The Col. Gentile collection and debate

[Ron Humphrey]

Simple Thesis.

It is easier for a Conventional "war fighting unit" to learn COIN skills, than it is for a COIN trained unit to learn or recover "War fighting skills"

If someone wants to jump in with the antithesis, or state the thesis more usefully, then I suggest that we the grounds a useful debate.

With 100, 000 men and one good commander nations can be conquered,
With 1000 men and 10 strong leaders one could set the world on fire.


Which one would you rather go against; and why

[William F. Owen]

With 100, 000 men and one good commander nations can be conquered,
With 1000 men and 10 strong leaders one could set the world on fire.


Which one would you rather go against; and why

I'm not sure I agree with the veracity of the statement.

I guess I could reply that a Hamster with lit match is more dangerous to a bale of hay, than a snake with a flick knife.

[Ron Humphrey]

I'm not sure I agree with the veracity of the statement.

I guess I could reply that a Hamster with lit match is more dangerous to a bale of hay, than a snake with a flick knife.

As to it's veracity me thinks if we turn to our good friend webster

1 : devotion to the truth : truthfulness
2 : power of conveying or perceiving truth
3 : conformity with truth or fact : accuracy
4 : something true <makes lies sound like veracities>

It would seem that both yours and my statements fit the bill.

That said perhaps it's applicability to the discussion might be called into question.

Then again maybe not.

Consider that the underlying premise is approach to a problem set
In each we find that a what might seem to be a less dangerous problem but in truth can be found to be much larger in its overall effect on the environments within which it exists.

Now in an effort to tie this into your initial presentation

It is easier for a Conventional "war fighting unit" to learn COIN skills, than it is for a COIN trained unit to learn or recover "War fighting skills"

Training is the real answer to this(I know big duh)
Honestly wars are fought by individuals the only differentiations in the long run are how many and in what context. Perhaps it is true as many seem to be concerned that working effectively in larger groups takes much more work to perfect than smaller yet potentially just as effective groups. Not to mention that in order to bring to bare resources and capabilities associated with large scale operations requires a much greater effort to collaborate and keep those involved on the same page.

One highly over simplified question is if the foundation isn't as important as the house why even build it. If one accepts that the foundation of any armed forces is the men and women of which it is comprised and then that they must be good at what they do then learn to do it together; would it not make just as much sense that the same premise follows all the way through to the highest levels. If one brigade commander has one really well trained battalion and several more not so much how well will they stand against a moderately well trained collection of battalions. Same for a Div, Corps, Army, etc.

If you get 6 Brigades trained well in infantry and supporting functions and each of their mechanized counterparts are equally comfortable with their tasks then the adjustment up or down the scale should be equally doable. Either extreme would seem to make it excessively difficult to transition without considerable hardship and unfortunate costs both human and otherwise.

It is true that soldiers are not police, it is however equally true that they are not natural born killers(Exceptions aside). They are at the base simply men and women who have chosen to do a job and deserve to be adequately trained to do it. When $#^ hits the fan they can and will adjust up or down as necessary the key is knowing if you've done your job getting them ready for it.

This is why the very argument itself is so unfulfilling, This is NOT a zero sum game whether we would like it to be or not. So despite the fact that there are limited funds and political intrigues, and touchy feely human interests there are men and women who are doing their best and deserve to be given every bit of knowledge, preparation, and skill you can give them.

Seems like we need to quit worrying about what type of war we want, need, expect and put meat and muscle behind every soldier, airmen, marine with whatever we've got to help them do whatever they have to.

[Surferbeetle]

One highly over simplified question is if the foundation isn't as important as the house why even build it. If one accepts that the foundation of any armed forces is the men and women of which it is comprised and then that they must be good at what they do then learn to do it together; would it not make just as much sense that the same premise follows all the way through to the highest levels. If one brigade commander has one really well trained battalion and several more not so much how well will they stand against a moderately well trained collection of battalions. Same for a Div, Corps, Army, etc.

