A Modest Proposal to Adjust the Principles of War

[William F. Owen]

":

1. Surprise
2. Local dominance
3. Agility
4. Initiative
5. Simplicity
6. Objective
7. Execution
8. Economy of force
9. Security

1. Surprise - what is your definition of surprise?
2. Local dominance - so what distribution?
3. Agility - do you mean the ability to change direction quickly?
4. Initiative - initiate means to start, so why is starting something a principle?
5. Simplicity - meaning only do something simple? Comparative to what?
6. Objective - what about freedom of action?
7. Execution - meaning what?
8. Economy of force - relative to what and meaning what?
9. Security - what about activity?

I am in no way looking to be dismissive of your list, but I would ask what such a list is supposed to achieve? How does having such principles or even being aware of them help the practice of operations?

The challenges to each principle are derived from Leonhard.

[slapout9]

1. Surprise - what is your definition of surprise?
2. Local dominance - so what distribution?
3. Agility - do you mean the ability to change direction quickly?
4. Initiative - initiate means to start, so why is starting something a principle?
5. Simplicity - meaning only do something simple? Comparative to what?
6. Objective - what about freedom of action?
7. Execution - meaning what?
8. Economy of force - relative to what and meaning what?
9. Security - what about activity?

I am in no way looking to be dismissive of your list, but I would ask what such a list is supposed to achieve? How does having such principles or even being aware of them help the practice of operations?

The challenges to each principle are derived from Leonhard.

Wilf, I think this a very good point the 9 principles of war can mean many different things to many different people.

[Ken White]

1. Surprise - what is your definition of surprise?

our definitions in a military context are quite similar. Simply in my view it means doing the unexpected and can be anything from a withdrawal to a no-firearms infiltration by small teams to an Inchon Landing and most everything in between. The choices are only limited by ones imagination and initiative...

2. Local dominance - so what distribution?

Strange question, METT-T applies as always -- not trying to be doctrinaire because I'm certainly not that but ask a question, get an answer.

3. Agility - do you mean the ability to change direction quickly?

Uh, no. That's only a relatively small part of the agility quotient and a rather silly one to cite i'd think. I mean the mental flexibility, equipment flexibility and organizational flexibility to respond quickly to enemy actions taken, hopefully, in response to own actions that precipitated the situation at hand..

4. Initiative - initiate means to start, so why is starting something a principle?

Two nations divided by a common language . No, I mean to foster and encourage initiative on the part of subordinates and units and, tactically and operationally (and far more importantly), to always seek to be the initiator of actions rather than to respond to the opponents actions. If you don't think that's important, we can disagree on the value.

The ability to think and to act in the absence of orders or when faced with an unusual situation. It also reinforces Agility and Surprise

5. Simplicity - meaning only do something simple? Comparative to what?

Avoid complex plans, the more complexity, the more openings for failure. Sometimes complexity is required but in my experience, that's quite rare.

6. Objective - what about freedom of action?

I'm easy, change it to 'goal' or 'aim.' Freedom of action is a given if initiative is fostered and encouraged. The issue is to remain focused on the purpose and destination of the operation.

7. Execution - meaning what?

Kill the guilty? Or the process actually followed as opposed to the planned course in achieving the goal or aim. Or you could reverse paraphrase this: ""I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!""

8. Economy of force - relative to what and meaning what?

Don't apply "overwhelming force." Use what's needed to do the job. Why send five men on a patrol when three are adequate -- or, even better, a single Scout can do the job. Why insist on a coordinated two Brigade attack when a Reinforced Battalion infiltration will do a better job? No sense risking more casualties than necessary. There are other considerations but that's one.

9. Security - what about activity?

Security means watch your rear and practice sensible OpSec for the level of force involved. I have no earthly idea what you mean by "what about activity."

I am in no way looking to be dismissive of your list, but I would ask what such a list is supposed to achieve? How does having such principles or even being aware of them help the practice of operations?

For the impossibly brilliant, such a list is a total waste of time; for the pedestrian it gives a simple list of ideas to consider in the conduct of operations. It is a framework, no more, for the application of force in war. If one dwells at Platoon level, it's a totally unnecessary list; at higher echelons, it may have some utility for many, little for a few. It is admittedly too long, it can be refined down to five. Which five?

The challenges to each principle are derived from Leonhard.

Have not read it. Given this quote Amazon says is therein:

"We still persist in studying a type of warfare that no longer exists and that we shall never fight again." Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare, 1961.

I probably won't bother. People have been telling me that war as we knew it is gone forever since the late 40s; been to three Wars, two county fairs and a goat roping since then and war is pretty much war. I heard there'll never be another amphibious landing -- then I went to Inchon, been downhill on that score ever since. I've heard about the demise of Parachute troops and the death of the Tank. Right...

Principles of War are like principles of living, some need them, some don't. Having a sensible set available may do some good and is unlikely to do much harm.

[wm]

I've followed this thread for a while now and feel the urge to chime in. If Gian's intent was to get COIN true-believers to recognize that warfare includes much more than just counter-insurgency operations, then I suspect a few more of the 9 principles need to be amended in order to get their attention. However, I predict that such an effort will be to no avail True believers tend not pay the right kind of attention when others lampoon their sacred cows. They usually just become angry and defensive.

