Small War on Basilan (catch all)

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Dayuhan,

I also think it would be a good idea to state, bluntly and publicly, that in our opinion we've done all we can, and that ultimately this insurgency is driven not by AQ or international extremism, but by governance issues that can only resolved by the Philippine government.

Two points, first I am in general agreement with your comment above as truth today; however, there were some ties to AQ (very loose) previously, and of JI played a role due to their regional ambitions.

I have to disagree with your comments that the JSOTF didn't impact good governance at the local level. By no means am I implying that corruption doesn't exist, but the relationship between the security forces and the locals have a much better relationship in many locations. That isn't true in Southern Basilan and at least one other location in the Sulu Archipelago, but it is true for many regions. Having watched that unfold over the years to me it is self evident, to others it may not be. You can argue correctly that alone isn't enough and you would be correct, but while uneven much progress has been made. I suspect we can't make much more progress with our current approach, and it is up to the Filipinos, or sadly it ups to the Government of the Philippines.

[jcustis]

I sponsored a Philippine Marine Corps Marine for a year at a PME school, and he stated that yes, logistics and technical support (e.g. FLIR-equipped helicopters) was what the AFP needed, not the will to fight.

ETA: It seems as those violence is on the uptick, with seven soldiers reported killed on follow-on fighting/attacks.

[Dayuhan]

here were some ties to AQ (very loose) previously, and of JI played a role due to their regional ambitions.

There were ties between AQ and the ASG, but borrowing a leaf from the gospel according to Robert C Jones I'd point out that the insurgency existed long before the ASG and will probably exist long after it. The ASG is probably best understood as a failed attempt by AQ to leverage the conditions supporting insurgency and to fill the leadership void left when the MNLF leadership reached various accommodations with the government. Both AQ and JI have tried to use the pre-existing conditions to their advantage, with varying levels of success, but they're not driving the insurgency, they're riding on it.

I have to disagree with your comments that the JSOTF didn't impact good governance at the local level. By no means am I implying that corruption doesn't exist, but the relationship between the security forces and the locals have a much better relationship in many locations. That isn't true in Southern Basilan and at least one other location in the Sulu Archipelago, but it is true for many regions. Having watched that unfold over the years to me it is self evident, to others it may not be. You can argue correctly that alone isn't enough and you would be correct, but while uneven much progress has been made. I suspect we can't make much more progress with our current approach, and it is up to the Filipinos, or sadly it ups to the Government of the Philippines.

Good governance and relations between security forces and the populace are two different things. In terms of governance, the dominant clans are still very much in control, and those leopards have not changed their spots. They may be adopting a somewhat less egregious pattern of corruption and abuse for the time being but they are still in it for themselves and they will still do what's required to keep themselves in power and in the money. I don't think there's been any change that will be sustained for any length of time.

Relations between security forces and the populace have improved to some extent. They could hardly have gotten worse. By 2001/2002 the security forces were in the awkward position of being mistrusted and resented by both sides. The Christian population was up in arms at the universally held perception that the security forces were colluding with the ASG, sharing ransoms and other profits. The Muslim populace knew, as they've known all along, that the government was the enemy. I think they still know that. They may not think it's the right time to take the enemy on, except in the rare times and places when they have the advantage, but the knowledge is still there.

Things are quieter, but these cycles have come and gone before. Whether or not this will last will only be known after we leave. I'm not at all optimistic. I don't see any evidence that there's been any fundamental or lasting changes in the aims or methods of any of the players.

I still think the Tausug/Yakan insurgency is primed to take off again. The only question is what sort of identity it will take... an MILF that learns to bridge the gap between the Maguindanao/Maranao leadership and the Tausug/Yakan populace, or a renewed, back-to-basics offshoot of the ASG, or an MNLF revival, or something completely different. Time will tell.

[Bob's World]

I am with both Bill and Dayuhan on this. Yes, JSOTF-P has made a marked influence on HOW the security forces of the Philippines engage the general populace that they encounter in the course of their duties in a very positive way. The reason this is creating what is likely an enduring effect is because the security forces have been pleasantly surprised that by treating the populace with respect and dignity and by infusing greater justice into their implementation of the rule of law they encounter far less violence directed against them.