If you get 6 Brigades trained well in infantry and supporting functions and each of their mechanized counterparts are equally comfortable with their tasks then the adjustment up or down the scale should be equally doable. Either extreme would seem to make it excessively difficult to transition without considerable hardship and unfortunate costs both human and otherwise.

It is true that soldiers are not police, it is however equally true that they are not natural born killers(Exceptions aside). They are at the base simply men and women who have chosen to do a job and deserve to be adequately trained to do it. When $#^ hits the fan they can and will adjust up or down as necessary the key is knowing if you've done your job getting them ready for it.

This is why the very argument itself is so unfulfilling, This is NOT a zero sum game whether we would like it to be or not. So despite the fact that there are limited funds and political intrigues, and touchy feely human interests there are men and women who are doing their best and deserve to be given every bit of knowledge, preparation, and skill you can give them.

Seems like we need to quit worrying about what type of war we want, need, expect and put meat and muscle behind every soldier, airmen, marine with whatever we've got to help them do whatever they have to.

Ron,

Excellent points all. (And the foundation analogy especially gladdens the heart of this civil engineer )

Ken likes to beat this drum as well; it does indeed all come down to training the troops. Like you, my part of this particular melody is that we need to accept the realities of what we find on the ground and craft appropriate solutions to them as opposed to coming in with strong preconceptions and refusing to adjust to the facts.

Excellent military forces do indeed excel at MCO but they are not just thoroughbred one trick ponies who should only be taken out of the barn for carefully prepared for MCO events. In the real world pickup trucks, tractors, quarter horses, mustangs, and mule's are used to get many things done around the ol' farm as well. Once upon a time I learned about the importance of combined arms and I still think that it's a valid concept...

Best,

Steve

[ipopescu]

Ken said:

The armed forces of any nation have a responsibility to be as prepared for all eventualities as possible. The US, for example was not prepared for stability operations in Afghanistan or Iraq -- we erred. We should not do so again.

Ken,
I think this pretty much nails it, and I don't think many people really object to this. I would only add that the probability of an eventuality should determine the emphasis given to it in terms of resource allocation, training, doctrine, etc. At the end of the day, in the US system elected civilian leaders are responsible for the decision to engage in the wars that they judge to be necessary to protect the national interest. If current leaders came to the conclusion that a COIN is something the US needs to be involved in now and in the near future, it is normal for the US military services to adapt accordingly to what's being asked of them. My prof Peter Feaver, a former Bush NSC official, recently summarized what I believe may be a commonly held position inside the former administration here on the Foreign Policy website. One of the paragraphs for this thread is pasted below;
Ionut.

"First, anti-COIN is a convenient way to argue against American military involvement in any fashion because the most urgentnear-term threats requiring military operations involve COIN... If the U.S. military cannot or will not do COIN, then the U.S. military cannot and will not be operational."

[Rob Thornton]

For those capable of accessing AKO - the Army has hung its UNCLASS "Army Strategy 2008" document there (just run a search). This is a good document - it is not so much a strategy as we might consider the NSS or NDS, however it does reference them. It is more of a capability generation strategy and addresses the full spectrum of required capabilities. I like that it frames the discussion in terms of "strategic choices" and "strategic questions".

There is a good deal of thought devoted to IW capabilities, SFA capabilities, MCO capabilities, ARFORGEN, personnel practices, areas of relevant DOTMLPF, spin out capabilites and modernization, AC/RC practices. etc.

If you have access, I think it will inform much of this and other discussion. Its the first time I've seen such a document. I think it is the appropriate focus for the Army as a force and capability provider to the GCCs.

If you have a .mil addy, ping me and I'll send it to you.

Best, Rob

[Entropy]

And I imagine if you put a Coin proponent in a room with me as a "Con" proponent and said take this list of defense resources and start cutting, then produce a scheme for how to organize and train the military and specifically the army for the future, well at that point agreement would most likely go away. I for one, in simplistic terms, would not want to trade-off armor and firepower in the force for more light infantry and soft-power-like systems. Certainly there is a need for the latter, but if it came to a tradeoff (which invariably all of these things must come to that) my vote would be for firepower and protection as a key element in the force.

