AC/RC Force Structure

[Tyree]

I am coming to this discussion a little late in the game. About six months late by the looks of the last post. But I see the last question is still out there hanging so I thought I would apply my two pence worth.

My basic heartburn is with the construct of all of the non-Stryker Brigades, both heavy and light. I feel that it is a fundamental error to have only two maneuver battalions in these brigades, rather than three. Three that is, along with the cavalry squadron.

I am also not sure about the combined arms battalions in the heavy brigades. On paper they look great, and certainly would seem better, again on paper, than the task organization nut roll we did for sixty plus years. We did all of this in the midst of deployments, and I don't think the concept has been throughly vetted. It should be. I would never advocate a backward step, and I am not doing that here. I just want to be sure that the balance is right before we go any further forward.

Now back to the main point. The changes in structure that I propose would mean that the numbers of brigades in both components be reduced. That is a given based upon authorized end strength. I feel though that that would be acceptable, if the resulting brigades were more robust and could dominate more battlespace per brigade.

Reducing each division down to three brigades, with MTO&E strengths at about the 4500-5000 level should fit within the confines of current constraints. That would produce a picture of something like the following:

Active Component:

1st ID ------- 2 IBCT, 1 HBCT
2nd ID------- 1 HBCT
3rd ID ------- 2 IBCT, 1 HBCT
4th ID ------- 2 INCT, 1 HBTC
7th ID ------- 2 IBCT, 1 HBCT (Activate Hqs at Lewis)
9th ID ------- 3 HBCT (Inactivate 1st AD - Activate 9th ID)
10th MD ----- 3 IBCT
24th ID ------ 2 HBCT (Activate Div Hqs in Germany)
82nd ABD ---- 3 IBCT
101st ABD --- 3 IBCT
1st CD -------3 Stryker Cavalry Brigades
173rd Airborne Brigade
2nd Stryker Cavalry Brigade
3rd Stryker Cavalry Brigade
6th Stryker Cavalry Brigade
11th Cavalry Stryker Brigade

Army National Guard

26th IBCT (New England)
27th IBCT (NY)
28th INCT (PA)
29TH IBCT (MD&VA)
30TH IBCT (NC & TN)
31st IBCT (AL&MS)
32nd IBCT (WI&MI)
33RD IBCT (IL&KY)
34th IBCT (IA&MN)
36TH IBCT (TX)
37th IBCT (OH&WV)
38th IBCT (IN)
39th IBCT (AR&LA)
40TH IBCT (CA)
41st IBCT (OR&WA)
42nd IBCT (NY&NJ)
45th IBCT (OK)
48th IBCT (GA)
53rd IBCT (FL)
56th Stryker Cavalry Brigade (TX)

All National Guard Divisions would be inactivated and their places taken in the force structure by coordinating headquarters co-located with FEMA Regions.

I believe that this would result in a balanced force struture capable across the spectrum. Glad I had a chance to put this on paper. You may fire when ready

[82redleg]

...
My basic heartburn is with the construct of all of the non-Stryker Brigades, both heavy and light. I feel that it is a fundamental error to have only two maneuver battalions in these brigades, rather than three. Three that is, along with the cavalry squadron.

Everybody agrees we need the third maneuver bn, the trick is how to pay for it.

I am also not sure about the combined arms battalions in the heavy brigades. On paper they look great, and certainly would seem better, again on paper, than the task organization nut roll we did for sixty plus years. We did all of this in the midst of deployments, and I don't think the concept has been throughly vetted. It should be. I would never advocate a backward step, and I am not doing that here. I just want to be sure that the balance is right before we go any further forward.

We tested this on multiple occasions. 1CD did a test in the late 80s, reorganizing a 2 tank/1 mech (IIRC) into a balanced TFs and 2 AR Heavy (3 tank CO/1 mech CO) TFs. They called them CAMBs (Combined Arms Maneuver BNs). The issues noted in the Armor or Infantry magazine article all had to do with the temporary test bucking the Army bureaucracy (inability of the BN to conduct adminstration for its attached companies) and inability to split certain things three ways (certain low density MOSs, etc) to support across the BDE. Both of these are corrected by making the organization permanent. There is the possibility of training issues, but I think they are balanced by the benefit of building a cohesive team. I think that starting from a mixed organization makes task organization easier, because the BN level support structure is used to supporting both types of companies- the balance of work might change in supporting a 3 mech, 1 tank TF instead of a 2 mech, 2 tank TF, but the supporters are trained in supporting both without having to task organize the support.

...
Active Component:
1st ID ------- 2 IBCT, 1 HBCT
...11th Cavalry Stryker Brigade

You moved flags around for some reason that I don't understand. We are bad enough about that already. Minimal change in flagging of type units is preferable.

