Syria under Bashir Assad (closed end 2014)

[JMA]

Is that even possible? I highly doubt the necessary intel for real time targeting is available.

The theory (my theory) is that you may not actually kill him (the targeted leader) but you will drive him underground and make life as intolerable for him as he has made it for his subjects.

Let me give you a very broad summary of events...

The 3-cruise missile theory.

The first missile is aimed at a strategic military target. Something like the most loyal troops like a Presidential Guard or the like. This makes the point that troops loyal to the 'target' can and will be targeted.

The second missile is aimed that the official residence of the 'target' at 24 hours notice. He won't be there when it arrives but the message will be clear.

The third missle will be reserved for a strike on the target. A reward of $1m (or more) will be promised for information on the location of the 'target' leading to a successful strike on him but probably won't be used.

As with Gadaffi and Saddam who moved a few times a day to avoid being in one place long enough to offer a target the strain becomes unbearable (as these people are used to the world revolving around them in their time and not having to keep moving out of fear for their lives). The result is that even their supporters avoid them as they do not wish to be collateral damage in the event of a strike and they themselves begin to trust no one and eventually offer a nice isolated target for a strike or a visit from a special forces team.

The result... let the target fell the fear and don't end up having many thousands of civilians killed to get at the 'target' when the message will be clearly transmitted to the one who is the cause of all the problems that there is a cruise missile with his name on it.

If the use of quid pro quo cruise missile strikes had been used (in the manner I suggested) in Syria the regime could have/ would have been put under sever pressure without having to arm the rebels (and we know hat a stupid policy that has been).

[Dayuhan]

The theory (my theory) is that you may not actually kill him (the targeted leader) but you will drive him underground and make life as intolerable for him as he has made it for his subjects.

Let me give you a very broad summary of events...

The 3-cruise missile theory.

The first missile is aimed at a strategic military target. Something like the most loyal troops like a Presidential Guard or the like. This makes the point that troops loyal to the 'target' can and will be targeted.

The second missile is aimed that the official residence of the 'target' at 24 hours notice. He won't be there when it arrives but the message will be clear.

The third missle will be reserved for a strike on the target. A reward of $1m (or more) will be promised for information on the location of the 'target' leading to a successful strike on him but probably won't be used.

As with Gadaffi and Saddam who moved a few times a day to avoid being in one place long enough to offer a target the strain becomes unbearable (as these people are used to the world revolving around them in their time and not having to keep moving out of fear for their lives). The result is that even their supporters avoid them as they do not wish to be collateral damage in the event of a strike and they themselves begin to trust no one and eventually offer a nice isolated target for a strike or a visit from a special forces team.

The result... let the target fell the fear and don't end up having many thousands of civilians killed to get at the 'target' when the message will be clearly transmitted to the one who is the cause of all the problems that there is a cruise missile with his name on it.

If the use of quid pro quo cruise missile strikes had been used (in the manner I suggested) in Syria the regime could have/ would have been put under sever pressure without having to arm the rebels (and we know hat a stupid policy that has been).

Ok, so you've fired off your three missiles. The dictator goes underground, his army disperses. They issue a statement telling you to stick your missiles where the sun don't shine, and proceed to do more of whatever it was you objected to in the first place. Your bluff has been called. Now what do you do? Do you escalate, and (assuming you're in the awkward position of leading a democracy) face the wrath of your populace and rest of the political edifice? Do you back down? Or do you just stand there buck naked with your putz shriveling in a cold breeze?

I can't see how it's a good idea to start firing off missiles based on assumptions about how somebody else is going to react, because you don't know how they're going to react. I can't see how it's a good idea to start something you aren't willing to finish: if you don't have a viable and politically feasible plan to escalate if plan A fails, better keep your missile in your pants, because once you're in, you're in.

I agree on not arming the rebels, unless of course there is some faction that you really want to see win and that you really think can win, both contentions requiring very realistic assessment and full awareness that you might be wrong. However, just because you don't arm the rebels doesn't mean they won't get arms. They will. People make ways. If they don't get them from you, they'll get them from someone else: no shortage of actors and agendas out there. If they want to fight, they will. If the dictator falls, different factions will fight it out to fill the vacuum. These things are not ours to control, and will happen whether we like it or not.

[JMA]

Oh, you are back.

Enjoy the little rant?