Schmedlap: Well the exchange between me and LG has been interesting. I have made my points about his well articulated but in my mind still discrete views. But stepping forward a bit, if he is correct along with you about a bunch of rhetoric out there as to how Coinized the army has become but in reality it is not even close to that ideal, then I think we are in actually more trouble than less. That is to say we have the worst of both possible worlds here; an army that still can’t do Coin and an Army that in so trying to do Coin has become deficient in its capabilities at the higher end of the fighting spectrum.

Col. Gentile,

After some thought, I think you and LG were talking past each other a bit. Specifically it appears you each are looking at slightly different timeframes. Your writings strike me as more focused on the future while LG is focused on the present.

And time is a problem in this debate. There's a distinction, I think, between what we should be doing now and what we should be doing down the road over the long term (once Iraq and Astan wind down). As it stands now, my perspective is that current OPTEMPO in the ground forces simply do not allow enough TIME for sufficient training in both HIC and COIN. It would be nice to have a full-spectrum force, but unless the force can be increased (unlikely) or unless commitments in Iraq and Astan decrease (likely, the question is when), I don't see how the ground forces can maintain competency in both areas. And, judging from the debate between you and LG, it seems we might be at (or on our way) to what you correctly describe as the "worst of all possible worlds" which is incomplete competence in both areas.

So, what should we do over the short term? How will those short-term decisions affect what we do over the long term? It seems to me your concern (which I share) is that going full-bore COIN now will make the creation of a balanced force in the future more difficult - a problem that only complicates the "tradeoffs" you describe above. If we go "all in" for COIN now, how long will it take to recover those HIC skills once OPTEMPO allows more training time? Will the Army's future leadership, raised on COIN, develop a COIN "mindset" and eschew HIC as LG believes the current leadership is eschewing COIN? What are the alternatives? This brings us back to the problem of trying to fight a high-optempo COIN war while trying to maintain HIC proficiency. Our force ain't big enough to do both right now. Something's got to give or we'll continue to muddle through.

[Schmedlap]

... if he is correct along with you about a bunch of rhetoric out there as to how Coinized the army has become but in reality it is not even close to that ideal, then I think we are in actually more trouble than less. That is to say we have the worst of both possible worlds here; an army that still can’t do Coin and an Army that in so trying to do Coin has become deficient in its capabilities at the higher end of the fighting spectrum.

That is about 95% right, imo. Were it not for the lackluster training that occurred prior to 9/11, I think that statement would be 100% correct. The only reason that I don't think we've become deficient at the higher end is because we already were. The reality check that occurred on 9/11 (that we might actually have to fight real enemies, rather than OPFOR at NTC), has forced some degree of realism and some relaxation of safety standards in training, both of which could do nothing less than improve the quality of training.

[Ken White]

This post addresses several comments above but not in chronological order.

ipopescu said:

"At the end of the day, in the US system elected civilian leaders are responsible for the decision to engage in the wars that they judge to be necessary to protect the national interest. If current leaders came to the conclusion that a COIN is something the US needs to be involved in now and in the near future, it is normal for the US military services to adapt accordingly to what's being asked of them."

That's true -- and efforts by the Army to deter them from COIN-like commitments from 1975 until 2001 were successful only because said civilians did not see a need. Once one of those civilians saw a need, we were off to COIN city. Well, sort of...

Ipopescu also posted this quote:

""First, anti-COIN is a convenient way to argue against American military involvement in any fashion because the most urgent near-term threats requiring military operations involve COIN... If the U.S. military cannot or will not do COIN, then the U.S. military cannot and will not be operational.""

I do not agree totally with that statement -- some in the Army have done that on that basis but they're fooling themselves, the real problem is that the US military will be told to go do it, ready or not. If, OTOH, even the partial intent of the statement is to say those are the only types of wars that can be seen in the near future -- I disagree on that score as well. No one can reliably predict that we will not become engaged in a major conventional combat next week, much less three years form now. That inference, COIN will rule, Attempts to make a guess into a statement of fact and it presupposes a choice that could be exceedingly dangerous.