Army National Guard
26th IBCT (New England)
...56th Stryker Cavalry Brigade (TX)

Even more issues here- we just trained a BCT in PA on the Stryker, why convert them back to IN and train TX on the Strykers? PA supports two BCTs now, NY doesn't. Rationalizing is good, but there are intangibles of unit history and heritage that are important. Plus, the above doesn't seem to match the realities of the currently supported force structure. Finally, why all IBCTs? IBCTs are more useful in less than full scale war, that might come up without warning, and are capable of rapid deployment, which is not a strong point of reserve components. My ideal balance is active component balanced 1/3-1/3-1/3 (or a little less for the H and I) between H/S/I BCTs, while the reserve component is about 40-60 H-S. I've written this on the blogs here before, my reasoning is that, in a emergency, the ARNG units with heavy equipment can train on training sets while their equipment deploys. IBCTs, for rapid deployment, wouldn't have the time to conduct post-mobilization training. There's some more details in my ideas, but I don't want to repeat the other posts.

All National Guard Divisions would be inactivated and their places taken in the force structure by coordinating headquarters co-located with FEMA Regions.

There's a SAMS monograph on the CARL website about the future of ARNG divisions. Might be worth a read.

I believe that this would result in a balanced force struture capable across the spectrum. Glad I had a chance to put this on paper. You may fire when ready

Shot, over.

[Tyree]

Well, I did not expect all of what I have to say to be received with a bouquet of daisys. If everyone were to agree then there would be a heck of a lot of people not thinking.

I am familiar with the experimentation at Fort Hood in the late 80's Valuable groundwork was done and a treasure trove of lessons learned.

The only way to pay for a third maneuver battalion across the board is to decrease the number of BCT's.

I would have no objection if some of the Guard BCT,s were heavy. In fact some should be. I would leave it to the Guard Bureau and the various states to decicde,

Reasons for the flags:

A division headquarters in Germany would be valuable in exercising C&C over the 170th - 172nd -173rd and 2nd SCR.

A division headquarters at Lewis for the same reason.

A flag change for the 1st AD, would eliminate one of the type divisions were have around that are in fact not required in that the division is a modular control headquarters. In elimination of the 1st AD I would consolidate its history and lineage with the 1st ID. I would do the same for all of the inactive armored divisions and consolidate them with a like numbered infantry division. There is little chance that any of these units will ever be called off the inactive rolls and it would seem that this would be a rather straightforward method of preserving their histories. Not an ideal solution, but better I think then having the only memory of these fine units, being a file locked away in some drawer at CMH

The First Cavalry Division would remain but in a new role as the unbrella force for the various Stryker Cavalry Brigades. By the way I call them that, not only because of the conversion of the 2nd Cavalry to the Stryker construct, or the impending conversion of the 3rd. I do so because they to me are more like the cavalry of old, the mounted dragoon. It is nothing more than my personal interpretation of history. I realize what a nut roll this would be in reorganization. It may possibly be cost prohibative. That is also the reason I would like to see two more created/converted/restationed. perhaps one at Fort Polk and one at Fort Sill. That is also the reason for my wishing to move a freshly trained Stryker brigade from Pennsylvania to Texas, proximity to a proposed Stryker community. Then there is the Mexican Border.

So in the end I have reasons for all I have proposed. Perhaps some will find agreement.

PS: Of course there is a more straightforward means of accomplishing this:

Reflag all of the existing division headquarters as Corps headquarters. Down echelon all of the now larger brigades with the division designations (1st Infantry Division lineage become 1st Infantry Brigade). A few of the traditionally seperate brigades would be required also (i.e 173rd and more).I would think it appropriate for the larger (approx 5000 +/-) brigade to be commanded by a BG. It would be a way of preserving history which I look upon, if used correctly, as an unquanifiable force multiplier. Such an action would fit in nicely with the present modular construct of the Army. Just another thought on a bright Sunday morning.

[82redleg]

...The only way to pay for a third maneuver battalion across the board is to decrease the number of BCT's.

Agreed, and I think everyone understands this. If you're going to go to big BCTs, you might as well go with big BCTs, and make them 4 maneuver BNs, plus the Recon, FA, BSB and STB/BEB. I fall back on the Military Review article "Small BCTs Undermine Modularity" from about 2005.

I would have no objection if some of the Guard BCT,s were heavy. In fact some should be. I would leave it to the Guard Bureau and the various states to decicde,

Did you get a chance to look up my other post?

Reasons for the flags:
A division headquarters in Germany would be valuable in exercising C&C over the 170th - 172nd -173rd and 2nd SCR.

Agreed. With 45 BCTs, 4 BCTs per division would seem to justify 11 divisions, but we only have 10. Germany would be the logical choice. Of course, if 170th and 172nd go away (as planned), that logic is weakend.

A division headquarters at Lewis for the same reason.

