Gloomy US intelligence assessment coming or Let's hear from the spies

[Fuchs]

Karzai can't live in exile "against the will of the CIA?" Please explain what you mean. It sounds like you're suggesting that we threaten him with assassination.

Well, I mean you could.

Force Karzai? With what leverage?

[Entropy]

Well, I mean you could.

The problem with threats used as coercion is that the threats must be credible in the eyes of the one being threatened. Is it really credible for Karzai to believe the US will not only abandon him, but kill him if he doesn't, in effect, become our puppet and then diminish his own authority in Afghanistan? I can't read the man's mind, but I really doubt it.

The second problem with threats is that if Karzai calls the bluff, then you have to be committed to actually carrying them out. So is, the US really prepared to deliver on those threats? No, it isn't.

The third problem with threats is that even if the above conditions are met, the person/country being threatened usually has the capability for some kind of reciprocity. Are we willing to suffer those consequences? Probably not.

This is the fundamental problem with the notion that we can force Pakistan and/or the Karzai government to bend to our will through threats.

[Old Eagle]

I'm not sure what an f-tard is, but I assume it's a legal term because, as I recall, BW is a JD.

BW -- Big point of contention: Intel doesn't lead anywhere. It informs and policy-makers (at the national level) and commanders (in the field) determine what actions will best accomplish their objectives. Classic case study by both academics and practitioners was the gap between intel analyses on how well the war was progressing in Vietnam (not well) and the commanders' assessments of the same topic (turned the corner, light at the end of the tunnel, etc.). In Washington, Pres Johnson reportedly chose commanders' assessments over intel, and in the field, Westmoreland let it be known that he had no use for gloomy intel.

This should come as no surprise. The analyst in the rear has much less on the line than the commander in the field. What happens to commanders who step forward and say, "Things are not going well; I think we're screwing this up."?

Can't wait to see how things play out at Langley now that Brother P is in charge.