Friend ipopescu homed in on the last part of my statement he quoted -- he should have paid more attention to the far more important first phrase: "The armed forces of any nation have a responsibility to be as prepared for all eventualities as possible."

Gian said:

"I for one, in simplistic terms, would not want to trade-off armor and firepower in the force for more light infantry and soft-power-like systems. Certainly there is a need for the latter, but if it came to a tradeoff (which invariably all of these things must come to that) my vote would be for firepower and protection as a key element in the force."

Since you're an Armor Officer, I'm sure you wouldn't -- I suspect some Light Infantry Officers might disagree...

However, isn't that really an argument looking for a home? I see no move by the Army to build more Tanks at this point nor do I see any inclination to get rid of any that we possess. So why bring this up? Because the added personnel are going to infantry Bdes perhaps. Makes sense -- Armor is expensive and if you're going to add more spaces -- almost certainly temporarily -- and there is no need for added armor at this time, it seems unwise to add any. There are also discussions about moving some heavy Bde sets into the ARNG; an idea with some merit if we get to the point where we can again have a strategic reserve.If the issue is truly the defense of the US instead of branch partisanship, neither of those things should be a problem.

Entropy said -- and this is important:

"As it stands now, my perspective is that current OPTEMPO in the ground forces simply do not allow enough TIME for sufficient training in both HIC and COIN. It would be nice to have a full-spectrum force, but unless the force can be increased (unlikely) or unless commitments in Iraq and Astan decrease (likely, the question is when), I don't see how the ground forces can maintain competency in both areas. And, judging from the debate between you and LG, it seems we might be at (or on our way) to what you correctly describe as the "worst of all possible worlds" which is incomplete competence in both areas.

In reverse order, "the worst of all possible worlds" is about where we are today. That is as a result of bad decisions by the Army in the 1989-2001 period, of mediocre training and of the ever ongoing generational change. Senior Commanders today received no COIN or stability ops training while they were developing and thus they did not practice those skills and embed them in muscle memory (so to speak). They're all smart guys, they can read, they go to schools, they learn new things -- but old habits die hard. Almost all adapt, some in a truly outstanding manner, the majority more than adequately but it is still an adaptation and it is not an experience and training derived skill. That's why the application is spotty and varies from person to person, why some above mention that we are not doing many things as well as one could hope.

Which leads to the fact that the current OPTEMPO does not allow time for adequate training. I'm not sure I agree with that but I will acknowledge that the way we currently train coupled with that OPTEMPO almost guarantee marginal training. We need better initial entry training so that both new Officers and new EM have the basics of soldiering firmly instilled. If the basics are acquired, branching out is simple -- without mastery of the ground floor of the profession, everything new becomes chaos. There are some good efforts taking place all over the Army to address this, Basic and AIT as well as the Officer Basic courses are being fixed and that's great. We are slowly --too slowly -- introducing Outcome Based Training. We simply need to take it a step further and double the time to allow mastery of the basics. It would help if we also had a series of courses on how to delegate and how not to micromanage.

That needed fix does not address the requirement for a full spectrum force and how it is trained. That is not a problem -- except that again the OPTEMPO now intrudes; if everyone has to rotate to a theater on a one on - one off schedule, there is no chance for specialization or multi spectrum training. Everyone has to train for the fight we're in, period. There shouldn't even be any argument about that. To train on unneeded skills is to waste training time and will put the troops at unnecessary risk. Lest I be misunderstood, a 19B or 19K needs to be able to shoot, move and communicate -- but he does not have to be a Master Gunner...

Later, post Iraq and Afghansitan (and they will become history) we simply divide training into a roughly 70:30 (or 80:20 -- the ratio will vary from unit to unti) time and effort routine with the light folks doing Stability ops : MCO and the Heavy guys doing MCO : Stability ops. Note I say stability ops and not COIN. The US should diligently avoid COIN situations. There will be those that say we cannot do that. We can -- however we may still have to do some now and then, thus we must have, as nearly everyone now agrees, the doctrine in hand and everyone trains at least a bit for that eventuality.

