It is far easier to rebuild military potential than political legitimacy. Hizbullah has the latter in Lebanon. Even if every single Hizbullah commander dropped dead and every supply dump exploded tomorrow, Hizbullah could train new leaders and rearm with Syrian and Iranian aid. The overall strategic picture would not change even given a militarily crippled Hizbullah, because unless its ideology or backers changed, it can always rebuild its military capabilities.
I think Israeli strategy (such as it was) in 2006 was to tip the party's cost-benefit analysis, in the hope that the Lebanese population would exert pressure on Hizballah to cease activities that brought Israeli retaliation —-or, otherwise, risk increasing alienation from its popular base.
This worked quite well in the 1970s against the PLO, which went from immensely popular to immensely unpopular in Lebanon. However, Hizballah is an indigenous actor with great reservoirs of goodwill in the Shiite community, and Israeli actions were in any case poorly calibrated to achieve this effect. When Israel started bombing gas stations or bridges in northern Lebanon, for example, many Lebanese bought into Hizballah's position that this was a preplanned Israeli war of aggression, and that Hizballah was once more defending the country as the "national resistance."
I suspect a sustained and extensive ground operation would have backfired in similar ways, and would have likely ended with Israel withdrawing under fire (again).
Right - this is essentially what I meant. You're saying that this idea was a flawed strategy, then? And, just to be clear, what I was referring to was Naveh's idea of the strategy he and other "heretics" had considered, not what was actually implemented in 2006. You are referring to the same, correct?Originally Posted by tequila
"Give a good leader very little and he will succeed. Give a mediocrity a great deal and he will fail." - General George C. Marshall
I suppose Navah's idea is that if you punish people severely enough for having weapons, they won't rearm, but it doesn't work in Washington DC, so I don't know why it would work in the Middle East.
Yeah, I'm disagreeing with Naveh on his concept for a "forcible disarmament" of Hizbullah. As long the Shi'i of Lebanon feel (1) disenfranchised and aggrieved (2) threatened, rightly or wrongly, by Israel, there will always be a constituency in that population for an armed party of their own capable of fighting both Lebanese and Israeli foes. There will have to be a sea change in the strategic context for this to work long-term - either by removing Hizbullah's foreign backers and arms suppliers, or by altering the political calculus of the broader Lebanese Shi'i community. Anything else is blowing smoke and kicking the can down the road, even if successful in the short term.
Guys, none of this is rocket science.
The Israelis made a bad plan, based on no other objective than trying to convince the Lebanese Govt. and people to turn against HezBollah by second order effects. When the plan didn't work, they tried to fix it, by not doing properly what they should have done. Read Ron Tira, Read their own commission of enquiry.
EBO strays dangerously from proper military thought. Hezbollah can be suppressed and even defeated by methods everyone understands.
Nasrallah saying "we won," means about as much as George Bush declaring victory.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
I understand methods that could suppress them, but I don't understand the methods that could lead to their defeat. If you have the time, I'd appreciate it if you could explain the methods to me.
If someone can be suppressed (does not act through fear of harm) then he can be defeated because sufficient fear will lead to withdrawal.
So the "methods" used to suppress (which you understand) just have to exploited to their logical conclusion. Obviously they would have to applied within a political context,(as all methods do) and would probably only be successful as a result of other activities - eg: loss of isolation from outside support and funding. Recognition of opportunity remains the key to success.
Sorry to sound vague, but simplistic or erroneous interpretations this type of activity could be misquoted or misused.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Withdrawal isn't defeat.
The Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, has described the "miracle of deliverance" from Dunkirk
Aren't they holding all the ground that Isreal used to occupy now?
I'm dubious that this can be done, frankly. The IDF certainly didn't manage it in the 1990s--quite the reverse.
Last edited by Rex Brynen; 01-09-2008 at 03:36 AM.
Ok, I completely agree with that. It seems Naveh's touted alternative was really just a tactical shift from what was actually done. The questions that raises, about how to combat a group like Hezbollah or its ilk, seem damn near insurmountable to me.