Seriously Steve - as I have told you before - I have little interest in discussing anything of this nature with someone with zero military background.

Ok, so you've fired off your three missiles. The dictator goes underground, his army disperses. They issue a statement telling you to stick your missiles where the sun don't shine, and proceed to do more of whatever it was you objected to in the first place. Your bluff has been called. Now what do you do? Do you escalate, and (assuming you're in the awkward position of leading a democracy) face the wrath of your populace and rest of the political edifice? Do you back down? Or do you just stand there buck naked with your putz shriveling in a cold breeze?

I can't see how it's a good idea to start firing off missiles based on assumptions about how somebody else is going to react, because you don't know how they're going to react. I can't see how it's a good idea to start something you aren't willing to finish: if you don't have a viable and politically feasible plan to escalate if plan A fails, better keep your missile in your pants, because once you're in, you're in.

I agree on not arming the rebels, unless of course there is some faction that you really want to see win and that you really think can win, both contentions requiring very realistic assessment and full awareness that you might be wrong. However, just because you don't arm the rebels doesn't mean they won't get arms. They will. People make ways. If they don't get them from you, they'll get them from someone else: no shortage of actors and agendas out there. If they want to fight, they will. If the dictator falls, different factions will fight it out to fill the vacuum. These things are not ours to control, and will happen whether we like it or not.

[JMA]

Obama seeks $500M to train, equip Syrian rebels

With the conflicts in Syria and Iraq becoming increasingly intertwined against the same Sunni extremist group, President Barack Obama moved on Thursday to ratchet up U.S. efforts to strengthen more moderate Syrian rebels.

First he does nothing (or very little) then he does the wrong thing.

Reminds me of the Churchill quote (which is certainly applicable to this administration):

"You can always count on Americans to do the right thing - after they've tried everything else."

[davidbfpo]

A long article by a SME via Open Democracy; with a short opening summary:

Why is the Syrian Army, against all predictions, winning the war in Syria? One has to delve into the history of the Syrian state since independence to understand how the military shaped the state and learned to divide its opponents.

Link:http://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-aw...-allconquering

Some history given refers to fighting the IDF, which was a "hot" topic on another thread on the 1982 war.

[Bill Moore]

A long article by a SME via Open Democracy; with a short opening summary:

Link:http://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-aw...-allconquering

Some history given refers to fighting the IDF, which was a "hot" topic on another thread on the 1982 war.

Not all of predicted the Syrian army would lose. I never saw any indication they would. They maintained external support, they're moderately well trained for an Arab army, they're willing to fight, and their opposition is divided.

Those that predicted his fall were the hardcore population centric crowd who think popular will is the determining factor. Hopefully this serves as a wake up call to challenge some of our naive views on warfare. I also don't think we should have provided support to the rebels. The only faction organized enough to establish control were the extremists. Live and learn or not.

[TheCurmudgeon]

The theory (my theory) is that you may not actually kill him (the targeted leader) but you will drive him underground and make life as intolerable for him as he has made it for his subjects.

Let me give you a very broad summary of events...

The 3-cruise missile theory.

The first missile is aimed at a strategic military target. Something like the most loyal troops like a Presidential Guard or the like. This makes the point that troops loyal to the 'target' can and will be targeted.

The second missile is aimed that the official residence of the 'target' at 24 hours notice. He won't be there when it arrives but the message will be clear.

The third missle will be reserved for a strike on the target. A reward of $1m (or more) will be promised for information on the location of the 'target' leading to a successful strike on him but probably won't be used.

As with Gadaffi and Saddam who moved a few times a day to avoid being in one place long enough to offer a target the strain becomes unbearable (as these people are used to the world revolving around them in their time and not having to keep moving out of fear for their lives). The result is that even their supporters avoid them as they do not wish to be collateral damage in the event of a strike and they themselves begin to trust no one and eventually offer a nice isolated target for a strike or a visit from a special forces team.

The result... let the target fell the fear and don't end up having many thousands of civilians killed to get at the 'target' when the message will be clearly transmitted to the one who is the cause of all the problems that there is a cruise missile with his name on it.

If the use of quid pro quo cruise missile strikes had been used (in the manner I suggested) in Syria the regime could have/ would have been put under sever pressure without having to arm the rebels (and we know hat a stupid policy that has been).