Entropy also said:

"This brings us back to the problem of trying to fight a high-optempo COIN war while trying to maintain HIC proficiency. Our force ain't big enough to do both right now. Something's got to give or we'll continue to muddle through."

Yes. Muddle through. That's what we're doing but we have a lot of practice at that, I got to watch us muddle through -- and believe, muddle is kind -- two earlier wars and we really do that well. So, muddle through we will. Hopefully, we'll improve our training and PME and thus get as good as we were in 1945 but do it without three hard years of a really hard war to get there. it can be done.

Ron Humphrey said:

"If you get 6 Brigades trained well in infantry and supporting functions and each of their mechanized counterparts are equally comfortable with their tasks then the adjustment up or down the scale should be equally doable.
. . .
...This is NOT a zero sum game whether we would like it to be or not. So despite the fact that there are limited funds and political intrigues, and touchy feely human interests there are men and women who are doing their best and deserve to be given every bit of knowledge, preparation, and skill you can give them."

Exactly.. The issue is not what we're going to buy -- those decisions are mostly locked in concrete for the next five years. The issue is how we train.

The answer is -- not very well.

As Schmedlap said:

"The only reason that I don't think we've become deficient at the higher end is because we already were. The reality check that occurred on 9/11 (that we might actually have to fight real enemies, rather than OPFOR at NTC), has forced some degree of realism and some relaxation of safety standards in training, both of which could do nothing less than improve the quality of training."

Sadly true on all counts.

All this discussion isn't really about equipment buys, force structure or strategic focus -- it is simply about training. Contrary to our inability to affect major policy and budget decisions, we can affect training decisions. Well, I can't -- but most of you guys can...

[Gian P Gentile]

Entropy: Agree with your post, and in a sense you are right in that we may have been talking past each other. LG is focussed on the now, while I am viewing the now but with a longer eye toward the future and the effects that the current wars in astan and iraq will have on it. I have stated this point in many of my published writings that--as you point out too--the Army must maintain its focus on coin now since the operational environment demands it. If a BCT is slated to deploy to Astan in 8 months then of course it should be training on counterinsurgency at the NTC instead of staring down the 11th Gaurds MRR in the VOD. My point all along has been to argue that the Army needs to accept how consumed it has become with counterinsurgency (again with good and understandable reasons) and then look honestly at itself in what that focus has done to its conventional capabilities. FM 3-24 is a different but related story. My criticisms of it have been toward its selectivity in theory and historical underpinnings at the expense of a doctrine that offers options other than nation-building. Did the Army need an updated counterinsurgency manual? yes of course it did. Was FM 3-24 a good cut at it based on the time constraints involved? Maybe. Is FM 3-24 the endstate for American counterinsurgency doctrine? In my mind it should not be.

Ken: My point about trade-offs was not an argument for building an armor-only force as your post suggests when it uses the term branch parochialism. Of course the Army needs an infantry capability. But if the Army is not careful we may wake up one day and look around and see the majority of its combat brigades as infantry with its few remaining mech and armor bcts in the national gaurd. That i do not think is a wise move. And hey Ken, what infantryman on the ground in Falujah in 04 didnt love having that Bradley in his hip pocket backing him up? Read David Belavia's book "House to House" to get a feel for the importance of firepower and protection even for dismounted infantry forces.

gian

[Ken White]

"Ken: My point about trade-offs was not an argument for building an armor-only force as your post..."

I did not think it was and did not mean to say or imply that you did.

"...suggests when it uses the term branch parochialism.

Not an accusation, merely a possibly unwarranted caution. I do not believe that is your motivation.

"Of course the Army needs an infantry capability. But if the Army is not careful we may wake up one day and look around and see the majority of its combat brigades as infantry with its few remaining mech and armor bcts in the national gaurd. That i do not think is a wise move.