And Wilf - I see 2006 as nearly as big a victory as Hezbollah could possibly score. The invincible Israelis withdrew, Hezbollah stood and fought in the villages in the south, and then helped clean up the country after Israel (again) devastated the infrastructure, gaining popularity and legitimacy through both their military and political wings. They may not have decisively defeated the IDF on the ground, but they fought very well and the strategic and IO gains for Hezbollah were quite large, IMO. I'd be interested to hear why you (or others) think otherwise.
Matt
"Give a good leader very little and he will succeed. Give a mediocrity a great deal and he will fail." - General George C. Marshall
Having talked to several men who actually fought, i would dispute that Hezbollah fought well or successfully. They were never able to hold ground against the units I have talked to. It would be like suggesting the Somalis fought well in Mogadishu or that the Taliban fought well during OP Anaconda.
They lost lots of equipment and about 5-600 dead. On the one occasion I know of where they cornered an entire IDF Platoon (Golani) they killed 6 and wounded everyone except 2, and still the platoon broke contact and recovered to their own forces. I have yet to see anything that would indicate Hezbollah as being widely skilled at the tactical level. - I would judge them to be as tactically proficient as the the Somalis in Mogadishu or that the Taliban fought during OP Anaconda.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
To disparage any irregular force because of their inability to "hold ground" against a professional army is to completely miss the point.
Hezballah was able to inflict casualties on the IDF, take out some armor, and continue to launch rockets into Israel until the very end of the conflict. And since Israel withdrew once again - without achieveing its objectives, in the end, that's all that matters.
Regarding the "defeat" of Hezballah, I think Tequila put it quite clearly:
The statement "Nasrallah saying "we won," means about as much as George Bush declaring victory." is really a false analogy: President Bush has been roundly mocked for his statement, both here in the US and abroad, while a significant chunk of the region's populace perceives that Israel was humiliated during their summer excursion.
FYI, there is quite a bit of discussion on this subject in the Hezballah TTP thread and the Hezbollah: A Win For 'The Best Guerrilla Force in the World'? thread.
Last edited by Jedburgh; 01-09-2008 at 07:36 PM.
Thanks, Jedburgh. I agree with that completely. Although a couple sources I read (some in the info you gave me for my RFI) said that, particularly for a irregular force, Hezbollah stood and fought rather effectively in some villages with a Chechen-type decentralized defense effort.
My question, then, from this, is what is the larger strategy against Hezbollah, Hamas, and other nonstate actors who in many cases have more popular legitimacy and power than weakened states in the regions they operate. If kinetic action (even if better planned and executed than the IDF's in 2006) is non-decisive, and may actually further their political popularity and strength (leading to more military potential in terms of manpower and potential outside support), and the indigenous government is too weak to reign them in - i.e., Lebanon - then what is the approach? Attempts to moderate them or co-opt them diplomatically? A combination?
This seems to lie outside our current COIN thinking. Or at least MY current COIN thinking. . .
Oh, and can we please agree on a universal spelling for Hezbollah? Drives me nuts. Just tell me how to spell it and I'll do it. . .
Matt
"Give a good leader very little and he will succeed. Give a mediocrity a great deal and he will fail." - General George C. Marshall
I am not disparaging Hezbollah for an inability to hold ground. I am correcting the perception that they successfully defended any villages - and when they did try, they were unable to do it, according to the men I have talked to. There may have been certain areas where they did conduct a successful defence, but I have yet to see that reported by sources I trust.
I am not in any way trying to suggest that the IDF won. The War was a mind numbing fiasco, because of the stupid EBO plan. - and war was only 30 days long!
..how ever the idea that the IDF somehow lacked tactical or operational skill, and was out fought by Hezbollah is also a gross distortion. I do understand that it aids some folks agendas to suggest that.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Posting Permissions
Reply With Quote
Bookmarks