North Korea: 2012-2016

[Surferbeetle]

Interesting you mention Germany and Japan. More interesting may be their pay back -- when it occurs.

A few score for Germany, whatever it takes for the far more patient Japan to include "hundreds." Both with the caveat that time will cure some of that as the world modifies and anger fades, thus the desire and thus the capability will diminish over time but either would take advantage of any opportunity or weakness to achieve to offset their known population decline which will adversely affect their ability for payback which a good many in both nations think is deserved.

The capabilities of the human animal are constant irrespective of place of origin however culture, as I have argued elsewhere, is very tough to change. You pose some sharp questions Ken which are interesting to think about. Having spent over a decade in Europe, and being a firm believer in the positive effects of the US melting pot, I will say up front that IMHO this scenario is very, very unlikely at this point in history.

For the sake of thinking about it however, and with respect to Germany in particular, I would in turn ask you a Slapout & JMM based question: does Motive, Means, and Opportunity exist for this to occur?

With respect to an important aspect of motive, will, this mornings english news was interesting and is starting to pick up on a theme that has been running in the german news for a few weeks now. From the BBC: Germans question Afghan war

German military involvement abroad is extremely unpopular back home - and becoming more disliked all the time.

According to the most recent polls, almost 70% of Germans now want their troops to pull out of Afghanistan.

But why are Germans so reluctant to send their troops into foreign combat?

"You have to go back a bit in German history, to the obvious place: the Second World War," said Mr Posener.

"We didn't only lose the war, in no uncertain terms. We were told it was our fault, and we were paying."

After half a century being told by the international community to be a non-threatening pacifist nation, Germany is now under pressure to become an effective military partner.

"Germans have had a hard time adjusting to all these mind-set changes that they are supposed to go through," said Mr Posener.

"Now we're supposed to flick a switch and suddenly be proud of our military heroes again."

Trade-wise what could be lost? US trade with Germany is reported as 3.7 billion USD per month by Wolfram Alpha.

If we assume, inaccurately, that expenditures alone determine the quality and capability of a fighting force Germany's military expenditures are reported as 41.8 billion USD per year while US military expenditures are reported as 503.4 billion USD per year. The potential military age population counts are 30.96 million vs 118.6 million (Germany:US) data again by Wolfram Alpha.

Orange Dave, I am not an Asia expert however, North Korea has been in the news of late:

From the BBC: In pictures: Burma's tunnel network

From the Sydney Morning Herald: Burma’s nuclear secrets

[Ken White]

...You pose some sharp questions Ken which are interesting to think about. Having spent over a decade in Europe, and being a firm believer in the positive effects of the... I will say up front that IMHO this scenario is very, very unlikely at this point in history.

Somehow, you frequently miss my conditional statements...

"... Both with the caveat that time will cure some of that as the world modifies and anger fades, thus the desire and [strike]thus[/strike] the capability will diminish over time but either would take advantage of any opportunity or weakness to achieve (payback) to offset their known population decline which will adversely affect their ability for (the) payback which a good many in both nations think is deserved." (emphasis, strikeout and 'payback' and 'the' added / kw)

Note also the time periods I stated; Germany is more likely to drop the idea of getting even before Japan. Ergo, given no major stumbles on our part, you may be right. You could be right with major stumbles on our part...

We'll see.

P.S.
Sorry for all the errors -- old fingers...

[George L. Singleton]

The educated youth of both Germany and Japan are several generations deep now and all is well indeed.

[orange dave]

Are you implying that Nixon's move was the sole cause of China's "start down the path of development"? I think you might find on examination that there was a good more to it than that.

Necessary but not sufficient. That put them in a position to open up; they still needed a competent leader who could understand their situation and take advantage of it, which didn't happen until Deng.

Japan was a developed industrial power well before the US got involved...

If you go back further, the precursor to Japanese development was the 'black ships' incident - which was taken as no less than a full US invasion.

On a political - not to mention personal - level, interactions between Eastern and Western cultures often involve the Western party putting themselves in a position high on the social hierarchy, without even realizing it. I see these crossed expectations all the time in my interactions with various Asians. The Asian side thinks that the Westerners were going to be more responsible with their power, while the Westerners think the Asians really were that enthusiastic about whatever.

