Haven't we had this discussion before?Did we learn anything new?
Just thinking that some of the SWC discussion recently has been running in circles. Seems like we need a new COL Gentile to come in here and at least challenge the two-sided orthodoxy (COIN vs. MCO) in a unique and stimulating way other than saying we just need to do both.
BTW, some pithy humor over at Abu M related to the thread:
P.S. It's not all sticks and stones for Gian, though. Granted, a site called "AntiWar.com" is probably not the best place to go for sober-minded discussion of military strategy. And this line was a peach:
It really shouldn’t be a surprise, that members of the elite news media — particularly the ones who don’t necessarily focus on a national security beat — fasten easily onto the conventional narrative and "move on" condescendingly, satisfied their knowledge is au courant and complete. ... To the rest of the world, the mainstream media included, Col. Gentile is kind of a ghost.
Uh, ma'am, Gian was the subject of a prominent article by elite news media journalist Yochi Dreazen (C '99) in the elite news media Wall Street Journal. I don't know a single defense policy journalist for a major U.S. news organization who doesn't know Gian either by name or personally. And for goodness sake, just do a Google News search for Gian's name. But when, I want to know, is regular Abu Muqawama commenter SNLII going to get the credit he deserves for coming up with the phrase "COINdinista"? Is there no justice, AntiWar.com?
To my mind there never was a COIN v Something else debate. I can't speak for COL Gentile, but I don't think anyone has ever spoken against COIN. They spoken about biasing training and resources so heavily towards COIN (Security Operations) that Combat Operations skills and resources suffer.Originally Posted by Cavguy
Haven't we had this discussion before?
Just thinking that some of the SWC discussion recently has been running in circles. Seems like we need a new COL Gentile to come in here and at least challenge the two-sided orthodoxy (COIN vs. MCO) in a unique and stimulating way other than saying we just need to do both.
Add to that the perversion of the "Security mission" into a "nation building mission" and I think you have still think there is a lot left unresolved.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
I was going to say "Reality is SO bo-o-ring..."
However, Wilf came in with "there's a lot left unresolved." True but there always will be as long as there more than two people in the debate.
What does not need resolution is that we do have to be able to do both (which may be why so many say that we need to do that...) and that's not nearly as hard as some seem to think. We have the doctrine (not perfect but adequate), we have smart dedicated kids that are willing for the most part to do more than they are asked -- they're also able to do much more. We have the equipment. All we need is the training piece and that's better than it's ever been and is improving.
Now we just have to (a) await the QDR and see what it brings; and (b) see if Congress gets a lot smarter and more concerned about their Oaths than they seem to be...
What's the problem?
Wilf,
I've stated this about ten times on other similar threads but it bears repeating to your observations.
Much of what COL G is saying is true, but what I am about to say is true as well -
Our TRAINING and OPERATIONAL forces are near 100% focused on COIN/SO/SFA. That is because the Army is fully committed to OIF and OEF for at least the next 2 years. It is irresponsible not to train them for the environments they are directly heading to.
Our LEADER DEVELOPMENT and EDUCATION has not significantly changed. Tweaked, but not changed. You can find numerous observations here on SWJ and on BCKS commenting about that our schoolhouses are generally focused on HIC.
I have a paper which will be published in a few months outlining the whole case, but the bottom line is that COIN is not currently mandated or integrated as a subject of military professional education. The educational system is a greater threat because right now it leads us to a repeat of our 1973-2003 educational deficit for this spectrum of war.
So in a sense, Gian is right, but so are many of the COIN crowd in stating that the institution has not changed for the long term. As soon as we have non-deploying combat brigades, HIC skills will resurrect.
Niel
Anybody else find irony in the fact that "antiwar.com" is defending MCO?
I also found that funny-ironic that AntiWar.com was wading into that side the pool, along with the perception that the Army is marching together under a "Somos COINdinistas" banner with COL Gentile as the lone, John the Baptist-esque voice in the wilderness.
Am I missing something or just confused about the part of the argument charging that COIN proponents want to go around the world nation-building, a la Thomas PM Barnett's expeditionary "leviathan"? Isn't the basic argument of Drs. Nagl/Kilcullen that doing so isn't the business we should want to be in, but that since we're in a COIN fight on two fronts we should focus on getting it right? I don't think I've read anything by either of those men saying otherwise, but I'm interested to know if there is something out there along those line that I hadn't seen or heard.
