Hmm - something we were sidebarring today - if campaigns and operations that fill them out are the physical manifestation of the ways - or the way the "ways" play out on the ground, and they in turn drive the requirements or the "means", then how does doctrine - and I mean doctrine in terms of what is accepted as being appropriate and feasible given a current set of beliefs - beliefs based on recent experience, popular wisdom, or convenience, - drive strategy?

Its a kind of back door manner of doctrine driving strategy I guess - maybe it happens without us really even realizing it. I may regret going down this road, but I was reading one of the blog posts where COL Gentile asked Niel to imagine a different way of achieving stated objectives in AfPak. In fact the whole GG debate is worth considering in this light (which to be fair is I think the thrust of his argument)

I tend to agree that there is the way we describe the relationship of strategy to doctrine (and to operations and tactics), which is one we can articulate and teach, one that suits our our need to order; but I also believe that description is subject to influences we either don't acknowledge or discount because it would force us to re-examine things we'd rather not.

This is why I thought Ken's observation on the relationship between strategy and doctrine was valuable, it acknowledges the requirement to at least re-examine the strategy and the ideas which support it, and be self critical. Otherwise no matter what the equation, the sum always = the same. I suppose then that is where I come down, it fits with my thoughts on the relationship between requirements and capabilities.

I find myself thinking more and more about Marc's comments about how we form our perception of reality and how we often avoid challenging it, how we defend it, etc.

Best, Rob