I think that would depend on how many Bdes went where, how it was done -- but I certainly do not think under any circumstances that all the heavy stuff should go to the Guard. We need to keep at least about 9 Heavy Bdes active. I think we also need at least 2 ACRS active and three or four in the Guard.

And hey Ken, what infantryman on the ground in Falujah in 04 didnt love having that Bradley in his hip pocket backing him up?

Actually, my son the Grunt was there at the time and he said Brads were great for crashing through gates. . He also sent me a great pic of an M1A2 resting on its Cupola in a ditch along with an 88 Crew that looked like they'd love to be anywhere else.

"Read David Belavia's book "House to House" to get a feel for the importance of firepower and protection even for dismounted infantry forces.

I will. Having wandered through Seoul and Uijongbu with Tanks to run antisocial types out of town I'm sort of aware of that importance. There's no doubt in my mind that tracks are good things (though I've gotta admit to never having been a Brad fan) and as a former M26 Gunner and M41 TC as one of the world's better Cav Platoon Sergeants, not to mention a Mech Bde Ops SGM who had to teach all the new guys how to drive an M577A2 -- I'm not against the heavy guys at all...

All for 'em, in fact. As you may recall, I agree with you that MCO is and must be the driver, that we need to be proficient at that and that then, oh by the way, we can do stability ops as well as a lesser chore. I hope you now see that I agree with you on the value of Armor. Where we really differ, I believe, is on the subject of how much the Army and its units can do -- I think they are capable of much more than we currently ask of them -- but I do know that to get there, we have to invest in training and that is not a popular thing to fund.

The force structure for the next few years is locked and I'm not going to affect that -- what I wish I could affect is our training -- even though it's better now than it's ever been, we just do not do it as well as we could

[Gian P Gentile]

Ken:

good post; and agree.

I too think a well trained combat outfit can do many, many missions of different types. My point, and this has been beat around pretty well in other threads, is that the most flexible and adaptable combat units are ones trained primarily in the higher end of the fighting spectrum because in that training they would have honed their basic combat skills (regardless if they are infantry, armor, cavalry, etc). What I just said is an ideal, an organizing principle of sorts, and not, NOT a call to stop coin training for units that are deploying so that they can train on hic. But at some point if we are able to wind down in Iraq these questions will start to arise.

The interesting thing about Belavia's book if you get the chance to read it is that he writes from an infantryman's perspective in urban combat and acutally is explicitly dismissive of armor at various points in the book, but when he describes fighting in houses at the end of the engagement there always seems to be a bradley outside either breaking the wall down or pumping rounds wherever needed.

If I had a dollar for your combat experience relative to mine I would be a rich man.

v/r

gian

[Ken White]

In order:

I agree.

I 'll get the book -- or my son the Military historian to be may already have it.

Nah. Different times breed different events, it's all relative. With all mine and a buck, I can get a cup of coffee in a cheap restaurant (which is really bad when one remembers a Nickel a cup in a good restaurant...). What counts is that we both brought back as many as we could, we both care and we're still here to pick on each other and mayhap, some day, buy each other a drink.

[Gian P Gentile]

Ken:

what a nice thing to say!!

your eloquence moved me.

we did bring back as many as we could; and the ones we didnt, well that is the bond that we share.

very respectcully

gian

ps; if you are ever in the new york city area you have an open invite to spend a day with me at west point in the classroom with future lieutenants who you in past times taught and trained.

[BayonetBrant]

I too think a well trained combat outfit can do many, many missions of different types.

Sir,

I wholeheartedly agree. And I think that combat-focused training is starting to lose traction as the 'experts' offer their 'help' to the current leaders charged with executing these wars.

I wonder if at least some of the 'muscle memory' that's ben referred to above is less about the difference between COIN/HIC and as much, or more, about risk aversion. COIN is inherently dangerous work, and it involves exposing yourself to all manner of dangerous possibilities. But COIN can't be successfully accomplished from inside the wire, or outside the wire in brigade-size movements to contact.