[Dayuhan]

I'm not at all sure that the inevitable US recognition of China's existence qualifies as a precondition for Chinese development.

I think we can certainly agree that NE Asian nations have in the last century had increasing contact with the US and the West in general, and that they have subsequently made substantial economic progress. I'm not at all sure that one can legitimately deduce from this that American action is necessary to bring North Korea back into the community of nations.

30 years in Asia have left me very wary of statements that begin with "The Asian side thinks...", and 50 years on the planet have left me wary of anything that purports to be "a permanent solution" to any problem.

[orange dave]

China wasn't going to split with Russia publicly unless it got something for its troubles. The US was Taiwan's main source of legitimacy, and Taiwan was China's biggest foreign policy objective. So without some movement on that issue, there never would have been a Sino-Soviet split. And without capitalism, there never would have been economic development. So the only way I can see for economic development without movement on Taiwan would have been if China somehow developed a capitalist system without splitting with the Soviet Union - which makes for an interesting counterfactual history exercise.

So I'm still not willing to concede this point on China. However, in the analogy to North Korea, the Soviet Union isn't forcing them to do anything, so the point is potentially moot anyway.

[Dayuhan]

China wasn't going to split with Russia publicly unless it got something for its troubles. The US was Taiwan's main source of legitimacy, and Taiwan was China's biggest foreign policy objective. So without some movement on that issue, there never would have been a Sino-Soviet split.

Are you suggesting that Nixon's visit enabled the Chinese to split with the Soviets? Given that the Sino-Soviet split occurred well before the visit, this hardly seems a defensible proposition.

I would think that China's move toward capitalism had more to do with the gradual dying off of the Mao-era communist hardliners and the rise of a more pragmatic generation looking for a more viable economic model than it did with Nixon's visit. The Nixon encounter was one step on China's road to emergence, but to call it the cause of that emergence is a major stretch and would need a good deal of support.

[Backwards Observer]

Somewhat related to the Confucian theme, Fareed Zakaria interview with Senior Minister (and Hakka Godfather), Lee Kuan Yew.

Let me be frank; if we did not have the good points of the West to guide us, we wouldn't have got out of our backwardness. We would have been a backward economy with a backward society. But we do not want all of the West.

Culture Is Destiny (1994) from the Lee Kuan Yew Website.

His pick for one of the West's crowning achievements: The Air-Conditioner.

TimeAsia Mini-Profile (1999)

Majulah Singapura! (and thanks for all the aircons, lah)

[Dayuhan]

I'd certainly agree that the Western example and direct exposure to Western ways were critical elements in Asia's emergence... but to jump from there to the conclusion that direct Western interference is necessary for an Asian nation to emerge seems to me a difficult proposition to support, and potentially a recipe for trouble.

[Backwards Observer]

...but to jump from there to the conclusion that direct Western interference is necessary for an Asian nation to emerge seems to me a difficult proposition to support, and potentially a recipe for trouble.

Okay, but can we still keep the air-conditioners?

[Dayuhan]

Okay, but can we still keep the air-conditioners?

If you're in Asia you probably make the air conditioners, and then lend America the money to buy 'em with...

[Backwards Observer]

The system works! Don't spend it all in one place.

[orange dave]

Well, so I got that timeline wrong. The Sino-Soviet split was in the '60's, Nixon's diplomacy in the '70's. He he, nobody look at me. :-|

However, restricting this argument to Japan, rather than all of Asia, there is still one more data point which I haven't mentioned (and I double checked the timeline on this.) Their 'lost decade' - not just a decade, but heralding a long-term decline in their power - was preceded by an international currency intervention, the Plaza accord. While this wasn't necessarily against Japan's will, it was led by the US, and thus still follows this theme of foreign events dictating Japan's internal political situation.

So, in short, Japanese colonial ambitions can be traced back to the unequal "Treaty of Amity and Commerce" from 1858, which was an American attempt at colonialism (even if feeble by European standards.) After their defeat in WWII, Japan put their economy into overdrive - at the bequest of the US. Finally, when outside economies (led by the US) expressed discomfort at how hot Japan's economy was, Japan figured they had done all they needed to in terms of war reparations, and they've kind of let things drift since then.