Again, killing the target, in this case Assad, is no guarantee that the next person in line is better, or that there will even be a orderly transition of power. The result could be total anarchy. At least with Assad in power you have someone to negotiate with.

Seems to me you want to know what you are going to get next before you pull that trigger.

[JMA]

Again, killing the target, in this case Assad, is no guarantee that the next person in line is better, or that there will even be a orderly transition of power.

Yes that is always a consideration when one considers an assassination.

The result could be total anarchy. At least with Assad in power you have someone to negotiate with.

Yea, over the bodies of 160,000 civilians.

I guess you don't understand the concept I propose. No matter.

Seems to me you want to know what you are going to get next before you pull that trigger.

Obviously.

You want to anticipate the consequences, intended and unintended, of all actions before proceeding.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Yea, over the bodies of 160,000 civilians.

I guess you don't understand the concept I propose. No matter.

I think I understand it, I just think it is simplistic.This is from research on killing the head of terrorist organizations as a tactic, but the principal is the same.

In general, the study found that the decapitation strategy
appears to have little effect on the reduction of terrorist activity. The most notable trend from the statistical analysis was that decapitation strikes on religious terrorist groups tended to be followed by sharp increases in fatalities. This could be an important indication that decapitation strikes should be carefully considered on the basis of the type of group targeted. As this strategy is currently viewed to be effective by policy makers and is supported by public opinion, more data should be gathered in order to thoroughly study the efficacy of the tactic.

The British finally gave us these types of targeted killing of IRA members in part because there was never anyone in power long enough to negotiate a final peace. Killings don't change the nature of the grievances, the reason people fight, or the dynamics of the game, it only alters the players.

I doubt that killing Assad, even if accomplished in the early days of the conflict, would have resulted in a lower death toll. It is not a solution that can bring a conflict to an end. There will have to be trials for war crime, reintegration of fighters, and a peace and reconciliation commission to bring closure to the war.

Without a massive commitment of forces from outside Syria, it will end in one of two ways. Assad, or someone like Assad (probably more brutal) wins; or the country is divided with Assad remaining in power in "South Syria" and a food fight over the north. That food fight will be just as bloody.

[JMA]

I think I understand it, I just think it is simplistic.This is from research on killing the head of terrorist organizations as a tactic, but the principal is the same.

Your reference relates to: "Does Killing or Capturing its Leaders Reduce a Terrorist Group’s Activity?"

Did I ever say that it did?

Would that be the only possible reason to target insurgent leadership?

You clearly neither understand what I stated nor the wider view towards he targeting of insurgent/terrorist leadership.

Then again we see from the following study: Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark where it concludes:

Ultimately, however, leadership targeting alone is not enough to effectively fight a strong and emboldened terrorist organization.

Again, I would ask the author - with tears in my eyes - why she assumes that leadership targeting is the sole strategy employed to fight the organisation.

The British finally gave us these types of targeted killing of IRA members in part because there was never anyone in power long enough to negotiate a final peace. Killings don't change the nature of the grievances, the reason people fight, or the dynamics of the game, it only alters the players.

I am not aware of the British policy in this regard but would assume that the legality of 'murdering' citizens of their country was a significant factor.

I doubt that killing Assad, even if accomplished in the early days of the conflict, would have resulted in a lower death toll. It is not a solution that can bring a conflict to an end. There will have to be trials for war crime, reintegration of fighters, and a peace and reconciliation commission to bring closure to the war.

No, no, no. Where do you get this stuff from? Syria is not the US and they have never been concerned with what the US thought - certainly since 1971 when daddy took charge. Let us assume that the CIA was in fact a competent outfit and they had an accurate assesment of the Syrian hierarchy and the importance and value of each of the component role players. They would be in a position to identify the demise of which persons would lead/contribute to the strategic result sought by the US in Syria (taking into account any possible negative or unintended consequences).

Without a massive commitment of forces from outside Syria, it will end in one of two ways. Assad, or someone like Assad (probably more brutal) wins; or the country is divided with Assad remaining in power in "South Syria" and a food fight over the north. That food fight will be just as bloody.

No...

Once again you miss the point.