Agreed, but I don't see where I Corps is doing such a horrible job. Since BCTs are employed individually anyway, the tie between BCT and DIV is not as important- they are supposed to be able to plug into any DIV or CORPS HQ.

A flag change for the 1st AD, would eliminate one of the type divisions were have around that are in fact not required in that the division is a modular control headquarters. In elimination of the 1st AD I would consolidate its history and lineage with the 1st ID. I would do the same for all of the inactive armored divisions and consolidate them with a like numbered infantry division. There is little chance that any of these units will ever be called off the inactive rolls and it would seem that this would be a rather straightforward method of preserving their histories. Not an ideal solution, but better I think then having the only memory of these fine units, being a file locked away in some drawer at CMH

There is not cost to having a division called 1st AD vice having one called 9th ID. They are the same- the only difference is a different color flag. You'll create more cost changing than by holding what you have.

The First Cavalry Division would remain but in a new role as the unbrella force for the various Stryker Cavalry Brigades. By the way I call them that, not only because of the conversion of the 2nd Cavalry to the Stryker construct, or the impending conversion of the 3rd. I do so because they to me are more like the cavalry of old, the mounted dragoon. It is nothing more than my personal interpretation of history. I realize what a nut roll this would be in reorganization. It may possibly be cost prohibative. That is also the reason I would like to see two more created/converted/restationed. perhaps one at Fort Polk and one at Fort Sill. That is also the reason for my wishing to move a freshly trained Stryker brigade from Pennsylvania to Texas, proximity to a proposed Stryker community. Then there is the Mexican Border.

Your logic is fine, and I agree with your historical analysis. However, 2CR and 3 CR have nothing (or very little) to do with 1st CD, other than a common name. Moving SBCTs to FT Hood (and the TXARNG) based on the very unlikely possibility of employment on the Mexican border seems silly to me. We have posse comitatus and all that. Moving the ARNG BCT would almost certainly be cost prohibitive- you won't move many (if any at all) of the Soldiers, so you've wasted the last 5 years of human capital development.

...Reflag all of the existing division headquarters as Corps headquarters. Down echelon all of the now larger brigades with the division designations (1st Infantry Division lineage become 1st Infantry Brigade). A few of the traditionally seperate brigades would be required also (i.e 173rd and more).I would think it appropriate for the larger (approx 5000 +/-) brigade to be commanded by a BG. It would be a way of preserving history which I look upon, if used correctly, as an unquanifiable force multiplier. Such an action would fit in nicely with the present modular construct of the Army. Just another thought on a bright Sunday morning.

This is another idea that has been brought up- in fact, it was proposed to the CSA GEN Schoomaker when the modular force was created. The decision brief was floating around, were he was given the three options of (1) minimal change (what he selected), (2) elevated echelon (what your describe) and (3) hybrid regiment. Since we are already doing option (2) in the ARNG, I think that was a better choice, with the advantage of removing a visual connection between DIV and BCTs that isn't supposed to exist. I'd still support executing that option, as I think I discussed here. I'll see if I can find the link.

[Tyree]

Everything I wrote above the PS in the above post is nothing more than a mental exercise, well really a yellow legal pad and pencil exercise to bring back a sense of historical structure. I believe you have discovered my strategms. Now I will get really serious

I would welcome a forced based upon brigades, that carry the flags of former divisions. I have the presentation of the three options on my desk as I write this. Of course at lot of that presentation has been overcome by events, particularly in the Guard.

The elevated option would be my preference. A BCT with four maneuver battalions, along with everything else would be a very formidable force. It would probably top out in the 5000-5700 range. I would favor that over all other options.

I want to thank for your response to my straw man. Everything you have said is quite well thought out and I do appreciate all you have contributed.

I would like to see a link to you previous post in this area. In fact I would like to see everything you have written which touches on this subject matter. It seems I have found a kindred soul.

[82redleg]

Here a couple of threads that touch similar concepts.

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...&highlight=BCT

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...&highlight=BCT

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...&highlight=BCT

[Fuchs]

(1) Reserve forces get usually less training time / year.

(2) Reserve forces belonging to a small active force with long-serving (volunteer, not conscript) troops will not be able to draw fully from trained former AC personnel.


Both in combination leads me to the conclusion that reserve forces (or most of them) should focus on not very training-intensive missions.
This in turn leads to my preference for relatively small stand-alone reserve forces, such as a regional battalion battlegroups. Training in larger formations and training deployments to foreign terrains and climates should be skipped until a time of crisis.

Such reserve forces could then augment active forces after a brief period of additional training or be assigned rather auxiliary tasks.

The concept of reserve / national guard brigades that go to war on short notice is for me as great wars-concerned guy (who thinks that small wars are usually a stupidity) simply an unacceptable negligence.