Pakistan: Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) - a collection

[davidbfpo]

Hamid Hussain our regular contributor has written a short paper 'The Beginnings – Early Days of Intelligence in Pakistan' and is attached.

Fascinating to see an Australian soldier played such a role; the Notes do have a link to his on-line biography. I was aware that a British General Gracey served as the first Army CinC, but not that an Australian general was Chief of Staff.

[Dayuhan]

Fascinating to see an Australian soldier played such a role; the Notes do have a link to his on-line biography. I was aware that a British General Gracey served as the first Army CinC, but not that an Australian general was Chief of Staff.

I believe the same General, Dougles Gracey, commanded the British expeditionary force that took control of Saigon at the close of WW2, and played a pivotal role in the restoration of French rule. He had a hand in a fair bit of history, though I don't suppose we should blame him for the outcomes.

[davidbfpo]

I believe the same General, Dougles Gracey, commanded the British expeditionary force that took control of Saigon at the close of WW2, and played a pivotal role in the restoration of French rule. He had a hand in a fair bit of history, though I don't suppose we should blame him for the outcomes.

Dayuhan,

Yes General Gracey took his Indian Army division to Saigon in 1945, which IIRC has a mention / debate elsewhere here and it is a complicated period of history. The division then went to the Dutch East Indies (to become Indonesia) and had its toughest ever fighting against the nationalists, with some unofficial Japanese help (deserters and weapons) at the port of Surabayu (?). There is a good book on the Saigon episode, The First Indo-China War by Peter Dunn, pub. 1985 (which has disappeared from my bookshelves) and on:http://www.amazon.com/First-Vietnam-...5879757&sr=1-4

[davidbfpo]

Owen Bennett-Jones, a BBC SME on South Asia, has a short article reviewing Pakistani national security as ISI gets a new Director:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-29903400

He starts with:

When he takes over the intelligence service ISI, Lt Gen Rizwan Akhtar will become one of the two most powerful men in Pakistan, answerable only to the army chief.

Moderator's Note

This thread has been re-named to reflect the merging of three threads and that it is a collection on ISI (ends).

[blueblood]

When he takes over the intelligence service ISI, Lt Gen Rizwan Akhtar will become one of the two most powerful men in Pakistan, answerable only to the army chief.

I don't think that this the case. Both Army chief and ISI director are independently powerful and neither report to each other. Case and point, Kargil fiasco and the 1999 coup.

Ziauddin has served as Director-General of Pakistan's premier intelligence agency ISI. He was nominated for the post of Pakistan Army chief on 12 Oct 1999 by then-Prime minister Nawaz Sharif after the dismissal of General Pervez Musharraf, who had begun a coup against the government.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ziauddin_Butt



Also, here's a discussion between Hamid Mir and Indian journalists. Couldn't find the relevant section so I am posting it here.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tMn6otJ0VP4

[davidbfpo]

This passage is taken from a long, five page commentary (on the main thread for the Pakistani Army, see Post 120 on:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...?t=8282&page=6 )

General Rizwan Akhtar was commissioned into the 4th Frontier Force Regiment. He is considered a good officer by his peers. His career is also typical of senior officers reaching Lieutenant General rank with usual command, staff and instructional appointments. He commanded the 27th Infantry brigade of the 7th Infantry Division from 2005-07. However, all North Waziristan formations were essentially restricted to their posts and there were no offensive operations. The Army was busy cleaning the South Waziristan and the swamps of North Waziristan were rapidly filling with alligators of all shapes and hues. The Army high command was simply reacting to events on the ground with the result that it lost the support of local population in tribal areas. In 2011-12, he was GOC of the 9th Division operating in South Waziristan. He was Director General (DG) of the Sindh Rangers in 2012-14 and involved in the clean-up operation against criminal elements in the city of Karachi. In October 2014, he was promoted to Lieutenant General rank and appointed DGISI. In 2005 as Brigade commander in North Waziristan, he prepared a detailed report about the threats emanating from North Waziristan and response options. In 2008, while at the US Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, Rizwan wrote his course paper on the U.S.-Pakistan trust deficit and the war on terror. He made several recommendations on how to bridge the gap in trust between Pakistan and the USA. Now as DGISI, his position enables him to address both these issues – only time will tell how successful he will be in this endeavor.

[davidbfpo]

Taken from a short obituary of Major General Ihtisham Zamir Jafri, who passed away in Rawalpindi on 04 May, 2015, by hamid Hussain (SWC contributor):

His most important assignment was when he was Deputy Director of Internal Security wing of Counter Intelligence (CI) section of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) from 2001 to 2003. In the aftermath of 11 September, 2001, relation between ISI and CIA was revived on an urgent basis. Ihtisham as DDG Internal Security played an important role in the capture of many high profile foreign terrorists. He was clear in his mind about the threat faced by Pakistan and at that time period ISI was operating in full gear against al-Qaeda. Robert Grenier was then CIA station chief of Islamabad. Deputy station chief was an old Afghan hand with firsthand knowledge of the region and he made a great team with Ihtisham. All the technical data collected by CIA from a variety of sources about specific targets was shared with ISI team in Islamabad. This was then passed on to the provincial heads of ISI in each province. Local intelligence teams further investigated initiated surveillance and then conducted raids to arrest culprits.

This good relationship that lasted for a short period was due to the fact that at that time United States was only interested in al-Qaeda and focus was only on foreign fighters. Any local fish caught in the net were simply handed over to Pakistanis to take care of them while foreigners were transported o Bagram air base with onward journey to Guantanamo Bay prison. American foot print in Afghanistan was limited to few dozen CIA paramilitary and Special Forces troops and Haqqani network and Lashkar-e-Taiba were somewhere in future. In his memoirs, Grenier didn’t use Ihtisham’s name due to personal security risk but now that Ihtisham has left the world, he doesn’t need to be anonymous. Grenier used a pseudo name of “Imran Zaman” using initials of I for Ihtesham and Z for Zamir.