So this explains Japan; however without China this theory isn't be consistent enough to generalize to North Korea. Assuming Japan is unique as an Asian country can at least help explain why Japanese re-armament is such a potent issue in the region though. We can threaten to encourage them to rearm in order to keep other countries in the region in line (particularly China, to use against North Korea, because North Korea themselves won't respond rationally.) Sort of like our relations with Israel, our relations with Japan can set the tone for our dealings with everyone else in the (respective) regions. In fact, in my view, it's possible to draw some strong parallels between these two parts of the world: Japan is equivalent to Israel; North Korea is equivalent to al-Qaeda, and the rest of East Asia is equivalent to moderate Islam. The connection between these two parts of the world, as I see it, is the US, which sees both Japan and Israel as its post-WWII responsibilities.

Having made this connection that US policy in the Middle East and East Asia is colonialism, some interesting ideas present themselves. These regions are too divided to mount an effective resistance a la India to Britain, so there is no vulnerability there. So we could keep the status quo; on the other hand we could also make this argument in order to withdraw from the Middle East process. (This perceived responsibility could potentially be a vulnerability, because there will never be a settlement which will satisfy the Palestinian side, and being in charge of the process simply moves the bulls-eye from Israel to us.) If China can manage the North Korean situation responsibly, then the US can be proactive about Japan not re-arming; and by the same token if the parties in the Middle East expect the US to find a solution, they will never learn to solve problems on their own. The term 'colonialism' is enough of an anathema to everyone that its use will stir immediate opposition, if a coherent argument can be made for its use. Solutions for the Middle East conflict and the problems on the Korean peninsula don't necessarily have to be made piecemeal. With some creative historical reinterpretations, it's possible not only to kill two birds with one stone, but make each individual solution stronger as well. Getting both of these international sub-systems to govern themselves without American help would allow us more flexibility to prepare for new kinds of threats; and also reduce the chances of us screwing things up and being held politically viable.

Really I'm just throwing some thoughts around - I don't know if this is any more viable than any of the other ideas I've had. If this methodology can produce ten bad ideas and one good one, it's still a useful exercise.

[Dayuhan]

However, restricting this argument to Japan, rather than all of Asia, there is still one more data point which I haven't mentioned (and I double checked the timeline on this.) Their 'lost decade' - not just a decade, but heralding a long-term decline in their power - was preceded by an international currency intervention, the Plaza accord. While this wasn't necessarily against Japan's will, it was led by the US, and thus still follows this theme of foreign events dictating Japan's internal political situation.

I still think you're overestimating the impact of external influence on Japan's internal politics. The Plaza Accord was an international intervention in support of the US economy (trying to deflate an overvalued dollar that was contributing to an unsustainable balance of payments deficit), and while the subsequent increase in the value of the yen was arguably one of the causes of the later Japanese asset bubble, it was certainly not the only or the primary cause. Japan's asset bubble and subsequent economic troubles did not take place in a vacuum - nothing does, these days - but it cannot be attributed to external intervention, certainly not to intentional action from an external source.

After their defeat in WWII, Japan put their economy into overdrive - at the bequest of the US. Finally, when outside economies (led by the US) expressed discomfort at how hot Japan's economy was, Japan figured they had done all they needed to in terms of war reparations, and they've kind of let things drift since then.

So this explains Japan...

Again, I don't think it does fully "explain Japan". Certainly the US wanted to see Japan succeed economically, but the Japanese of course wanted the same thing, for their own reasons. The US may have helped Japan get started, but the Japanese economic boom was ultimately a product of Japanese action, much assisted by a culture that stresses hard work and discipline. As we've all seen elsewhere, US action or desire alone cannot produce economic development.

China this theory isn't be consistent enough to generalize to North Korea. Assuming Japan is unique as an Asian country can at least help explain why Japanese re-armament is such a potent issue in the region though. We can threaten to encourage them to rearm in order to keep other countries in the region in line (particularly China, to use against North Korea, because North Korea themselves won't respond rationally.)

I'm not sure that would work. The Japanese make their own decisions for their own reasons, and if there was ever a time when the US could "use Japan" as a leverage point, that time is long past.