Actually the US is more accurately conducting "Post-regime change FID" on two fronts. My term, but it seems pretty accurate. (COIN is something that a Nation's government does to deal with its own internal insurgency.)
To add to our confusion, many think not only that we are doing COIN, but also that the recipe for COIN is one part "Defeat the Insurgent," one part "Defeat the Ideology," and two parts "Create Effective Democratic Governance."
Since we are not the cooks in this kitchen, but merely advising and assisting, we should at least start by making sure we have the right recipe:
One part "understand the populace and what the issues are (real or perceived) that makes them susceptible to ideological inspiration (tailored for taste across the nation),"
one part "help fix that part of the government that is failing to adequately address those particular issues, ensuring that the populace is allowed full self-determination, with the only caveat being that whatever system is adopted must provide that same populace with the absolute certainty that it has legitimate recourse to address any such failures in the future short of violent insurgency"
one part "ensure your own narrative for your involvement not only matches your principles and your actions, but also facilitates avoiding as much as possible the perception that you are now the source of legitimacy of this failed government, but are instead an ally of the populace representing them first, over whomever happens to be in office,"
and one part "help create a secure environment, with emphasis on host nation security capacity enabled as necessary."
Once we get out of the mode we are in and adopt a “smarter” application of power, we will probably find that we no longer need to convert the entire force to the conduct of such operations, or to create an equivalent civilian corps for the same. A small force can enable a large one if it is applying the right recipe and knows what its doing; and there are plenty of civilians looking for work right there at ground zero. No need to import many of ours.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
found helpful information
Good post, Bob
Smack on the target...
Thank you
The only COIN the USG does is internal anti-gang,terrorism, etc...
I've been banging my head against the wall trying to consider why we don't consider this fact. We can assist other governments (SFA, FID, IW); We can force regime change (UW, HIC), but what we are doing in Iraq and Afghanistan is occupation.
I simply don't understand why that is hard to grasp. Occupation is neither good nor bad. It is just a word. What we must determine in our grand strategy is if we want to be an empire or not. That, IMHO is the elephant in the room that no one talks about.
v/r
Mike
I'm currently a student at the Field Artillery Captain's Career Course.
Last week, I was tasked to give a class on The Mobile Defense (division level operation).
This week, I called for Fire (with ICM i/e) on a BMP-1 in the Guardfist.
HIC is alive and well here at Fort Sill. I'm not saying there is anything wrong with that; but you are correct, sir.
However, tomorrow we start on chapters 1-4 in FM 3-24. Our first COIN class since we started two months ago.
Last edited by jkm_101_fso; 05-08-2009 at 04:36 AM.
Sir, what the hell are we doing?
Learn your trade first, redleg
Become the very best artilleryman you can possibly be first, because if asked to support COIN operations someday the speed and accuracy of how well you can do that will be far more important than how well you understand the process that went into developing the target that you are shooting at.
That said, never limit your own professional development by the limits of your profession. As a former Artilleryman who spent most of his conventional career in the Infantry, I can tell you, that most artillerymen just don't understand maneuver, but more dangerously, think that they do. I suspect many will walk out of Ft Sill thinking they understand COIN. Understand your role in COIN and that you don't fully understand the nuances of it and you will do fine. Study on your own to be as capable as possible. Or, do like I did and go straight from Sill to Bragg, I walked of the stage at Sill as the honor grad, and then went straight to selection and never looked back. That knowledge has served me well over the years.
The Field Artillery is facing hard times these days, but someday we will need it again in spades, and we'll need an artillery that can once again reign as the greatest killer on the battlefield. Don't lose that. Don't let your profession lose that.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
If you spray painted that mothers head-stone, I'd still buy you a beer. Well said Sir.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Sir,
I appreciate the advice and Prof Dev. To say that my artillery skills were degraded when I arrived here would be an understatement. I was very glad to refresh on gunnery and FS. In fact, the schoolhouse is implementing a "reset" block dedicated to correct degraded artillery skills for junior officers in CCC. It added a month to CCC, but I think it's probably worth it. More importantly, they are concentrating on teaching us "how" to train our redlegs when we get back to the force. I also think we are slowly moving away from "cram for this, take the test and then forget it" mentality.
