Selective Use of History in the Development of American COIN Doctrine

[William F. Owen]

It always appears to me that the only people abusing history are those with something to sell. MW and EBO both used very bad history to try and sell their wears. I see the COIN agenda as no different.

If you read military/strategic history in both depth and breadth, you really see nothing new, in terms of basic form. Wars and rebellions flow from the politics of their time. Until someone stands up and admits that the Army should ALWAYS have been skilled at irregular war, and nothing has changed, we will make little progress.
The end of the Cold War should have been a far more seismic shock to the World's Armies that 911.

[Schmedlap]

If you read military/strategic history in both depth and breadth, you really see nothing new, in terms of basic form. Wars and rebellions flow from the politics of their time.

I'm definitely in agreement with you there, but I wonder what chance this argument has of talking the cult members out of the cult, or at least pumping the kool-aid out of their stomachs.

Until someone stands up and admits that the Army should ALWAYS have been skilled at irregular war, and nothing has changed, we will make little progress.

I don't see that happening until the flaws of pop-COIN in Afghanistan can be thoroughly discredited to a degree that most people with an interest in the topic can comprehend. Sadly, I don't think we're there yet.

[William F. Owen]

I'm definitely in agreement with you there, but I wonder what chance this argument has of talking the cult members out of the cult, or at least pumping the kool-aid out of their stomachs.

None. - which is why I try and avoid cult members - and agenda monkeys!!

I don't see that happening until the flaws of pop-COIN in Afghanistan can be thoroughly discredited to a degree that most people with an interest in the topic can comprehend. Sadly, I don't think we're there yet.

Agree, but I don't think they ever will be. There is a huge emotional need to believe in the solution, as all things good will be part of the solution in the eyes of those adhering to POP-Coin.

[iveschris]

Gentile himself uses history selectively to beat the too-much-COIN drum. One common theme rooted in history that influenced the French in their wars to preserve their fading empire and the US in Iraq by the early 2000s was defeat or near defeat: both were losing. Establishing context - like a zeal for practical solutions fired by losing - is a critical historical task and seems rarely to make into history-using TTPs.

Much of the American work on COIN until recently was actually explain-the-defeat history of second wave Vietnam War historiography. Much of that history concluded the US Army got the war wrong because it didn't "do" COIN right. The French school, if you will, was one place to start. But what of that American school represented by Andrew Krepinevich's The Army in Vietnam? Fast forward to the most recent works of Andrade, Birtle, and Moyar that argue that maybe the previous conclusions about the army in Vietnam were wrong.

One reason the army's COIN-manual writing team had to work fast (and accuracy often suffers when speed has become necessary) was the intellectual voids left by the army in terms of doctrine and honest historical inquiry into small wars in the shadow of the perceived failures in Vietnam. Those voids speak to larger issues of both intellectual intensity and PME as well as the long-discussed role of military history in PME.

[Bob's World]

People use phrases like "that's Maoist insurgency" the same way they use phrases like "that's a good tactical approach, but is not strategic." Both are typically phrases meaning nothing intended solely to undermine the position of their opponent.

Insurgency is insurgency; many tactics can be applied, but the root causes are pretty damn constant. Address the root causes and the counterinsurgent will prevail, ignore the root causes and the counterinsurgent will either fall into a cycle of re-occurring insurgency or will lose.

Did the majority of the COIN crowd draw the wrong conclusions from Galula's work? Probably. Population-Centric COIN is too focused on sad attempts to buy the populaces support while keeping the offending government in power; rather than on addressing the problems of governance and supporting the populaces right and duty to stand up to despotism.

COL Gentile makes some valid points that should be listened to. We need a US military that is fully prepared to deter major state-based threats and to deal with warfare. Insurgency really isn't warfare at all, and as such, COIN should be a supporting mission for the military that falls in the category with the rest of MSCA.

When we do, however, get drawn into the insurgencies of others, we will indeed need some unique capabilities, authorities and funding to engage. We also need a new COIN manual that is based on a clearer understanding of Insurgency than the current one.