In fact, in my view, it's possible to draw some strong parallels between these two parts of the world: Japan is equivalent to Israel; North Korea is equivalent to al-Qaeda, and the rest of East Asia is equivalent to moderate Islam. The connection between these two parts of the world, as I see it, is the US, which sees both Japan and Israel as its post-WWII responsibilities.

The comparison is IMO a bit strained... Japan may have been a US responsibility at the close of WW2, but that ended decades ago.

Having made this connection that US policy in the Middle East and East Asia is colonialism

Is US policy in the Middle East and East Asia colonialism? How so? I'm not sure the connection is supportable.

Getting both of these international sub-systems to govern themselves without American help would allow us more flexibility to prepare for new kinds of threats; and also reduce the chances of us screwing things up and being held politically viable.

Really I'm just throwing some thoughts around - I don't know if this is any more viable than any of the other ideas I've had. If this methodology can produce ten bad ideas and one good one, it's still a useful exercise.

With this I agree... but America is no more able to get these areas to "govern themselves without American help" than it is able to govern these areas itself. As far as North Korea goes, I think the 6-party format, cumbersome as it is, is probably the only viable approach. China has more leverage than anyone, but they will use that leverage as they see fit, and the ability of the US to influence those decisions is very limited. Fortunately China's trade-driven prosperity has moved them into the position of a status quo power with little interest in rocking any regional boats.

I don't think North Korea is controllable. I do think the situation is manageable, though the management will not be entirely satisfactory. Their nuclear capacity is subject to deterrence, and their perennial shortages of food and fuel are a point of vulnerability that can be exploited. Internal political change will come, but it will be internally driven and it could take a long time (or it may not; we don't know). I don't see any external action that is likely to accelerate the process.

[George L. Singleton]

I don't think North Korea is controllable. I do think the situation is manageable, though the management will not be entirely satisfactory. Their nuclear capacity is subject to deterrence, and their perennial shortages of food and fuel are a point of vulnerability that can be exploited. Internal political change will come, but it will be internally driven and it could take a long time (or it may not; we don't know). I don't see any external action that is likely to accelerate the process.

I worked in the Japan Section of the Asia Dept., old Manufactuers Hanover Trust Co. in NYC, while doing my night school MBA at NYU at bank expense, while doing 2 lunch seminars on both domestic and international credit every week, being aide de camp to the then President of MHTCo. to the World Bank/IMF Annual Conference in 1969 held in D.C.

This self serving b. s. is said to say that I think, as I have written here before, than mainland China, still being politically a communist governance system, is the most akin model for N. Korea to follows.

N. Korea could start by setting up a free trade zone with S. Korea on one side, and another such free trade zone on the China side, and offer to set up a third N. Korean free trade zone, if welcomed to do so, in Japan!

You need to think outside the box, and stop trying to reinvent the classical Japan and German post WW II models which can't work for N. Korea, ever, my view.

[orange dave]

I still think you're overestimating the impact of external influence on Japan's internal politics. The Plaza Accord was an international intervention in support of the US economy (trying to deflate an overvalued dollar that was contributing to an unsustainable balance of payments deficit), and while the subsequent increase in the value of the yen was arguably one of the causes of the later Japanese asset bubble, it was certainly not the only or the primary cause. Japan's asset bubble and subsequent economic troubles did not take place in a vacuum - nothing does, these days - but it cannot be attributed to external intervention, certainly not to intentional action from an external source.

But you have to see things in their broader context here. For instance, if we're talking about the current financial crisis, one could certainly point to internal faults in America's financial regulatory system, and various sorts of internal economic imbalances. Any analysis that left out America's trade balance with China, and their threatening America's hegemonic status, though, would be lacking. My view, in both cases, is that while the external may not be a trigger for anything, it provides the context, or the backdrop, for everything else.