Are the leadership today more afraid of appearing on C-SPAN with a well-hones "Yes, Senator. No, Senator" soundtrack than they are of failing at COIN because they were too tentative in their FOB-based approach?

I guess I'm trying to ask if the old habits that die hard aren't more the result of endless 'risk assessments' in training that have more to do with snakebites and heat cramps than with mission failure.

It's easy to justify casualties in HIC - there's a shooting war going on. But it's harder to tell some kid's parents that they were patrolling without body armor on because the local populace were more likely to open up to the soldiers and provide better info to them when they weren't wearing it.

[RTK]

I too think a well trained combat outfit can do many, many missions of different types. My point, and this has been beat around pretty well in other threads, is that the most flexible and adaptable combat units are ones trained primarily in the higher end of the fighting spectrum because in that training they would have honed their basic combat skills (regardless if they are infantry, armor, cavalry, etc). What I just said is an ideal, an organizing principle of sorts, and not, NOT a call to stop coin training for units that are deploying so that they can train on hic. But at some point if we are able to wind down in Iraq these questions will start to arise.

Sir,

I've always thought this was the crux of your argument. It's spot on.

Basics and fundamentals don't change. Their application may, but basic battle drills, action drills, contact drills and reports are the exact same. Dealing with other people in other cultures and our own in the way they should be treated as equals and peers and not in the "I'm-American. I'm- wicked-way-smarter-than-you" methodology we've been known to use
doesn't have to be a battalion training event.

[Cavguy]

I too think a well trained combat outfit can do many, many missions of different types.

I don't think anyone disagrees with this - but - how do we educationally prepare soldiers for full-spectrum ops?

I, like many others, did not feel that the army provided sufficent grounding in COIN basics prior to 2003 as part of our professional military education, and as a result we committed major avoidable errors in tactical COIN 2003-2004.

I think the answer lies more in professional education versus training, as I look back at my OBC and CCC I realize nearly all of it was training. In line units, only three commanders (two BN and one CO) of mine had any regular sort of formal OPD program.

It may be easy to criticize Galula, but I would submit if more officers had read that book as part of a general military education (alongside all other works), we may have created less problems than we ultimately did in OIF.

Niel

[Gian P Gentile]

I don't think anyone disagrees with this - but - how do we educationally prepare soldiers for full-spectrum ops?

I, like many others, did not feel that the army provided sufficent grounding in COIN basics prior to 2003 as part of our professional military education, and as a result we committed major avoidable errors in tactical COIN 2003-2004.

I think the answer lies more in professional education versus training, as I look back at my OBC and CCC I realize nearly all of it was training. In line units, only three commanders (two BN and one CO) of mine had any regular sort of formal OPD program.

It may be easy to criticize Galula, but I would submit if more officers had read that book as part of a general military education (alongside all other works), we may have created less problems than we ultimately did in OIF.

Niel

Niel: right, and now with the operational demands of coin we must train our formations to perform the mission they are getting ready to conduct which means until we ramp-down we must maintain our operational training focus on coin. But as I said that comes at a cost, there is risk involved. Now the Coin advocates response is well, really, so what, because we must win the wars we are in now so don’t worry about the future. I don’t buy that logic, and I think it to be irresponsible. This gets to your question about education. Certainly at places like the Army War College and other defense educational institutions there is an important place for coin, irregular war as subjects for education. But we should not turn these places into Coin Academies where that is all that they do there. Why? Because we must be able to think beyond the current wars in terms of policy and strategy, do otherwise would be to ignore a duty that we have to our elected leaders and the people of the United States.

finally, you and I will never agree on your other points. I think it is just flat-wrong to think counterfactually that if more soldiers had read Galula things would have turned out differently. You cannot prove that anyway. But what I can prove at least through the record as it is given to us from the most recent credible histories written is that the majority of American Army tactical units transitioned quickly to full-spectrum operations and within that were conducting many best practices in coin. Were these capabilities as wide-spread as they were under the Surge? Probably not, but they still were wide-spread and the delta so to speak was not decisive.