[William F. Owen]

One reason the army's COIN-manual writing team had to work fast (and accuracy often suffers when speed has become necessary) was the intellectual voids left by the army in terms of doctrine and honest historical inquiry into small wars in the shadow of the perceived failures in Vietnam. Those voids speak to larger issues of both intellectual intensity and PME as well as the long-discussed role of military history in PME.

Well there is considerable debate as to why they even had to write a COIN Manual. Why was it needed? Did it actually make any difference? The British Army never produced a COIN manual. They had theatre doctrine. It worked and worked well. Only now, are they sadly writing COIN-doctrine and it's a mess.
I submit that there was no intellectual void when it comes to "COIN". There was considerable ignorance, but no void.
Most folks just never bothered to read the material or to cherry pick the material they did, based on fashion. Personally I can see nothing written about COIN in the last 10 years is either insightful or new.

[iveschris]

An American military historian now working in Australia wrote of the British Army in WWI that they had an ethos rather than a doctrine: embedded behaviors from the collective memory of the regiments. No, the British Army didn't have a COIN doctrine going into their participation in the Iraq War even after decades of hands-on "war among the people" or COIN in N' Ireland. I suspect it is different to find a serving officer or long-service NCO who has not served multiple rotations in N' Ireland (like the US Army and Marines now with multiple tours in a GWOT theater). This embedded, tacit knowledge is perhaps more valuable than all the doctrine written. Such knowledge didn't keep them from their issues in Southern Iraq I suspect. The internal BA study on their historical experiences and learning about COIN did not paint a pretty picture.

One reason the joint US COIN manual had little new in it was that the old knowledge was largely unknown. Even in army special forces in the '80s and '90s I found there was very little in the way of historical discussion possible about anything other than Vietnam or El Salvador because there was almost no venue for professional, serious study. It is interesting that McMasters and Petreaus both did Vietnam War dissertations outside of the military during their advanced civil schooling. The only officer, at the risk of injecting an anecdote, I recall a historical conversation with about small wars with was the now-USASOC commander when he was a battalion XO. We discussed SF and the Montagnards in VN.

The TRADOC history of the period immediately following the Vietnam War makes pretty clear - as does Conrad Crane's monograph for SSI - that the army seized upon the 1973 war in the Middle East with its high intensity and combined arms requirements with notable zeal. This institutional decision - rather than studying the recent, long return from Vietnam - resembles very much the British Army's decision to return to real soldiering on the frontiers of the Empire in the 1930s rather then study WWI for knowledge.

[William F. Owen]

An American military historian now working in Australia wrote of the British Army in WWI that they had an ethos rather than a doctrine: embedded behaviors from the collective memory of the regiments.

Well for WW1 they had a published Doctrine Manual in 1909. "The Field Service Regulations." I have a copy, and it's pretty good. Yes, it is strongly imbued with "opinion." - The section on Cavalry is very telling.

No, the British Army didn't have a COIN doctrine going into their participation in the Iraq War even after decades of hands-on "war among the people" or COIN in N' Ireland. I suspect it is different to find a serving officer or long-service NCO who has not served multiple rotations in N' Ireland

The UK did have COIN doctrine. It just didn't reside in one manual. The CATOM was published in 12 different Editions, and specific to Malaya. There was published doctrine for each theatre.
Actually by 2003 in Iraq, very few men had real pre-cease fire NI experience, but everyone understood that doing COIN was what all armies did and it was not an option to ignore it.

The internal BA study on their historical experiences and learning about COIN did not paint a pretty picture.

Concur, but more importantly the problem would not have been solved by having a "COIN Doctrine."

[Pete]

... the British Army's decision to return to real soldiering on the frontiers of the Empire in the 1930s rather then study WWI for knowledge.

Wait a minute, I was under the impression that the field sports of British cavalry regiments during the interwar years encouraged bold maneuver and decisive action. Maybe the U.S. Army Armor Center and School should be moved to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, where there are lots of wild boars.

[Pete]

MW and EBO both used very bad history to try and sell their wears.

Wares, Wilf, wares.

Why can't the English teach their children how to speak?
This verbal class distinction by now should be antique.
If you spoke as she does, sir, instead of the way you do,
Why, you might be selling flowers, too.

[William F. Owen]

Wares, Wilf, wares.

ThanX mate! My dyslexia and spell checker never cease to amaze me. - but you understood what I meant?