So I'm brand new to this board, and relatively new to the military in general. I recently went through AIT at the exceedingly broken A/3/1 SWTG for PSYOP, and having just read the article this thread is addressing, I think its just applicable, perhaps even more so, to the little sisters who train across the hall from our Green Beret wearing big brothers at the schoolhouse.

Soft Power one thing that distinguishes the special operations community from the big Army, and in a time when UW and soft power capabilities are more critical than they ever have been, it seems that we've been just crippling our capacity in that arena through sub par training, shortened timelines, and organizational screw ups.

Now, maybe I'm wrong, maybe I don't know what I'm talking about, its a possibility, but as an academic consumer of security policy from my undergraduate years through grad school, I have some inkling into whats required of policy actors. And now as a policy actor myself, I think I've gained a wee bit more insight.

Now, to revisit my point, what happened in this thread is exactly what seems to be happening at SWTG, USASOC, and now USAR - two primary components of SOF, CA and PSYOP, go from being heavily discussed in the article, to virtually ignored in the discussion. Why is that? Is CA not sexy enough? Is PSYOP too much of an unknown commodity?

Or is it that SF is really the only thing people care about?