Africom Stands Up 2006-2017

[hendrikwitbooi]

Or we could rent even more of Ascension Island to you!

Do you have any oil there, David?

Southern Africa (ZA, Namibia, Botswana) might be a good place for the new command, but, as someone already mentioned, it's some distance away from the action. I think the Americans are mostly worried about the Sahara and the Sahel, and want a dedicated training command on the continent to oversee programs such as the Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI). I wonder how Gaddafi would feel about having AFRICOM in Libya?

Africa, which represents 35 percent of the world’s land mass and 25 percent of the population, is growing in significance, and . . . (from one of the defenselink.mil links)

Stuff like this just annoys the crap out of me, especially when you can google the correct information in five minutes. Whatever happened to attention to detail in the military?

[wm]

I wonder how Gaddafi would feel about having AFRICOM in Libya?

I actually thought that Benghazi would make an interesting and relevant site for the AFRICOM HQ--good port, sizable population--relatively close to the current trouble spots in the Horn and Sudan--not too far from what I beleive may well will be the next locus of African troubles in the Niger/Mali/Burkina Faso/South Algeria region. Down side is the distance from southern Africa--we might need a forward command post in Botswana too.

If Qaddafi is really interested in rejoining the "civilized" world, he might be more amenable than we think.

[John T. Fishel]

I've been reading this thread for a while and, although I don't believe that organizational change is really the answer to anything, it can facilitate the resolution of some problems. For this reason, if for no other, I welcome the creation of Africa Command. Among the things wit will accomplish are:

1. Put DoD and DoS on the same regional sheet of music. It aligns the regional unified commands with with State's regional bureaus - at long last (and with the partial exception of NORTHCOM/SOUTHCOM - WHA.
2. It will make it easier to coordinate among OSD, the Joint Staff, AFRICOM, Africa Bureau, AID. CIA, and others.
3. It will make life much, much easier for DoD's Africa Center for Security Studies and give it a single unified command master.

AFRICOM certainly provides a new opportunity to focus more and coordinate policy more effectively on an important region.

[TROUFION]

The last post here was 2 weeks ago any news on the status?

Further a quick google of African sites popped up this article. It provides a different perspective.

http://allafrica.com/stories/200702140349.html

Here is a quote:

"The African Union and the Peace and Security Council were established to entrench democracy, create economic development and monitor and secure peace but have not been allowed to develop and mature enough to deal with the continent's problems. Africa does not need another US base aimed at "promoting" peace and development. Africom would destabilise an already fragile continent and region, which would be forced to engage with US interests on military terms."
Business Day (Johannesburg) OPINION, February 14, 2007, Posted to the web February 14, 2007, Michele Ruiters, Johannesburg SA.

The author's focus seems a bit off as he is more concerned about a physical base and the troops he believes would be stationed there. He is concerned about the cultural effects of a large footprint set up, not about a C2 organization that facilitates and coordinates effort. But it is an indication that prior to setting up USAFRICOM a lot of PR work needs to be done. That is unless I'm missing something, the intent of the new command seems very beneficial from my understanding:

The Boston Globe’s Bryan Bender reports:

" The Pentagon, which crafted the proposal with the aid of the State Department and other government agencies, envisions the new command to be unique among its global combat headquarters. Because African nations do not pose a direct military threat to the United States, Defense officials said, the AFRICOM operation would focus far less on preparing troops for major combat in the area. Instead, it would stress military training programs to help local governments secure their borders and take steps to guard against crises such as Darfur as well as contain outbreaks of deadly diseases such as AIDS and malaria . Unlike in other traditional command posts, the four-star general who would be in charge of AFRICOM would probably have a civilian counterpart from the State Department to coordinate nonmilitary functions of the US government. The expectation is that diplomacy and economic and political aid will often prove more critical to achieving US goals in Africa than relying on military solutions."

[SWJED]

28 May Washington Post - U.S. Africa Command Brings New Concerns by Walter Pincus.

The creation of the Defense Department Africa Command, with responsibilities to promote security and government stability in the region, has heightened concerns among African countries and in the U.S. government over the militarization of U.S. foreign policy, according to a newly released study by the Congressional Research Service.

The Africa Command (AFRICOM) was announced in February by the Bush administration and is scheduled to begin operations in October with temporary headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany. AFRICOM would have traditional responsibilities of a combat command "to facilitate or lead [U.S.] military operations" on the continent, but would also include "a broader 'soft power' mandate aimed at preemptively reducing conflict and would incorporate a larger civilian component to address those challenges," according to the CRS study...

[John T. Fishel]

The essence of the Pincus story (and, presumably, the CRS report) is that there is interagency conflict and resentment over the establishment of AFRICOM and DOD's greater resources. So, what's new?

As I see it, there are 2 problems here: 1) We inadequately fund State and USAID and related efforts. 2) We do not create effective unity of command where we should. The latter is more of a problem in Iraq and Afghanistan than in AFRICOM's AOR where the American ambassador to a country is legally and clearly in charge. The problem there comes from #1 where the Combattant Commander may have inordinate influence because of his control of resources. Given this disparity he can often provide the funds needed to ensure an ambassador's success or, by witholding them, guarantee failure.

[SWJED]

The essence of the Pincus story (and, presumably, the CRS report) is that there is interagency conflict and resentment over the establishment of AFRICOM and DOD's greater resources. So, what's new?

As I see it, there are 2 problems here: 1) We inadequately fund State and USAID and related efforts. 2) We do not create effective unity of command where we should. The latter is more of a problem in Iraq and Afghanistan than in AFRICOM's AOR where the American ambassador to a country is legally and clearly in charge. The problem there comes from #1 where the Combattant Commander may have inordinate influence because of his control of resources. Given this disparity he can often provide the funds needed to ensure an ambassador's success or, by witholding them, guarantee failure.

... and in the absence of unity of command, it would be nice to at least have unity of effort. Sometimes I think that our cultural intelligence efforts should focus on our interagency partners - at least then we might lower our expectations of who does what and when.