rgt.

One more year and I might be finished with a 50-200 pages effort that's in part built on this assertion of mine.

From said study:

I hope it didn't take that study to point out something so blindingly obvious!

Question: If you are advancing to contact, why do you need reconnaissance?

It's actually not that obvious, but rather depends on assumptions.

This point can actually lead to another discussion of manoeuvre à priori/command push vs. manoeuvre à posteriori/recon pull.
Recce ahead loses some importance if you use the latter.

There's also the thing whose name I always forget; attacking an enemy ASAP to catch him unread to fight. Military history suggests that this can work extremely fine if you use the right forces.
Actually, Rommel drove over a French division on a road with a fraction of his Panzer-Division (about a third of it; he lead the vanguard, Vorausabteilung) simply because said division was resting along a road and didn't expect attackers, being 30+ km behind the front that was penetrated only a few hours before.

The quote from the study was actually rather context (NTC) specific and probably only right in ~80% of all cases.
A weak recce ahead (that needs to be sent ahead because it's not already in place!) can sometimes provide more early warning to the enemy than to yourself and waste your time.