Such arguments of "if we had done this or that" are really a big large trope within the american army for trying to fight vietnam all over again in iraq but this time win.

gg

[Cavguy]

Sir,

Understand, but I just think we need to develop a broad based, rigorous "liberal" education for our officers covering the "full spectrum" of warfare.

As of this moment, TRADOC has no such beast or articulation therof - what are our educational learning objectives/standards for our Officers and NCO's? I feel they should have an understanding of the principles of all forms of conflict, supported by broad reading.

Yes, we adapted quicky, but I (along with many observers) think we missed our window in Iraq between April 10 and August 17 (UN Bombing, IIRC). Yes, we "rapidly" adapted tactically, slower operationally. In my view, we did lose whatever chance we had to gain the cooperation of the population in that period, mostly through ignorance of COIN principles. The fact that we learned later doesn't mean that it was okay to not know in the first place. If you read Kalev Sepp's taxonomy of best/worst COIN practices, it largely describes everything we did in 2003-2004.

You do have a point that no amount of better tactics would have fixed the lack of strategic clarity and direction at that time.

Niel

[selil]

I don't think anyone disagrees with this - but - how do we educationally prepare soldiers for full-spectrum ops?

I think the answer lies more in professional education versus training, as I look back at my OBC and CCC I realize nearly all of it was training. In line units, only three commanders (two BN and one CO) of mine had any regular sort of formal OPD program.

Most of what I have seen the Army do is training not education. Training is task oriented while education is concept oriented. There is often a misunderstanding in expectations between the two paradigms. The result is also often the criticism heaped upon academia that what is taught isn't immediately relevant. That is because the educational model creates flexibility to changing environments and adaptability. You educate a student on operating systems not Windows XP. They can then figure out any operating system.

The way you get past limitations in training is you identify the concepts, patterns, and educate troops on those. We often refer to the Army of today as the best, brightest, smartest in history. It may be true that there are officers with doctorates, or multiple masters degrees, but we aren't talking about the outliers. We are talking about the base of the pyramid where the job gets done not talked about.


Well dropping a bunch of superlatives on the deck as evidence does not make it true. A highly trained Army will do specific tasks within that paradigm of training. As a root cause the methods and educational tools used to train soldiers require intensive instruction that is single minded in the execution. That system produces skilled soldiers with silos of training. If you expand that training model you can cross train soldiers through further intensive training and make special operations forces. At some point in time through that model falls apart as we see in the COIN/HIC argument when training resource time runs out.

The problem though is solvable. There is another way but y'all won't like it.

You have to educate soldiers and eradicate the diffidence between academic and military culture. Embrace the scholar soldier and produce thinkers. Then you can educate based on patterns of conflict versus task oriented training. I am not even suggesting you abandon all training. There are specific skills that are required for EVERY soldier and those should be learned. If you want a cross functional Army capable of taking on any mission at any time without large times spent re-training then you will have to change the educational models and expectations.

This is not a discussion of semantics. The vocational training system versus higher education debate has raged for a long time. The result is that thinking, problem solving, risk management, and other thinking strategies are becoming highly sought over. These would be exactly the same skills needed at the root of a fully flexible military branch.

There are a lot more things that could be said but in general the arguments will be around; 1) There isn't enough time in the training cycle (applying the wrong model from the onset); 2) Soldiers aren't that smart (even though they are getting older and more educated, wrong again); 3) We have to train for the fight we have today (again same wrong model as evidence against being prepared); 4) There is no way to integrate that kind of training with the current staff (presupposing the failure based on the inadequacy to develop staff will always fail, but how did we get armor?); 5) Various other similar rebuttals following the same pattern.

The fact is it would be a success, it would work, it has worked in previous conflicts, and as the national education system abandoned liberal arts and social sciences, so did the military drive towards a vocational model that now is seen as a restriction on mission capability.

Put succinctly the abject failure to reform military training to an educational model from a vocational model is a direct and substantial impact on national security capability.