As to the point of having principles of war, I submit that they have two functions:
(1) Folks use them to conduct post mortems (sometimes know as after action reviews or campaign studies) on military operations or battles. The goal in this case is to explain a commander's success or failure by showing how well or poorly the principles were applied in the operation under study.
(2) Other folks (those whom I would call ops planners) use them as a check on the plans that they build. That is, they see how well the plan conforms to the principles of war. The more principles they get right, the higher the likelihood that those folks in group 1 above wil consider the operation a success.

For planners, as Ken notes in the quotations that follow, the principles may or may not be necessary. What will be necessary is the METT-TC analysis (I know Ken doesn't hold much truck with including civilians in the planning process, but they really do impact on operations and must be planned for.)

.For the impossibly brilliant, such a list is a total waste of time; for the pedestrian it gives a simple list of ideas to consider in the conduct of operations. It is a framework, no more, for the application of force in war. If one dwells at Platoon level, it's a totally unnecessary list; at higher echelons, it may have some utility for many, little for a few. It is admittedly too long, it can be refined down to five. Which five?

Principles of War are like principles of living, some need them, some don't. Having a sensible set available may do some good and is unlikely to do much harm.

METT-TC, by the way sets the context that Wilf and Global Scout were looking for in their respective posts. I suspect that METT-T also could be used to come up with Ken's 5 principle list (with suitable renaming and some creative redescriptions): Mission=objective; time=surprise; security (Ken's agility)=troops available; enemy=security; and terrain and weather=initiative)

On a separate note, here's an anecdote related to Ken's comment about the order of presentation of the principles. When I learned them from an Armor officer in ROTC, he lead off with Maneuver; an artillery officer who taught them in OBC started with Mass while the infantry-branched tactics guru led off with Offensive.
My personal mnemonic sort goes like this: maneuver, objective, surprise, simplicity, mass, offensive, security, unity of command, economy of force. Part of the arrangement puts what I consider the key components to building a plan that is likely to succeed as the first four items, the remaining 5 are also important, but their relative im[portance is much more dependent on METT-TC, IMHO. They are arranged in order simply to remember them as MOUSE.

[Ken White]

...
On a separate note, here's an anecdote related to Ken's comment about the order of presentation of the principles. When I learned them from an Armor officer in ROTC, he lead off with Maneuver; an artillery officer who taught them in OBC started with Mass while the infantry-branched tactics guru led off with Offensive.
My personal mnemonic sort goes like this: maneuver, objective, surprise, simplicity, mass, offensive, security, unity of command, economy of force. Part of the arrangement puts what I consider the key components to building a plan that is likely to succeed as the first four items, the remaining 5 are also important, but their relative im[portance is much more dependent on METT-TC, IMHO. They are arranged in order simply to remember them as MOUSE.

include a quote from from a Dinosaur.

I think it's particularly good that you included the paragraph of yours I quote above. Being old, I'd truly forgotten that my early days also included a different order depending on who was spouting the principles. The thing that was pounded in my head was that the order was irrelevant, apply them to the situation at hand and you may not need all of them. Perhaps we've gotten away from that.

That triggered another thought. All forms of warfare have their devotees, all our little Mafias (and I've belonged to a couple) make it entirely too easy to develop mantras that become dogma. Take the people bit. I don't really have an objection to including the 'C' -- just a reactionary move objecting to change for change's sake -- and I acknowledge that 'C' is not such a change, it does have a place. Sometimes I just say stuff to see if everyone's awake...

However, that let me recall I had before 1960 been informed that COIN did required a focus on people. Then, after working in three Insurgencies and a couple of IW operations that were not quite insurgencies in the strictest sense, I realized two things that occurred in all of those.

1. The vast majority of the people just wanted all those involved in the actual conflict of force to just go away and leave them alone. Period.

2. If you are a foreigner, particularly if there is a large cultural and /or racial gap, they are not ever going to give you their hearts and minds and are not going to trust their own folks who are on your side.

Get too wrapped around the people bit and you'll expect things you'll never see. Yes, the focus is on the people rather than on the enemy forces but it's entirely too easy to determine that a specific pattern of operation is the holy grail. I doubt that any one size fits all is going to adapt totally to all situations and the tendency to adopt a mantra and make it a dogma exists.

All that's required to avoid that is a little initiative and mental agility.

[Gian P Gentile]

...Get too wrapped around the people bit and you'll expect things you'll never see. Yes, the focus is on the people rather than on the enemy forces but it's entirely too easy to determine that a specific pattern of operation is the holy grail. I doubt that any one size fits all is going to adapt totally to all situations and the tendency to adopt a mantra and make it a dogma exists.

I find Ken's point here exceptionally insightful. This goes along with what i have been arguing about dogmatism today in the American Army with the dominance of Coin. The notion of the people as the center of gravity and the Principle--turned law--turned rule to "protect the people" has become dogmatic and keeps us from being creative. Generally yes in Coin the people should be the focus, but if we make that the rule all of the time then we might find ourselves comitting lots of combat brigades to whatever little problem confronts us because we believe we have to go in and "protect the people."

And WM your description of why i wrote the thing is correct:

If Gian's intent was to get COIN true-believers to recognize that warfare includes much more than just counter-insurgency operations, then I suspect a few more of the 9 principles need to be amended in order to get their attention.

That is what i was trying to explore with the piece; If we are dominated by Coin in the American Army and those true believers are not listening to Ken White et al and think Coin is the wave of the future and the only kinds of wars we will be fighting then lets just lay it on the line and start taking away some of the Principles and replacing them with Coin specific ones. That is why in the piece i limited myself to the original nine so to put two new ones in i would have to take two of the old ones out.

gian