I don't think North Korea is controllable. I do think the situation is manageable, though the management will not be entirely satisfactory. Their nuclear capacity is subject to deterrence,

If we're talking about the North nuking Seoul, yeah. However, the scenario the North Koreans are talking about is giving the nuclear technology away to terrorists, who could then use it against the US at a time of their convenience. Now, one strategy might be to declare to the North Koreans that if anybody nukes the US, we will hold them accountable if we think it originally came from them. Even without judicial hurdles, I don't see this strategy as being particularly effective, though, because our intelligence would still never be good enough. Oh, and if they hadn't yet nuked Souel, then they would then just as retribution. So deterrence isn't going to be nearly as effective as it was during the Cold War.

and their perennial shortages of food and fuel are a point of vulnerability that can be exploited.

Again, not really. For the US to do so would open it up to charges of using food to gain political favor. More practically, the US can never prevent other countries from stepping into the gap - particularly China.

As to the question of what degree of control the US still has over Japan - they are still a pacifist country, and the US is committed to defending them against foreign threats. The US obviously can't just give them orders, but it can work more subtly for or against their interests, in order to influence how much they trust us in general.

And for Israel, my argument is just an extension of the notion the the US is always protecting Western Europe - very popular at certain points in the political cycle. Just include Israel in the grouping of 'Europe,' and substitute another term for 'protecting,' and you've got yourself a new perspective.

[Dayuhan]

This self serving b. s. is said to say that I think, as I have written here before, than mainland China, still being politically a communist governance system, is the most akin model for N. Korea to follows.

N. Korea could start by setting up a free trade zone with S. Korea on one side, and another such free trade zone on the China side, and offer to set up a third N. Korean free trade zone, if welcomed to do so, in Japan!

North Korea certainly could follow this model, if they chose to... but they don't choose to, and there's not a lot we can do to change that. It will change, when there is change in the North Korean government, and I personally think that can only come from inside.

[Dayuhan]

But you have to see things in their broader context here. For instance, if we're talking about the current financial crisis, one could certainly point to internal faults in America's financial regulatory system, and various sorts of internal economic imbalances. Any analysis that left out America's trade balance with China, and their threatening America's hegemonic status, though, would be lacking. My view, in both cases, is that while the external may not be a trigger for anything, it provides the context, or the backdrop, for everything else.

I'm not convinced that China "threatening America's hegemonic status" is a major issue here. It looks to me that China's emergence as a trading power of increasing prosperity is moving China's national interest closer to, rather than farther from, that of the US, especially where issues like North Korea are concerned. To put it simply, regional instability is bad for business, and China needs to do business. They've little interest in rocking the boat; the status quo is running rather nicely for them.

I'm not trying to say that external events have no impact on North Korea, I'm trying to say that the impact of any given event is likely to be extremely unpredictable, and that any external effort to influence North Korea is likely to be ineffectual and filled with possibilities for unintended consequences. I don't see any action that the US could take - especially unilaterally - that would be likely to have much positive impact.

For the US to do so would open it up to charges of using food to gain political favor. More practically, the US can never prevent other countries from stepping into the gap - particularly China.

I didn't say that the US could unilaterally exploit North Korea's perennial shortages of food and fuel. That would have to take place in the context of a regional sanctions package emerging from the 6-party format. It's clumsy, but it's necessary: it's a regional issue and requires a regional strategy.

As to the question of what degree of control the US still has over Japan - they are still a pacifist country, and the US is committed to defending them against foreign threats. The US obviously can't just give them orders, but it can work more subtly for or against their interests, in order to influence how much they trust us in general.

The US works for US interests, Japan works for Japanese interests. Where North Korea is concerned, those interests coincide to a large degree, as do those of other regional powers. That's why the 6-party format exists. The parties may have numerous areas of disagreement elsewhere, but none of them want to see conflict in the Korean peninsula.

And for Israel, my argument is just an extension of the notion the the US is always protecting Western Europe - very popular at certain points in the political cycle. Just include Israel in the grouping of 'Europe,' and substitute another term for 'protecting,' and you've got yourself a new perspective.

Against whom does the US protect Europe these days?

A new perspective, possibly... but I'm not sure how well supported that perspective is, or what practical solutions it produces.

[George L. Singleton]

Dayuhan:

1. North Korea can't be left to make it's foreign exchange by sales of atomic bomb technology and missles to dangerous third world nations in this time of our war on terrorism.