Also, the security forces are in many ways the only physical manifestation of the central governance down at the local level. So, in about 300 years this should have spread and elevated up to where it actually has an impact on the primary source of the problem up in Manila. A good program with good effects, but not a program that has any hope of actually addressing the true problems in the Philippines. As I said, same same for VSO, ALP and the Commandos in Afghanistan.

We delude ourselves with unsubstantiated theories of "bottom up" legitimacy and good governance. The anti-bodies projected downward from the central governance (that we too often refuse to engage at the strategic - policy level) prevent any true change from occurring.

As Dayuhan often, and accurately points out, it is the elite, the landowner caste, etc who project and sustain the system that promotes so much discontent, not the government. Same was true in the American South. It was not the federal government that was oppressing the African American populace, it was an overall accepted culture of oppression, primarily projected from local level officials, business, etc. But it was by implementing change at the very top and enforcing those changes throughout the system that put us on the path toward stability.

The same will be true in the Philippines, and the same will be true in Afghanistan. Too bad we have a policy of no true engagement at that level for fear that those governments will not support perceptions of US interests that are the true reason for our presence in the first place. Those interests having very little to do with nationalist insurgencies in either case. Until then, we keep sending out the troops to mitigate the symptoms at the bottom, and attempt to convince ourselves that we are actually addressing the true problem and producing enduring good for the affected populaces and nations of such engagement. There is little evidence of that being the case.

[Bill Moore]

Dayuhan,

Good governance and relations between security forces and the populace are two different things. In terms of governance, the dominant clans are still very much in control, and those leopards have not changed their spots.

A State's security forces are an element of governance, so I disagree that good relations between a State's security forces and its populace are not good governance, but I do agree with your last part of your comment.

Bob's World,

The same will be true in the Philippines, and the same will be true in Afghanistan. Too bad we have a policy of no true engagement at that level for fear that those governments will not support perceptions of US interests that are the true reason for our presence in the first place. Those interests having very little to do with nationalist insurgencies in either case. Until then, we keep sending out the troops to mitigate the symptoms at the bottom, and attempt to convince ourselves that we are actually addressing the true problem and producing enduring good for the affected populaces and nations of such engagement. There is little evidence of that being the case.

We claim to follow a 3D approach (Diplomacy, Defense, and Development), and I guess that is true, but these three approaches are still largely stove piped efforts that are occassionally fused at the tactical level due to the initiative of the action agents on point, but at the strategic level we're still drifting aimlessly. You are absolutely right that we all too often default to bottom up solutions by focusing on solving the problem with security forces, and these are problems that can't be resolved by security forces.

We not only need to reform our security cooperation/security assistance programs so we can cost effectively help produce capable security forces, we also need to revamp our strategy development and planning efforts that operationalize those strategies so we truly put first things first and put the military in a supporting role, instead of a decisive role, but I suspect that won't happen anytime soon.

[Dayuhan]

Yes, JSOTF-P has made a marked influence on HOW the security forces of the Philippines engage the general populace that they encounter in the course of their duties in a very positive way. The reason this is creating what is likely an enduring effect is because the security forces have been pleasantly surprised that by treating the populace with respect and dignity and by infusing greater justice into their implementation of the rule of law they encounter far less violence directed against them.

Interesting, though, that this supposed attitude change doesn't seem to be reflected in other parts of the country, even where troops have moved in that were previously stationed in Basilan and Jolo. Obviously we won't know whether there's been a long-term change until we leave, but I'm a good deal less optimistic than some. We'll see.

So, in about 300 years this should have spread and elevated up to where it actually has an impact on the primary source of the problem up in Manila...

We delude ourselves with unsubstantiated theories of "bottom up" legitimacy and good governance. The anti-bodies projected downward from the central governance (that we too often refuse to engage at the strategic - policy level) prevent any true change from occurring.

As Dayuhan often, and accurately points out, it is the elite, the landowner caste, etc who project and sustain the system that promotes so much discontent, not the government. Same was true in the American South. It was not the federal government that was oppressing the African American populace, it was an overall accepted culture of oppression, primarily projected from local level officials, business, etc. But it was by implementing change at the very top and enforcing those changes throughout the system that put us on the path toward stability.