There are plenty of folks here that think they are COIN experts. But mainly it's students. The instructors are a bit antiquated, just because they have not been to theater lately; not their fault. As mentioned, the culture has changed in the school somewhat to: "Here is a method of doing things and here some examples; but it's up to YOU to make decisions." I am glad this change has occured.
What the CCC doesn't teach, I try to make up for by hanging out on here and reading as much as I can. It is apparent that the FA is having somewhat of an identity crisis. We've picked up IO, EW and are concentrating on precision munitions to stay relevant. But you are right, we will be needed someday again. And contrary to popular belief we ARE shooting in AFG and a little bit in Iraq.
Funny story, I tried to access SWC on the computers in the schoolhouse library and the site was blocked. I marched down to the S-6 dudes and demanded they unblock this site. I was kind of disappointed, because that means that of all the Captains and LTs (and field grades) that have come through Snow Hall at some point, no one was interested enough to access SWC during their downtime at school. But the block was lifted, thankfully. I've tried to spread the word to my classmates about SWC.
Oddly, when assignments came down last week, there were NO slots for Bragg, Campbell or Lewis. Needless to say, getting back to the light world will be pretty competitive, but I'll do my best. Thanks again,
Jake
Sir, what the hell are we doing?
Cav mate, thanks and I do get this.
I have no dog in this fight, except as a critic of the abuse of history and military thought, and your concern about the education system is clear and valid.
However, what would concern me is if COIN (The Security Mission) was deemed to a separate or special area requiring some special insight or education.
I submit it is not, and I further submit that the COIN-club are pushing that it is.
Everything we know about War and Conflict flows seamlessly between the combat mission and the security mission. They are one and the same, or two sides of the same coin (pardon the pun).
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Maybe you should take a stab at it...Haven't we had this discussion before?
Just thinking that some of the SWC discussion recently has been running in circles. Seems like we need a new COL Gentile to come in here and at least challenge the two-sided orthodoxy (COIN vs. MCO) in a unique and stimulating way other than saying we just need to do both.
I look at it from the historical standpoint, and it's discouraging to note that the bi-polar orthodoxy has existed in American military history more or less from the beginning. It's also discouraging to note that many truly adaptable leaders within the army have been historically ignored or marginalized in many cases (I'm thinking mainly of the post-Civil War period, which was a great testing ground to see who could make the transition from MCO to what was effectively COIN, although there are other periods that certainly deserve study).
One good first step would involve overhauling the personnel system. Until we scrap that draft-age relic I'd say we're stuck tilting at the same windmills to at least some degree.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Yes.
Thank you, thank you...
At Risk to Rank and Pay ~
"Large portions (not all) of the US COIN-club approach is "history free." They know it exists, but ignore the bits they want to invent and change the bits they need as evidence. What is more a great many of the COIN clubs' assertions about the future, past and present are wonderfully evidence free. "
(WF Owen)
-maybe then that's to say the COIN principle of talent being gleaned from anywhere regardless of rank is either a myth or incapable of being implemented without fracturing the chain of command. How much spontaneity can there be in a combat zone? MikeF asserts there are no human terrain teams, only people. If true, it is a two edged sword, applicable to both camps. What price is paid for spontaneity? What is the reward? The reflection of history shows a lot of dead bodies stemming from fractures in the COC. I don't have a clue as to how much at the small unit level has to 'go up' before there is movement on the part of the small unit in either theatre.
A couple of comments...
1. Any "COIN" lessons learned in Iraq should have a astrix next to them, just like a Barry Bonds homerun record. Good lessons, but you just don't want to confuse them with truly understanding COIN, or contributing to truly understanding COIN
2. History is indeed critical to understanding COIN, but anyone who limits that study to just the insurgencies of the past 100 years or so won't draw a full perspective. In fact, anyone who just studies conflicts over thousands of years won't have a true perspective. COIN is about governance and human dynamics, and the conflict aspect of it is just the one very blaring, but small slice that we focus on. Look deeper to understand the root causes, and through that, not the study of tactics used to "defeat" insurgents will one find the true keys to putting to rest an insurgency.
3. Some Empires die in a blaze of glory with grand conventional fights. Others, like the British Empire, die a death of a thousand cuts, through a series of lost COIN campaigns due largely to the misconception that military might and the ability to exert ones will on another means anything in COIN.
4. Do study history, but make it as comprehensive as you can, or the lessons you draw may be false ones.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
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