2. Change change as you refer to it even in mainland China has not come even in it's Communist form of government, with problems today in Tibete and other far side of China areas which are majority Muslim Chinese population.

3. The raw ideas I have pushed including with this follow up note three times now can begin with:
a) China offering to finance and help N. Korea set up it's free trade zone on the Chinese border, in which items to be manufacturered (future tense) would come out of plants China would finance for N. Korea to build and opeate, "start up bridge money" to jump start an entprenaural zone between N. Korea, China, and other nations from that same free zone.
b) South Korea could offer the same thing, to bridge loan N. Korea the funds to set up a free trade zone, same model.
c) Japan could off ther same thin, to bridge loan N. Korea the funds to set up a free trade zone model.

Or, China, South Korea, and Japan, even perhaps the US, might form a loan consortium whose loan terms and conditions would create the "will and the plan" that would get "whoever the top decision makers are" now or in the near term future with personality changes allegedly around the corner if the top leader of N. Korea is terminally ill as some alledge, but if not terminally ill, there is no reason why such a consortium package should not be appealing to him and his top miliary folks, who, after all, would become as are the top Chinese government and military officials, fairly soon "economic haves" while still running as Communist government, as China still does.

Change is driven economically, not in a raw military or dictatorial sense.

They key out in the open in what I am suggesting here is to have clean cut, straight forward, no hidden agendas, a business plan the consortium lenders would require of any nation, anywhere, as has been the case currently, for instance, in Vietnam.

Let's talk about this...I have noticed some writing here recently who probably know more ecnomics and finance than I do...so I happily yield the floor for them to take this further, refine it as they see fit, whatever.

Thanks for your acknowledgement of my rough idea which I hope is better spelled out now. You might also look at today's Libya since they renounced nuclear weapons and what and how their business model is and how it came about...while we hear little about Libya it is a model of a different nature in and of itself now.

[orange dave]

I'm not convinced that China "threatening America's hegemonic status" is a major issue here. It looks to me that China's emergence as a trading power of increasing prosperity is moving China's national interest closer to, rather than farther from, that of the US, especially where issues like North Korea are concerned. To put it simply, regional instability is bad for business, and China needs to do business. They've little interest in rocking the boat; the status quo is running rather nicely for them.

This is a tangent, but I just want to say that I didn't say they were "rocking the boat." Just that their sheer weight, and what people project it to be in the future, has caused some creaks and groans as the system has struggled to cope.

I'm not trying to say that external events have no impact on North Korea, I'm trying to say that the impact of any given event is likely to be extremely unpredictable, and that any external effort to influence North Korea is likely to be ineffectual and filled with possibilities for unintended consequences. I don't see any action that the US could take - especially unilaterally - that would be likely to have much positive impact.

That's why we need to be thinking in terms of 'dual use.' Policies that would be good in their own right, but could also shape things in this part of the world to our benefit. This, incidentally, would take care of the unilateral part, as we can advertise the first use to our allies.

I didn't say that the US could unilaterally exploit North Korea's perennial shortages of food and fuel. That would have to take place in the context of a regional sanctions package emerging from the 6-party format. It's clumsy, but it's necessary: it's a regional issue and requires a regional strategy.

Are you (or the 6 parties) really going to be willing or able to stop anyone from donating food? NGO's? Anyone else who wants to cultivate their 'good guy, anti-American' image?

George Singleton: You've basically delineated the Chinese approach, applied to North Korea. That's probably the closest historical precedent; however it can't be applied exactly. North Korea is probably near rock-bottom at the moment, with its agricultural problems. China's free trade didn't start until decades after their Great Leap Forward disaster. The first step for North Korea, therefore, would be to fix these agricultural problems. I don't know too much about their source, but letting in foreign experts to survey the problem, and heeding their recommendations - however politically incorrect - may be a good start. These advisors could also confirm that any aid we decide to give them actually makes it to the proper places. NK can't be expected to produce goods for foreign trade when their traditional systems of domestic production are dysfunctional. (Incidentally, this sentiment coincides with their 'juche' philosophy of extreme self-reliance, and thus may be more saleable to a North Korean audience.)

But that's what the N Koreans can do, and what they will decide on their own time. The bigger question is what we can do, now.