What I think you're missing here is that the local elites control the Manila government. They dominate the legislature and virtually everyone in the executive and judicial branches has their roots in that class. They're good at talking about reform, making a gesture here and there, and making very sure that any program threatening their power never gets off the ground. They also tend to stick together. Once in a while someone will become a liability and be tossed to the sharks, but for the most part they close ranks against any effort to diminish their power or bring them within the rule of law. They're generally pretty effective at it.

I think in the case of the American south you may be glossing over some things. The moves from the top didn't emerge from a vacuum and they weren't initiated from the top. They were a response to a whole lot of agitation from Americans who found that old order unacceptable. The moves came from the top, but they came because of pressure from the bottom.

One thing that makes the southern Philippines insurgency so intractable is that the majority populace lines up strongly on the side of an aggressive, repressive military response. If anything the Government is more inclined toward accommodation. The majority populace doesn't want to talk about root causes, they want to crush the rebellion and beat the rebel populace into submission.

Too bad we have a policy of no true engagement at that level for fear that those governments will not support perceptions of US interests that are the true reason for our presence in the first place. Those interests having very little to do with nationalist insurgencies in either case. Until then, we keep sending out the troops to mitigate the symptoms at the bottom, and attempt to convince ourselves that we are actually addressing the true problem and producing enduring good for the affected populaces and nations of such engagement. There is little evidence of that being the case.

Again, I don't think any level of US engagement is going to matter much. It's really not about us.

[Bob's World]

What I think you're missing here is that the local elites control the Manila government. They dominate the legislature and virtually everyone in the executive and judicial branches has their roots in that class. They're good at talking about reform, making a gesture here and there, and making very sure that any program threatening their power never gets off the ground. They also tend to stick together. Once in a while someone will become a liability and be tossed to the sharks, but for the most part they close ranks against any effort to diminish their power or bring them within the rule of law. They're generally pretty effective at it.

I think in the case of the American south you may be glossing over some things. The moves from the top didn't emerge from a vacuum and they weren't initiated from the top. They were a response to a whole lot of agitation from Americans who found that old order unacceptable. The moves came from the top, but they came because of pressure from the bottom.

Of course there was "pressure from the bottom." That is the essence of insurgency. Sometimes it is primarily illegal and violent; sometimes it is primarily illegal and non-violent; usually it is some mix of legal and illegal, violent and non-violent approaches that ultimately lead to change.

But if you don't think local elites have a major impact on US politics, you haven't been paying attention. This is true in every country to some degree, and in a country with any form of republican democracy it is very true and significant. Lyndon Johnson showed tremendous selfless moral courage in ignoring what all of the polls, advisors, and his own political instincts were warning him about what would happen to his political career if he insisted on pushing for civil rights reforms, but in the face of all of that, push he did. Many experts believe that it was this, far more than the nature of events in Vietnam, that was the primary factor in his decision not to run for a second term. The three landmark civil rights bills that he pushed through congress changed America forever and for better. It all looks so benign and obvious now in retrospect, but at the time it was HUGE, not obvious at all, and stirred up tremendous turmoil.

As information technology continues to empower populaces and non-state actors there will be increasing demand for political elites and their backers to take note of what the people are telling them and to actually address reasonable concerns that they may well have been ignoring and suppressing for generations or even centuries. The tide is turning. Those governments who recognize this and evolve will prevail and endure; those who think that they are somehow immune to this powerful dynamic will ultimately implode. Even those that may seem so stable on the surface today. The signs are there for those who are willing to pause and read them.

The instinct of most such governments is to double-down on internal security and intel in an effort to suppress the growing resistance. While this can have a very real temporary effect on suppressing the symptoms, it at the same time exacerbates the root causes, and makes the problem worse. Inevitably at some point this approach collapses.

Americans may well cheer when a Qaddafi is dragged from a sewer pipe and riddled with bullets. Will they cheer as loudly when these scenes are of leaders we see as critical allies?? Just as national leaders must evolve and be more in tune to their populaces as a whole (and not just the traditional powerful elite), so too must powerful nations that may well be stable at home be more in tune to such perceptions among the populaces of the nations we engage with and rely upon for economic or security interests that we perceive as vital.

The world is evolving at an unprecedented rate on the back of technology. Those governments who are willing to evolve with it will prevail. Those who cling dogmatically to the status quo will struggle or fail.