The world is now faced with the outcome - 160,000 dead and massive infrastructure damage - as a result of the actions (or inaction if you prefer) over the last few years. In any such situation it is always a matter of who dies/gets killed. In this case we have seen (the majority of the) 160,000 killed being as civilians and citizens rising up against an illegitimate and brutal dictatorship. I certainly would not be outraged if the dead comprised the military and supporters of the Assad regime. Because of the carnage there must be no doubt that the need for revenge (a beast alive and well in the heart of the Arab) will have its day and this is not only as a result of the years under the brutal Assad dictatorship but in addition the 160,000 deaths in the last few years. Yes the blood will flow... and probably with some justification. Why would you want to protect the perpetrators?

Now please read this:

Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns

Is killing or capturing insurgent leaders an effective tactic? Previous research on interstate war and counterterrorism has suggested that targeting enemy leaders does not work. Most studies of the efficacy of leadership decapitation, however, have relied on unsystematic evidence and poor research design. An analysis based on fresh evidence and a new research design indicates the opposite relationship and yields four key findings. First, campaigns are more likely to end quickly when counterinsurgents successfully target enemy leaders. Second, counterinsurgents who capture or kill insurgent leaders are significantly more likely to defeat insurgencies than those who fail to capture or kill such leaders. Third, the intensity of a conflict is likelier to decrease following the successful removal of an enemy leader than it is after a failed attempt. Fourth, insurgent attacks are more likely to decrease after successful leadership decapitations than after failed attempts. Additional analysis suggests that these findings are attributable to successful leadership decapitation, and that the relationship between decapitation and campaign success holds across different types of insurgencies.

Thanks for the references, Mike

[TheCurmudgeon]

Once again you miss the point.

The world is now faced with the outcome - 160,000 dead and massive infrastructure damage - as a result of the actions (or inaction if you prefer) over the last few years. In any such situation it is always a matter of who dies/gets killed. In this case we have seen (the majority of the) 160,000 killed being as civilians and citizens rising up against an illegitimate and brutal dictatorship. I certainly would not be outraged if the dead comprised the military and supporters of the Assad regime. Because of the carnage there must be no doubt that the need for revenge (a beast alive and well in the heart of the Arab) will have its day and this is not only as a result of the years under the brutal Assad dictatorship but in addition the 160,000 deaths in the last few years. Yes the blood will flow... and probably with some justification. Why would you want to protect the perpetrators?

I am afraid that I am missing your point. I will go back over the conversation and see where I missed the mark. If there is a post you made that has your central thesis please point me to it.

Now please read this:

Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns

I am familiar with this paper. I don't like it for two reasons. The first is that, while Mr. Johnson complains about other research using poor data sets, he cherry picks his data to include only instances where there was an attempt on the life of key leaders. He then breaks it into two groups; successful and unsuccessful attempts. There is no comparison to any other situation where an insurgency or civil war ended.

He also considers success in a very short term temporal way. For example of the 44 successful decapitations Chad appears 3 times, Indonesia – 3, Philippines – 2, Pakistan – 2, Sri Lanka – 2, Algeria - 6 times, and India a whopping 11 times. So India successfully decapitated the insurgent leaders eleven times but did not find peace. In Algeria the government killed the leader of the same group, the GIA, 5 times. This is what the author sees as success. Of the 44 instances of successful decapitation only 8 nations appear only once on the list. One of those is the US and the killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi which allegedly ended the insurgency in Iraq. So no, I find this work less than convincing.

He is using a well recognized effect, the short term disorganization that occurs after a key leader is killed, to extrapolate that killing key leaders is an effective tactic for ending insurgencies. There is little in this paper that changes my opinion that you cannot truely end an insurgency or civil war without addressing the key issues and bringing closure through the appropriate trials and tribunals.

Thanks for the references, Mike

No problem, I just wish I could link to articles on JSTOR, but most people don't have access.

[JMA]

I am afraid that I am missing your point.

Yes you are in assuming that advocates of targetting insurgent leadership believe it is a 'sliver bullet' for ending the conflict.

It is not... if correctly implemented it can and does dislocate the insurgent's command and control and thereby its operations as a component of the overall strategy.

US and Brit special forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan have 'taken out' (probably) hundreds of 'leaders' over the years. They are replaced by more junior and less experienced fighters and the war continues... but each time a little less effectively.

I would accept any criticism that the McChristal/Lamb team placed way too much emphasis on such killing. They may have had their reasons for doing so.