[Dayuhan]

But if you don't think local elites have a major impact on US politics, you haven't been paying attention. This is true in every country to some degree, and in a country with any form of republican democracy it is very true and significant.

I think you're missing the matter of degree. Philippine local elites don't "have a major impact" on policy, they control it. They don't influence the government, they are the government Imagine a place in the US where local elites can fix an election to the point where the non-preferred candidate gets zero votes and votes for the preferred candidate exceed the number of voters, or where supporters of opposing candidates can be beaten or killed without legal repercussions, where the local elites control virtually every form of economic enterprise and openly treat the public coffers as a private account. Can you imagine an American town where citizens line up in the Mayor's parlor to beg for the favors funded with public money, while someone sits by taking note of who gets what so the favors can be called in later?

Lyndon Johnson showed tremendous selfless moral courage in ignoring what all of the polls, advisors, and his own political instincts were warning him about what would happen to his political career if he insisted on pushing for civil rights reforms, but in the face of all of that, push he did. Many experts believe that it was this, far more than the nature of events in Vietnam, that was the primary factor in his decision not to run for a second term. The three landmark civil rights bills that he pushed through congress changed America forever and for better. It all looks so benign and obvious now in retrospect, but at the time it was HUGE, not obvious at all, and stirred up tremendous turmoil.

Yes, it was huge... but again, there was real support for reform from a large part of the populace, including a large part of the populace outside the group that was being discriminated against. That supported a good deal of the moral courage. You don't see Christian Filipinos in Manila demanding fair treatment for their Muslim brothers in Mindanao. The attitude is more on the "kill 'em all" side. There's virtually no constituency supporting moral courage, and a huge constituency opposing it.

As information technology continues to empower populaces and non-state actors there will be increasing demand for political elites and their backers to take note of what the people are telling them and to actually address reasonable concerns that they may well have been ignoring and suppressing for generations or even centuries. The tide is turning. Those governments who recognize this and evolve will prevail and endure; those who think that they are somehow immune to this powerful dynamic will ultimately implode. Even those that may seem so stable on the surface today. The signs are there for those who are willing to pause and read them.

I think the impact of information technology is overrated. It's a tool and people will use it, take it away and they'll use other tools. There were revolutions before it hit - ask the Marcos family - and they managed to communicate. Certainly facebook and twitter mean squat on Basilan, and they aren't rallying any support in Manila either.

Again, if Filipino political elites "take note of what people are telling them" about Mindanao, the repression will only get worse, because the bulk of the populace doesn't want concessions or reform.

Americans may well cheer when a Qaddafi is dragged from a sewer pipe and riddled with bullets. Will they cheer as loudly when these scenes are of leaders we see as critical allies??

Hosni Mubarak was a "critical ally", and Americans seem able to cope with him being in jail. Egyptians seem reasonably amenable to a continuing relationship with the US. These situations are not unmanageable, especially if we let go when it matters.

Just as national leaders must evolve and be more in tune to their populaces as a whole (and not just the traditional powerful elite), so too must powerful nations that may well be stable at home be more in tune to such perceptions among the populaces of the nations we engage with and rely upon for economic or security interests that we perceive as vital.

The world is evolving at an unprecedented rate on the back of technology. Those governments who are willing to evolve with it will prevail. Those who cling dogmatically to the status quo will struggle or fail.

In many ways yes, we have to be more attuned to populaces as a whole. That includes being aware that most populaces don't want us interfering in the internal affairs of their nations, at all. Responding to situations and trying to help populaces that have decided it's time to move is one thing, and there's a place for it. Trying to initiate change ourselves or trying to appoint ourselves champion of a populace is a very different thing and it's not generally going to be advisable. In most of these cases it really isn't about us, and we have to accept that we are not going to be the drivers of evolution, in the Philippines and in most other places.

[ganulv]

Can you imagine an American town where citizens line up in the Mayor's parlor to beg for the favors funded with public money, while someone sits by taking note of who gets what so the favors can be called in later?

I’m not an insider, but isn’t this more or less how campaign finance works in the United States? I know more than one person who spent years trying to jump through the hoops leading to a green card to find that they all disappeared once they made a donation to their Representative. And they are small, small potatoes in the finance pot.

Not discounting that the Philippines and the U.S. are categorically different places, by the way.